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Foreword 
Background to this Inquiry 
On 20 November 2013, the Treasurer, the Hon. Joe Hockey MP, released a draft terms 
of reference for the Financial System Inquiry (the Inquiry) for consultation with 
interested stakeholders.  
After completing this consultation process on 20 December 2013, the Treasurer 
released a final terms of reference (at Appendix 1) and appointed a Committee, 
independent of Government, to undertake this task. The Committee comprises: 
• Mr David Murray AO (chair) 
• Professor Kevin Davis 
• Mr Craig Dunn 
• Ms Carolyn Hewson AO 
• Dr Brian McNamee AO 
The Committee is charged with examining how the financial system could be 
positioned to best meet Australia’s evolving needs and support Australia’s economic 
growth.  
In March 2014, the Treasurer also appointed an International Advisory Panel (the 
Panel) to provide an expert international perspective on issues relevant to the Inquiry. 
The Panel comprises: Sir Michael Hintze AM (London), Dr David Morgan AO 
(London), Ms Jennifer Nason (New York) and Mr Andrew Sheng (Hong Kong).  
The Treasurer tasked the Committee with producing an Interim Report for 
consultation with stakeholders in mid-2014, before providing a Final Report in 
November 2014. 
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Consultation 
The Inquiry has taken a consultative approach to its task. Submissions for a first round 
of consultations, based on the Terms of Reference, opened on 30 January 2014 and 
closed on 31 March 2014. As part of this process, the Inquiry received over 280 
submissions. Appendix 3 provides a list of stakeholders who lodged first round 
submissions. 
In addition, the Inquiry has participated in more than 100 meetings with interested 
stakeholders to gather information, seek alternative perspectives and discuss policy 
issues in depth. This included Committee members meeting with a large range of 
domestic stakeholders on a bilateral basis, including financial institutions, businesses, 
academics, consumer groups and regulators. The Committee also met with the Panel 
and international regulators.  
The Committee would like to thank all stakeholders who have freely given their time 
to assist the Inquiry in its task so far.  
This consultation process, which has gathered both policy issues and stakeholder 
views on market-related opportunities and challenges, has been the primary source of 
information in preparing this Interim Report.  
Through this Interim Report, the Inquiry is now calling for a second round of 
submissions to gather further evidence, check the validity of observations and test 
potential policy options. For information on how to make a submission, please refer to 
www.fsi.gov.au. 
Submissions are requested by Tuesday, 26 August 2014. 
Scope of Interim Report 
The purpose of this Interim Report is to elicit comments from interested stakeholders 
to inform the Final Report to the Treasurer. The Interim Report does not make 
recommendations, nor does it describe the final view of the Inquiry.  
Each chapter of the Interim Report makes a number of observations on the Australian 
financial system, as summarised in the Executive Summary. These observations reflect 
the Inquiry’s current judgement, based on available evidence. The Inquiry welcomes 
additional evidence from interested stakeholders to either support or contest these 
observations.  
The observations do not cover all the issues raised in submissions or consultations. By 
necessity, the Inquiry has had to prioritise issues. Even so, the range of topics covered 
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in the Interim Report remains broad. Stakeholders are encouraged to provide feedback 
on whether other issues are of greater priority than those covered in the Interim Report 
and which issues should be the focus of the Final Report. 
Reflecting the observations made, the Interim Report also includes a range of possible 
policy options mentioned throughout each chapter. The Inquiry seeks evidence of the 
costs and benefits of these options, including the option of ‘no change’ or other policy 
alternatives. As mentioned above, these policy options are not the Inquiry’s draft 
recommendations. In most cases, the Inquiry has chosen to put forward a spectrum of 
policy options, rather than a single suggested option. 
In considering reforms, the Inquiry is mindful that no system is perfect and preferred 
outcomes will not always be practical or cost effective to achieve. The Inquiry’s final 
recommendations will reflect the Committee’s judgement, based on the evidence 
provided, that the change will deliver a better balance of policy outcomes than the 
status quo.  
The Inquiry recognises other processes may be best placed to consider certain subjects 
in further detail, including through concurrent Inquiry processes such as the Tax 
White Paper and the Competition Policy Review.  
The Inquiry also notes that, concurrent with the preparation of this report, the Senate 
has been examining the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission. The Senate Committee’s Report contained a large number of 
recommendations relevant to the work of this Inquiry. The Senate Report was issued at 
the time the Interim Report was being finalised for printing. The findings of the Senate 
Report will be carefully examined by this Inquiry in the lead-up to its Final Report. 
Most chapters also include a number of specific questions where additional 
information would be appreciated to assist in preparing the Final Report and making 
final recommendations.  
Next steps 
Following its release of the Interim Report, the Inquiry will continue to engage actively 
with stakeholders. In addition to receiving formal submissions, Committee members 
and secretariat staff will undertake a range of consultation processes, including public 
forums and domestic and international stakeholder meetings.  
Over the remainder of the available time, the Inquiry will further focus its attention on 
those issues of the highest priority, gathering more evidence to make informed, 
practical policy recommendations to the Treasurer in November. 
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Executive Summary 
Objectives and principles 
This Inquiry’s objective is to assess, and make recommendations on, how the financial 
system can most effectively help the Australian economy be productive, grow and 
meet the financial needs of Australians. 
To meet this objective, the Inquiry considers that the financial system must satisfy 
three principles: efficiently allocate resources and risks, be stable and reliable, and be 
fair and accessible. These three principles underpin the following analysis. 
The Inquiry’s initial assessment 
Based on the input of submissions, regulators and international perspectives, the 
Inquiry’s initial assessment is that, to date, the Australian financial system has 
performed reasonably well in meeting the financial needs of Australians and 
facilitating productivity and economic growth.  
Indeed, many areas of the financial system are operating effectively and do not require 
substantial change. Those areas are not the focus of this Interim report. 
However, there is no room for complacency. The Australian economy will face a 
number of opportunities and challenges in the coming decades. Each of these has 
implications for the financial system: 
• Future financial crises: History has demonstrated that financial crises can and will 
occur at significant cost to the economy. Although we cannot predict their cause or 
timing, our financial system framework should reduce the likelihood and impact of 
such events.  
• Fiscal pressures: The Commonwealth’s fiscal position will continue to come under 
long-term pressure, particularly from the effect of an ageing population.  
• Productivity growth: On its current trajectory, productivity growth will not be able 
to sustain the same rate of income growth experienced over the past decade. The 
financial system has an important role to play in facilitating higher productivity 
growth through funding the economy more efficiently, including funding new 
businesses and using new technology. 
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• Technology change: The rapid pace of technology change has already had a 
significant impact on both consumers’ interaction with the financial system and 
how the system functions. Although difficult to predict, future changes will present 
both opportunities and risks for the financial system and are expected to continue 
to have a significant impact. 
• International integration: Although Australia’s key financial relationships remain 
with Europe and the United States, the weight of global economic activity is 
shifting towards Asia. This trend presents opportunities and risks for Australia.  
In analysing how well the Australian financial system is prepared to meet these 
challenges, the Inquiry has identified nine priority issues facing the system, as 
outlined in the diagram below. 
 
The Inquiry makes a number of observations related to each issue. These observations 
are based on the evidence presented to the Inquiry through the consultation and 
submission process as well as the Inquiry’s judgement. In most cases, these 
observations reflect areas where submissions suggest the performance of the system 
may be improved in some way. 
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The Inquiry seeks additional evidence from interested stakeholders to support, or 
contest, these observations. 
Based on these observations, the Inquiry puts forward a range of possible policy 
options for consultation. These policy options should not be considered as draft 
recommendations. The Inquiry has sought to consult on a broad range of policy 
options to ensure informed practical policy recommendations in the Final Report.  
The Inquiry seeks evidence on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of these options 
from stakeholders, including the option of ‘no change’ or alternative options. 
The remainder of the executive summary outlines the Inquiry’s observations and 
possible policy options for stakeholder feedback.  
Growth and consolidation 
Since the Wallis Inquiry, the financial system as a whole has grown significantly, 
especially the superannuation sector. The system has also seen considerable 
consolidation and integration, particularly in banking.  
Against this backdrop of growth and consolidation, and noting the consequences of 
the global financial crisis (GFC), the Inquiry observes several issues, including 
opportunities for improvement in competition and contestability, distortions in 
funding flows, and issues with the efficiency and policy settings of the superannuation 
system. 
Competition and contestability  
Competition is the cornerstone of a well-functioning financial system, driving efficient 
outcomes for price, quality and innovation. 
Most sectors of the Australian financial system are concentrated, with that 
concentration generally increasing since the Wallis Inquiry. Banking, payments, 
financial market infrastructure (FMI) and personal general insurance have a relatively 
high degree of market concentration. However, competition can be strong between 
players in a concentrated market. Indeed, market concentration can be a by-product of 
competition, if more efficient firms grow at the expense of their less efficient 
competitors. 
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Observation 
The banking sector is competitive, albeit concentrated. The application of capital 
requirements is not competitively neutral. Banks that use internal ratings-based 
(IRB) risk weights have lower risk weights for mortgage lending than smaller 
authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) that use standardised risk weights, 
giving the IRB banks a cost advantage. 
On balance, the Inquiry considers that the banking sector is competitive. The net 
interest margins of the major banks are around historic lows, and their average return 
on equity is comparable to those achieved by other large Australian companies. 
However, although the banking sector as whole appears competitive, the level of 
competition may vary across individual banking markets. 
Risk weights affect the extent to which a bank must fund its assets using regulatory 
capital rather than potentially cheaper deposits and wholesale debt. The IRB banks 
have lower risk weights for mortgage lending than standardised ADIs, although the 
advantage is less clear in relation to other asset classes. This provides the IRB banks 
with a cost advantage for mortgage lending. However, the extent of the disadvantage 
would vary between ADIs, depending on the riskiness of their assets, as well as over 
time. 
Large banks derive funding advantages from their size and sophisticated risk 
management systems. However, some submissions argue that large banks also benefit 
from a funding advantage because they are perceived as being too-big-to-fail. The 
Inquiry considers the best way to deal with any potential competitive advantage 
arising from these perceptions is to directly address the systemic risks posed by large 
banks. 
During the GFC, the residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market became 
dislocated and the cost of RMBS funding increased. Since then, the market has started 
to recover, although not back to pre-GFC levels. There is little evidence that the current 
state of the RMBS market and the associated deterioration in the competitive position 
of smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders relate to an ongoing market failure. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Assist ADIs that are not accredited to use IRB models in attaining IRB 
accreditation, increase minimum IRB risk weights, introduce a tiered system of 
standardised risk weights, lower standardised risk weights for mortgages or 
allow smaller ADIs to adopt IRB modelling for mortgages only.  
• Provide direct Government support to the RMBS market, or allow RMBS to be 
treated as a high-quality liquid asset for the purpose of the liquidity coverage 
ratio. 
 
Observation 
Regulation of credit card and debit card payment schemes is required for 
competition to lead to more efficient outcomes. However, differences in the 
structure of payment systems have resulted in systems that perform similar 
functions being regulated differently, which may not be competitively neutral. 
The Inquiry considers that interchange fee caps have improved the functioning of 
four-party payment schemes. They have reduced merchant service fees. Although 
difficult to measure, the caps have also most likely reduced cross-subsidisation from 
customers who use low-cost payment mechanisms, such as cash, to those who use 
high-cost payment schemes. 
However, payment systems of similar economic substance should be regulated 
consistently. Arguably four-party interchange fees, companion card service fees and 
incentive payments under all schemes are equivalent in economic substance. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Lower interchange fee caps, ban interchange fees, expand interchange fee caps to 
include payments of similar economic substance, or remove interchange fee caps. 
• Cap merchant service fees or cap differences in interchange service fees between 
small and large merchants.  
• Require acquirers to enable merchants to choose which scheme to route 
transactions through, and provide merchants and customers with real time 
pricing information regarding interchange fees and merchant service fees. 
• Allow schemes to reintroduce ‘no surcharge’ rules, broaden the ban on ‘no 
surcharge’ rules, or enforce reasonable cost recovery in customer surcharging. 
The Competition chapter also seeks information on the following topics: 
• Competition in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) and personal lending 
• Vertical integration in the banking sector 
Funding Australia’s economic activity 
The efficiency with which Australia’s financial system allocates funding and risk in the 
economy affects Australia’s economic growth and long-term living standards. 
Although it is difficult to assess allocative efficiency, it is likely that distortions are 
hampering the operation of price mechanisms that would otherwise promote an 
efficient allocation of funding and risk. The Inquiry has identified three main sources 
of distortions: taxation, regulation and market imperfections. 
Observation 
Ongoing access to foreign funding has enabled Australia to sustain higher growth 
than otherwise would have been the case. The risks associated with Australia’s use 
of foreign funding can be mitigated by having a prudent supervisory and regulatory 
regime and sound public sector finances. 
Australia has been a net importer of foreign funds for much of its history and has 
therefore recorded persistent current account deficits. Used productively, additional 
investment increases the economy’s growth potential. 
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Observation 
There are structural impediments for small- and medium-sized enterprises to access 
finance. These impediments include information asymmetries, regulation and 
taxation. 
Financing constraints can limit a firm’s development and ability to transform ideas 
into technical advances. This can affect broader job creation, productivity and 
economic growth. 
Information asymmetries are the most significant structural factor contributing to the 
higher cost and lower availability of credit for SMEs. Lenders typically will have 
limited knowledge about a new borrower’s financial position, the financial 
performance of the business and the financial behaviour of the business owner. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Facilitate development of a small- and medium-sized enterprise finance database 
to reduce information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers.  
 
Observation 
Australia has an established domestic bond market, although a range of regulatory 
and tax factors have limited its development. 
Traditionally, private non-financial corporations have made relatively little use of the 
domestic bond market. A more developed and accessible corporate bond market 
would provide corporates with more funding options and allow investors to better 
diversify their portfolios. 
Corporate issuers face impediments in making public offers of listed corporate bonds, 
particularly to retail investors. Reducing such impediments would likely increase 
investor demand for domestic corporate bonds. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Allow listed issuers (already subject to continuous disclosure requirements) to 
issue ‘vanilla’ bonds directly to retail investors without the need for a 
prospectus.  
• Review the size and scale of corporate ‘vanilla’ bond offerings that can be made 
without a prospectus where the offering is limited to 20 people in 12 months up 
to a value of $2 million, or for offers of up to $10 million with an offer 
information statement. 
The Inquiry has identified a number of tax issues that affect the allocation of funding 
and risk in the economy. 
Certain tax and regulatory settings distort households’ saving decisions towards 
housing, for both owner-occupiers and investors. Tax incentives also encourage 
investors to use more leverage than otherwise might be the case.  
Since the Wallis Inquiry, the increase in housing debt and banks’ more concentrated 
exposure to mortgages mean that housing has become a significant source of systemic 
risk. 
A number of other taxes may materially affect the demand for, and supply of, funding 
for particular sectors and the broader allocation of funding and risk. Details of tax 
issues raised in the report are in Appendix 2 (Tax Summary). 
The Funding chapter also seeks information on the following topics: 
• Australia’s insolvency regime 
• Infrastructure financing 
• Impact investment and social impact bonds 
• The banking system 
• Superannuation 
• Equity financing 
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Superannuation efficiency and policy settings 
Principally as a result of Government policy, the superannuation system is large and 
growing rapidly. It is an important source of funding for long-term capital formation, 
which is important for national productivity growth.  
Observation 
There is little evidence of strong fee-based competition in the superannuation sector, 
and operating costs and fees appear high by international standards. This indicates 
there is scope for greater efficiencies in the superannuation system. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in comparing fees and costs across funds, Australia’s 
superannuation sector has some of the highest operating costs among Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries. The decline in fees over the past 
decade is modest, given the economies of scale that the sector has achieved. That said, 
high allocations to growth and alternative assets contribute to these costs, but they can 
also deliver higher after-fee returns to members. 
In general, competition has led to feature-rich, but more costly, superannuation 
products, in part reflecting that many consumers are not fee sensitive. It is too early to 
assess the effect of recent reforms to default arrangements (MySuper) on fees. There is 
an opportunity for fees to fall significantly over time, with further expected increases 
in scale and increased competition for MySuper products. 
High demand for liquidity from superannuation funds may be reducing after-fee 
returns to members. The mandatory inter-fund portability timeframe of three days is 
contributing to higher allocations to liquid assets than the system requires.  
It remains unclear whether funds are chasing short-term returns and, if so, whether 
this is contributing to lower after-fee returns, as well as to what extent more individual 
tailoring of asset allocations would produce net benefits to members.  
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements and review the effectiveness of the MySuper 
regime in due course. 
• Consider additional mechanisms to MySuper to achieve better results for 
members, including auctions for default fund status.  
• Replace the three-day portability rule: 
– With a longer maximum time period or a staged transfer of members’ 
balances between funds, including expanding the regulator’s power to extend 
the maximum time period to the entire industry in times of stress. 
– By moving from the current prescription-based approach for portability of 
superannuation benefits to a principles-based approach. 
 
Observation 
If allowed to continue, growth in direct leverage by superannuation funds, although 
embryonic, may create vulnerabilities for the superannuation and financial systems. 
The general lack of leverage in the superannuation system is a major strength of the 
financial system. Although direct leverage in superannuation is small, the current 
ability to borrow directly may, over time, erode this strength and create new risks to 
the financial system. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
Restore the general prohibition on direct leverage in superannuation on a 
prospective basis. 
 
Observation 
Superannuation policy settings lack stability, which adds to costs and reduces 
long-term confidence and trust in the system. 
Constant change in superannuation and retirement income policy settings imposes 
costs on superannuation funds, which are ultimately paid by members. As 
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superannuation is a long-term savings vehicle, change can also undermine confidence 
and trust in the system.  
To ensure policy stability, the system needs to achieve, and be seen to achieve, its 
objectives efficiently and equitably, and the fiscal cost needs to be sustainable. Some 
evidence casts doubt over whether current policy settings will stand the test of time. 
The Superannuation chapter also seeks information on the following topics: 
• Mechanisms to drive down fees 
• Vertical integration 
• Tailoring asset allocation and the focus on short-term returns 
• Active asset management 
• Pricing of member investment switching 
• Liquidity management 
• Trust structure 
• Self-managed superannuation fund operating costs and establishment 
Post-GFC regulatory response 
The GFC tested both the resilience of the Australian financial system generally and the 
performance of its regulators. We can learn many lessons from the GFC. This has been 
reflected in the substantial volume of regulatory change over recent years in Australia 
and internationally. 
The Inquiry considers this an opportune time to revisit Australia’s approach to 
stability and the prudential framework, consumer and conduct regulation, and our 
regulatory architecture. In light of the GFC experience, the Inquiry will consider the 
need for any change. 
Stability and the prudential framework 
Australia’s approach to financial stability proved resilient during the GFC. No 
prudentially regulated institution experienced a disorderly failure, and there was only 
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a minor interruption to economic growth.1 However, there are many lessons on which 
to reflect.  
Observation 
During the GFC, significant government actions in a number of countries, including 
Australia, entrenched perceptions that some institutions are too-big-to-fail. These 
perceptions can be reduced in Australia by making it more credible to resolve these 
institutions without Government support. 
Financial institutions that were of such size, market importance or interconnectedness 
that their failure would cause significant financial or economy disruption were at the 
heart of the GFC. Unprecedented government support was extended to these 
institutions globally, which — although necessary to avoid worsening the crisis — 
perversely entrenched views that such institutions are too-big-to-fail and therefore 
receive an implicit government guarantee. Reversing these perceptions and their 
associated moral hazard has been a focus of the international regulatory agenda.  
The Australian Government can adopt a number of measures to reduce these 
perceptions. It can take steps to make it more likely or more credible to achieve orderly 
failure without Government support and to lower the probability of failure in the first 
place. Some of these steps would be relatively low-cost and straight forward to 
implement, while others would involve substantial changes to the Australian financial 
system. Many of these measures could also have an effect on competition. 
                                                          
1  A number of non-prudentially regulated institutions did fail over this period. However, 
while these caused losses for individual investors, their broader effect was limited. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Increase the ability to impose losses on creditors of a financial institution in the 
event of its failure. 
• Strengthen regulators’ resolution powers for financial institutions, and invest 
more in pre-planning and pre-positioning for financial failure. 
• Further increase capital requirements on the financial institutions considered to 
be systemically important domestically. 
• Ring-fence critical bank functions, such as retail activities. 
 
Observation 
A number of jurisdictions have implemented new macroprudential toolkits to assist 
with managing systemic risks. The effectiveness of these for a country like Australia 
is not yet well established, and there are significant practical difficulties in using 
such tools. 
Systemic risks have the potential to cause financial system–wide disruption and inflict 
severe damage on the economy, as demonstrated by the GFC. The ability to identify 
and manage systemic risks is critical to long-term financial stability and economic 
growth. In general, Australia has a robust framework for monitoring and responding 
to systemic risks, although risks arising outside the prudential perimeter may be more 
difficult to manage. 
A number of international jurisdictions have introduced quantitative 
‘macroprudential’ tools for managing systemic risk. Empirical evidence and academic 
research is still limited on the effectiveness of these tools. Nevertheless, the Inquiry 
sees merit in investigating whether some additional tools for addressing systemic risk 
would be helpful, but it is cautious about Australia adopting tools that are yet to be 
proven.  
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Establish a mechanism, such as designation by the relevant Minister on advice 
from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) or the Council of Financial Regulators 
(CFR), to adjust the prudential perimeter to apply heightened regulatory and 
supervisory intensity to institutions or activities that pose systemic risks.  
• Introduce specific macroprudential policy tools. 
 
Observation 
Australia has implemented some aspects of global prudential frameworks earlier 
than a number of jurisdictions. It has also used national discretion in defining 
capital ratios. When combined with other aspects of the prudential framework and 
calculated on a consistent basis, Australian banks’ capital ratios (common equity 
tier 1) are around the middle of the range relative to other countries. However, 
differences such as those in definitions of capital do limit international 
comparability. 
Australia adheres to a number of international prudential frameworks, in particular 
the Basel framework for the banking industry. Among other benefits, this strengthens 
Australia’s international reputation and facilitates the integration of Australia’s 
financial system with the rest of the world. Australia is an active member of many 
international standard-setting bodies and has had considerable success in ensuring 
that such standards are fit for Australia. 
As an importer of capital, it is critical that Australia continues to adopt appropriate 
international standards. This will require Australia’s active participation in the 
international bodies that set these standards to ensure they suit our national 
circumstances. 
Submissions highlight some areas where Australia has used national discretion to 
diverge from baseline international standards. In some instances, this divergence has 
obscured international comparisons of prudential ratios, potentially creating real costs 
for industry. However, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision data shows that 
Australian banks do not have excessively high capital ratios relative to their peers.  
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Maintain the current calibration of Australia’s prudential framework. 
• Calibrate Australia’s prudential framework, in aggregate, to be more 
conservative than the global median. This does not mean that all individual 
aspects of the framework need to be more conservative. 
• Develop public reporting of regulator-endorsed internationally harmonised 
capital ratios with the specific objective of improving transparency. 
• Adopt an approach to calculating prudential ratios with a minimum of national 
discretion and calibrate system safety through the setting of headline 
requirements. 
 
Observation 
To contribute to the effectiveness of the financial system, sound corporate 
governance requires clarity of the responsibilities and authority of boards and 
management. There are differences in the duties and requirements of 
governing bodies for different types of financial institutions and, within 
institutions, substantial regulator focus on boards has confused the 
delineation between the role of the board and that of management. 
The GFC revealed the failure of both the boards and senior management of some 
international financial institutions to understand fully the risks their institutions were 
undertaking, as well as a culture of focusing on short-term gains. Recognition of the 
role boards and senior management play in fostering corporate culture and 
determining the risk appetite and behaviour of financial institutions is critical. 
However, stakeholders are concerned that, in Australia, regulatory burdens unduly 
require boards to play a quasi-management role, taking time away from other 
appropriate governance activities and strategic oversight. Part of this may stem from a 
lack of clarity around regulators’ expectations of boards, which should be addressed. 
In addition, the primary duty of governing bodies differs across different types of 
financial institutions. For example, the relevant legislation requires that insurer 
directors and superannuation fund trustees place the interests of policy holders and 
members ahead of those of shareholders, yet there is no equivalent for ADIs. It is not 
clear if this diversity is appropriate.  
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Review prudential requirements on boards to ensure they do not draw boards 
into operational matters. 
• Regulators continue to clarify their expectations on the role of boards. 
The Stability chapter also seeks information on the following topics:  
• Financial Claims Scheme 
• The appropriate primary duties of financial institution governing bodies 
Consumer outcomes and conduct regulation 
The financial system should meet the financial needs of Australians. Retail consumers 
are an important end-user of the financial system. Trust in the financial system is an 
important prerequisite for consumers to participate confidently and actively in the 
financial system. Since the Wallis Inquiry, consumers have been increasingly required 
to participate in the financial system through compulsory superannuation. 
Fundamental to the effective operation of the financial system is the appropriate 
allocation of risk between participants. Consumers, like other participants, must take 
responsibility for both the risk and reward of financial decisions. However, adverse 
consumer outcomes in the financial system may result from a variety of factors, 
including fraud, mis-selling, product unsuitability, lack of information and lack of 
financial literacy.  
Consumer outcomes can be enhanced by a variety of methods, including competition, 
innovation by industry and effective regulatory regimes (including self-regulation). 
Regulation seeks to create confidence and trust in the financial system, inform 
consumers and assist them to manage their risk. Active surveillance and enforcement 
are an important part of enhancing confidence and trust in the financial system and 
encouraging consumer participation. Although Australia’s financial system performed 
reasonably well during the GFC, consumers still suffered substantial loss in some 
areas. In addition, a series of domestic failures in the last decade have demonstrated 
limitations in a number of vital elements of the consumer protection framework 
introduced following the Wallis Inquiry. 
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Observation 
The current disclosure regime produces complex and lengthy documents that often 
do not enhance consumer understanding of financial products and services, and 
impose significant costs on industry participants. 
Although disclosure is an important part of the regulatory regime for providing 
financial products and services, it alone has not been sufficient to enable consumers to 
make informed decisions and purchase products and services that meet their needs. 
Over the past decade, industry and Government have made efforts to improve the 
quality of disclosure documents. However, a culture of legal compliance, rather than a 
focus on how best to inform consumers, continues to influence the design of disclosure 
documents. This has resulted in lengthy and complex documents, rather than short, 
targeted documents that highlight product features, risks and rewards. Submissions 
also argue that disclosure compliance has been costly for industry. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Improve the current disclosure requirements using mechanisms to enhance 
consumer understanding, including layered disclosure, risk profile disclosure 
and online comparators. 
• Remove disclosure requirements that have proven ineffective and facilitate new 
ways of providing information to consumers, including using technology and 
electronic delivery. 
• Subject product issuers to a range of product design requirements, such as 
targeted regulation of product features and distribution requirements to promote 
provision of suitable products to consumers.  
• Provide the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) with 
additional product intervention powers and product banning powers. 
• Consider a move towards more default products with simple features and fee 
structures. 
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Observation 
Affordable, quality financial advice can bring significant benefits for consumers. 
Improving standards of adviser competence and removing the impact of conflicted 
remuneration can improve the quality of advice. Comprehensive financial advice 
can be costly, and there is consumer demand for lower-cost scaled advice. 
For consumers to engage effectively with the financial system and meet their financial 
needs, they need access to advice that helps them make informed financial decisions. 
Many consumers consider that their advice needs are currently unmet. 
Studies suggest there are significant issues with the quality of financial advice, due in 
part to varying standards of adviser competence and the impact of conflicted 
remuneration structures. Some submissions suggest aligned or vertically integrated 
structures may also reduce the quality of advice consumers receive. 
At times, consumers also lack access to affordable advice. In addition, some 
submissions question whether general advice is properly labelled and whether 
consumers understand its nature, given general advice often includes sales and 
advertising information.  
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Raise minimum education and competency standards for personal advice 
(including particular standards for more complex products or structures such as 
Self-managed Superannuation Funds), and introduce a national examination for 
financial advisers providing personal advice. 
• Introduce an enhanced public register of financial advisers (including employee 
advisers) which includes a record of each adviser’s credentials and current status 
in the industry, managed either by Government or industry. 
• Enhance the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s power to 
include banning individuals from managing a financial services business. 
• Rename general advice as ‘sales’ or ‘product information’ and mandate that the 
term ‘advice’ can only be used in relation to personal advice. 
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Observation 
Technological developments have the potential to reduce insurance pooling. This 
will reduce premiums for some consumers; however, others will face increased 
premiums, or be excluded from access to insurance. Underinsurance may occur for a 
number of reasons, including: personal choice, behavioural biases, affordability, and 
lack of adequate information or advice on the level of insurance needed. 
Insurance can mitigate risks of significant loss for consumers. The decision to insure 
against certain risks is a personal one, which means there will always be a level of 
non-insurance and underinsurance in the system. However, other factors may also 
drive levels of underinsurance. The increasing trend towards risk-based pricing may 
make insurance more affordable for some consumers. However, it will also 
disadvantage others through increasing costs, potentially to the point of 
unaffordability, or may mean that some people are simply not offered insurance. That 
said, risk-based pricing provides important price signals to consumers, which may 
encourage risk minimisation in some cases. 
The Consumer outcomes chapter also seeks information on the following topics: 
• Financial literacy 
• Financial advice 
• Disclosure for prospectuses 
• Levels of underinsurance 
• Industry self-regulation  
• Microfinance facilitating access to credit 
• Small business lending 
• Regulation of managed investment schemes 
• Consumer loss as a result of misconduct 
• Product rationalisation of legacy products 
Regulatory architecture 
Australia’s regulatory structure has served us well, and the perimeters defined by the 
Wallis Inquiry remain broadly valid. However, market developments, technological 
advancements and stakeholder feedback suggest there is value in re-examining certain 
aspects. 
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The Inquiry has also commissioned work on the costs and benefits of the extent of 
regulation in the financial system, and seeks further evidence in this regard. In parallel, 
the Government is running a deregulation process that includes improving policy 
development processes and assessing existing regulation. 
The Inquiry also notes that concurrent with the preparation of this report, the Senate 
has been examining the performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission. The Senate Committee’s Report contained a large number of 
recommendations that are relevant to the work of this Inquiry. The Senate Report was 
issued at the time the Interim Report was being finalised for printing. The findings of 
the Senate Report will be carefully examined by this Inquiry in the lead-up to its Final 
Report. 
Observation 
The regulatory perimeters could be re-examined in a number of areas to ensure each 
is targeted appropriately and can capture emerging risks. 
The Inquiry’s intention is to assess the current regulatory perimeters and align 
regulation for like risks. A number of areas have been examined, building on the 
Wallis Inquiry’s intensity of promise. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Introduce specific refinements to the existing perimeters, including: 
– Prudential regulation — consider the case for prudential versus conduct 
regulation of superannuation funds. 
– Retail payment systems — consider a simplified and/or graduated 
framework with clear and transparent thresholds. 
– Conduct regulation — consider the case to extend regulation to fund 
administrators and technology service providers of sufficient scale, and apply 
select market integrity rules to securities dealers. 
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Observation 
Australia generally has strong, well-regarded regulators, but some areas of possible 
improvement have been identified to increase independence and accountability.  
Strong, independent financial regulators are crucial to the efficient, stable, fair and 
accessible operation of the financial system. However, regulators also require robust 
accountability mechanisms that provide appropriate checks and balances. 
Submissions identify areas of improvement in relation to operational and budgetary 
independence. Current funding models for the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) and ASIC diverge from best-case funding models for financial 
regulators. In particular, the current funding models potentially could be improved 
through increasing the certainty of year-to-year funding. 
Although Australian financial regulators are subject to a range of existing 
accountability mechanisms, the Inquiry recognises there is room to strengthen 
accountability mechanisms, particularly in light of proposals to increase independence. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Move Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) to a more autonomous budget and 
funding process. 
• Conduct periodic, legislated independent reviews of the performance and 
capability of regulators. 
• Clarify the metrics for assessing regulatory performance. 
• Enhance the role of Statements of Expectations and Statements of Intent. 
• Replace the efficiency dividend with tailored budget accountability mechanisms. 
• Improve the oversight processes of regulators. 
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Observation 
During the GFC and beyond, Australia’s regulatory coordination mechanisms have 
been strong, although there may be room to enhance transparency.  
The Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) is a well-functioning mechanism, playing an 
important role in coordinating financial regulation and stability issues. 
The CFR’s objective is to contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of financial 
regulation by providing a high-level forum for cooperation and collaboration among 
its members. The capacity of the CFR to perform this function was tested during the 
GFC, to the satisfaction of both domestic stakeholders and the International Monetary 
Fund.  
Regulators also participate in a number of councils, committees and working groups 
with each other, through which regulatory interventions and supervision activities are 
coordinated. 
Underlying these coordination mechanisms is a strong culture of cooperation and 
collegiality among the financial sector regulators and the Treasury. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Consider increasing the role, transparency and external accountability 
mechanisms of the CFR: 
– Formalise the role of the CFR within statute.  
– Increase the CFR membership to include Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
and Australian Taxation Office. 
– Increase the reporting by the CFR. 
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Observation 
Regulators’ mandates and powers are generally well defined and clear; however, 
more could be done to emphasise competition matters. In addition, ASIC has a 
broad mandate, and the civil and administrative penalties available to it are 
comparatively low in relation to comparable peers internationally. 
An effective regulatory model requires Government to specify regulators’ mandates 
and objectives with clarity and transparency. Although the individual parts of 
Australia’s regulatory mandates are clear, they are not entirely unambiguous: they 
require judgement in balancing sometimes competing objectives. Submissions 
typically raise this issue in the context of competition. 
Stakeholders also question the breadth of ASIC’s mandate, which has grown over time. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Strengthen competition considerations through mechanisms other than 
amending the regulators’ mandates. 
• Refine the scope and breadth of ASIC’s mandate. 
• Review the penalty regime in the Corporations Act. 
 
Observation 
To be able to perform their roles effectively in accordance with their legislative 
mandate, regulators need to be able to attract and retain suitably skilled and 
experienced staff. 
Regulators face strong competition for top talent, given the size and high remuneration 
levels of the Australian financial sector. Another hurdle is the perception that APRA 
and ASIC’s operational independence and effectiveness are unduly hampered by 
public sector operating constraints. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Review mechanisms to attract and retain staff, including terms and conditions. 
The Regulatory architecture chapter also seeks information on the following topics: 
• Costs and benefits of regulation 
• Regulator mandates, including the role and remit of ASIC 
Emerging trends 
Over the coming decades, Australia will confront a number of continuing trends as 
well as new drivers of change for the financial system, creating both opportunities and 
risks. These changes include our ageing population, technological change and 
Australia’s international integration. To varying degrees, these trends are already 
manifesting themselves. 
Retirement incomes and ageing 
The superannuation drawdown phase of Australia’s retirement income system 
provides limited choice for managing risk in retirement. It also gives little guidance to 
retirees in navigating complex and important financial decisions. Retirees do not 
efficiently convert superannuation benefits into income streams in retirement. 
Observation 
The retirement phase of superannuation is underdeveloped and does not meet the 
risk management needs of many retirees. 
During the accumulation phase, employers make Superannuation Guarantee 
contributions automatically on behalf of employees, with defaults applying to those 
who are less engaged with the system. This framework to guide individuals ceases at 
retirement. Retirees make critical, once-in-a-lifetime decisions regarding when and 
how to draw down their savings over the remainder of their lives, and how to manage 
the investment, inflation and longevity risks involved. Many retirees are unprepared 
for these decisions. 
Risk management is a major weakness of the drawdown phase. Although individuals 
are concerned about outliving their savings, few retirees use income stream products 
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with longevity risk protection, and there a limited choice of these products. Australia is 
unusual in not encouraging its citizens to use income streams with longevity 
protection in retirement. Also, the Government bears significant longevity risk by 
providing the Age Pension.  
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
A spectrum of options to achieve the objectives of the retirement income system and 
position Australia to manage the challenges of having an ageing population: 
• Maintain the status quo with improved provision of financial advice and 
removal of impediments to product development. 
• Provide policy incentives to encourage retirees to purchase retirement income 
products that help manage longevity and other risks. 
• Introduce a default option for how individuals take their retirement benefits. 
• Mandate the use of particular retirement income products (in full or in part, or 
for later stages of retirement). 
 
Observation 
There are regulatory and other policy impediments to developing income products 
with risk management features that could benefit retirees. 
Around half of superannuation benefits in retirement are currently paid as lump sums, 
while the other half are paid as income streams. Australians who wish to convert their 
superannuation assets into a retirement income stream can essentially choose from two 
types of products: account-based pensions and annuities. The overwhelming majority 
of retirees who take income streams choose an account-based pension. 
There are products that could help retirees achieve their desired levels of income and 
help them manage their risks better. These do not exist in Australia due to market 
impediments.  
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Take a more flexible, principles-based approach to determining the eligibility of 
retirement income products for tax concessions and their treatment by the Age 
Pension means-tests. 
• For product providers, streamline administrative arrangements for assessing the 
eligibility for tax concessions and Age Pension means-tests treatment of 
retirement income products.  
• Issue longer-dated Government bonds, including inflation-linked bonds, to 
support the development of retirement income products. 
The Retirement income chapter also seeks information on the following topics: 
• Potential increased government provision of longevity insurance 
• Reverse mortgages 
Technology opportunities and risks 
Technology is a powerful force for change in the financial system, potentially 
improving efficiency and competition, and benefiting consumers. Consumers have 
better access to information and products to meet their needs. Firms can better 
customise products and enhance internal processes. Competition is emerging from 
technology-enabled alternative business models, new entrants and new services. 
Financial services boundaries are shifting as firms from inside and outside the sector 
harness the power of data to create and capture value in new ways. In particular, many 
are seeking to influence a greater share of consumers’ spending. Increasingly, 
technology firms and retail groups are also becoming part of financial service delivery. 
These trends and benefits bring new or intensified risks. 
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Observation 
Technological innovation is a major driver of efficiency in the financial system and 
can benefit consumers. Government and regulators need to balance these benefits 
against the risks, as they seek to manage the flexibility of regulatory frameworks 
and the regulatory perimeter. Government is also well-positioned to facilitate 
innovation through coordinated action, regulatory flexibility and forward-looking 
mechanisms. 
Government and regulators face ongoing challenges from the need to apply existing 
regulatory frameworks to new participants and products. In a rapidly changing 
environment, a technology neutral approach facilitates regulatory flexibility. As firms 
outside the regulated financial sector increasingly perform financial-type functions, 
challenges are raised for the regulatory perimeter. Although innovation may bring 
risks, it is important for Government to enable technology’s benefits to flow through 
the financial system, while also maintaining stability. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Amend regulation that specifies using certain technologies with the aim of 
becoming technology neutral. Amendments should enable electronic service 
delivery to become the default; however, they should include opt-out provisions 
to manage access needs for segments of the community. 
• Adopt a principle of technology neutrality, for future regulation recognising the 
need for technology-specific regulation on an exceptions basis. Where 
technology-specific regulation is required, seek to be technology neutral within 
that class of technologies. 
• Establish a central mechanism or body for monitoring and advising Government 
on technology and innovation. Consider, for example, a public-private sector 
collaborative body or changing the mandate of an existing body to include 
technology and innovation. 
• Establish a whole-of-Government technology strategy to enable innovation. 
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Observation 
Access to growing amounts of customer information and new ways of using it have 
the potential to improve efficiency and competition, and present opportunities to 
empower consumers. However, evidence indicates these trends heighten privacy 
and data security risks. 
Firms are collecting, storing and using growing volumes and types of customer data. 
Information analytics has the potential to provide consumers with better products and 
improved access. It may also present opportunities to empower consumers through 
access to better information for decision making. Firms may be able to improve 
internal processes, such as those for risk assessment and pricing, and create more 
efficient marketing and better cross-sell opportunities. Although there are many 
potential benefits from the growth and use of data, concerns are increasingly raised 
about the way in which personal information is used and handled. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• Review and assess the new privacy requirements two years after implementation 
to consider whether the impacts appropriately balance financial system efficiency 
and privacy protections. 
• Review record–keeping and privacy requirements that impact on cross-border 
information flows and explore options for improving cross-border mutual 
regulatory recognition in these areas. 
• Implement mandatory data breach notifications to affected individuals and the 
Australian Government agency with relevant responsibility under privacy laws. 
• Communicate to APRA continuing industry support for a principles-based 
approach to setting cloud computing requirements and the need to consider the 
benefits of the technology as well as the risks. 
 
Observation 
The financial system’s shift to an increasingly online environment heightens cyber 
security risks and the need to improve digital identity solutions. Government has 
the ability to facilitate industry coordination and innovation in these areas. 
The rise of e-commerce and widespread internet connectivity expose financial 
institutions to increasingly more cyber crime. Cyber attacks are growing in 
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sophistication and frequency. Cyber security is one of the Government’s top national 
security priorities and the financial system is considered part of Australia’s critical 
infrastructure. 
Consumers’ growing preferences for online and digital delivery of financial services is 
increasing the need for digital identity solutions. Australia currently has a 
decentralised identity infrastructure and various building blocks to assist with digital 
identity solutions. However, it has not yet developed a detailed approach for the 
future of digital identities. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• Review and update the 2009 Cyber Security Strategy to reflect changes in the 
threat environment, improve cohesion in policy implementation and progress 
public–private sector collaboration. 
• Develop a national strategy for promoting trusted digital identities, in 
consultation with financial institutions and other stakeholders. 
The Technology chapter also seeks information on the following topics: 
• Priorities for regulatory amendments in relation to technology neutrality 
• Government and regulatory mechanisms for responding to innovation 
• Consumer and private sector access to data 
• Cyber security information sharing, standards setting and crisis planning 
• Digital identity roles and responsibilities for the private and public sector 
International integration 
Australia has benefited substantially from financial integration with the rest of the 
world, most notably from trade and accessing international capital markets over many 
decades. Benefits have also flowed from opening up Australia’s financial services 
market to foreign competition and from exporting financial services to other markets, 
although these exports have not been as significant. 
Since the GFC, cross-border capital flows have declined globally and the international 
regulatory response to the crisis has in part aimed to reduce the interconnectedness of 
the global financial system and increase its resilience to shocks. Although the risks are 
real, there remain long-term benefits from financial integration. 
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The Inquiry supports efforts to drive greater financial integration with the rest of the 
world, provided it doesn’t compromise appropriate standards for financial stability 
and conduct in Australia. The Inquiry does not support tax subsidies, concessions or 
market intervention to enhance financial integration. 
Observation 
Although elements of Australia’s financial system are internationally integrated, a 
number of potential impediments have been identified. Financial system 
developments in the region will require continuing Government engagement to 
facilitate integration with Asia. 
Given the anticipated development in Asian financial markets in coming decades, and 
the strength and significance of Australia’s trade relationships with the region, 
opportunities to access capital in Asia are likely to increase. Predictions are that 
Australian and Asian financial services firms will expand into each other’s markets 
and grow financial services exports and imports. Ongoing engagement with financial 
markets in North America and Europe will also continue to be important. 
The Inquiry seeks to engage with stakeholders in more detail about the existence of 
impediments and the priorities for considering them, prior to the Inquiry’s Final 
Report. 
Observation 
Government efforts to promote Australia’s policy interests on international standard 
setting bodies have been successful. Domestic regulatory processes could be 
improved to better consider international standards and foreign regulation, 
including processes for collaboration and consultation about international standard 
implementation, and mutual recognition and equivalence assessment processes. 
Commercial issues and market conditions are often the most significant factors 
affecting the level and nature of financial integration; however, policy and regulatory 
settings are also important. These factors are especially significant in the financial 
services sector, both because it is heavily regulated and because, since the GFC, more 
standards are being set by international bodies and foreign regulation increasingly 
extends to activities occurring in Australia. 
Mutual recognition by regulators facilitates greater integration, as do arrangements 
between central banks. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
Improve domestic regulatory process to better consider international standards and 
foreign regulation — including processes for transparency and consultation about 
international standard implementation, and mutual recognition and equivalence 
assessment processes. 
 
Observation 
Coordination of Australia’s international financial integration could be improved. 
Although greater financial integration is not without risk, a number of inquiries have 
made recommendations to remove impediments to greater integration and foster 
mutual recognition, particularly within the Asian region. Government has generally 
responded positively to these recommendations, but implementation has been slow 
and not always well coordinated across Government, regulators and industry. 
The Inquiry recognises that much of the success in enhancing financial integration will 
depend on commercial and market factors, as well as the financial sector’s willingness 
and capacity to drive greater integration. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives:  
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Amend the role of an existing coordination body to promote accountability and 
provide economy-wide advice to Government about Australia’s international 
financial integration. 
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1: Overview 
Objectives and principles 
This Inquiry’s objective is to assess, and make recommendations on, how the financial 
system can most effectively help the Australian economy be productive, grow and 
meet the financial needs of Australians. 
The financial system provides funding and liquidity, allows effective risk 
management, delivers payment services, facilitates price discovery and provides some 
monitoring services. Although tested during the global financial crisis (GFC), 
Australia’s financial system performed well in most respects relative to its 
international counterparts. 
However, the Inquiry considers there are policy issues that need close examination 
given developments since the Wallis Inquiry and the lessons of the GFC, as well as the 
opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. 
The view of the Inquiry 
The Inquiry considers the financial system needs to satisfy three principles: efficiently 
allocate resources and risks, be stable and reliable, and be fair and accessible. 
It must do so in the context of Australia’s circumstances. Australia is a small, open and 
market-based economy with a large services sector, a relatively small population, a 
large land mass and a significant endowment of natural resources. It uses both 
domestic and foreign investment to fund development. The financial system is 
predominantly privately owned and based on market principles that support risk 
taking and allow both success and failure.  
A number of pre-requisites underpin a well-functioning financial system, including a 
predictable rule of law with strong property rights (providing certainty of contract and 
access to redress), a freely convertible floating currency, sustainable fiscal policy, a 
sound monetary policy framework and a stable political system. The Inquiry believes 
independent monetary policy, prudential supervision and conduct regulation remain 
the preferred approach over direct Government control of prices and quantities in the 
financial system. 
Competition remains the cornerstone of a well-functioning financial system. It is vital 
in driving efficient outcomes for price, efficiency, quality and innovation. 
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However, the behaviour of financial markets and the financial system is complex, 
reflecting the consequences of information asymmetries, network effects and human 
psychology. 
Asset prices are prone to volatility, which can be exacerbated by the natural 
momentum of markets and/or the intervention of governments. This can result in 
asset values deviating from fundamental values and instability, particularly with the 
use of leverage. The GFC entrenched perceptions that some institutions are 
too-big-to-fail. Governments have a role in both preventing the build-up of systemic 
risk and creating a framework in which financial failure is managed in an orderly and 
cost-effective manner. 
Consumers of financial products and services can be subject to information imbalances 
and behavioural biases that are detrimental to them and the efficiency of the system. 
Effective disclosure, sound advice and improved financial literacy are necessary, but 
often incomplete, remedies to these information imbalances. In addition, conduct and 
disclosure requirements need to be effectively supervised and enforced. 
Wherever possible, the financial system should be subject and responsive to market 
forces. It should not be politicised to the extent that the Government sets prices, or 
mandates non-commercial financial decisions to resolve Government fiscal problems 
such as requiring banks to hold Government debt. Market discipline, through 
competition or self-regulation, is generally preferred to Government intervention. 
Where there is compelling evidence for Government intervention, the Inquiry 
considers the intervention should seek to best balance efficiency, stability and fairness. 
Inevitably, policy decisions facing the Government require some trade-offs. 
The system has evolved in response to consumer needs, competitive pressures, tax 
settings, demographic changes, new technology, and ongoing change to global 
economic and financial developments.  
The Inquiry is aware that the legal and governance obligations of financial entities, 
such as fiduciary duties, can be a driving force in determining the culture of Australian 
businesses, their decision making and financial outcomes for Australians. 
It is also the Inquiry’s view that financial system regulators need sufficient powers, 
independence and resourcing, but they should also be subject to rigorous 
accountability mechanisms. Regulation should be cost-effective, transparent, targeted, 
forward-looking and competitively and technological neutral. Ultimately, however, 
governments and ministers remain responsible and accountable for the regulation of 
the financial system. 
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Principles for government intervention1 
The Inquiry has not seen evidence to suggest a need to reform radically the way 
Government intervenes in or regulates the financial system. However, as noted in the 
terms of reference, the current framework is in need of a refresh to enable the system to 
meet future challenges. 
The Wallis Inquiry’s approach to regulatory philosophy broadly considered unfettered 
financial markets would generally lead to resources being allocated efficiently. In the 
Wallis Inquiry’s view, the role of Government was only to intervene where market 
imperfections inhibited efficiency.2 
The financial system has undergone significant change since the Wallis Inquiry. It is 
now larger and more concentrated, particularly the banking and superannuation 
sectors. The GFC demonstrated that the Australian financial system was exposed not 
only to domestic but international shocks. Since the Wallis Inquiry it has also become 
clearer that financial market outcomes can sometimes depart markedly from outcomes 
suggested by the theoretical ideal. Over the coming decades, the financial system will 
also face a number of challenges and opportunities. These include: exposure to 
potential future crises; allocating finance to best facilitate productivity growth; the 
effects of changing technology and ongoing international integration. 
Figure 1.1 shows selected major events affecting the financial system since the Wallis 
Inquiry, and local and international governments’ responses to these events.  
                                                          
1  Intervention can occur through regulation, tax, the social safety net, guarantees or other 
specific policies such as superannuation. 
2  Commonwealth of Australia 1997, Financial System Inquiry Final Report, Melbourne, First key 
finding of Chapter 5 — Philosophy of Financial Regulation. 
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Figure 1.1: Selected major developments since the Wallis Inquiry 
 
The Inquiry acknowledges the Government has a role in the financial system, but 
considers it important that this intervention is consistent and predictable. Consistency 
of approach reduces opportunities for preferential treatment, encourages predictability 
and reduces risks associated with economic decisions by the private sector.  
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Although advances in network theory, understanding of the consequences of 
imperfect information and behavioural economics are useful developments that assist 
in better understanding the behaviour of the financial system, no widely accepted 
philosophy of optimal government intervention has emerged from this research.  
A refreshed approach 
In the first instance, the Inquiry takes the view that the status quo is the appropriate 
starting point for policy discussion. This is not to suggest the financial system as it 
currently operates is perfect; rather, policy makers should focus on how the current 
system can be improved from its current state.  
This approach acknowledges there are realities in the Australian and international 
financial system that dictate or influence certain outcomes and should not or cannot 
easily be changed. For example, as an open market economy using foreign savings, 
Australia must accept key aspects of internationally driven financial regulation, while 
adapting it appropriately to meet national conditions wherever possible. The Inquiry 
has also noted the importance of ethics, incentives and governance arrangements, and 
the influence these factors can have on financial system outcomes.  
Like the Wallis Inquiry, this Inquiry considers there remains a role for Government to 
intervene to remove impediments to the market working more efficiently, including 
intervention to manage information asymmetries3 and principal-agent conflicts.4 
In addition to efficiency, the Inquiry believes both stability and fairness should have 
prominence in policy design when the Government considers intervention in the 
financial system. Importantly, these characteristics build confidence and trust in the 
financial system. 
• The potential costs of instability to the economy during the GFC underlined the 
need for Government action to both minimise the chance of a systemic crisis and 
mitigate its costs if it does occur. This includes ensuring that certain critical 
financial functions continue to be provided, even during a crisis.  
• Moreover, fairness is an important policy objective of the financial system. Unfair 
outcomes discourage participation and ultimately economic efficiency, increasing 
political pressure for unnecessary regulatory change. Fairness is also a principle 
underpinning several aspects of financial system law, including regulation of 
financial markets and services. 
                                                          
3  Information asymmetry or information imbalance occurs when the two parties entering into 
a transaction do not have the same level of information. 
4  Principal-agent conflicts occur if an agent (for example, a company executive) pursues their 
own self-interest rather than those of the principal (for example, a shareholder) who has 
provided them resources and delegated responsibility for making decisions.  
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Fairness involves fair treatment by applying the concepts of integrity, honesty, 
transparency and non-discrimination (entities with the same characteristics are treated 
in the same manner) which go to building trust in the financial system.  
Of course, these policy objectives can be conflicting and add complexity to policy 
decisions. Some of the most difficult policy decisions facing the Government occur 
where there is a trade-off between these objectives, including many of those discussed 
in this report. Where intervention is necessary, the Inquiry considers it should not 
unduly add to the complexity of regulatory arrangements. 
There is no simple empirical calculation that provides the answer on when or how the 
Government should intervene (or remove a previous intervention) in the financial 
system. Case-by-case judgement is required, and both the costs and benefits of a policy 
change should always be carefully considered. 
The Inquiry emphasises the importance of market forces and competition in any 
cost-benefit analysis. The financial system has the ability to evolve successfully in 
response to market signals without Government intervention in many situations. In 
many cases, the best outcome may be for the Government to allow market forces to 
operate. The removal of unnecessary Government regulation and interventions that do 
not meet this cost-benefit test should remain a priority where they are identified.  
The Inquiry suggests the following principles (Table 1.1) to guide the actions of 
Government and regulators. Although sometimes conflicting, the Inquiry considers 
Government and regulators should take account of these principles when regulating or 
considering regulation for the financial system. 
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Table 1.1: General principles of government intervention 
Outcome-focused Regulation and actions by regulators should reflect the outcomes sought 
by policy. This is not to suggest regulation should be simple or complex 
— but appropriate for the policy outcome desired.  
Forward-looking The regulatory framework must have the flexibility to cope with 
changing institutional and product structures, including in response to 
regulatory settings, without losing its effectiveness.  
Cost-effective Regulation should impose the least possible aggregate cost to the 
regulated business, its customers and the regulator, while still achieving 
the desired outcome. The costs of regulation should be allocated to those 
that enjoy the benefits or impose the costs. 
Competitively/ 
technologically 
neutral 
The regulatory framework affects all entities providing products or 
services with the same characteristics equally, regardless of 
technological approach.  
Targeted and 
proportionate 
Ideally, regulation should only constrain the behaviour of those who 
will otherwise act inappropriately or make decisions without taking into 
account social costs. Regulation should be targeted to minimise adverse 
effects on those entities for which it is not needed and be as simple as 
possible to achieve the policy outcome desired.  
System-wide 
approach  
A system-wide view of the interdependence, interconnectivity and 
feedback relationships between different parts of the financial system 
and other sectors of the economy, including internationally, is required. 
Very often the externalities, overlaps and gaps, hidden connections and 
dynamic feedbacks create risks and distortions to efficiency that are not 
recognised by either markets or siloed regulators 
Transparent The actions and purpose of Government (or regulators) should be 
obvious to participants in the financial system, both before and after the 
event. The actions of Government or regulators should also be consistent 
and predictable.  
Accountable/ 
independent 
Regulators should have clear mandates determining their objectives. In 
achieving these objectives, regulators should operate independently and 
have sufficient funding. Regulators must be held to a high level of 
accountability for their actions and be subject to regular public reviews 
of their performance relative to their mandate. 
Themes and major issues 
Taking into account the input of submissions, regulators and international 
perspectives, the Inquiry’s initial assessment is that the Australian financial system has 
performed reasonably well in meeting the financial needs of Australians and 
facilitating productivity and economic growth. 
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Indeed, many areas of the financial system are operating effectively and do not require 
substantial change. This Inquiry has not focused on these areas.5 
However, a number of policy issues have been raised that the Inquiry believes should 
be considered further. The remainder of this chapter provides context for why the 
Inquiry has chosen to concentrate on the issues covered in this Interim report.  
Table 1.2 outlines the Inquiry’s view of the nine priority issues facing the Australian 
financial system and its key observations. It is followed by an explanation of the 
evidence supporting each issue. The following chapters of the Interim Report address 
each of these issues in more detail, including presenting potential policy options. 
                                                          
5  For the purposes of this Inquiry, the Committee considers private health insurance to be out 
of scope. Private health insurance is closely linked to the operation of the health system and 
government plays a significant role in approving products and premiums. In addition, it 
does not pose a systemic risk to the financial system. 
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Table 1.2: Priority issues 
Theme one: Growth and consolidation 
Competition 
and 
contestability 
The banking sector is competitive, albeit concentrated. The application of capital 
requirements is not competitively neutral. 
Regulation of credit card and debit card payment schemes is required for 
competition to lead to more efficient outcomes. However, differences in the 
structure of payment systems have resulted in systems that perform similar 
functions being regulated differently, which may not be competitively neutral. 
Funding 
Australia’s 
economic 
activity 
Ongoing access to foreign funding has enabled Australia to sustain higher growth 
than otherwise would have been the case. The risks associated with Australia’s use 
of foreign funding can be mitigated by having a prudent supervisory and 
regulatory regime and sound public sector finances. 
There are structural impediments for small- and medium-sized enterprises to 
access finance. These impediments include information asymmetries, regulation 
and taxation. 
Australia has an established domestic bond market, although a range of regulatory 
and tax factors have limited its development. 
Superannuation 
efficiency and 
policy settings 
There is little evidence of strong fee-based competition in the superannuation 
sector, and operating costs and fees appear high by international standards. This 
indicates there is scope for greater efficiencies in the superannuation system. 
If allowed to continue, growth in direct leverage by superannuation funds, 
although embryonic, may create vulnerabilities for the superannuation and 
financial systems. 
Superannuation policy settings lack stability, which adds to costs and reduces 
long-term confidence and trust in the system. 
Theme two: Post-GFC regulatory response 
Stability and 
the prudential 
framework 
During the GFC, significant government actions in a number of countries, 
including Australia, entrenched perceptions that some institutions are 
too-big-to-fail. These perceptions can be reduced in Australia by making it more 
credible to resolve these institutions without Government support. 
A number of jurisdictions have implemented new macroprudential toolkits to 
assist with managing systemic risks. The effectiveness of these for a country like 
Australia is not yet well established and there are significant practical difficulties in 
using such tools. 
Australia has implemented some aspects of global prudential frameworks earlier 
than a number of jurisdictions. It has also used national discretion in defining 
capital ratios. When combined with other aspects of the prudential framework and 
calculated on a consistent basis, Australian banks’ capital ratios (common equity 
tier 1) are around the middle of the range relative to other countries. However, 
differences such as those in definitions of capital do limit international 
comparability. 
To contribute to the effectiveness of the financial system, sound corporate 
governance requires clarity of the responsibility and authority of boards and 
management. There are differences in the duties and requirements of governing 
bodies for different types of financial institutions and, within institutions, 
substantial regulator focus on boards has confused the delineation between the 
role of the board and that of management. 
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Consumer 
outcomes and 
conduct 
regulation 
The current disclosure regime produces complex and lengthy documents that often 
do not enhance consumer understanding of financial products and services, and 
impose significant costs on industry participants. 
Affordable, quality financial advice can bring significant benefits for consumers. 
Improving the standards of adviser competence and removing the impact of 
conflicted remuneration can improve the quality of advice. Comprehensive 
financial advice can be costly, and there is consumer demand for lower-cost scaled 
advice. 
Regulatory 
architecture 
The regulatory perimeters could be re-examined in a number of areas to ensure 
each is targeted appropriately and can capture emerging risks. 
Australia generally has strong, well-regarded regulators, but some areas for 
improvement have been identified to increase independence and accountability.  
During the GFC and beyond, Australia’s regulatory coordination mechanisms 
have been strong, although there may be room to enhance transparency. 
Regulators’ mandates and powers are generally well defined and clear; however, 
more could be done to emphasise competition matters. In addition, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has a broad mandate, and the civil 
and administrative penalties available to it are comparatively low in relation to 
comparable peers internationally. 
Theme three: Emerging trends 
Ageing and 
retirement 
incomes 
The retirement phase of superannuation is underdeveloped and does not meet the 
risk management needs of many retirees. 
There are regulatory and other policy impediments to developing income products 
with risk management features that could benefit retirees. 
Technology 
opportunities 
and risks 
Technological innovation is a major driver of efficiency in the financial system and 
can benefit consumers. Government and regulators need to balance these benefits 
against the risks, as they seek to manage the flexibility of regulatory frameworks 
and the regulatory perimeter. Government is also well-positioned to facilitate 
innovation through coordinated action, regulatory flexibility and forward-looking 
mechanisms. 
Access to growing amounts of customer information and new ways of using it have 
the potential to improve efficiency and competition, and present opportunities to 
empower consumers. However, evidence indicates these trends heighten privacy 
and data security risks. 
The financial system’s shift to an increasingly online environment heightens cyber 
security risks and the need to improve digital identity solutions. Government has 
the ability to facilitate industry coordination and innovation in these areas. 
International 
integration 
Although elements of Australia’s financial system are internationally integrated, a 
number of potential impediments have been identified. Financial system 
developments in the region will require continuing Government engagement to 
facilitate integration with Asia. 
Government efforts to promote Australia’s policy interests on international 
standard setting bodies have been successful. Domestic regulatory processes could 
be improved to better consider international standards and foreign regulation. 
Coordination of Australia’s international financial integration could be improved. 
Growth and consolidation 
Two of the most striking developments in the financial system since the Wallis Inquiry 
have been the growth and consolidation of the financial system.  
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• Financial system assets have grown from the equivalent of two years of nominal 
GDP in 1997 to more than three years of nominal GDP today.6 In particular, 
superannuation assets have grown substantially (Chart 1.1). Australia’s financial 
sector accounts for 8 per cent of GDP and is relatively large internationally.7, 8 
However, the focus of this Inquiry is not the size of the financial system but how 
effectively it distributes funding and risk in the Australian economy. 
• The Australian financial system has become more concentrated and integrated since 
the Wallis Inquiry. In particular, each of the four major banks has expanded its 
operations into life insurance and wealth management. These developments have 
prompted concerns about competition in the market.  
Chart 1.1: Assets of financial institutions 
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Source: Reserve Bank of Australia.9 
                                                          
6  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 15. 
7  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 17. 
8  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2013, National system of accounts 2012/13, cat. no. 5204.0, 
ABS, Canberra. Note: Uses gross value added at basic prices (total industrial value added). 
9  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, B1 Assets of financial institutions, RBA, Sydney, 2 June. 
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Competition and contestability 
Competition is important because of its ability to lower prices and improve quality of 
financial products, services and markets. 
High levels of market concentration can raise concerns about the level of competition 
in a market, but it is not sufficient to look at this measure alone. Competition can be 
strong between players in a concentrated market. In addition, the threat of new 
entrants can exert competitive pressures on incumbents.  
Competition in banking 
Australia’s banking market has become more concentrated since the GFC, with 
declines in the share of credit provided by credit unions, building societies and the 
non-bank sector. The crisis drove concentration by pushing out smaller lenders as the 
cost of funding rose, which reflected the higher price of risk following the GFC.  
Australia’s larger banks have a number of commercial competitive advantages over 
their smaller domestic rivals, including scale of operations, funding costs, product 
breadth and brand recognition. On balance, the Inquiry considers that the banking 
sector is competitive, reflecting a number of indicators. Australian banks’ net interest 
margins have almost halved since the early 1990s10 and the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) submits that returns on equity are comparable to those achieved by other large 
Australian companies.11 
The Inquiry notes existing capital requirements are not always competitively neutral. 
Larger banks have satisfied the criteria to use an advanced approach when 
implementing the Basel II capital requirements, but smaller authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs) have to charge more to achieve the same return on equity for a 
mortgage.12 Some submissions hold the view that, particularly for their mortgage 
book, smaller banks would have lower capital requirements if they were able to 
employ internal ratings-based approach (IRB) models. 
Some submissions argue that the larger banks also benefit from a funding advantage 
from being perceived as too-big-to-fail. However, it is the Inquiry’s view that the best 
way to deal with any competitive advantage arising from these perceptions is to 
address directly the systemic risks posed by large banks. 
                                                          
10  Treasury 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 34. 
11  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 165. 
12  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 75. 
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Funding is critical to ADI and non-bank lenders’ ability to compete. The use of 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) was a key factor in growing the market 
shares of smaller banks and non-bank lenders before the GFC. The crisis significantly 
increased the cost of this type of funding, thereby reducing the competitive position of 
smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders. Although the RMBS market has started to recover, 
the relative cost of fund raising via this method remains higher than before the GFC. 
The ‘four pillars’ policy, which prevents mergers between the big four banks, has been 
in place, with some modifications, since 1990. Allowing a merger between the large 
banks would likely reduce competition, and this may offset any advantages that flow 
from larger scale. No submissions supported removing this policy. 
Competition in payment systems and markets 
The payments industry is characterised by significant economies of scale and strong 
network effects, with the challenge for new payment system operators to build scale 
through acceptance by consumers and merchants. 
A lack of transparency has required regulatory intervention to provide consumers and 
merchants with clearer price signals and more choice in responding to them. Without 
regulation, customers who use lower-cost payment methods, such as cash, may 
cross-subsidise those who use other forms of payments.  
Some submissions argue that, while the regulated caps on credit card interchange fees 
may have reduced costs for merchants and customers at the checkout, they have also 
lowered the value to cardholders by limiting reward points and potentially making 
credit card fees or interest rates higher than they would have been. 
There are separate standards or access regimes for eftpos, scheme debit cards, scheme 
credit cards and automated teller machines (ATMs). Due to this, some payment system 
operators are subject to relatively intensive regulation, while others are less heavily 
regulated. Several submissions ask for more consistency in the way different schemes 
are regulated. 
Funding Australia’s economic activity 
As discussed above, the Australian financial system has grown substantially. 
However, the Inquiry recognises that a larger financial system is not necessarily 
beneficial to economic growth and a system that is too large may pose greater risks to 
economic growth. 13 The Inquiry is focusing on the efficiency with which Australia’s 
                                                          
13  For a discussion of this issue, see for example Cecchetti, S and Kharroubi, E 2012 Reassessing 
the impact of finance on growth Bank for International Settlements Working Paper No 381, BIS, 
Basel.  
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financial system allocates funding and risk in the economy, rather than on its size or 
direct contribution to economic activity.  
Australia has been a user of foreign funding for much of its post-European settlement 
history. It has typically had more abundant domestic investment opportunities than 
could be funded from historic levels of national saving. By using these foreign funds 
productively, Australia’s growth potential has been raised, benefiting both residents 
and foreign investors. 
The continued inflow of foreign funding reflects the confidence foreigners have in 
Australia’s growth prospects. Although Australia’s use of foreign funding is not 
without risks, these can be mitigated by ensuring these funds are directed to their most 
productive use, as well as maintaining a prudent regulatory regime and a sustainable 
fiscal position. Based on evidence presented in submissions, the Inquiry notes some 
distortions that may interfere with the allocative role that prices perform.  
In particular, the Inquiry identifies distortions affecting household financial decision 
making and structural impediments to small- to medium-sized enterprise (SME) 
lending. It also recognises the effects of the taxation system on outcomes in the 
financial system.  
Housing and household leverage 
Taxation distorts households’ saving and borrowing decisions towards housing and 
salary-sacrificed superannuation, and encourages higher levels of household leverage 
to fund purchases of dwellings.  
Since the Wallis Inquiry, household leverage has almost doubled.14 This has been 
accompanied by a significant increase in housing prices relative to income over the 
past decade.15 Higher household indebtedness and the greater proportion of 
mortgages on bank balance sheets mean that an extreme event in the housing market 
would have significant implications for financial stability and economic growth. 
                                                          
14  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 22 (ABS, APRA and RBA data). Note: since 1997, household leverage has increased 
from debt equivalent to around 0.8 years of gross disposable income to around 1.5 years of 
income in 2008 — household leverage has since stabilised at around this level. Disposable 
income is after the payment of tax and before the deduction of interest payments. 
15  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Home Prices and Household Spending research discussion 
paper 2013-14, RBA, Sydney. 
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SME financing 
Australia’s 2 million SMEs employ almost 70 per cent of the workforce.16 SMEs and 
new ventures source some of their business equity from their own personal wealth; 
however, they also require external sources of finance. The Inquiry notes that, 
compared to their larger counterparts, the price and terms of SME loans can be more 
restrictive. For example, many lenders now require more security, usually residential 
property, for business loans.17 In large part, this is due to the lack of information 
lenders have on the financial behaviour of SMEs and their owners. 
Other taxation issues 
As Australia becomes increasingly integrated with global capital markets, there is also 
a question of whether the corporate tax regime, particularly the dividend imputation 
system, is effective in reducing the cost of capital in Australia. The dividend 
imputation system creates a bias for individuals and institutional investors (including 
superannuation funds) to invest in domestic equities, and it may be a contributing 
factor to the lack of a deep domestic corporate bond market in Australia. 
Interest withholding tax (IWT) may also be distorting the funding decisions of 
financial institutions and placing Australia at a competitive disadvantage 
internationally. A number of submissions call for IWT to be removed or reduced. 
The Goods and Services Tax (GST) is not levied on most financial services. This affects 
the size of the financial services industry relative to other industries where GST is 
levied, and affects the composition of the end-users who ultimately consume those 
financial services. However, levying a GST on financial services is difficult. 
A more neutral taxation of savings vehicles and assets across the economy is desirable. 
It is not this Inquiry’s role to make recommendations on tax issues; however, the 
Inquiry will provide its observations to the Government’s forthcoming Tax White 
Paper. 
Superannuation efficiency and policy settings 
A major development since the Wallis Inquiry is the rapid expansion in 
superannuation assets. Superannuation assets have grown from around $300 billion to 
$1.8 trillion today.18, 19 Continued high rates of growth are expected for the foreseeable 
                                                          
16  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2013, Counts of Australian businesses, including entries and 
exits Jun 2009 — Jun 2013, cat. no. 8165.0, ABS, Canberra. 
17 Reserve Bank of Australia 2011, Submission to the Inquiry into Access of Small Business to 
Finance. Cited in Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry, page 5. 
18  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2007, Insight: Celebrating 10 years of 
superannuation data collection 1996-2006, Issue 2, Special Ed., APRA, Sydney. 
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future and will be driven by the increase in the Superannuation Guarantee rate to 
12 per cent by 2022, superannuation tax concessions, and investment returns. Industry 
Super Australia predicts that superannuation assets will exceed those of the banking 
system by around 2030.20 
The structure of the system has also changed significantly. The number of Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)-regulated funds (excluding small APRA 
funds) has fallen from more than 4,700 to 299 since 1997,21 and the number of 
self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) has grown rapidly. SMSFs now make up 
the largest segment of the superannuation system in terms of the number of entities 
and the size of funds under management (Chart 1.2).22 
Chart 1.2: Superannuation assets by fund type, percentage of GDP 
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19  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Statistics: Quarterly superannuation 
performance (interim edition), Sydney, March. 
20  Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to Financial System Inquiry, page 117. 
21  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2007, Insight: Celebrating 10 years of 
superannuation data collection 1996-2006, issue 2, Special Ed., APRA, Sydney; Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Statistics: Quarterly superannuation performance (interim 
edition), APRA, Sydney, March. 
22  Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: Quarterly superannuation 
performance (interim edition), APRA, Sydney, March. 
23  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, data supplied to Financial System Inquiry from APRA, ATO 
and RBA, 13 June 2014.  
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The Australian superannuation system has become an important source of funding for 
the rest of the economy, particularly for long-term fixed capital formation. However, 
some evidence raises questions about the efficiency of the sector. Australian 
superannuation fund operating costs are among the highest in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).24 The Grattan Institute estimates 
that fees have consumed over one-quarter of returns since 2004, despite increases in 
scale.25 Direct leverage in superannuation funds is embryonic but growing. The 
number of SMSFs using geared products grew by more than 11 per cent to 38,000 over 
the year to April 2014.26 A number of submissions point to the stabilising influence of 
the superannuation sector during the GFC. The current ability of funds to borrow 
directly may, over time, erode the superannuation system’s ability to act as a 
stabilising influence on the financial system during times of stress. 
Post-GFC regulatory response 
In the years since the Wallis Inquiry there have been several international financial 
crises and major institution collapses, including the Long-term Capital Management 
collapse, Asian financial crisis, Enron and WorldCom collapses, Russian and Argentine 
currency crises and dot-com crash, and then the global financial and European 
sovereign debt crises. 
However, the GFC has had a lasting effect on Australia’s financial system. After a 
period of favourable economic conditions in the major economies, investors 
worldwide began to take more risks than was prudent.  
The catalyst for the crisis was the deterioration of the United States housing and 
mortgage market, which caused a liquidity and confidence crisis in the financial 
markets of developed countries. The contagion was transmitted via the 
interconnectedness of global financial institutions and markets, including through the 
growth of complex securitisation structures. A number of financial institutions in the 
United States and Europe collapsed. In response, governments became involved in 
stabilising their financial systems through guarantees, direct equity measures, and 
large fiscal and monetary stimulus measures. 
                                                          
24  Reserve Bank of Australia, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 178 
(OECD data). 
25  Minife, J 2014, Super sting: How to stop Australians paying too much for superannuation, Grattan 
Institute, Melbourne. 
26  Investment Trends 2014, SMSF Investor Report, April. Note: Based on a survey of 2,163 SMSF 
trustees. 
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Although Australia’s financial system performed reasonably well through that period 
of acute stress,27 the Government intervened in the form of wholesale and deposit 
guarantees, and provided support for the securitisation market. Deposit guarantees 
and direct support for markets departed from the Wallis Inquiry principle that the 
Government should not provide guarantees in the financial system. 
Regulatory responses 
In response to the GFC, Australian regulators and the Government have taken steps to 
increase the resilience of the financial system. International bodies responsible for 
making standards on financial regulation have also become increasingly active. Within 
the G20, for example, governments and regulators in Europe and the United States 
have led efforts to strengthen regulation and oversight — including taking a more 
active regulator role in identifying and addressing the build-up of systemic risks.  
An issue for Australia is the extent to which it should implement new global 
standards. A significant consideration for Australian authorities has been the need for 
our banks to maintain the confidence of external investors and credit rating agencies, 
given their exposure to foreign funding markets. 
Australian regulators have sought to influence the design of the global framework to 
take into account Australia’s circumstances. Further, regulators have applied the 
framework in a manner and timeframe to best suit Australian market circumstances, as 
a capital importer within a global market. 
Stability and the prudential framework 
Australia has had a relatively stable financial system for most of the past two decades. 
In particular, Australia’s financial system weathered the GFC relatively well. This 
stability is the result of a number of factors, including a stable macroeconomic 
environment; prudent risk management by financial institutions themselves; and a 
traditional, comparatively low-risk commercial banking model remaining profitable. 
A factor contributing to Australia’s resilience during the GFC was its strong prudential 
framework. Australia’s prudential rules, often tighter than minimum international 
standards before the GFC, together with a proactive approach to supervision, helped 
maintain a healthy and stable financial sector domestically.28 
                                                          
27  Davis K 2011, ‘The Australian Financial System in the 2000s: Dodging the Bullet’, in 
Gerard, H and Kearns, J (eds), The Australian Economy in the 2000s, Proceedings of a Conference, 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, pages 301–48. 
28  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2011, Australia 2011 Article IV Consultation, IMF country 
Report No 11/300, IMF, Washington DC. 
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International financial history indicates that financial crises and financial instability are 
not uncommon.29 Instability has substantial costs to the economy. It limits the financial 
system’s capacity to allocate funds, facilitate payments, transfer risk and create 
liquidity. Instability can result in losses for savers or policyholders, lower economic 
growth, and damage to the financial sector’s ability to serve the economy. As shown 
by the GFC, it can also have severe negative effects on the economy, including low 
growth and high unemployment, and can result in policy options that lead to higher 
Government debt.  
Internationally, governments’ responses to the GFC sought to minimise these costs. 
These actions were often appropriate, and illustrated the potential need for 
government intervention in the financial system in very extreme circumstances. The 
GFC, both here and overseas, highlighted the link between governments and the 
financial sector. It demonstrated that fiscal responsibility is an important ingredient to 
maintaining a resilient financial system.  
However, any expectation that government will support a failing financial institution 
creates a moral hazard in the longer term. This may reduce market discipline and 
encourage riskier behaviour. Although the perception that some institutions are 
too-big-to-fail cannot be eliminated entirely, there is much the Government can do to 
minimise moral hazard and the problems associated these perceptions.  
As markets continue to develop, financial and technological innovations are emerging 
rapidly, which may bring new risks. The GFC highlighted that focusing on the 
soundness of individual institutions without stepping back to consider the overall 
financial system is not sufficient to ensure financial stability. Australia has a 
well-established system for monitoring systemic risk. However, risks outside the 
prudential perimeter can be more difficult to identify due to limited oversight and a 
lack of data.  
To help address these risks, significant reforms such as improving the transparency of 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives have been introduced since the GFC. However, 
this has also moved derivatives from banks into the shadow banking sector. Globally, 
the increasing use of shadow banking has the potential to generate systemic risks. 
However, because of the small size of the shadow banking sector in Australia, risks to 
stability in Australia remain limited. 
Consumer outcomes and conduct regulation 
Although there were no significant prudentially regulated institution failures during 
the GFC in Australia, the crisis resulted in significant losses for some individuals. 
                                                          
29  Although noting the extent to which this is an inherent feature of financial markets or the 
result of government interventions (or a mixture of both) remains a matter of debate. 
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Fraud, mis-selling, product unsuitability, lack of information and lack of financial 
literacy were all factors in poor financial outcomes for some Australians.  
Since the crisis, the emerging theory of behavioural economics has recognised that 
most individuals do not always act in an economically rational way. Behavioural 
biases can reduce the effectiveness of many traditional consumer protection 
approaches, which rely on the assumption that consumers will seek out and 
understand all relevant information before purchasing a financial product.  
Consumer disclosure 
Australia’s regulatory framework relies heavily on disclosure to protect and empower 
consumers. 
Submissions support a view that the disclosure framework is not achieving its 
objectives. The current disclosure regime produces complex and lengthy documents 
that do not always enhance consumers’ understanding of financial products and 
services, and impose significant costs on industry participants. 
Reasons that disclosure does not always inform consumers include low levels of 
financial literacy, disengagement due to lack of time or motivation, behavioural biases, 
and the length and complexity of disclosure documents. This situation makes it 
difficult for consumers to compare products, understand risks and make informed 
decisions. 
Financial advice 
Retail investment failures following the GFC, including high-profile cases such as 
Storm and Trio, highlighted concerns with financial advice regulation. 
Recent reforms have sought to improve the quality of financial advice and increase 
trust and confidence in the financial advice industry by introducing a best interests 
duty and a requirement to put the interests of the client ahead of those of the adviser. 
These reforms have provided greater clarity over the expectations and requirements of 
financial advisers. Reforms on conflicted remuneration have also sought to better align 
the interests of financial advisers and consumers.30 The Inquiry considers the principle 
of consumers being able to access advice that helps them meet their financial needs is 
undermined by the existence of conflicted remuneration structures in financial advice. 
                                                          
30  Note: the Government has recently announced some changes to the Future of Financial 
Advice (FOFA) laws, see Cormann, M (Minister for Finance) 2014, The Way Forward on 
Financial Advice Laws, media release, 20 June, Canberra, viewed 2 July 2014, 
<http://www.financeminister.gov.au/media/2014/0620-the-way-forward-on-financial-advice
-laws.html> 
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Financial advisers provide advice on a range of products including investment, debt 
management, tax management, superannuation and insurance. The total number of 
financial advisers in Australia is around 54,000, with 3,000 organisations holding an 
Australian Financial Services Licence to provide personal financial product advice.31 
However, less than 42 per cent of the Australian adult population has ever used a 
financial adviser.32 Good financial advice is increasingly important given growing 
household wealth and mandated superannuation investment. 
Evidence suggests that the quality of financial advice could be improved significantly. 
For example, ASIC’s shadow shopping study of retirement advice concluded:  
• More than a third of the advice examples were poor in quality (39 per cent) 
• There were only two examples of good quality advice (3 per cent) 
• The majority of advice examples reviewed (58 per cent) were adequate33 
Regulatory architecture 
The GFC tested regulatory arrangements globally and domestically, and Australia’s 
twin peaks model has proven robust and effective. A number of overseas jurisdictions 
have looked to Australia’s model, or versions of it, to address weaknesses the GFC 
exposed in their financial systems. 
Evidence suggests there is no case to make significant changes to Australia’s 
regulatory framework. 
However, submissions and stakeholders suggest a wide range of refinements. 
Reflecting this, the Inquiry observes a number of issues relating to regulatory 
architecture: 
• Regulatory burden: Following the GFC, the considerable international policy 
response included new and increased regulation for financial system entities. A 
number of submissions are concerned about the burden of implementing new 
regulations. The Inquiry has commissioned further analysis of the costs and 
benefits of regulation, including the relative impact of the fixed cost of regulation 
on institutions of varying size. 
                                                          
31  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 202. Note: these are not exact numbers as there is currently 
no register of advisers. 
32  Roy Morgan Research 2012, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 18 June 2014. 
33  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2012, Report 279 Shadow shopping 
study of retirement advice (REP 279), ASIC, Sydney. 
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• Regulatory perimeters: As the financial system environment changes, the way 
Australia considers the regulatory perimeter may need to change. In this context, 
regulation should be examined pertaining to superannuation funds, retail 
payments systems, securities dealers and certain technology service providers of 
sufficient scale. 
• Independence and accountability: Australia generally has strong, well-regarded 
regulators, but some areas of possible improvement have been identified to increase 
independence and accountability. 
• Regulator structure and coordination: The GFC demonstrated the importance of 
strong regulatory coordination mechanisms. Submissions were strongly supportive 
of the Council of Financial Regulators, endorsing it as the right body for high-level 
coordination. Some submissions recommended expanding and strengthening its 
role, although regulators consider it effective. 
• Execution of mandates: Australia’s regulators have mandates that place a similar 
emphasis on competition to international peers; however, more could be done 
beyond mandates to emphasise competition. ASIC’s mandate is broad, having 
grown considerably over the last two decades, generally in response to major 
reform processes and reviews. 
• Enforcement powers: Strong enforcement powers underpin an effective regulatory 
framework. Enforcement sends a message of deterrence to industry and is an 
important aspect of the consumer regulatory framework.  
Emerging trends 
The financial system must continue to be flexible and to adapt quickly to whatever 
developments unfold in the future. Although the Inquiry does not intend to try and 
predict the future, it recognises that the financial system can play an important role in 
helping the economy respond to several opportunities and challenges. With the need 
to lift low productivity growth and ease fiscal pressures, these challenges are likely to 
include our ageing population, changes in technology and Australia’s international 
integration. 
The need for higher rates of productivity growth to ensure continuing improvement in 
living standards is a major challenge facing Australia, in particular given the need to 
support an ageing population.  
The unprecedented increase in the terms of trade, which drove the improvement in 
living standards over the past decade, is believed to have ended and the terms of trade 
are expected to decline over coming years. On its current trajectory, productivity 
growth will not be able to sustain the same rate of growth in incomes that Australia 
has experienced over the past decade (see Chart 1.3 below). 
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Chart 1.3: Contributions to annual per capita income growth 
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foreign income is the differential between incomes payable to Australians by foreigners and incomes payable 
to foreigners by Australians, in real terms. 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Treasury.34 
The financial system has an important role to play in facilitating higher productivity 
growth through allocating funding in the economy more efficiently. Closer financial 
and economic ties with other jurisdictions can also improve productivity by allowing 
foreign firms to enter Australia and by supporting more competition and innovation. 
The financial system also enables Australian firms, both financial and non-financial, to 
expand offshore. 
                                                          
34  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2011, Australian system of national accounts, cat. 
no. 5204.0, ABS, Canberra; and Treasury.  
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Associated with these expected developments, the Commonwealth and state 
governments face a fiscal challenge. The ageing population is expected to contribute to 
a deterioration of the Government’s fiscal position. By 2050, these demographic 
developments are expected to result in a net cost to Government of 3 per cent of GDP 
(see Chart 1.4 below). 
Chart 1.4: Net fiscal cost of ageing to Government 2011-12 to 2059-60, as 
percentage of GDP 
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Note: The fiscal cost is defined as the primary balance, which is the difference between Government 
revenues and expenditures in any given year excluding interest payments on debt. 
Source: Productivity Commission.35 
The financial system can help, or hinder, governments in relieving some of this fiscal 
pressure. For example, an appropriately designed retirement income system can assist 
in reducing the fiscal costs of the ageing population by providing products to deliver 
retirement incomes from superannuation balances. Conversely, policies that subsidise 
or incentivise imprudent or excessive risk taking may lead to adverse long-term 
consequences for the economy and further pressure on government spending. 
Retirement incomes and ageing 
Australia faces a significant demographic challenge. The ageing population and higher 
life expectancy are likely to result in lower workforce participation rates (Chart 1.5), 
which could lower the long-run growth in the economy and may result in higher costs 
for governments. 
                                                          
35  Productivity Commission (PC) 2013, An ageing Australia: Preparing for the future, Commission 
Research Paper, PC, Canberra, page 165. 
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 Chart 1.5: Labour force participation rates 
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Source: Productivity Commission.36 
But the ageing population also presents an opportunity for the financial system. 
Individuals require a different set of financial products and services to enable them to 
manage their income and risks in retirement. 
The current retirement income system provides limited choice for managing risks in 
retirement. The system lacks a sufficient range of financial products to help provide 
retirees with income and flexibility and to manage risks, particularly longevity risk. 
Furthermore, current policy settings and the incentives they generate do not support 
product development. Australia is unusual compared to its peers in not having a 
well-functioning market for products that manage longevity risk. Australia’s annuity 
market is much smaller than that of comparable countries when measured as a 
proportion of GDP.37 
The structure of retirement income products may also affect the allocation of funding 
in the economy and productivity growth. As the stock of superannuation assets in the 
retirement phase increases, demand for defensive assets such as fixed income products 
can be expected to increase.  
                                                          
36  Productivity Commission (PC) 2013, An ageing Australia: Preparing for the future, Commission 
Research Paper, PC, Canberra, page 92. 
37  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2013, ‘Survey of Annuity 
Products and their Guarantees’, paper presented at the Insurance and Private Pensions 
Committee meeting, 5–6 December. Note: the OECD defines size as the amount of assets 
backing products (where dedicated or separated accounts back the products) or technical 
provisions or reserves. 
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Technology opportunities and risks 
Technology-driven innovation is a major driver of efficiency in the financial system 
and can benefit consumers. It is changing the financial products and services available 
to consumers, as well as the delivery channels and providers of the products and 
services. 
Financial services boundaries are shifting as technology enables new competitors from 
inside and outside the sector, new business models and new services. Trends, such as 
the increasing adoption of cloud technology and financial institutions using growing 
amounts of data, provide opportunities for increasing financial system efficiency. 
Australians are showing themselves to be rapid adopters of technology with 
7.5 million Australians accessing the internet via their mobile phones in 2013, an 
increase of 33 per cent from 2012.38 More Australians shop online for insurance and 
financial services than their counterparts in the United States and major European 
economies.39 This has contributed to the swift growth of services such as mobile 
banking and electronic payments. 
Although there are many benefits, technological innovation also poses challenges for 
Government and regulators, in particular, how to trade off potential benefits against 
risks. To facilitate innovation, Government and regulators should seek to be flexible in 
regulatory approach and technology neutral in regulation. This is not always the case 
currently; for example, some Federal and state-based legislation and regulations 
require (implicitly or explicitly) the use of certain forms of technology.  
Increasing collection of data by financial institutions raises privacy-related risks. 
Submissions highlighted issues including that data might be used in ways a customer 
might not like and might reveal information about persons other than the consenting 
customer, such as their friends, family or clients. Other submissions note that some 
segments of the community, such as senior Australians, are particularly sensitive to 
privacy, safety and security issues. 
Cyber attacks are no longer only a potential threat; they are occurring on an 
increasingly frequent basis. For example, in 2013 cyber crime affected 5 million 
Australians at an estimated cost of $1.06 billion.40 As well as these direct costs, cyber 
crime may erode consumer and business trust and confidence in the financial system. 
The financial system’s shift to an increasingly online environment also heightens the 
                                                          
38  Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 2013, Communications 
report 2012–13, ACMA, Melbourne. 
39  The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 2013, 2013 Global Consumer Sentiment Survey, BCG, 
Boston. 
40  Symantec 2013, 2013 Norton Report: Total Cost of Cybercrime in Australia amounts to 
AU$1.06 billion, media release, 16 October, Sydney. 
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need to improve digital identity solutions. Trusted digital identities are important in 
helping prevent identity-related crime and fraud. 
International integration 
Changes are also occurring in global financial and capital flows that are affecting the 
interaction of Australia’s financial system with the rest of the world. Since the GFC, 
cross-border capital flows have declined globally, and the international regulatory 
response to the crisis has in part aimed to reduce the interconnectedness of the global 
financial system and increase its resilience to shocks. Although the risks of 
connectedness with economies experiencing volatility are real, there remain long-term 
benefits from financial integration. 
The pattern of international financial and capital flows will continue to change with 
forecast financial development and economic growth in the region (see Chart 1.6).  
Chart 1.6: Share of world output over time 
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Source: Treasury.41 
A particularly significant change is the planned gradual liberalisation of foreign 
exchange and capital controls for major economies in this region. Currently, 
Australia’s trade flows and overseas commercial presences in financial services are 
North Atlantic-focused, whereas physical flows are Asia-focused. (See Figure 1.2.) In 
                                                          
41  Based on IMF and Conference Board data, as well as Maddison, A 2010, Statistics on world 
population, GDP and GDP per capita, 1-2008 AD, Historical Statistics, Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre, viewed 21 June 2014, <http://www.ggdc.net>. Based on purchasing 
power parity adjusted GDP. 
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future, trade flows, capital raising and investment by economies in our region are 
likely to increase, in addition to activity in our traditional European or North 
American financial corridors. 
Figure 1.2: Financial and physical outward flows 
  
Note: Includes Australian exports of financial and insurance services, as well as financial and insurance 
services provided by Australia’s foreign affiliates abroad. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics.42 
Australia has benefited substantially from financial integration with the rest of the 
world, most notably from trade and accessing international capital markets over many 
decades. Benefits have also flowed from opening up Australia’s financial services 
market to foreign competition and from exporting financial services to other markets, 
although these exports have not been as significant. 
                                                          
42  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2010, Australian Outward Finance and Insurance Foreign 
Affiliate Trade, 2009-10, cat. no. 5485.0 and International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia, 
2009-10, cat. no. 5368.0, ABS, Canberra. Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, 
Indonesia and Thailand 
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However, the Inquiry observes potential impediments to further international 
integration. Previous Government inquiries and private sector reviews have identified 
tax settings that are interfering with international flows, and regulatory and other 
impediments. To address impediments and effectively respond to changes in the 
region, coordination across Government, regulators and industry could be improved. 
In addition, the Australian financial system is increasingly affected by international 
standards and foreign regulation. Submissions have raised concerns that domestic 
regulatory processes need to better accommodate the scale and complexity of 
increasing international influence on the regulatory environment.
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Growth and Consolidation 
Since the Wallis Inquiry the financial system as a whole has grown significantly, 
especially the superannuation sector. The system has also seen considerable 
consolidation and integration, particularly in banking.  
Against this backdrop of growth and consolidation, and noting the consequences of 
the global financial crisis, the Inquiry observes several issues, including: 
opportunities for improvement in competition and contestability, distortions in 
funding flows, and issues with the efficiency and policy settings of the 
superannuation system. 
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2: Competition 
Competition is the cornerstone of a well-functioning financial system, driving 
efficient outcomes for price, quality and innovation. 
Most sectors of the Australian financial system are concentrated, with that 
concentration generally increasing since the Wallis Inquiry. Banking, payments, 
financial market infrastructure (FMI), platform providers in wealth management 
and personal general insurance have a relatively high degree of market 
concentration. However, competition can still be strong between players in a 
concentrated market. Indeed, market concentration can be a by-product of 
competition, if more efficient firms grow at the expense of their less efficient 
competitors. 
The Inquiry has made the following observations about competition in the 
Australian financial system: 
• The banking sector is competitive, albeit concentrated. The application of capital 
requirements is not competitively neutral. Banks that use internal ratings-based 
(IRB) risk weights have lower risk weights for mortgage lending than smaller 
authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) that use standardised risk weights, 
giving the IRB banks a cost advantage. 
• Regulation of credit card and debit card payment schemes is required for 
competition to lead to more efficient outcomes. However, differences in the 
structure of payment systems have resulted in systems that perform similar 
functions being regulated differently, which may not be competitively neutral. 
Context 
This chapter examines competition across key sectors of the financial system, including 
banking, payments, financial markets, wealth management and insurance. 
Competition is a process of rivalry between individuals or firms in the sale and 
purchase of goods and services. It is the cornerstone of a well-functioning financial 
system, driving efficient outcomes for price, quality and innovation. Competition is 
desirable because it generally leads to better consumer outcomes. 
Assessing competition and contestability 
As competition is a dynamic process, rather than an outcome, it is difficult to measure 
and must be assessed indirectly using a range of indicators. These include market 
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concentration, barriers to entry, margins, profitability, operating costs, switching 
behaviour, firm behaviour and customer satisfaction.  
High levels of market concentration can raise concerns about the level of competition 
in a market, but it is not sufficient to look at this issue alone. Competition can be strong 
between players in a concentrated market. Indeed, market concentration can be a by-
product of competition, if more efficient firms grow at the expense of their less efficient 
competitors. In addition, the threat of new entrants can exert price discipline over an 
incumbent, even in the absence of existing competitors. This threat of competition is 
called ‘contestability’. 
As with other industry sectors, incumbent firms in the financial system have 
significant advantages over new market entrants. These advantages include brand 
recognition, existing customer bases and established distribution arrangements. Large 
incumbent firms have additional advantages in sectors where scale or network effects 
are important, such as payments or FMI, in which case new entrants will find it 
difficult and expensive to attract customers away from existing providers. 
Trends affecting competition 
Government policy should take into account how potential future trends in markets 
may affect the level of competition over time. Competition issues today may resolve 
themselves over time, while highly competitive markets today may become less 
competitive. The Inquiry must consider how potential future trends may affect the 
level of competition over the medium to long term. 
Over the medium term, technology will increasingly affect the level of competition in 
the financial system. In some ways, technology is improving competition. It enables 
consumers to compare and switch between products, making new business models, 
such as online-only banks and peer-to-peer lenders, viable.  
However, technology also has the potential to reduce competition. Technology is 
introducing new economies of scale into financial markets. For example, the use of 
data is becoming increasingly important in understanding risks and meeting consumer 
needs, giving players with large customer bases the capacity to develop competitive 
advantages by leveraging their pre-existing data sets. Although these developments 
should make the financial system more efficient, they could potentially lead to less 
competition in the medium to long term. 
How does the Government promote competition? 
Governments facilitate the operation of markets by upholding property rights and the 
rule of law. They also intervene in markets to promote competition, particularly where 
there is market failure, where firms have accrued excess market power or where there 
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are regulatory distortions in the market. The Government seeks to promote 
competition in the financial system in several ways: 
• Preventing firms from building up excessive market power and/or abusing 
market power. The financial sector is covered by the competition provisions of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) is responsible for determining whether proposed mergers and 
acquisitions in the financial sector would substantially lessen competition. It is also 
responsible for enforcing provisions relating to the misuse of market power; third-
line forcing; and other exclusionary conduct, cartel conduct and price signalling. 
The Payments System Board (PSB), which has responsibility for setting the 
payments policy of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), plays a unique role in 
regulating access regimes and fee arrangements for payment schemes. 
• Promoting competition by increasing a market’s contestability. The Government 
can do this by reducing regulatory barriers to entry, such as licensing or 
authorisation requirements, or by reducing barriers to consumer switching, such as 
by introducing mandatory disclosure requirements or abolishing exit fees. 
There is a potential trade-off between competition and stability. One of the objectives 
of prudential regulation is to ensure that market participants do not take inappropriate 
risks when competing for greater market share. Maintaining sustainable firms may 
also promote long-term competition. 
The Government can also affect competition by imposing compliance costs on market 
participants. The regulatory frameworks administered by the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA), and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
affect the cost bases of market participants. Many submissions highlight aspects of 
regulation they claim are harming competition by increasing the costs of particular 
businesses. For example, although large institutions face the biggest absolute costs, 
smaller competitors may face a higher relative burden. 
The Inquiry’s principles for competition policy 
To facilitate competition, the Government should: 
• Ensure market participants do not act anti-competitively or build up excessive 
market power through mergers and acquisitions 
• Remove regulatory impediments to competition, such as barriers to entry and 
distortions to level playing fields, subject to trade-offs with other policy objectives 
that the regulation seeks to achieve 
• In the case of network goods and natural monopolies, ensure market participants 
have access to infrastructure and data that enable them to compete for consumers, 
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subject to considerations around the investments that initial market participants 
may have made in developing the infrastructure or data sets 
• Facilitate consumers’ capacity to understand and compare products, and ensure 
that consumers are able to switch between products at a reasonable cost and 
through a simple process 
Banking sector 
Australia’s banking market is relatively concentrated by international standards. The 
share of banking assets owned by the four largest banks in Australia is higher than 
equivalent shares in most other jurisdictions.1 Concentration has increased since the 
global financial crisis (GFC), with the major banks’ share of total ADI assets increasing 
from 65.4 per cent in September 2007 to 78.5 per cent in March 2014.2 However, it is not 
unusual for concentration to increase following a financial crisis or economic 
downturn.  
The banking sector’s increased concentration reflects two primary factors: 
• Westpac and the Commonwealth Bank acquired St George and Bankwest, which 
together accounted for 11 per cent of mortgages and small- and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) loans at the time of their acquisition.3,4 
• Since the GFC, the major banks have benefited from better access to funds and 
lower funding costs than their competitors, allowing them to grow faster. 
Some submissions, particularly those from smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders, 
propose that increased concentration has led to less competition. They point to the 
robust returns on equity earned by the major banks as an indicator of excessive 
profitability. However, the major banks argue there is adequate competition, pointing 
to low net interest margins and returns on equity around international norms. 
                                                          
1  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, ‘Australia: Addressing Systemic Risk through 
Higher Loss Absorbency—Technical Note’, IMF Country Report no. 12/311, IMF, Washington 
DC, page 7. 
2  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Quarterly Authorised Deposit-taking 
Institution Performance Statistics, APRA, Sydney, March 2014. Note: this statistic captures all 
assets held by ADIs, not only assets associated with borrowing and lending.  
3  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 2008, Public Competition 
Assessment: Commonwealth Bank of Australia – proposed acquisition of Bankwest and St Andrew’s 
Australia, ACCC, 10 December. 
4  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 2008, Public Competition 
Assessment: Westpac Banking Corporation – proposed acquisition of St George Bank Limited, ACCC, 
13 August.  
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On balance, the Inquiry considers the banking sector is competitive, reflecting a 
number of indicators.  
Net interest margins of the major banks are around historic lows and mid-range by 
world standards.5, 6 In the lead-up to the GFC (2004–08), the average return on equity 
of the major banks was around 16 per cent, and has since averaged about 14 per cent.7 
The RBA notes that these rates are comparable to those achieved by other large 
Australian companies, as well as by major foreign banks before the GFC.8  
Customer satisfaction with the major banks has steadily increased since 2001 and is 
now at record highs, following an initial drop after the Wallis Inquiry.9 Consumers 
also have access to an extensive range of products and providers. For example, there 
are more than 500 standard variable mortgage products from more than 100 providers 
available, and more than 1,500 term deposit products from over 80 providers. That 
said, there are only about 35 small business loan products from around 20 providers.10 
Further, bank lending fee income, non-deposit fee income and deposit fee income as 
a percentage of assets have all fallen since 2000.11 Fees paid by households have 
declined in absolute terms since 2010, with that decline largely driven by decreases in 
account servicing fees and transaction fees. However, fee income from businesses has 
increased, mainly due to an increase in account servicing fees and the volume of loans. 
Merchant service fees have also increased, although these have grown by only 
13 per cent since 2003; whereas the value of transactions accepted has more than 
doubled. 
                                                          
5  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
6  World Bank 2013, Financial Development and Structure Dataset, World Bank, Washington DC, 
November. 
7  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Quarterly Authorised Deposit-taking 
Institution Performance Statistics, APRA, Sydney, March 2014. Note: this return on equity 
statistic includes returns on all ADI activities, not only borrowing and lending. 
8  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
9  Roy Morgan Research 2014, State of the Nation: Report 18, April. 
10  Based on review of Canstar website on 20 June 2014, <http://www.canstar.com.au>.  
11  Craig, A 2014, Banking Fees in Australia, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney. 
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Although the Inquiry considers the banking sector is competitive, the level of 
competition may vary across individual banking markets. Stakeholders raise a number 
of potential competition issues that warrant consideration, including:  
• The effect of regulatory capital requirements, and in particular capital risk weights, 
on competition 
• The effect of funding costs on the competitiveness of smaller ADIs and non-bank 
lenders 
• The level of competition in small business and personal lending 
• Constraints on the ability of consumers to compare and switch between products 
• The four pillars policy 
• Increasing market power and vertical integration 
Regulatory capital requirements 
Capital requirements are largely determined as a proportion of ADIs’ risk-weighted 
assets. Risk weights affect the extent to which a bank must fund its assets using 
regulatory capital (equity, preferred shares and subordinated debt), rather than 
potentially cheaper deposits and wholesale debt. The purpose of risk weights is to 
ensure the size of an ADI’s regulatory capital buffers reflects certain risks to which the 
ADI is exposed. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) sets minimum capital standards 
for banks. APRA enforces these minimum standards in Australia. The first of the Basel 
accords, known as Basel I, established standardised asset risk weights for calculating 
capital requirements, which applied to all ADIs in Australia. The Basel II framework 
allowed banks to seek regulatory approval to determine risk weights using IRB models 
that reflect their actual loss experiences. IRB modelling incentivises ADIs to improve 
their risk management practices by requiring less regulatory capital for lower-risk 
assets.  
The four major banks and Macquarie Bank have had their internal risk models 
accredited by APRA. Other ADIs are not accredited, mainly because of the current 
standing of their risk management systems and the costs involved in developing 
internal models. Instead, they rely on standardised risk weights. 
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Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
The banking sector is competitive, albeit concentrated. The application of capital 
requirements is not competitively neutral. Banks that use IRB risk weights have 
lower risk weights for mortgage lending than smaller ADIs that use standardised 
risk weights, giving the IRB banks a cost advantage. 
The IRB banks have lower risk weights for mortgage lending than standardised ADIs, 
although the advantage is less clear in relation to other asset classes. This provides the 
IRB banks with a cost advantage for mortgage lending. In its submission, APRA 
notes:12 
• In early 2014, the average risk weight for housing lending under the IRB approach 
was 18 per cent, as compared to 39 per cent under the standardised approach. 
• All else being equal, an ADI using the standardised approach would have to charge 
23 basis points more than an IRB bank to achieve the same return on equity for a 
mortgage. 
Submissions from smaller ADIs identify these higher risk weights as a competitive 
disadvantage. They argue that similar loans should be risk weighted the same, 
regardless of who holds them. However, APRA’s submission makes the following 
points: 
• IRB and standardised risk weights cover credit, market and operational risk. IRB 
banks are subject to additional requirements for interest rate risk in the banking 
book, whereas standardised ADIs are not. This means that direct comparisons 
between IRB and standardised risk weights overstate any competitive advantage 
for IRB banks.  
• The risk weights of the IRB banks vary over time in line with their loss 
performance. In recent years, the IRB banks have benefited from strong asset 
quality and low impairments. However, this could change if they experience higher 
losses in the future. Although credit unions and building societies have also 
experienced low impairment rates, some of the regional banks have experienced 
higher loss rates.13 
                                                          
12  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry. 
13  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Chart Pack: The Australian Economy and Financial 
Markets, June, Sydney, page 29, viewed 20 June 2014, <http://www.rba.gov.au/chart-
pack/pdf/chart-pack.pdf>.  
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• The aggregate regulatory capital requirements of an ADI should reflect its overall 
risk profile. Although small ADIs may benefit from detailed knowledge of their 
customers, they also have relatively concentrated loan books and, in the case of 
credit unions and building societies, limited capacity to raise new equity. They also 
tend to have less sophisticated risk management systems, albeit with less complex 
risks. These factors suggest smaller ADIs may need higher regulatory capital 
buffers than their larger competitors. 
The Inquiry considers smaller ADIs most likely face a disadvantage due to the 
differences between standardised risk weights and risk weights determined by IRB 
models. However, the extent of the disadvantage would be difficult to determine and 
would vary between ADIs over time, depending on the riskiness of their assets.  
Standardised risk weights do not provide incentives for the ADIs that use them to 
reduce the riskiness of their lending, as this would not reduce their risk weights. 
Conversely, IRB banks receive strong incentives to reduce the riskiness of their 
lending. 
Policy options for consultation 
Submissions identify a number of options to address the consequences of the 
differences between standardised and IRB risk weights:  
• It may be possible for Government or APRA to work with smaller ADIs to help 
them attain IRB accreditation. Submissions indicate some non-IRB banks are 
actively considering how to attain IRB accreditation, but are finding this difficult. 
The Inquiry would welcome views on how Government or APRA may be able to 
assist with this. 
• Another option could be to increase the risk weights for IRB banks. This could 
involve setting a minimum risk weight for mortgages determined by IRB models, 
or indirectly determined by setting or increasing floors for key parameters in IRB 
models. For example, for stability reasons, APRA already requires that IRB banks 
assume a 20 per cent ‘loss given default’ rate for their mortgage book, even when 
their models produce a lower rate. Increasing the risk weights for IRB mortgages 
could increase stability and competition, and incentivise more lending away from 
housing; although, it could also increase costs for IRB banks and may therefore 
reduce efficiency.  
• In its submission, APRA notes that risk weight floors have been introduced in 
Sweden and Hong Kong, and the BCBS is investigating measures, such as floors 
and benchmarks, to limit risk weight variability while retaining appropriate risk 
sensitivity. However, the prospective introduction of floors and analysis by the 
BCBS is driven primarily by stability rather than competition concerns, and is not 
limited to mortgage lending. 
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Other suggested options would have trade-offs between stability and competition. 
They would also be inconsistent with Australia’s commitment to the Basel framework, 
and so may risk the international reputation of Australia’s banking system. 
• It may be possible to develop a tiered system of standardised risk weights that 
incorporates some components of IRB models. Such a system could potentially be 
more accurate than standardised risk weights, while less burdensome than IRB 
modelling. The Inquiry welcomes views on how such an option could be 
implemented. 
• A number of submissions propose APRA should lower standardised risk weights 
for mortgages.14 This option would have several drawbacks. It could lower the 
incentive to improve risk management models and further incentivise non-IRB 
ADIs to undertake mortgage lending, rather than business or personal lending. This 
option could also increase risk, which could increase funding costs.  
• A final option would be to allow smaller ADIs to adopt IRB for residential 
mortgages only, rather than for all asset classes. This would likely only benefit mid-
tier ADIs that have the capacity to model their own mortgage risk weights. This 
option could also reduce stability, as the IRB accreditation process is designed to 
ensure ADIs manage their entire loan book effectively – and this would be lost.  
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements 
• Assist ADIs that are not accredited to use IRB models in attaining IRB 
accreditation 
• Increase minimum IRB risk weights 
• Introduce a tiered system of standardised risk weights 
• Lower standardised risk weights for mortgages 
• Allow smaller ADIs to adopt IRB modelling for mortgages only 
 
                                                          
14  For example, the Regional Banks’ submission to the Financial System Inquiry on behalf of 
Bank of Queensland, Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, ME Bank and Suncorp Bank proposes 
lowering standardised risk weights for mortgages to 20 per cent. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
How could Government or APRA assist smaller ADIs to attain IRB accreditation? 
Funding costs 
The major banks have lower wholesale funding costs than their smaller competitors. A 
significant part of this advantage is derived from commercial and market factors, 
including the major banks’ size, their greater access to capital, the diversity of their 
lending portfolios and their sophisticated risk management systems. Although the 
funding advantages accruing from these factors may be a natural consequence of size, 
some submissions argue that other factors disadvantage smaller ADIs, namely: 
• A perception that some banks are too big for Government to allow them to fail, 
which may lead to creditors lending to these banks at a lower rate 
• The collapse in the residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market following 
the GFC 
Preliminary assessment 
The impact of perceptions of too-big-to-fail on wholesale funding costs 
A number of submissions argue that large banks receive an additional funding 
advantage, as they are perceived as too-big-to-fail.15 The Stability chapter explores this 
in more detail. In short, creditors may believe that, in times of crisis, the Government 
will provide taxpayer support to banks whose disorderly failure could damage other 
parts of the economy. Thus, creditors may be willing to lend to these banks at a 
reduced rate. 
It is difficult to estimate the size of any possible funding cost advantage that the 
perception of being too-big-to-fail provides large banks. This is in large part due to 
different creditors having different perceptions around risk. A number of 
organisations have attempted to estimate the potential funding advantage; however, 
estimates vary depending on the methodology used.16 Any advantage is also likely to 
                                                          
15  Submissions to the Financial System Inquiry include those by the Customer Owned Banking 
Association, the Regional Banks and Yellow Brick Road. 
16  International examples include: Schich, S and Lindh, S 2012, ‘Implicit Guarantees for Bank 
Debt: Where Do We Stand’, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, vol 2012, issue 1, OECD; 
and Santos, J 2014, ‘Special Issue: Large and Complex Banks’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Economic Policy Review, vol 20, no. 2, New York. Australian studies are scarcer, but include: 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, ‘Australia: Addressing Systemic Risk through 
Higher Loss Absorbency—Technical Note’, IMF Country Report no. 12/311, IMF, Washington.  
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fluctuate over time, and could be transient if Government policies effectively reduce 
the systemic risks posed by large banks.17 
The residential mortgage-backed securities market 
During the GFC, the RMBS market became dislocated and the cost of RMBS as a 
funding source for mortgage lenders increased. This disproportionately affected 
smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders, which rely more heavily on these markets for 
funding, and compounded the wholesale funding cost advantage that the larger banks 
already had. The introduction of the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS), which protects 
retail bank deposits up to $250,000, also affected non-bank lenders, who could not 
benefit from it. 
Before the GFC, short-term debt and securitisation provided a cost-effective form of 
funding that allowed smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders to compete with the major 
banks. In 2007, smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders accounted for approximately 
70 per cent of RMBS issuance (Chart 2.1). Investor demand for RMBS fell during the 
GFC, with RMBS spreads increasing by over 100 basis points by 2012.18 At the same 
time, smaller ADIs found it difficult to access wholesale debt markets. The 
Government directed the Australian Office of Financial Management to purchase 
RMBS securities to support the market, but many non-bank lenders were forced to 
reduce their lending or change their business models.19  
The Government has now closed its RMBS purchase program and the market has 
started to recover, with issuance of over $20 billion in 2013 (Chart 2.1). However, the 
RBA does not expect the market will return to pre-GFC levels in the near future.20 
                                                          
17  Oliver Wyman 2014, Do Bond Spreads Show Evidence of Too Big To Fail Effects, April. 
18  Westpac, RP Data, cited in Joye, C 2012, ‘Credit where it’s due to RMBS’, The Australian 
Financial Review, 2 November. 
19  Australian Office of Financial Management 2013, Residential Mortgage-backed Securities, 
viewed 11 June 2014, <http://aofm.gov.au/cash-management-and-investments/residential-
mortgage-backed-securities/>. 
20  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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Chart 2.1: RMBS issuance by financial institution type 
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Further, smaller ADIs have relied more on deposit funding since the GFC, which has 
become relatively more expensive as all ADIs have shifted towards deposit funding 
and away from short-term debt.21 This has further reduced the competitive position of 
smaller ADIs. 
It is not clear if changes in the RMBS market, and the associated deterioration in the 
competitive position of smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders, relate to an ongoing 
market failure. For example, the increase in RMBS spreads likely relates to a correction 
in the price of RMBS to reflect risk, rather than any ongoing issues with the market.  
Policy options for consultation 
Too-big-to-fail 
A number of submissions propose measures to reduce the potential funding benefit 
arising from perceptions of too-big-to-fail. The Inquiry considers the best way to deal 
with any potential competition issues is by directly addressing the systemic risks 
posed by large banks. Potential policy responses to achieve this aim are discussed in 
the Stability chapter. They include: 
                                                          
21  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Table: Retail Deposit and Investment Rates – 
F4, RBA, Sydney. 
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• Increasing the ability to impose losses on a failed financial institution’s creditors 
• Strengthening regulators’ resolution powers for financial institutions, and investing 
more in pre-planning and pre-positioning for financial failure 
• Increasing capital requirements on the most systemically important financial 
institutions 
Other proposals that submissions raise include charging the major banks to ameliorate 
the funding disadvantage, or to explicitly guarantee all ADIs. The Inquiry does not 
consider that there is a case for options of this nature. Charging for a perceived 
funding advantage may strengthen the perception of Government support. Explicitly 
guaranteeing all ADIs would create significant moral hazard, expose taxpayers to very 
large contingent liabilities and put non-bank lenders at a competitive disadvantage. 
Residential mortgage-backed securities 
Some submissions argue that the Government should support the RMBS market to 
reduce funding costs for smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders, and to promote 
competition. The options include:  
• Introducing a new RMBS purchase program, which could potentially focus on 
purchasing lower-rated tranches 
• Purchasing housing loans from small lenders and issuing RMBS, or establishing a 
joint public–private sector body to undertake this function, along the lines of the 
Canadian approach or Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States 
Before recommending such interventions, the Inquiry would need to be convinced of a 
clear market or regulatory failure in the RMBS market. Although Government support 
may have been appropriate during the crisis, the recent market recovery weakens the 
case for further intervention. All options, to varying degrees, would create contingent 
liabilities for taxpayers. The options may also require the Government to intervene in 
the market to ensure lending standards and could potentially create moral hazard. 
Other proposals involve changes to regulatory arrangements governing ADI issuance 
and investment in RMBS. Some submissions suggest RMBS be treated as a high-quality 
liquid asset for the purpose of the liquidity coverage ratio. This would encourage 
major banks to purchase RMBS from smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders, as it could 
be a cheaper way of meeting these requirements than holding Commonwealth 
Government Securities or paying the fee for the committed liquidity facility. At 
present, RMBS holdings are only eligible as collateral for the RBA’s committed 
liquidity facility. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements 
• Provide direct Government support to the RMBS market 
• Allow RMBS to be treated as a high-quality liquid asset for the purpose of the 
liquidity coverage ratio 
Small business and personal lending 
Approximately 50 per cent of small businesses rely on bank loans to fund their 
businesses.22 Small businesses do not have access to the alternative funding channels 
available to larger corporations, such as debt market funding. This makes them more 
dependent on bank credit.  
Individuals can access unsecured loans through a number of means, including 
personal loans and some credit cards. Individuals relying on loans from these sources 
may not have access to cheaper sources of financing. 
Preliminary assessment 
During the GFC, the spreads between lending rates and the cash rate increased for all 
loans. However, spreads for SME and personal lending increased by more than 
spreads for mortgages and corporate loans (Chart 2.2), which largely increased in line 
with banks’ funding costs.23 Terms of lending also tightened. This has generated 
concerns about the strength of competition in the SME and personal lending sectors.  
                                                          
22  Australian Bankers’ Association and Council of Small Business Australia 2013, Small 
Business: Access to Finance Report, Year to March 2013. 
23  Robertson, B and Rush, A 2013, Developments in Banks' Funding Costs and Lending Rates, 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney. 
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Chart 2.2: Changes in spreads to cash rate for different loan types since 
September 2007 
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*Spreads for small business loans are for residentially secured small business loans. 
Source: RBA.24 
However, the increase in SME and personal lending spreads reflects, at least in part, a 
re-evaluation of risk in these lending categories and a general increase in the price of 
risk. As SME and personal lending is more risky than mortgage and corporate lending, 
it follows that their spreads increased by a greater margin.25, 26 It is not clear if any of 
the increase in spreads was due to reduced competition.  
The Inquiry would welcome views on whether there is evidence that spreads in SME 
and personal lending reflect reduced competition. 
Policy options for consultation 
Most policy suggestions relate to how the SME lending market operates, rather than 
the level of competition. The Funding chapter discusses options that may improve the 
funding environment for SMEs. 
                                                          
24  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Table: Indicator Lending Rates – F5 and 
Statistical Table: Interest Rates and Yields – Money Market – Monthly – F1.1, RBA, Sydney. 
25  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Chart Pack: The Australian Economy and Financial 
Markets, June, RBA, Sydney, page 30, viewed 20 June 2014, <http://www.rba.gov.au/chart-
pack/pdf/chart-pack.pdf>.   
26  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 79. 
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Some submissions suggest expanding comprehensive credit reporting (CCR). CCR was 
introduced in March 2014 to enable market participants to share consumers’ 
repayment histories. CCR expands on the previous credit reporting regime, where 
market participants could only share negative credit events, such as a default. The shift 
from a negative to a positive credit reporting system has the potential to promote 
competition by enabling credit providers to more accurately assess the credit 
worthiness of borrowers, and to compete for customers by offering risk-based pricing. 
However, CCR is voluntary and the Inquiry understands that, to date, none of the 
major banks have participated. This is likely because the cost of sharing their 
information with competitors is greater than the benefit of gaining access to other 
competitors’ databases. Some submissions propose making CCR mandatory, which 
may improve the value of CCR for smaller lenders. 
Some submissions also suggest increasing the number of fields reported to include 
additional information, such as outstanding account balances. This could further 
address information asymmetries in the credit assessment processes and enable risk 
assessment at a more granular level. These benefits would need to be balanced against 
privacy concerns, as well as the upfront investments credit providers make in 
establishing customer relationships. 
Another option could be to extend credit reporting to SMEs. This may have the 
potential to improve SME credit risk assessments and improve SME access to funding. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements 
• Expand CCR by making it mandatory, adding new fields and/or extending it to 
SME lending 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
Is there evidence that spreads in SME and personal lending reflect reduced 
competition? 
Comparing and switching between banking products 
Competition relies on consumers being able to compare the value of different 
products. Since the Wallis Inquiry, technology has enabled the growth of online 
aggregators and price comparison websites that better enable consumers to compare 
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value. In the banking sector, aggregators have focused on mortgages, term deposits 
and savings accounts.  
However, there is little gain in improving the capacity of consumers to compare the 
value of products if there are impediments to switching between products. The 
Government and industry have reduced switching costs for banking products since the 
Wallis Inquiry, and a number of industry trends will further lower costs in the future. 
Preliminary assessment 
Comparing banking products  
Some product terms can reduce the functionality of aggregators. For example, account 
aggregators enable consumers to view several bank accounts through one interface 
and identify alternative banking products that may offer superior value. However, 
where a consumer permits an aggregator to access their account, this may constitute a 
breach of the account terms and conditions. Consequently, the consumer may have 
invalidated protections they would otherwise have been afforded in cases of fraud or 
stolen funds. 
Switching banking products 
Several submissions identify low rates of transaction account switching as an obstacle 
to improving banking competition. Roy Morgan Research estimates that 3.2 per cent of 
consumers switch their main financial institution each year.27 This means that, on 
average, consumers switch approximately every 30 years. The Government introduced 
a transaction account switching tool in 2011 to help consumers transfer their direct 
debits and credits. However, take-up of the service has been low, with only 17,500 
people using the system in 2013.28  
Some submissions argue that the Government should go further and introduce full 
account portability. The New Payments Platform industry initiative facilitated by the 
Australian Payments Clearing Association and RBA may assist in this regard. One of 
the platform’s build requirements is for consumers to be able to attach a unique 
address, such as their mobile phone number or email address, to their bank account. 
Implementation of this addressing system will begin in 2016.29 Direct debits and 
credits could then be made to addresses, rather than underlying bank account 
numbers, which would allow a consumer to change accounts without switching 
                                                          
27  Roy Morgan Research 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry. Note: the statistic 
refers to the Australian population aged 18 years and over that switched their main financial 
institution in the 12 months before April 2014. 
28  Treasury 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry. 
29  Australian Payments Clearing Association 2013, Real-Time Payments, Summary of RTPC 
Proposal to the Payments System Board, viewed 20 June 2014, <http://apca.com.au/docs/real-
time-payments/real-time-payments-summary.pdf>.  
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address. In addition, consumers with multiple accounts would be able to use multiple 
addresses. Such a system could also work for new banking products that do not use 
bank account numbers.  
However, the introduction of the new platform would not connect existing direct 
debits and credits to consumers’ addresses. This means the benefits would accrue over 
time, as consumers roll over their direct debits and credits and attach them to their 
address. 
Steps have also been taken to improve switching for mortgages. The Government 
banned exit fees for mortgages in 2011. Industry initiatives, such as e-conveyancing, 
are also likely to reduce switching costs. Future initiatives could further assist, 
including a national e-mortgage regime, standardised mortgage discharge forms and 
timelines, and improved online identity verification processes, as discussed in the 
Technology chapter. 
Four pillars policy 
In 1990, the then Government introduced a ‘six pillars’ policy whereby the four major 
banks and two major life insurers were prevented from merging with one another. 
This has since evolved into the ‘four pillars’ policy maintained today, which applies to 
the four major banks.  
The policy arguably assists with both competition and stability. For competition, it 
ensures that the banking sector does not become overly concentrated, which could 
materially lessen competition. For stability, if larger and more systemically important 
banks fail, they tend to be more difficult to resolve in an orderly fashion, so four pillars 
may assist by limiting the size of Australia’s largest banks. 
In its final report, the Wallis Inquiry recommended abolishing the (then) six pillars 
policy. It argued that general competition law was sufficient to address competition 
issues in the banking sector. This reflected the Wallis Inquiry’s philosophy that 
competition in the financial sector should be treated no differently to other sectors of 
the economy. The Wallis Inquiry also saw little stability benefit, given the major banks 
were already very large. 
Successive governments have maintained the four pillars policy. The Inquiry views 
this as appropriate and does not plan to recommend changes. The banking sector is 
already concentrated; further significant concentration has the potential to limit 
competitive pressure in the market and reduce the choices available to Australian 
individuals and firms. Although general competition law may prevent a merger 
between the major banks, the Inquiry sees merit in retaining the four pillars policy. 
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The concentration and integration of the major banks 
The major banks have increased concentration and integration in the banking sector 
through acquiring other banks and integrating with mortgage brokers. Mortgage 
brokers enable consumers to compare the value of different banking products better, 
including mortgages, personal loans and term deposits. The major banks have also 
integrated horizontally and vertically into other sectors of the financial system, 
including wealth management and insurance.  
Increased market power 
Some submissions argue that the increasing concentration and integration of the major 
banks is harming competition. They submit the major banks can cross-subsidise 
products to drive out competitors in some markets. Submissions also argue that the 
major banks’ market power has led to oligopolistic competition and higher prices for 
consumers. 
The major banks have market power across a range of markets. However, it is not clear 
they are abusing this power. The ACCC has taken relatively little action against the 
major banks in recent years. The Inquiry would welcome views on the level and 
exercise of market power across the various markets in which the major banks operate. 
Vertical integration of mortgage brokers  
Vertical integration of mortgage broking may create conflicts of interest, which could 
hamper competition. Mortgage brokers can improve competition by enabling smaller 
players to access a broader range of consumers than their standard distribution 
networks would allow. However, vertical integration may have the potential to distort 
the way in which mortgage brokers direct borrowers to lenders. The extent of this 
issue is not clear. The Inquiry welcomes views on this issue. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
• Is integration in the banking sector causing competition issues? 
• Is vertical integration distorting the way in which mortgage brokers direct 
borrowers to lenders? 
• If so, what would be the best way to limit the adverse impacts? 
Lenders mortgage insurance 
Lenders mortgage insurance (LMI) protects a lender against default by a borrower, if 
there is a shortfall after realising the security. Lenders use LMI to make loans to 
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borrowers with low deposits (usually where the loan-to-valuation ratio (LVR) is 
greater than 80 per cent) or without a regular earnings record, such as the self-
employed. About one-quarter of new mortgage loans are covered by LMI,30 which is 
generally paid by the borrower. 
Preliminary assessment 
Under Basel I, lenders were able to apply a lower risk weight to loans with a high LVR 
or to non-standard loans if they were covered by LMI. This incentive does not exist 
under Basel II for IRB banks, as APRA’s floor of 20 per cent for the loss given default 
on residential mortgages means that the risk weight is the same, whether or not the 
mortgage is covered by LMI. 
Some submissions argue that, under these policy settings, the major banks will reduce 
or stop their use of LMI, as they can carry the default risk themselves and have no 
capital incentive. They state the LMI industry may not be viable as the market size 
reduces and major banks accept lower-risk, high-LVR loans, leaving higher-risk loans 
in the LMI pool. This may in turn reduce access to mortgage lending for those with 
low deposits or the self-employed. It could also increase the major banks’ competitive 
advantage over RMBS issuers and smaller ADIs that seek the risk protection of LMI. 
Policy options for consultation 
Submissions propose policy changes to re-establish the place of LMI in mortgage 
lending, including changes to capital standards to decrease the risk weights for insured 
loans. They contend such changes could improve the competitive position of smaller 
ADIs and non-bank lenders, maintain broad access to mortgage loans and assist with 
system stability by providing more capital in the system. However, this option could 
involve trade-offs: 
• There could be stability implications. In its submission, APRA states that the 
20 per cent loss given default floor for housing lending has been set until IRB banks 
develop appropriate methodologies and estimates for a downturn period.  
• Decreasing risk weights for insured loans may affect the competitive situation 
between IRB banks and smaller lenders. 
                                                          
30  QBE 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy option or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements 
• Decrease the risk weights for insured loans 
Payments sector 
Payment systems are networks that enable individuals, businesses, banks and other 
financial system participants to make and receive payments.  
Submissions on payment systems covered: 
• Interchange fees, merchant service fees and customer surcharging  
• The competitive neutrality of regulation for different debit payment systems 
Overview of payment schemes and participants  
Two of the largest payment systems in value terms are the Direct Entry system, which 
processes direct debits and credits between bank accounts, and the Real Time Gross 
Settlement System, which processes inter-bank fund transfers. However, submissions 
do not raise competition issues about these systems.  
The primary focus of submissions is on debit and credit card systems. These are now 
used almost as frequently as cash for consumer transactions and are therefore of 
considerable importance to customers and retailers (merchants).31 Debit card systems 
link customer payments to their transaction accounts, while credit card systems enable 
customers to pay for purchases using credit.32 Both systems generally function for both 
point-of-sale transactions and online transactions. In addition, new online-only 
payment schemes have begun to emerge, which often interlink with traditional 
payment schemes.  
                                                          
31  Ossolinski, C, Lam, T and Emery, D 2014, The Changing Way We Pay: Trends in Consumer 
Payments, Research Discussion Paper 2015-05, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney. 
32  Some debit cards also work on a pre-paid basis and are known as stored value cards. Charge 
cards are a variation of credit cards and require cardholders to pay their outstanding balance 
monthly, instead of providing a revolving line of credit. 
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eftpos, which is owned by a number of financial institutions and retailers, is the largest 
debit card payment scheme provider. Its main competitors are MasterCard and Visa, 
which are increasing their share in that market.33  
In comparison, MasterCard and Visa are the main providers of credit card payment 
schemes, with a combined market share of 80.7 per cent.34 For these schemes, the 
financial institutions that issue the cards (see issuers below) provide the credit. The 
main competition for credit card schemes comes from American Express (Amex) and 
Diners Club, which provide credit for the cardholder in addition to operating the 
scheme network. Their combined market share has increased from 14.6 per cent of the 
value of transactions in April 2003 to 19.3 per cent in April 2014.35  
To date, PayPal has been the most successful online payment provider, although there 
is continuing innovation and market entry in this area.  
A number of participants compete within debit card and credit card payment schemes. 
They compete on issuing payment cards and associated services to customers and 
providing acceptance facilities and associated services to merchants. The major banks 
are the main issuers of payment cards, with competition from most other ADIs and a 
number of non-bank issuers. The major banks are also the main providers of 
acceptance facilities, with competition from other ADIs and Tyro. In addition, some of 
the largest merchants, including the major supermarkets, have in-house payment 
acceptance facilities.  
Other payment systems include Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) networks, cheques 
and BPAY. However, submissions do not focus on them from a competition 
perspective. The Inquiry would welcome views on whether there are competition 
issues with these systems or any other parts of the payments sector. 
Regulation of debit card and credit card schemes 
Payment schemes are regulated by two main instruments under the Payment Systems 
(Regulation) Act: access regimes and standards. The RBA has designated the eftpos, 
MasterCard and Visa payment schemes under the Act and applied access regimes, 
primarily to ensure that smaller and non-ADI participants could enter and compete in 
these markets. Standards cover scheme pricing arrangements, or interchange fees, and 
the removal of restrictions on merchants, such as in relation to customer surcharging. 
                                                          
33  eftpos 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
34  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Table: Market Shares of Credit and Charge Card 
Schemes – C2, RBA, Sydney. 
35  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Table: Market Shares of Credit and Charge Card 
Schemes – C2, RBA, Sydney.Note: due to a series break in March 2008, the increase in market 
share is over-represented by 1.5 percentage points. 
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Interchange fees 
Interchange fees are often a feature of four-party payment card schemes (Figure 2.1), 
which include the debit and credit schemes operated by eftpos, MasterCard and Visa. 
Acquirers, the merchants’ providers of payment acceptance facilities, pay interchange 
fees to issuers, the cardholders’ payment card providers. The fees enable issuers to 
recover the cost of processing transactions. Payment schemes can also set interchange 
fees to incentivise financial institutions to issue their payment cards. Issuers can 
incentivise cardholders to use their cards by passing on a proportion of interchange 
fees as reward points, interest-free periods or other benefits.  
Figure 2.1: Simplified example of a four-party payment scheme 
 
Payment schemes designated by the RBA (eftpos, MasterCard and Visa) ensure that 
the weighted-average value of their interchange fees complies with caps established by 
the RBA. The caps are 0.5 per cent of the value of transactions for credit card schemes 
and 12 cents per transaction for debit card schemes. The RBA established these caps 
following a cost-based benchmarking exercise.  
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The RBA caps interchange fees for a number of reasons. 
• Price signals are not efficient in four-party payment schemes, which can result in 
competition and paradoxically lead to higher prices. Merchants generally exhibit 
low price sensitivity to merchant service fees for widely used payment schemes, 
such as those operated by eftpos, Visa and MasterCard. If merchants do not accept 
these cards, they may lose sales to the majority of merchants that do. In 
comparison, cardholders are often more price sensitive. They have access to a range 
of payment schemes, and will respond to incentives like reward points when 
determining which scheme to use. Payment schemes therefore have an incentive to 
set high interchange fees, which issuers can use to offer reward points for 
cardholders.  
• Interchange fees act like price floors for merchant service fees. To break even, at a 
minimum, acquirers set merchant service fees at the cost of interchange fees, plus 
the cost of processing transactions. 
• Cross-subsidisation will occur if merchants do not recover merchant service fees 
through customer surcharges. The cost of absorbing merchant service fees would be 
reflected in higher prices for goods and services. This would result in cross 
subsidisation from customers using low-cost payment mechanisms, such as eftpos 
and cash, to those using high-cost payment schemes – an inefficient outcome.  
Amex and Diners Club operate three-party payment schemes. In three-party schemes, 
the scheme takes the role of issuer and acquirer. As no interchange fees are involved, 
these schemes are not covered by interchange fee regulation. Issues with the regulation 
of a variation of three-party schemes, known as companion cards, are discussed below. 
Customer surcharging 
Since 2003, the RBA has required payment schemes to remove ‘no surcharge’ rules so 
merchants can pass on the reasonable costs of card acceptance, such as merchant 
service fees, to cardholders. These standards apply to both three-party and four-party 
schemes, but not to online payment system providers.36 Allowing merchants to 
surcharge introduces a price signal to customers about the cost of the payment 
mechanism they use and can help reduce the effects of the interchange fee issues 
highlighted previously. 
                                                          
36  The standards only apply to four-party payment schemes; however, the three-party payment 
schemes have provided voluntary undertakings to comply with them.  
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Table 2.1: Summary of payment system regulation 
System  Type  Interchange fee 
regulation 
Customer surcharging 
regulation 
eftpos debit Four-party Weighted-average cap 
of 12 cents per 
transaction 
No explicit prohibition 
on ‘no surcharge’ rules, 
but no such rules 
applied 
MasterCard/Visa debit Four-party Weighted-average cap 
of 12 cents per 
transaction 
Prohibition of ‘no 
surcharge’ rules 
MasterCard/Visa credit Four-party Weighted-average cap 
of 0.5 per cent of  
transaction values 
Prohibition of ‘no 
surcharge’ rules 
Amex/Diners Club 
credit 
Three-party No regulation (no 
interchange fees to 
regulate) 
Voluntary undertaking 
to refrain having from 
‘no surcharge’ rules 
Amex companion cards In between three-party 
and four-party 
No regulation (only 
service fees, which are 
not regulated) 
Voluntary undertaking 
to refrain from having 
‘no surcharge’ rules 
Online payment 
systems 
Variety of models, often 
linked to other systems 
No regulation  No regulation 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
Regulation of credit card and debit card payment schemes is required for 
competition to lead to more efficient outcomes. However, differences in the 
structure of payment systems have resulted in systems that perform similar 
functions being regulated differently, which may not be competitively neutral. 
Interchange fees 
Efficiency 
The RBA submission argues that interchange fee caps have reduced merchant service 
fees, citing that merchant service fees declined for MasterCard and Visa credit card 
schemes shortly after interchange fee caps were introduced in the early 2000s 
(Chart 2.3).  
Merchant service fees also fell for the non-designated Amex and Diners Club schemes. 
This suggests these schemes responded to the lower prices of the designated schemes, 
potentially because merchants have more bargaining power in relation to three-party 
payment schemes. Merchants know they are unlikely to lose business if they do not 
accept three-party scheme cards, because most three-party scheme cardholders also 
hold four-party scheme cards.  
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Although eftpos debit card fees have increased, they are still lower than fees for other 
schemes. Initially, they were negative because issuers paid acquirers to use the system 
to incentivise take-up.  
Chart 2.3: Merchant service fees as a percentage of transaction values 
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Source: RBA. 
Submissions from MasterCard and Visa argue that interchange fee caps are not 
efficient, as they benefit merchants rather than cardholders. They contend that, 
although the caps may have reduced costs for merchants, they have also lowered the 
value to cardholders, limiting reward points and potentially making credit card fees 
and interest rates higher than they would have been.  
On balance, the Inquiry considers that interchange fee caps have improved the 
functioning of four-party payment schemes. They have reduced merchant service fees. 
Although difficult to measure, they have also likely reduced cross-subsidisation across 
payment mechanisms. It may be possible to build on these efficiencies by lowering 
interchange fee caps or by applying caps to arrangements of similar economic 
substance across the payments sector.  
Companion cards 
Companion cards, which typically operate through the Amex scheme, are issued by 
ADIs. Companion cards can be thought of as a blend of three-party schemes and four-
party schemes. The scheme is the acquirer, but an ADI is the issuer.  
Submissions from MasterCard and Visa argue that the service fees companion card 
schemes pay to issuers are equivalent to interchange fees in four-party payment 
schemes, as they are both payments made to issuers funded by merchant service fees. 
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They submit that payment scheme regulation lacks competitive neutrality because 
these service fees are not capped, which allows companion card schemes to provide 
more generous incentives to issuers and cardholders to incentivise take-up. They point 
to the increase in the market share of Amex. 
Amex argues the service fees it pays to ADIs for its companion cards are more akin to 
the incentive payments that MasterCard and Visa pay issuers in four-party schemes. It 
notes that, unlike interchange fees, which are set by payment schemes for all ADIs, 
companion card service fees are negotiated bilaterally between the scheme and 
individual ADIs.  
The Inquiry considers that payment systems of similar economic substance should be 
regulated consistently. An argument could be made that four-party interchange fees, 
companion card service fees and incentive payments under all schemes are equivalent 
in economic substance. The Inquiry would welcome stakeholder views on this matter. 
Merchant routing choice 
Payment cards issued by banks and other financial institutions often provide 
cardholders with access to more than one payment scheme. This enables cardholders 
to choose which scheme to pay with by selecting ‘savings’ or ‘credit’ at the terminal.37 
It also potentially enables merchants to choose which debit scheme to route debit 
transactions through. The Australian Retailers Association submits that many 
acquirers do not provide merchants with the opportunity to route transactions through 
their payment scheme of choice. This reduces both merchants’ ability to choose low-
cost acceptance schemes and the incentives for debit schemes to operate as efficiently 
as possible.  
Impacts on small merchants 
Interchange fees are not applied evenly to all transactions. Instead, schemes must 
ensure that weighted-average fees fall below the cap. Large merchants with more 
market power are often able to secure lower interchange fees than smaller merchants. 
This difference in purchasing power can reduce small retailers’ ability to compete with 
large retailers. 
Customer surcharging 
Allowing merchants to surcharge customers for the reasonable cost of acceptance 
improves efficiency by providing cardholders with clearer price signals about the costs 
of different payment mechanisms. Therefore, ‘no surcharge’ rules can reduce 
efficiency. ‘No surcharge’ rules do not apply to other traditional mechanisms, such as 
                                                          
37  However, for contactless transactions, customers are automatically routed through the 
scheme that provides the contactless facility.  
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cash and cheques. The RBA considers customer surcharging appropriate for any 
payment mechanism where merchants incur acceptance costs.38 
However, submissions raise some issues with surcharging for debit card and credit 
card transactions that warrant consideration: 
• If merchants over-surcharge customers, they will skew price signals and make the 
payments system less efficient. Submissions raise concerns that some merchants, 
particularly in the airline and ticketing industries, over-surcharge. Scheme 
operators argue they are not well placed to control this behaviour because they do 
not have direct relationships with merchants. However, the Inquiry notes that they 
were generally able to enforce ‘no surcharge’ rules when they were in place.  
• Submissions from MasterCard and Visa argue that some merchants surcharge the 
same amount for their cards as for the more expensive Amex and Diners Club 
cards. They argue that this unfairly reduces the volume of payments made using 
their schemes. However, evidence suggests that, on average, merchants surcharge 
Amex cardholders more than MasterCard and Visa cardholders.39 
• Submissions also note that online payment system providers are still able to impose 
‘no surcharge’ rules, which is not competitively neutral. As noted above, the 
Inquiry considers payment systems operate most efficiently when merchants have 
the capacity to recover the reasonable cost of acceptance.  
Policy options for consultation 
Interchange fees 
Stakeholders suggest a number of ways to reform interchange fee regulation: 
• Lower interchange fee caps. Although, in Australia, interchange fees are currently 
set to approximate the cost of processing transactions, other jurisdictions such as 
Europe apply a merchant indifference test. This test aims to set interchange fees at a 
level that makes merchants indifferent to which payment mechanism a customer 
uses, resulting in lower fee caps than in Australia. An argument could potentially 
be made for banning interchange fees altogether, which would require issuers to 
                                                          
38  Richards, T 2014, Transcript of Question and Answer Session with Tony Richards, Head of 
Economic Analysis Department, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, 4 June, viewed 23 June 
2014, 
<http://static.knowledgevision.com/account/brr/assets/attachment/RBA/RBA_Speech_QA
_transcript_Tony_Richards_4_June_2014_2_1__1_.pdf>. 
39  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2013, Payment System Board Annual Report: 2013, RBA, 
Sydney, page 34. 
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recover the cost of processing transactions directly from consumers. Although 
lowering fee caps for four-party schemes may make these schemes more efficient, it 
could exacerbate issues around competitive neutrality with companion cards. In 
addition, if caps are set too low, it could risk the viability of some participants’ 
business models. 
• Expand interchange fee caps to capture other payments of similar economic 
substance. This could include service fees under companion card schemes and 
incentive payments under all schemes. This would ensure competitive neutrality 
between different schemes. It would also mean that schemes compete less on 
incentive payments and award points to drive take-up by customers and more on 
improving cost efficiencies, innovations and system performance. It could address 
submission concerns that the current designation process is open to inconsistencies 
and involves considerable upfront compliance costs. 
• Remove interchange fee caps. The MasterCard and Visa submissions argue for this 
option, partly on the basis that service fees under companion card schemes are not 
regulated. Given the benefits interchange fee caps have delivered, it may be more 
effective to address any competitive neutrality issue by consistently regulating fees 
of similar economic substance.  
• Cap merchant service fees. The Australian Retailers Association argues that this 
could ensure retailers pay similar merchant service fees, no matter their strategic 
importance to scheme providers. Small merchants generally pay higher fees than 
large merchants. However, regulating merchant service fees would act like a price 
control on the final product, representing a more interventionist approach. It may 
also harm innovations that deliver considerable benefits to merchants but cost more 
than current practice. A less interventionist approach could involve setting limits 
on how much interchange fees could vary between merchants.  
• Require acquirers to enable merchants to choose which scheme to route 
transactions through once customers have selected debit or credit. Submissions 
note this option would improve competition by incentivising schemes to reduce 
their costs.   
Customer surcharging 
Stakeholders suggest a number of ways to reform customer surcharge regulation: 
• Allow schemes to reintroduce ‘no surcharge’ rules or ban ‘no surcharge’ rules for 
all payment systems. Some submissions argue for the return of ‘no surcharge’ 
rules. They contend that some surcharging provides inaccurate price signals and is 
therefore inefficient. They also argue that it puts regulated payment schemes at a 
disadvantage to unregulated, online payment systems that can still apply ‘no 
surcharge’ rules. The Inquiry is predisposed to address instances where 
surcharging is inaccurate, rather than allow surcharging to be banned. 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
2-32 
• Enforce reasonable cost recovery in customer surcharging. Submissions from 
payment schemes suggest this option; however, it is not clear that payment 
schemes need regulator assistance with enforcing reasonable surcharging, given 
that previously they were able to enforce ‘no surcharge’ rules. If there is a case for 
regulator enforcement, it may be more efficient to target industries with high rates 
of over-surcharging, rather than introducing economy-wide regulation.  
• Provide merchants and customers with real-time pricing information regarding 
interchange fees and merchant service fees. The CSR submission argues that this 
could enable customer surcharges to reflect costs accurately. Interchange service 
fees depend on a range of circumstances, including the payment system being used, 
the type of card being used (such as standard, gold or platinum) and the merchant 
receiving the payment. Currently, merchants can only estimate the average costs of 
acceptance. Accurate and transparent prices could allow clearer price signals and 
improve efficiency.  
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements 
• Lower interchange fee caps or ban interchange fees 
• Expand interchange fee caps to include payments of similar economic substance 
• Remove interchange fee caps 
• Cap merchant service fees or cap differences in interchange service fees between 
small and large merchants 
• Require acquirers to enable merchants to choose which scheme to route 
transactions through 
• Allow payment schemes to reintroduce ‘no surcharge’ rules or broaden the ban 
on ‘no surcharge’ rules to all payment systems 
• Enforce reasonable cost recovery in customer surcharging 
• Provide merchants and customers with real-time pricing information regarding 
interchange fees and merchant service fees 
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Financial markets 
Financial markets facilitate the operation of other financial sectors. The main activities 
in financial markets are typically split into three stages (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2: The trade process 
 
• Pre-trade – an investor decides whether they wish to trade, what to trade and at 
what price. 
• Trade – an investor that wishes to buy is connected to an investor willing to sell. A 
broker (or a dealer or a broker/dealer) generally assists in this process. For most 
financial products, the broker will use an exchange, an organised financial market 
where financial products are traded, but can also execute the trade directly with 
another broker. 
• Post-trade – investors swap the financial product and cash. There are two main 
post-trade processes:  
– Clearing – details of the trade are confirmed and counterparties’ obligations 
calculated. In many markets, a central clearing facility, such as a central 
counterparty (CCP), will step in to manage the pre-settlement risks that exist 
between counterparties to a trade. 
– Settlement - the financial product is legally transferred to the buyer and the 
cash is transferred to the seller. A securities settlement facility provides for the 
final settlement of securities transactions. Settlement in most markets, such as 
cash equities, occurs quickly. However, derivatives markets are more complex 
due to the time taken for derivatives to terminate. CCPs manage the risks 
involved by requiring payment of collateral (called ‘margin’) as security. When 
derivatives expire, the final margin is paid to reflect the ending position of the 
contract. 
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In recent years, the Australian Government has taken steps to increase competition in 
financial markets. These steps include transferring supervision of Australia’s equities 
markets to ASIC and otherwise amending regulatory arrangements to allow the entry 
of the Chi-X exchange in the equities trading market.  
There is currently a Government moratorium on competition in clearing trades in 
Australian cash equities. This was implemented on the 2012 advice of the Council of 
Financial Regulators (CFR), which proposed it was not the appropriate time for further 
changes that would have additional cost implications for industry. The Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) has developed a code of conduct for access ahead of the 
CFR examining options for competition or access regulation in 2015.40 
Preliminary assessment 
Stakeholders suggest that competition in financial markets is constrained in two areas: 
• The time and resources required for market operators to obtain financial market 
licences, which can be a barrier to entry 
• Cross-border operation of financial market infrastructure (FMI), including the 
moratorium on competition in clearing cash equities 
Submissions also identify current licensing arrangements as a barrier to entry for 
foreign competitors. 
Financial market licensing 
Generally, financial market operators in Australia must obtain an Australian Market 
Licence. The Minister can exempt a financial market from requiring a licence if ASIC 
advises there is no public benefit in regulating the market. 
However, the current legislative system has not adapted to market developments. In 
its submission, Treasury notes that, as new market forms have arisen, the current 
legislative framework is producing a piecemeal approach to regulation. It is too 
inflexible to regulate all financial markets appropriately.  
The piecemeal approach is reflected in the time taken to assess licence applications. 
Chi-X noted its licensing process took over three years. An earlier prospective entrant 
to operate a domestic equities market in Australia, AXE ECN, withdrew its proposal 
                                                          
40  ASX 2013, Code of Practice for Clearing and Settlement of Cash Equities in Australia, 9 August, 
ASX, Sydney. 
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four years after first applying for a licence.41 This is slower than similar processes 
elsewhere. Exchange approval in the United Kingdom is subject to a six-month time 
limit. It took five months for BATS Chi-X to have its United Kingdom application to 
become a regulated stock exchange approved.  
To some extent, the longer time for Australian applications may be attributable to the 
applications raising novel and complex regulatory issues. Introducing Chi-X required 
transferring responsibility for market supervision from ASX to ASIC and introducing a 
new regulatory and cost recovery framework.42 Similarly, proposals by foreign clearers 
to offer services in Australian financial markets required regulators to consider cross-
border service provision issues for the first time. 
Future market entrants will benefit from the regulatory adjustments to accommodate 
initial applicants to these markets, but ‘level playing field’ issues remain. The initial 
applicants bear the cost and uncertainties that arise from seeking regulatory change. 
Some market innovations, such as crossing systems and dark pools, do not require 
financial market authorisation. 
Treasury has commenced a review of the market licensing framework, which will 
consider how the framework may better accommodate market developments. 
Competition in financial market infrastructure 
FMI competition can bring benefits through innovation and lower costs.43 However, 
options to increase competition in FMI involve a trade-off between boosting efficiency, 
regulating functionally similar activities in the same way and giving Australian 
authorities capacity to regulate important FMI, especially in a crisis. Competition can 
be destabilising to existing market practices, but it can also remove single points of 
failure – potentially contributing to overall stability.  
In its submission, ASX presents two potential long-term choices for Australia’s FMI: 
• A domestic mandate for critical FMI, with all competitors required to comply with 
the same location and ownership requirements 
• An open global market, with all participants, including ASX, free to optimise the 
economics of their arrangements 
                                                          
41  This was a joint venture between New Zealand exchange operator, NZX, and six investment 
banks and brokerages, see: NZX 2010, 2010 Annual Financial Report. 
42  Bowen, C (Minister for Financial Services, Superannuation and Corporate Law) 2009, 
Reforms to the supervision of Australia’s financial markets, media release no. 013, 24 August, 
Canberra. 
43  Council of Financial Regulators 2012, Competition in Clearing Australian Cash Equities: 
Conclusions, December. 
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Submissions from Chi-X and LCH.Clearnet support introducing competition for 
clearing for ASX-quoted securities when the moratorium expires, but did not comment 
on domestic location requirements. 
However, a potential competitor is likely to offer a cheaper service if it can use existing 
infrastructure, which is typically located offshore. Requirements of scale and 
Australia’s relatively small market mean that, in most cases, competition in FMI will 
come from foreign entrants, relying to some degree on cross-border infrastructure. 
Foreign entrants can also increase funding opportunities for domestic business.44 
Chi-X suggests that a regulator, either ASIC or the ACCC, be given specific legislative 
responsibility for maintaining and supervising competition in Australia’s FMI. 
Guidance and recommendations from the Council of Financial Regulators 
To facilitate competition from international participants, the CFR has provided 
guidance of its expectations for international participation in Australia’s FMI.45 That 
guidance seeks to retain appropriate oversight, particularly for clearing and settlement 
facilities. Where FMI is systemically important and highly connected to domestic 
service provision, ‘regulatory influence requirements’ apply to ensure critical elements 
of infrastructure are located in Australia and subject to local regulation.  
Further, the guidance imposes liquidity requirements on operators to ensure that, if a 
crisis occurs, a central counterparty, even one offering services from overseas, would 
have sufficient liquidity to meet its Australian obligations.46 Foreign and domestic 
central counterparties will be required to manage their Australian dollar liquidity 
using an RBA Exchange Settlement Account. They must maintain sufficient assets in 
Australia, which would be eligible to enter into repurchase arrangements with the 
RBA to obtain liquidity. Other elements of the guidance address legal incorporation, 
governance arrangements and some location requirements for critical infrastructure. 
                                                          
44  For example, see: Asian Development Bank 2008, Emerging Asian Regionalism, Chapter 4: 
Integrating Financial Markets, Philippines. 
45  Council of Financial Regulators 2014, Application of the Regulatory Influence Framework for 
Cross-border Central Counterparties, March. 
46  Heller, D and Vause, N 2012, ‘Collateral requirements for mandatory central clearing of 
over-the-counter derivatives’, BIS Working Papers No 373, March. 
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The CFR has also made recommendations to strengthen Australia’s FMI regulatory 
architecture and tools. This was done at the request of the Government following the 
rejection of the merger proposal between the ASX and the Singapore stock exchange.47 
The suggested reforms included: 
• New powers to require systemically important market infrastructures to have 
aspects of their operations located in Australia, when the conditions set out in the 
CFR’s regulatory influence framework are met 
• New powers to ensure FMIs are overseen by ‘fit and proper’ persons 
• Increased power for regulators to intervene if infrastructure experiences substantial 
difficulties 
• New resolution processes48 
The Inquiry understands that CFR agencies have developed a set of legislative 
proposals to address these reforms. 
Implementing the CFR recommendations for FMI and changes to market licensing 
would provide greater certainty to existing and future FMI operators. It would create a 
framework under which competition and international financial integration could be 
increased. The CFR proposals would also promote improved stability, as discussed in 
the Stability chapter. 
Wealth management 
There is no clear definition of wealth management. For the purposes of this Inquiry, 
wealth management will be taken to include financial advice services and funds 
management. Superannuation is the largest component of the wealth management 
sector. 
                                                          
47  Council of Financial Regulators 2011, Review of Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation: 
Consultation Paper, October. 
48  Stevens, G 2012, Review of Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation, letter to the Deputy 
Prime Minister and Treasury, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, 10 February, viewed 
23 June 2014, 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2012/CFR-
Financial-Market-Infrastructure-Regulation>. 
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The wealth management sector has undergone considerable consolidation since the 
Wallis Inquiry.  
• The most successful platforms have been getting larger relative to their competitors. 
The five largest platform providers now hold almost 80 per cent of primary planner 
relationships.49 
• Financial planners have consolidated or moved in-house to work directly for 
wealth management institutions. 
• Vertical integration is increasing, with the major banks and AMP at the forefront of 
this trend, combining advice, platforms and fund management into single 
businesses. Other wealth managers, including Macquarie Group, IOOF and 
Perpetual, have replicated this strategy to varying degrees. 
Competition in the wealth management sector appears to be focused more on securing 
distribution channels and improving product features, rather than reducing fees. The 
Superannuation chapter explores competition issues in relation to superannuation 
products and the recent MySuper reforms. The Consumer outcomes chapter discusses 
the recent Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) reforms; however, it is too early to assess 
the effect of these reforms on competition. 
The Inquiry welcomes stakeholder views on competition issues in the broader wealth 
management sector. 
Insurance sector 
The insurance market is segmented between general insurance, comprising personal 
and commercial lines, and life insurance, comprising risk products (death, disability 
and income protection) and investment products. There is also a reinsurance market: 
the insurers of the insurers. 
                                                          
49  Investment Trends 2014, Planner Technology Report, May. Note: Based on a survey of 1,038 
financial planners. 
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Preliminary assessment 
The insurance sector has similar levels of concentration and profitability to the banking 
sector.  
• The personal lines market for general insurance is concentrated. The top five 
insurers account for over 80 per cent of the market,50 with the top two estimated to 
have a 60 per cent share.51  
• There is less market concentration in commercial insurance, where the five largest 
insurers have about 60 per cent market share of gross earned premium.52 
• The life insurance industry is more fragmented than the general insurance 
industry, although several of the major insurers are owned by banks.  
Although the sector has generally become more concentrated, some trends are moving 
in the opposite direction. For example, a number of new insurers have entered the 
market, including Youi, Hollard and Progressive. Banks and retailers have also entered 
the insurance market, usually by white labelling products provided by the main 
insurers, but with some underwriting themselves.  
Returns on equity in insurance have been more volatile than in the banking sector. For 
general insurance, they have averaged 16.5 per cent since 2002 and around 
13.5 per cent since the GFC.53 For life insurance, returns have averaged around 
14 per cent since the GFC, although they fell to below 10 per cent in 2013 due to higher 
than expected disability claims and lapse rates on individual policies.54 
As with banking, the main barriers to entry in insurance are commercial rather than 
regulatory. Incumbents benefit from well-established brands, customer bases and 
distribution networks. These advantages are particularly important in the direct 
marketed sectors, although annual renewal requirements in general insurance provide 
a trigger for switching that is not evident in many banking products. 
                                                          
50  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry. 
51  UBS 2014, Australian Insurance Sector Update, Reality Check, UBS, 14 May. 
52  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry. 
53  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Quarterly General Insurance 
Performance Statistics, APRA, Sydney, March 2014. 
54  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Quarterly Life Insurance 
Performance Statistics, APRA, Sydney, March 2014. 
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Despite the high level of concentration, few submissions raise concerns about 
competition in the insurance sector. 
Aggregator access to information 
The main issue submissions raise in relation to insurance sector competition relates to 
aggregator access to information. Insurers in the home and contents and car insurance 
markets have been reluctant to share their product information with aggregators, 
slowing their growth. As a result, consumers in these markets must compare products 
without the assistance of aggregators, which may reduce price competition.  
However, insurers argue that it is more complex to aggregate insurance products than 
other financial products, because they are tailored to individual circumstances. In 
addition, aggregators need access to insurers’ pricing models, or at least the outcomes 
they provide, to compare different product offerings. If this access was provided, it 
could potentially enable aggregators or other market participants to identify sensitive 
pricing information, such as premia differentials based on market research. Some 
stakeholders are also concerned that aggregator services could lead to consumers 
focusing too much on price and potentially underinsuring. 
However, these concerns have not prevented aggregators from successfully assisting 
consumers to compare products in the life insurance, travel insurance and private 
health insurance markets. Therefore, there may be scope to improve aggregator access 
to general insurance product information. 
Competition for statutory insurance schemes 
Submissions from insurers and insurance brokers note that some state- and territory-
based statutory insurance schemes are not open to private sector competition. The two 
main types of statutory schemes are workers compensation and personal injury motor 
accidents schemes. Submissions argue that some schemes operate like government 
monopolies and that consumer value could be improved by introducing competition 
from the private sector. The Inquiry notes that stakeholders have also raised these 
concerns with the Competition Policy Review. The Inquiry would welcome 
stakeholder views on this matter.  
Policy options for consultation 
Aggregator access to information 
One option to enhance aggregator access to general insurance product information is 
to ensure aggregators are able to use automated processes to seek quotes from general 
insurance websites. This would not give aggregators direct access to pricing models, 
but may provide a route to discover them.  
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Another option could be to develop representative consumer categories based on key 
consumer characteristics. Insurers could disclose their policy premia for each category 
and consumers could then, potentially with the assistance of aggregator services, 
compare premiums from different insurers for the category that best represents their 
characteristics. The difficulty with this option would be developing enough categories 
so the majority of consumers fall within a category, while not creating too many 
categories, which could create complexity for consumers and compliance costs for 
insurers. 
An issue with both of these approaches is that different insurance policies generally 
have different levels of coverage. Even if consumers are able to compare the premia of 
different policies, they may still struggle to compare coverage and overall value. The 
Inquiry welcomes input on how these issues could be managed.  
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements 
• Ensure aggregators are able to use automated processes to seek quotes from 
general insurance websites 
• Create comparison categories for insurance products that aggregators could use 
to compare the value of different products 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Would opening up state- and territory-based statutory insurance schemes to 
competition improve value for consumers? 
• How could insurance aggregators provide meaningful comparisons of policies 
with different levels of coverage? 
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3: Funding 
The Inquiry has been asked to examine how the Australian financial system 
allocates funding and risk to maximise growth opportunities for the Australian 
economy. 
By allocating funding and risk efficiently, the financial system can promote higher 
productivity growth. Transparent and accurate pricing of risk ensures that risks can 
be distributed to entities that are willing and able to bear those risks. 
The Inquiry has made the following observations about the allocation of funding 
and risk in the Australian economy: 
• Ongoing access to foreign funding has enabled Australia to sustain higher 
growth than otherwise would have been the case. The risks associated with 
Australia’s use of foreign funding can be mitigated by having a prudent 
supervisory and regulatory regime and sound public sector finances. 
• There are structural impediments for small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) to access finance. These impediments include information asymmetries, 
regulation and taxation. 
• Australia has an established domestic bond market, although a range of 
regulatory and tax factors have limited its development. 
The Inquiry has identified a number of tax issues that affect the allocation of 
funding and risk in the economy. Those issues that are not currently under active 
Government consideration should be considered as part of the Tax White Paper 
process. 
Context 
The financial system’s ability to allocate funding and risk efficiently is central to 
promoting a higher trend rate of economic growth. The financial system does this by: 
providing funding for business investment and innovation; enabling businesses, 
households and governments to smooth their cash flows and make large asset 
purchases; and facilitating the transfer of risk to give agents greater certainty to 
undertake certain economic activities. 
Figure 3.1 shows a high-level representation of the supply and use of funds in the 
economy. Suppliers of funds provide savings to users of funds through markets and 
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intermediaries. This chapter deals explicitly with the components in Figure 3.1 in bold 
type. They represent major issues raised in submissions to the Inquiry. 
Figure 3.1: The supply and use of funds in the economy 
 
Assessing allocative efficiency 
It is difficult to assess and quantify the effect any inefficient allocation of funding and 
risk has had, and is having, on economic growth. It is also difficult to identify what an 
efficient allocation of funding would look like. The best way to ensure resources are 
allocated efficiently is to allow relative prices to perform their allocative function. The 
Campbell Inquiry placed particular emphasis on this mechanism to facilitate a better 
allocation of funding and risk in the economy; this Inquiry sees no reason to change 
this emphasis. 
The Inquiry has examined potential impediments to prices performing their primary 
function and has identified three main sources of distortions: taxation, regulation and 
other market imperfections. The Inquiry has explored these distortions by examining 
the saving, investment and funding choices of households, businesses, governments 
and financial entities, and the functioning of certain financial markets. 
The Inquiry has identified a number of taxes that may distort the demand for and 
supply of funding in particular sectors, and may distort the broader allocation of 
funding and risk. This chapter explores these issues in more detail. The Inquiry has 
also identified other taxes that may adversely affect outcomes in the broader financial 
system. A summary of these tax issues is in Appendix 2 (Tax summary). Those issues 
that are not currently under active Government consideration should be considered as 
part of the Tax White Paper process. 
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Funding from overseas 
Australia has recorded current account deficits for most of its post–European 
settlement history. Over the past two decades, Australia’s current account deficit has 
averaged roughly 4½ per cent of GDP. However, Australia’s gross cross-border 
financial flows are larger: inflows of foreign funds have averaged around 8½ per cent 
of GDP over the past two decades, while outflows of Australian investment abroad 
have been around 4¼  per cent of GDP on average over the same period. 
Australia’s open capital account 
Observation 
Ongoing access to foreign funding has enabled Australia to sustain higher growth 
than otherwise would have been the case. The risks associated with Australia’s use 
of foreign funding can be mitigated by having a prudent supervisory and regulatory 
regime and sound public sector finances. 
Australia typically has had more abundant domestic investment opportunities than 
could possibly be funded from historic levels of national saving, and has therefore 
recorded persistent current account deficits. Compared to other advanced economies, 
Australia has had a relatively high investment rate and, more recently, a 
comparatively high saving rate (Chart 3.1). By using foreign funds productively, 
Australia’s growth potential can be raised to benefit both residents and foreign 
investors. 
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Chart 3.1: Gross saving and gross investment for Australia and for advanced 
economies1 
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Source: IMF.2 
Access to offshore markets (reflected in gross inflows) frees Australian borrowers from 
domestic financing constraints. Foreign investors may not have the same risk-return 
preferences as their Australian counterparts, so access to foreign funding markets may 
enable Australian borrowers to align their funding needs better with investors’ 
preferences. All else being equal, this would tend to enhance Australian borrowers’ 
ability to raise funds and lower the cost of those funds. This helps support a higher 
level of gross fixed capital formation and a higher rate of labour productivity growth. 
Investing offshore allows Australians to achieve a more diversified investment 
portfolio internationally on the basis of expected returns and risks. It also means that 
Australian entities compete for finance in global funding markets, which has broader 
productivity benefits. 
The continued inflow of foreign funding reflects the confidence foreigners have in both 
Australia’s growth prospects, and Australia’s capacity and willingness to service and 
repay its foreign liabilities. 
                                                          
1 Gross saving and gross investment reflect total saving and total investment (the aggregate of 
all sectors). 
2 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2014, World Economic Outlook Database, IMF, 
Washington DC, United States. 
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The risks of using foreign funding 
The risks to Australia, and to the financial system, from foreign funding relate more to 
rollover risk on debt than to foreign currency risk.3 Around two-thirds of Australia’s 
gross foreign liabilities are in the form of debt. Australia is therefore exposed to the 
risk that foreign debtors may choose to withdraw funding when the debt matures, 
particularly during periods of financial stress.4 The shorter the term of the debt, the 
more acute the rollover risk. 
Since the global financial crisis (GFC), rollover risk has receded. Although banks still 
hold the bulk of Australia’s short-term foreign debt liabilities, these now represent a 
lower share of banks’ foreign debt liabilities than before the crisis.5 
If foreigners become reluctant to invest in Australia, the cost of funding (for both debt 
and equity) for Australian entities would increase significantly. The higher cost of 
funding would translate into lower growth in gross fixed capital formation and GDP. 
As a significant net importer of funds, Australia needs to maintain the confidence of 
foreign investors to ensure ongoing cheap access to foreign funds. To do this, it should 
adhere to the following principles: 
• Use foreign funds productively. 
• Maintain a prudent supervisory and regulatory regime for the broader financial 
system. 
                                                          
3 As at the end of March 2013, about 70 per cent of Australia’s gross foreign liabilities were 
denominated in Australian dollars. In addition, about a further 20 per cent of Australia’s 
gross foreign liabilities were hedged into Australian dollars (this does not account for 
‘natural hedges’). Australia as a whole has a net foreign currency asset position — that is, 
the stock of Australia’s foreign currency assets is larger than the stock of Australia’s foreign 
currency liabilities (as such, a depreciation of the Australian dollar, all else being equal, 
would reduce the size of Australia’s net foreign liabilities). Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
2013, ‘Foreign Currency Exposure and Hedging in Australia’, RBA Bulletin, December 
Quarter, RBA, Sydney, page 51. 
4 As at the end of March 2014, Australia’s total gross foreign liabilities were $2.5 trillion, 
$0.9 trillion of which was equity (or 35 per cent). Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, 
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position, cat. no. 5302.0, ABS, Canberra. 
5 For the main categories of foreign debt liabilities (debt securities, currency and deposits, and 
loans), deposit-taking institutions account for around 90 per cent of foreign debt liabilities 
that are short term (as at the end of March 2014). For deposit-taking institutions, their 
short-term foreign debt liabilities (with respect to debt securities, currency and deposits, and 
loans) have decreased as a share of their foreign debt liabilities (debt securities, currency 
and deposits, and loans), from 43 per cent in the September quarter 2008 to 28 per cent in 
the March quarter 2014. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, Balance of Payments and 
International Investment Position, cat. no. 5302.0, ABS, Canberra. 
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• Run a strong general government balance sheet to ensure governments remain 
good credit risks. In the event of a significant economic and financial disruption, 
more sustainable fiscal settings would provide the Government with greater 
capacity to support the economy and the financial system. Outside periods of 
stress, the Government’s credit rating is reflected in private sector ratings and 
therefore affects the cost of and access to foreign funds for the private sector. 
Household saving 
Households save through purchasing assets and paying down debt. Superannuation is 
the largest (and fastest growing) financial asset on the household balance sheet, 
followed by deposits and equities. Housing is a significant savings vehicle for 
households, but also represents a significant use of funds in the economy. The Housing 
and household leverage section in this chapter explores this issue in further detail. 
Taxation and the household balance sheet 
The unequal tax treatment of savings vehicles distorts the asset composition of 
household balance sheets. This can affect the broader flow of funds in the economy. 
Many submissions support a more uniform tax treatment of household savings.6 
Decisions related to asset allocation are based on the after-tax return and risk 
characteristics of different savings vehicles. The extent to which tax distorts relative 
after-tax returns affects both the composition of household assets and the amount of 
risk households are prepared to accept. Australia’s Future Tax System Review noted that: 
There is considerable evidence that tax differences have large effects on which assets a 
household’s savings are invested in. Based on an examination of the literature and 
OECD data, the OECD concluded that while low-income individuals respond to tax 
incentives with more savings, for high-income individuals in particular savings are 
diverted from taxable to tax-preferred savings.7 
                                                          
6 For example, Westpac 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 48. 
7 Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australia’s Future Tax System Review: Report to the 
Treasurer, Part Two — Detailed analysis, volume 1 of 2, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
page 68. 
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Chart 3.2: Stylised example — after-tax return on savings vehicles8, 9, 10 
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Source: Treasury. 
Across savings vehicles, after-tax returns differ markedly in the stylised example 
presented in Chart 3.2. For most savings vehicles, taxation reduces the after-tax return. 
However, in some cases — particularly salary-sacrificed superannuation for higher 
income earners — taxation increases the after-tax return above the pre-tax return.  
Of the savings vehicles depicted, bank deposits (and other interest-earning assets) are 
taxed relatively heavily because the interest earned on deposits is subject to the 
individuals’ marginal tax rate. 
                                                          
8 Chart 3.2 shows the nominal post-tax return for a range of savings vehicles, assuming a 
pre-tax nominal return (for each savings vehicle) of 6 per cent per annum. The analysis 
assumes that the assets are held for seven years. The chart draws on methodology used in 
Australia’s Future Tax System Review: Report to the Treasurer Part Two — Detailed analysis, 
volume 1 of 2, page 67. The marginal tax rates reflect the individual income tax thresholds 
plus the 1.5 per cent Medicare levy but excludes the Temporary Budget Repair levy and the 
recent increase in the Medicare levy. 
9 Chart 3.2 shows the tax treatment of salary-sacrificed superannuation. The tax advantages 
for non-concessional contributions, which comprise the majority of superannuation fund 
assets, are less generous than for salary-sacrificed superannuation. 
10 The relative tax treatment of assets is the same within superannuation as outside 
superannuation. 
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In general, returns on salary-sacrificed superannuation are either taxed concessionally 
or subsidised, except for very low–income earners. Salary-sacrificed superannuation 
contributions are taxed at a flat rate of 15 per cent, rather than the individual’s 
marginal rate — unless contributions exceed prescribed caps. Individuals with income, 
including contributions, above $300,000 may pay additional tax on contributions that 
reduce the attractiveness of salary-sacrificed superannuation.  
For assets that generate capital gains, the asymmetric tax treatment of borrowing costs 
to purchase assets (and other expenses) and capital gains can result in a tax subsidy by 
raising the after-tax return above the pre-tax return. Individuals can deduct their full 
interest costs (and other expenses) from taxable income, but only half of capital gains 
are taxed when they are realised at a time chosen by the taxpayer. All else being equal, 
the increase in the after-tax return is larger for individuals on higher marginal tax 
rates. 
The tax system encourages households to direct their savings into superannuation 
funds. Households’ allocation of assets towards superannuation as a preferred savings 
vehicle is reflected in their holdings of other assets. For example, since around 2002, 
households have tended to reduce their direct holdings of equities, instead opting to 
invest in equities through superannuation (Chart 3.3). This has been facilitated by 
changes to capital gains tax arrangements in 1999, which lowered the tax costs of 
selling equities and other assets. 
Chart 3.3: Household investment in domestic equities 
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Source: ABS.11 
                                                          
11 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, Balance of Payments and International Investment 
Position, cat. no. 5302.0, ABS, Canberra. 
Growth and Consolidation – Funding 
2-51 
The distortions generated by the tax system affect the channels by which savings are 
allocated to the users of funds. This is particularly relevant to the superannuation 
sector, which is expected to grow rapidly over coming decades. The banking system and 
Superannuation sections in this chapter explore these issues further. 
Households’ exposure to adverse market movements depends on the mix of savings 
vehicles; for example, if households choose to invest in a superannuation fund 
regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) rather than in 
other savings vehicles. The asset allocations of APRA-regulated superannuation funds 
are more diversified than the asset allocations of self-managed superannuation funds 
(SMSFs) and the household balance sheet (excluding superannuation) (Chart 3.9). To 
some extent, SMSFs’ asset allocations also reflect the age composition, and thus 
particular investment preferences, of individuals within SMSFs. The Superannuation 
section in this chapter explores this issue in further detail. 
Housing and household leverage 
Housing accounts for the largest share of household assets. It serves two important 
functions for households: acting as a store of wealth, and producing a flow of housing 
services that households consume. 
Since 1997, household leverage has increased markedly from debt equivalent to 
around 0.8 years of gross disposable income to around 1.5 years of income in 2008 — 
household leverage has since stabilised at around this level.12 Australia’s trajectory and 
current level of household leverage is similar to that in some other advanced 
economies.13 
Since the Wallis Inquiry, over 90 per cent of the increase in household credit has been 
due to borrowing for housing; investor housing credit has accounted for one-third of 
the increase in total housing credit over this period.14 
Housing finance 
There is little evidence of a shortage of housing finance. Although lending conditions 
tightened following the GFC, this only partially reversed the easing of lending 
                                                          
12 The ratio of household debt to annualised household disposable income. Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Tables: Household Finances — Selected Ratios (E2), RBA, 
Sydney. 
13 Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 32. 
14 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Tables: Money and Credit Statistics, Lending 
and Credit Aggregates (D2), RBA, Sydney. 
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conditions that occurred over the preceding couple of decades. Over that period, 
product innovation increased the range of, and households’ access to, loan products. In 
general, households are not constrained from borrowing amounts that they can 
reasonably be expected to repay.15 
Demand for housing finance largely reflects purchases of existing (rather than new) 
housing by households wanting to upgrade or downgrade, by first home–buyers or by 
investors. 
Since 1997, around 10 per cent of the flow of housing finance has been for constructing 
new dwellings.16 New dwelling construction arguably has not been sufficient to meet 
population growth over the past decade.17 The Australian housing market has a 
number of longstanding structural features that inhibit supply responsiveness to 
demand-driven price rises. These include regulatory and zoning constraints, inherent 
geographical barriers and the cost structure of the building industry.18 These issues are 
out of the scope of this Inquiry. 
The increase in housing debt over recent decades has been facilitated by households’ 
capacity and willingness to borrow. Growth in household incomes has allowed 
households to service larger loans for a given interest rate. Australia’s move to a 
low-inflation and low–interest rate environment facilitated a one-off shift in the level 
of household debt. To some extent, households’ greater capacity to borrow has 
contributed to the increase in housing prices relative to income since 2000. 
Taxation and regulatory treatment of housing 
Households’ appetite for housing debt also reflects the favourable treatment that the 
tax and transfer system applies to housing. Returns on owner-occupied housing 
(including imputed rent and capital gains) are exempt from tax, although this is not 
unusual by international standards. This makes housing a very attractive vehicle for 
saving. In addition to the more favourable tax treatment, individuals have an extra 
incentive to put more of their wealth into their primary residence because of the means 
test for the Age Pension, which excludes the primary home. This leads to higher 
allocation of wealth to housing and, for some, an inefficient level of consumption of 
housing services. 
                                                          
15 Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, Submission to the Inquiry into Affordable Housing, Senate 
Economics References Committee, Sydney, page 1. 
16 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Tables: Money and Credit Statistics, Lending 
Commitments — All Lenders (D6), RBA, Sydney. 
17 National Housing Supply Council (NHSC) 2012, Housing Supply and Affordability — Key 
Indicators, NHSC, Canberra, page 25. 
18 Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, Submission to the Inquiry into Affordable Housing, Senate 
Economics References Committee, Sydney, page 1. 
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The tax treatment of investor housing, in particular, tends to encourage leveraged and 
speculative investment in housing. Investors are attracted by the asymmetry in the tax 
treatment of expenses and capital gains on investor housing. Investors can reduce their 
tax liabilities by deducting borrowing costs and other related expenses against total 
income at the individual’s full marginal tax rate.19 However, nominal capital gains, 
when realised, are effectively taxed at half the marginal rate. 
This regime has been in place since 1999; between 1985 and 1999, real capital gains 
were taxed at the individual’s full marginal tax rate.20, 21 The change in capital gains tax 
arrangements reduced the tax burden of holding an investment property for shorter 
periods and has contributed to the growth in investor housing credit and investors’ 
shift to more leveraged investments over the past 15 years (Charts 3.4 and 3.5). Because 
of these tax arrangements, owners of residential property have an incentive to repay 
their mortgage as slowly as possible to maximise the tax deductions they can accrue. 
Loans with interest-free periods help to maximise these tax deductions in the early 
years of a loan, although these loans also give borrowers more flexibility with 
repayments. The tax system, therefore, encourages individuals to take on more risk, 
which does have implications for risks to lenders. 
                                                          
19 Against total income, not only income from the property. 
20 On investments held for more than 12 months. 
21 At an average rate of inflation of 3 per cent, a property would need to be held for 66 years 
under pre-1999 tax concessions to get the same capital gains tax concession as the current 
arrangements provide after holding the property for one year. 
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Chart 3.4: Housing finance (flow of housing lending commitments) 
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Source: RBA.22 
Although these tax arrangements apply to other leveraged investments, such as 
equities, investors perceive housing investment as less risky than leveraged securities 
investment; mortgages are less likely to be subject to margin calls, and there is 
arguably a widespread and falsely held view that housing prices never fall.23 
                                                          
22 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Tables, Money and Credit Statistics, Lending 
Commitments — All Lenders (D6), RBA, Sydney. 
23 Glenn Stevens has noted that “It is a very dangerous idea to think that dwelling prices 
cannot fall. They can, and they have.” Stevens, G (Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia) 2012, The Lucky Country, address to The Anika Foundation Luncheon, 24 July, 
Sydney. 
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Chart 3.5: Proportion of landlords with net losses24 
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Source: ATO.25 
Some submissions argue that the current risk-weighting arrangements favour housing 
loans, or loans secured by housing, at the expense of business loans. Since the current 
risk-weighting scheme was introduced in 2008, the share of credit used for housing has 
increased. However, this has been the trend for the past 20 years or so.26 In addition to 
this trend, the GFC weighed on business conditions and investment, which reduced 
business demand for credit. As conditions improved, low market interest rates made 
the bond market a relatively attractive source of funds compared to bank loans, 
particularly given the more favourable covenants on bonds compared to bank loans. 
The broader effects and risks associated with housing and 
household leverage 
One implication of higher household debt is the extent to which housing finance may 
crowd out finance for other activities. The banking system generally does not face 
binding constraints on balance sheet growth from prudential requirements. However, 
at times, lending by individual institutions may be constrained by such requirements. 
In addition, banks may choose to restrict lending, overall or to specific sectors, to 
manage their exposures. 
                                                          
24 Net rent equals gross rent less rental deductions, which include interest, capital works and 
other deductions. 
25 Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2012, Taxation Statistics 2011–12, ATO, Canberra. 
26 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Tables: Money and Credit Statistics, 
Lending and Credit Aggregates (D2), RBA, Sydney. 
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In an environment of rising house prices, such constraints may see bank allocate funds 
towards housing and away from (unsecured) business loans.27 All else being equal, 
this would tend to increase the price and reduce the amount of business lending.28 
Cross-country analysis on the effects of bank credit on economic growth suggests that 
credit provided to businesses has a larger positive effect on growth than credit 
provided to households.29 
Housing is also a potential source of systemic risk for the financial system and the 
economy. Since the Wallis Inquiry, the increase in households’ mortgage indebtedness 
has been accompanied by banks allocating a greater proportion of their loan book to 
mortgages; the share of loans for housing has increased from 47 per cent in 1997 to its 
current share of 66 per cent. A large enough disruption to the housing market could 
have significant implications for household balance sheets, financial stability, 
economic growth, and the speed of recovery in household spending and broader 
economic activity following a shock.  
As discussed in the Stability chapter, the FSI Secretariat conducted an analysis of a 
number of scenarios (Box 5.3). One of the scenarios considered the effect of a shock 
that resulted in a sharp and prolonged fall in house prices. In this scenario, household 
wealth would contract and there would be broader and, potentially, long-lasting 
effects on the economy and financial system. A sharp fall in house prices could push 
some households into negative equity and would amplify financial distress associated 
with any broader economic downturn. Deleveraging, combined with lower consumer 
confidence, would weigh on household consumption and broader economic growth. 
The extent of the damage to households’ balance sheets would determine, to a large 
degree, the speed of recovery of household consumption. 
An extreme shock of this nature would also affect the quality of banks’ balance sheets 
and their capacity to extend new credit. This would include business lending, 
particularly for small businesses — which tend to use housing as collateral. Offshore 
wholesale funding would be likely to become more expensive and some banks might 
find it more difficult to raise funds, which would exacerbate pressures on the cost and 
availability of bank credit. Overall, the deterioration in bank balance sheets would 
compromise the speed of a subsequent recovery in economic activity. 
                                                          
27 APRA imposes constraints, in particular by requiring banks to meet certain ratios with 
respect to capital relative to risk-weighted assets. Banks face internal constraints from 
desired returns on equity. 
28 Chakraborty, I, Goldstein, I, and MacKinlay, A 2013, ‘Dark side of housing-price 
appreciation’, VOX, 25 November. 
29 Beck, T, Buyukkarabacak, B, Rioja, F K and Valev, N T 2012,’Who gets the credit? And does 
it matter? Household vs. firm lending across countries’, The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 
issue 1, vol 12, De Gruyter, United States. 
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How policy would react to these developments — to boost demand or stabilise the 
financial system — would depend on the capacity of Government to use available tools 
to respond. The strength of the Australian Government balance sheet and the level of 
interest rates would affect the degree to which both fiscal and monetary policy could 
provide support for the economy. 
It is difficult to quantify the likelihood of such a scenario occurring in Australia. 
Official stress test results in recent years have found Australian banks are likely to be 
relatively resilient to most shocks. Historically, banks have mainly realised losses on 
their commercial property loan portfolios. However, the exposure of the financial 
system to the housing market has clearly increased over time and, in the opinion of the 
Inquiry, the systemic risk associated with this trend should be further considered. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
What measures can be taken to mitigate the effects of developments in the housing 
market on the financial system and the economy? How might these measures be 
implemented and what practical issues would need to be considered? 
Corporate financing 
Non-financial corporations source funds internally from retained earnings and 
externally from lenders and from financial markets. 
Corporations decide on a mix of debt and equity that minimises their cost of capital 
while maintaining a favourable credit rating. Financing decisions also reflect particular 
preferences for internal over external financing, the particular activities that corporates 
undertake, and the timing of any fund raising. Risk preferences matter as well. 
Corporates have to consider the risk that debt providers might not roll over debt when 
it matures or any triggers in debt contracts requiring early repayment. Depending on 
the nature of coupon payments on debt, corporates may need to consider the risk that 
interest rates might increase. Australia’s corporate tax regime also affects corporates’ 
choice of financing. 
Given that access to different types of funding also matters, issues relating to the 
domestic corporate bond and equity markets are explored elsewhere in this chapter. 
Tax treatment of corporate financing 
In Australia, as is the case in tax systems across the world, debt costs are tax 
deductible. Equity-financed investments are subject to corporate tax, although 
Australia’s dividend imputation regime reduces, to some degree, the after-tax cost of 
equity. 
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Dividend imputation 
Some submissions raise the need to review Australia’s dividend imputation regime. 
Submissions note the effect of imputation on investor and corporate behaviour, but 
they also recognise the potentially complex consequences of any changes to the 
corporate tax regime on such behaviour and the broader flow of funds. In its 
submission, PwC states: 
[C]areful consideration should be given to whether there would be benefits to be obtained 
from modifications to the imputation system.30 
In 1987, Australia introduced dividend imputation to remove the bias against domestic 
equity (because of the pre-existing double taxation of corporate earnings) and to 
increase investment. However, the case for retaining imputation is now less clear than 
it was in the past. 
The dividend imputation system affects corporate funding decisions in two main 
ways: the amount of debt financing to seek, and the share of earnings to distribute to 
shareholders, which affects the amount of equity financing used. 
By removing the double taxation of corporate earnings, the introduction of dividend 
imputation reduced the cost of equity and so contributed to the general decline in 
leverage among non-financial corporates. Relative to corporates in other jurisdictions, 
Australian corporates generally have lower leverage.31 In general, this makes 
Australia’s corporate sector more resilient to shocks and means that such shocks are 
less likely to have systemic implications. When reflecting on the lessons of the GFC, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated: 
In most countries, the tax system is biased toward debt financing through deductibility 
of interest payments. This bias to higher leverage increases the vulnerability of the 
private sector to shocks, and should be eliminated.32 
Corporates’ dividend policies are influenced by demand from shareholders for 
dividends and demand from domestic shareholders for the franking credits associated 
with imputation (as well as corporates’ capital funding and cash flow requirements). 
This encourages firms to pay a greater proportion of their earnings as dividends. 
Arguably, this subjects corporates to more market discipline by requiring them to raise 
more external funds (debt or equity) to fund new investment projects. 
                                                          
30 PwC 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 76. 
31 Fan, J P H, Titman, S and Twite, G 2012, ‘An International Comparison of Capital Structure 
and Debt Maturity Choices’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, issue 1,vol 47, 
University of Washington, Seattle, pages 23–56. 
32 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2009, Lessons of the Global Crisis for Macroeconomic Policy, 
19 February, page 14. 
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Australia’s Future Tax System Review argued that the benefits of dividend imputation, 
particularly in lowering the cost of capital, have declined as Australia’s economy has 
become more open. If, as some argue, global capital markets set the (risk-adjusted) cost 
of funding, dividend imputation acts as a subsidy to domestic equity holders but does 
not affect the cost of capital or the level of investment. The effect of dividend 
imputation is to increase private saving and reduce the use of foreign funding for 
investment.33 
The degree to which dividend imputation may act as a subsidy to domestic equity, 
making equities relatively more attractive as a savings vehicle, may contribute to a 
number of characteristics of the broader financial system. These include: 
• The propensity of domestic investors, particularly superannuation funds, to hold 
more domestic equity relative to foreign equity and other asset classes than 
otherwise would be the case, which encourages less diversified portfolios 
• The lack of a deep, liquid domestic corporate bond market 
• Low demand for annuities, which are largely supported by fixed-income securities, 
relative to a retirement income strategy based on high-yield domestic equity 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises 
SMEs are major employers and drivers of economic growth. Australia’s 2 million SMEs 
employ almost 70 per cent of the workforce, which is large by international 
standards.34, 35 SMEs account for over half of the output of the private sector and tend 
to be a major source of innovation in the economy. 
Small business entrepreneurs will often use their families’ finances to fund their 
business. Some seek external funding, which can include extra equity or debt from 
family and friends, debt from financial institutions, or equity from venture capital 
funds. Banks’ business models and expertise are more suited to providing debt finance 
to established businesses, whereas venture capital is more suited to start-up firms in 
nascent industries. 
                                                          
33 Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australia’s Future Tax System Review: Report to the 
Treasurer, Part Two — Detailed analysis, volume 1 of 2, Canberra, pages 191–98. 
34 This reflects ABS categories. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2013, Counts of Australian 
businesses, including entries and exits, cat. no. 8165.0, ABS, Canberra. 
35 This reflects ABS categories. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2013, Australian Industry, 
cat. no. 8155.0, ABS, Canberra. 
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Financing conditions for small and medium enterprises 
Cost 
Interest rates on SME loans are generally higher than those for large business loans 
and mortgages.  
This largely reflects the higher costs and risks associated with bank lending to SMEs. 
Smaller businesses typically have less documentation and shorter financial histories, so 
it is generally harder and more costly for banks to acquire the required information to 
make accurate credit assessments. In addition, SMEs typically have more volatile 
revenue streams and are more likely to default. As such, lenders generally make 
higher provisions for loan losses than for larger corporates. However, lenders do 
differentiate on price and some businesses can pay below standard rates, depending 
on their credit history and quality of collateral. 
Since the GFC, interest rate spreads on small business loans have increased relative to 
other loan types, which reflects the generally higher price of risk (Chart 3.6). This is 
similar to developments in some other advanced economies.  
Access 
Access to external debt funding is not a major issue for most SMEs. In general, the 
majority are successful in getting a loan application approved. Since 2006–07, approval 
rates have been well above 80 per cent.36 Approval rates are much lower for new 
ventures, which reflect the relative riskiness of lending to such enterprises. New 
ventures usually lack collateral and sufficient proven credit history to qualify for a 
loan. Such firms can also lack sufficient cash flow until their product can be 
commercialised. 
                                                          
36 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2012, Selected Characteristics of Australian Business 2011–
12, cat. no. 8167.0, ABS, Canberra. 
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Chart 3.6: Cumulative change in domestic interest rate spreads 
(since Jan 2007) 
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Source: RBA.37 
In some instances, lenders’ application processes can be overly cumbersome for 
SMEs.38 Business owners may not be directed to bank officers who are qualified to 
provide proper advice on business loan applications, or may be directed to personal 
loan products because some bank officers lack familiarity with business lending. In 
some cases, banks do not communicate to business owners why a loan application has 
been declined.39 
Information asymmetries 
Observation 
There are structural impediments for small- and medium-sized enterprises to access 
finance. These impediments include information asymmetries, regulation and 
taxation. 
                                                          
37 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Tables, Interest Rates, Indicator Lending Rates 
(F5), RBA, Sydney. 
38 NSW Business Chamber, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 2. 
39 NSW Business Chamber 2013, Small Business Access to Finance, NSW Business Chamber, 
Sydney, page 44. 
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Information asymmetries are the most significant structural factor contributing to the 
higher cost and lower availability of credit for SMEs and can be a barrier to 
competition in SME lending. Limited or no access to information for potential entrants 
in SME lending increases the cost of establishing SME lending operations.  
Lenders typically will have limited knowledge about a new borrower’s financial 
position, the financial performance of the business and the financial behaviour of the 
business owner. In addition, the SME sector is extremely diverse, so lenders may have 
limited knowledge of the conditions in, and prospects for, particular industries. 
Lenders are less likely to lend to newer businesses because the lender lacks familiarity 
with the customer’s financial performance and behaviour.40 In its submission, the 
Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) notes: 
Small business loans carry higher risk as small business incomes are more volatile, the 
arrangements to secure the loans vary significantly, and lenders generally are offered 
less information to make an assessment of risk partly due to a shorter financial history. 
As a result, lenders charge small businesses a premium for the higher risk.41 
These information asymmetries will be reflected in the price of loans. Banks may have 
to invest resources to acquire sufficient information to make a well-informed lending 
decision, which increases the cost of assessing and approving a loan application. When 
lenders are unable to access sufficient information to make a proper assessment, the 
risks associated with the loan are generally, and justifiably, perceived to be greater. 
This leads to higher provisioning and higher loan costs for the borrower. 
Some submissions raise concerns about the nature of covenants in loan contracts for 
SMEs. In particular, submissions suggest that some non-monetary loan covenants are 
unfair, and the application of some clauses, particularly non-monetary default clauses, 
could be more transparent. The Consumer outcomes chapter explores this issue in 
further detail and notes that Treasury is currently consulting on the issue. However, 
some of these covenants are used to deal with the difficulties in bridging the 
information asymmetries involved in SME lending, and therefore facilitate greater 
access to lending for businesses. 
Many lenders are requiring more security, usually residential property, against 
business loans.42, 43 Requirements for collateral to be held against SME loans can result 
                                                          
40 NSW Business Chamber 2013, Small Business Access to Finance, NSW Business Chamber, 
Sydney, page 36. 
41 Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 73. 
42 Reserve Bank of Australia 2011, Submission to the Inquiry into Access of Small Business to 
Finance. Cited in Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry, page 5. 
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in allocative inefficiencies, where loans are made to businesses with the best collateral, 
rather than those that are the best business prospects. The requirement for residential 
security for a loan disproportionately disadvantages new ventures and younger 
Australians, who are less likely to have ‘bricks and mortar’ collateral. This issue has 
become increasingly problematic as housing has become more expensive and many 
individuals are forced to purchase housing later in life.44 
Prudential regulation 
Several submissions claim that APRA’s capital requirements have reduced the 
availability of and/or increased the price of lending to SMEs.45 Two examples cited are 
the capital requirements for small business lending and the distinction that is made 
between corporate and retail business lending. 
Capital requirements 
The Inquiry has received little evidence that capital requirements have affected either 
the supply of lending to SMEs or the relative pricing of secured and unsecured loans 
beyond what reflects the relative riskiness of the loans. APRA’s submission presents 
data showing that the average default rate of unsecured small business loans is 
generally higher than for secured small business loans, which is reflected in the higher 
risk weights applied to unsecured loans.46 That said, under the internal ratings-based 
approach to determine risk weights, discounts are applied to the capital requirements 
for lending to smaller businesses.47 
                                                                                                                                                          
43 Westpac 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 63 : “as a 
responsible lender … [Westpac] has strict requirements and a limited appetite around the 
types of unsecured lending made available.” 
44 Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry; Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry; Minister for Small Business the Hon. Bruce Bilson 2014, First round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
45 NSW Business Chamber 2013, Small Business Access to Finance, NSW Business Chamber, 
Sydney; Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 38. 
46  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 79. 
47 Australia’s four major banks and Macquarie Bank Ltd use the Basel II internal ratings-based 
approach to determine risk weights. 
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Lenders generally make higher provisions for loan losses to reflect the higher expected 
losses on small business loans. This tends to increase the cost of small business loans, 
particularly unsecured loans.48, 49 
Distinction between corporate and retail business lending 
As part of the Basel II ‘advanced’ approach, a loan can only be treated as ‘retail’ if it is 
subject to standardised loan management processes, and if the loan is managed as part 
of a pool with similar risk characteristics for the purposes of risk assessment and 
quantification.50 APRA has deemed that loans less than $1 million, and subject to such 
processes, can be treated as ‘retail’.51 This reduces administrative costs for the lender 
and lowers capital requirements relative to corporate exposures.52 For borrowers with 
smaller-sized and less-complex loans, this reduces compliance costs, because these 
borrowers are generally not subject to the more intensive annual review requirements 
that apply to borrowers with loans of $1 million or above. 
Increasing the loan-size threshold by which banks distinguish retail from corporate 
lending might, at the margin, increase SME lending. Some submissions argue that the 
$1 million threshold provides a disincentive for firms to borrow more to expand their 
business activities. Several submissions support raising the threshold. APRA indicates 
it would be “willing to consult on raising the $1 million retail/corporate boundary to $1.5 
million, which would bring it into line (at current exchange rates) with the Basel II 
framework”.53 
Barriers to accessing capital markets directly 
SMEs face prohibitively higher fixed costs of raising funds in capital markets, which 
reduces the capacity of SMEs to use market-based finance.54 Requirements to prepare a 
prospectus may discourage some SMEs from seeking equity financing. A prospectus is 
not required where securities are sold to sophisticated investors, or where a small-scale 
                                                          
48 Reserve Bank of Australia 2011, Submission to the Inquiry into Access of Small Business to 
Finance. Cited in Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry, page 5. 
49 Westpac 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 63: “as a 
responsible lender … [Westpac] has strict requirements and a limited appetite around the 
types of unsecured lending made available.” 
50  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2008, Prudential Standard APS 113, 
Capital Adequacy: Internal Ratings-based Approach to Credit Risk, page 12. 
51 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Matic, M, Gorajek, A and Stewart, C 2012, Small Business Funding in Australia, RBA Small 
Business Finance Roundtable, Sydney, 22 May. 
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offer is made that raises no more than $2 million through offers to no more than 
20 investors in any rolling 12-month period. This issue is discussed in more detail in 
the Equity markets section in this chapter. 
Venture capital and private equity 
Venture capital and private equity funds tend to finance more innovative and 
high-growth firms. These firms are drivers of long-term productivity growth. 
Australia’s venture capital and private equity markets are small, and there are barriers 
to generating significant investor interest. 
New ventures can typically take several years of development before any cash flows 
are generated from their activities, and failure rates are high. As a result, new ventures 
have limited access to credit, and market-based financing can be inaccessible or too 
costly to acquire. 
Over the past two decades or so, the returns from domestic venture capital funds have 
not provided investors with adequate compensation for the associated risks. Indeed, 
all Australian venture capital funds formed between 1985 and 2007 had a pooled 
internal rate of return of minus 1.4 per cent.55 
The fee structures of venture capital and private equity funds may also discourage 
some investors. Venture capital fund managers often charge a 2 per cent management 
fee and take 20 per cent of returns. However, unlike other fund managers, venture 
capital fund managers are typically very involved in managing the ventures in their 
funds. Venture capital fund managers provide mentoring services, business expertise, 
and access to industry and market connections, which is reflected in management and 
monitoring costs. However, fee structures and the services these fees reflect may not 
always be transparent to investors. Greater transparency would allow investors to 
make more informed investment choices and lead to greater competition. 
Another barrier to the growth of the venture capital sector is scale. The Australian 
market may be too small for some ventures to be viable, particularly when it comes to 
commercialising a product. In addition, certain cultures, particularly relating to risk, 
and extensive networks need to be developed to facilitate a thriving venture capital 
industry. 
The tax treatment of Venture Capital Limited Partnerships (VCLPs) is complex and 
may be a barrier to fundraising. Investments made under the VCLP regime are 
accorded special tax treatment based on whether the investor is domestic or 
                                                          
55 As of 30 June 2008. Treasury and Department of Industry 2012, Review of Venture Capital and 
Entrepreneurial Skills, Final Report, Treasury, Canberra, referencing the Australian Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association, page 39. 
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international, and whether the treatment of any gains is made on the revenue or capital 
account. The submission from the Australian Private Equity & Venture Capital 
Association Limited states that some features of the VCLP tax framework: 
... put Australia’s funds management sector at a competitive disadvantage, including 
ongoing uncertainty in the treatment of some classes of investors. This makes attracting 
investments into Australia challenging for local fund managers, particularly those that 
manage funds for offshore clients.56 
A recent Board of Taxation Review into the regime’s effectiveness made 
recommendations to simplify and reduce uncertainty, which would reduce barriers to 
investment.57 
Rural business 
Although financial issues affect the rural sector, submissions do not identify significant 
structural issues related to rural finance. 
Agricultural incomes are volatile and uncertain. Rural businesses are exposed to large 
and sometimes prolonged weather events, and weather and pest conditions have a 
marked effect on the quantity and quality of agricultural products. Prices for 
agricultural products can be volatile, typically reflecting conditions in international 
markets, and yields can vary from season to season. However, for those commodities 
for which Australia is a significant global supplier, domestic supply conditions can 
materially affect global prices. Rural businesses have access to a range of insurance 
products to protect against income loss, as well as financial instruments to hedge 
against commodity price and exchange rate losses. 
Debt levels in the agricultural sector have more than doubled over the past decade and 
have outpaced farm incomes, although the debt-to-income ratio for the rural sector has 
stabilised since 2011 at around two years of income.58 Increased indebtedness reflects 
financial factors, such as lower interest rates and increased availability of credit, and 
non-financial factors, such as periods of prolonged drought. 
Farmers are most likely to experience difficulty meeting debt repayment obligations 
during periods of low revenue, such as during a drought or a period of low 
commodity prices. Despite these challenges, the sector has a long history of servicing 
                                                          
56 Australian Private Equity & Venture Capital Association Limited 2014, First round 
submission to the Financial System Inquiry, Submission 1, page 19. 
57 The Board of Taxation 2011, Review of Taxation Arrangements under the Venture Capital 
Limited Partnership Regime, June 2011, Canberra. 
58 Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 132. 
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debt, albeit with government support. Currently, less than 1.5 per cent of loans to the 
rural sector are more than 90 days in arrears and bank losses on the portfolio of rural 
loans are less than 0.5 per cent.59 Many lenders work closely with farmers in times of 
financial hardship, often accommodating arrangements such as repayment holidays 
and using independent mediators to help resolve issues with their customers.  
Policy options for consultation 
Policy options to address the structural impediments to funding SMEs range from 
direct government intervention in the SME lending market to initiatives to reduce 
information asymmetries.  
An important consideration for this Inquiry is whether competition and technological 
developments will resolve issues related to financing SMEs and early-stage ventures. 
Reducing information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers and facilitating 
more competition in SME lending would improve SME financing. As such, the Inquiry 
is requesting suggestions and opinions about mechanisms to narrow information 
asymmetries between lenders and SME borrowers. 
One such option, mentioned in some submissions, is to facilitate the development of an 
SME finance database that could provide business-level data to lenders and potential 
new market entrants. Data could include details from tax returns and business activity 
statements, and financial information from lenders. 
Ideally, such a database would be managed on a commercial basis, but the Inquiry 
recognises the barriers to the private sector establishing such a database. Such barriers 
include restrictions on access to particular information. Entities with the relevant 
information would need to be able or willing to provide such information. Privacy 
issues would also need to be considered, and some lenders and borrowers may be 
reluctant to supply information that could be deemed commercial-in-confidence. 
Some submissions suggest the Government could provide facilities that make direct 
loans to small business, subsidies on loans, or guarantees on loans. Although this 
would improve the cost and availability of finance to small businesses, taxpayers could 
bear significant costs and risks, which would be exacerbated by adverse selection as 
riskier lending prospects are pushed to Government schemes. 
Other submissions suggest encouraging superannuation funds to invest in securitised 
SME loans and venture capital funds. Although this might increase the availability of 
finance for SMEs, there are currently very few impediments. A mandate requiring 
superannuation funds to do so may also involve an implicit guarantee by the 
                                                          
59 Australian Bankers Association 2014, Submission to Senate Inquiry: Reserve Bank 
Amendment (Australian Reconstruction and Development Board) Bill 2013, page 6. 
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Government, which the Inquiry does not consider to be appropriate. Although it is 
doubtful that a deep market of securitised SME loans could develop, the Inquiry 
would value views as to how this might be achieved. Superannuation funds could 
consider investing in venture capital funds as part of a broader approach to 
diversifying their asset portfolios. This may involve taking a broader view of their 
investment options and require them to engage the required expertise. 
A well-developed broker market for SME lending would likely increase competition 
among lenders and improve access to finance for SMEs. In recent years, brokers have 
become more prevalent in some areas of small business lending, particularly 
equipment finance. However, for other areas of SME lending, the broker market 
remains relatively undeveloped. This may reflect a combination of transitional issues 
for the broker industry and structural impediments. 
Venture capital funds argue that changing the research and development (R&D) tax 
credit system to a quarterly basis for new ventures would help alleviate cash flow 
constraints. New ventures tend to make significant cash outlays in the early stages of 
the product lifecycle. This is an issue that should be considered as part of the Tax 
White Paper process. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Facilitate development of an SME finance database to reduce information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• To what degree will technological developments resolve issues related to 
information asymmetries in SME lending? 
• What are the best options to narrow the informational gaps between lenders and 
SME borrowers? 
• Could the use of certain loan covenants be reduced, while still providing SMEs 
with adequate access to finance and lenders with appropriate protection? 
• What are the prospects for a market for securitised SME loans developing? 
• What are the main barriers to greater broker activity in SME finance? Are these 
barriers transitional or structural in nature? 
• What are the best options for improving the tax treatment of VCLPs? 
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External administration 
Recycling capital to new businesses 
A well-functioning external administration regime facilitates the efficient recycling of 
capital and so contributes to the efficiency with which funds are allocated in the 
economy. It also protects creditors’ rights, which promotes confidence in broader 
credit provision. 
There are a number of processes available to businesses under Australia’s external 
administration regime (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Australia’s external administration regime60 
Process  Description 
Voluntary administration When a voluntary administrator is appointed to control and investigate a 
company’s affairs and make a recommendation to creditors about the 
company’s future and what is in the best interests of creditors. 
Liquidation The orderly wind-up of a company’s affairs, distribution of assets to 
creditors and dissolution under the control of a liquidator.  
Controller (including 
receivership) 
Someone who enters into possession or control of the company’s property 
to enforce a security interest.  
Schemes of arrangement An arrangement (approved by the court) between a company and its 
creditors and/or members to alter their respective rights and interests or to 
facilitate a reconstruction. 
Informal work-outs Restructuring outside formal external administration.  
External administration of an entity involves costs, but it is important that these costs 
are minimised, so the maximum amount of capital can either be retained in a business 
that is able to continue operating or reallocated to more productive activities. 
Some submissions argue that the current regime is biased towards liquidation.61 They 
claim the prohibition on trading while insolvent, and its associated penalties, make 
directors more cautious in attempting to reorganise a business that could continue to 
be viable. 
Stakeholders suggest that placing a company into voluntary administration can lead to 
the failure of a business that could survive with some restructuring, because voluntary 
                                                          
60  Corporations Act 2001, Chapter 5. 
61  This has also been suggested in Bickerdyke, I, Lattimore R and Madge, A 2000, Business 
Failure and Change: An Australian Perspective, Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper, 
AusInfo, Canberra, page 89.  
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administration processes can significantly devalue a company and involve significant 
costs.62 
Others submissions suggest that current arrangements are too complex and costly for 
SMEs. For example, SME owners are often personally liable when the business is in 
financial distress, and there are costs associated with navigating the corporate external 
administration and bankruptcy regimes. 
In some cases, liquidator misconduct in areas of improper gain, including excessive 
remuneration, and liquidator independence and competence affect the cost and 
effectiveness of liquidation for SMEs.63 
Policy options for consultation 
To prevent viable businesses from entering voluntary administration, some 
submissions suggest that Australia adopt the US Chapter 11 regime, or certain aspects 
of it.64 The Inquiry considers adopting such a regime would be costly and could leave 
control in the hands of those who are often the cause of a company’s financial 
distress.65 Capital would be maintained in a business that is likely to fail, which would 
restrict or defer the capital from being channelled to more viable and productive 
enterprises. Adopting such a regime would also create more uncertainty for creditors 
by limiting their rights. The Inquiry notes that Chapter 11 has rarely enabled 
businesses to continue as going concerns in the long term.66 
                                                          
62 Parbery, S 2010, ‘Assessing Voluntary Administration in Australia: Including Suitability for 
Workouts, Turnarounds and Pre-Packs’, paper presented at the Supreme Court Annual 
Corporate Law Conference, 24 August, Sydney, pages 98–99. 
63 ASIC data on liquidator supervision reflects such complaints. Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 389 — ASIC regulation of registered liquidators: 
January to December 2013, ASIC, Canberra. 
64 Title 11, United States Code, Chapter 11. 
65 These are some of the reasons several inquiries have rejected Chapter 11, including the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2004, and 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2004. 
66 The Productivity Commission notes that only around 6.5 per cent of businesses emerge from 
Chapter 11 as an ongoing entity. See Bickerdyke, I, Lattimore R and Madge, A 2000, Business 
Failure and Change: An Australian Perspective, Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper, 
AusInfo, Canberra, page 90. 
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There is little empirical evidence that Australia’s voluntary administration process is 
causing otherwise viable businesses to fail.67 The Inquiry would like stakeholders to 
provide any empirical evidence that supports that view. 
The Australian Government released proposals in 2012 to improve liquidator 
competence, align corporate insolvency and bankruptcy, and promote market 
competition on price and quality.68 These proposals seek to mitigate administrative 
costs for SMEs and curtail the escalation of time-based fee entitlements. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Implement the 2012 proposals to reduce the complexity and cost of external 
administration for SMEs. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
Is there evidence that Australia’s external administration regime causes otherwise 
viable businesses to fail and, if so, what could be done to address this? 
Infrastructure financing 
Submissions do not raise significant financial system issues that directly relate to 
infrastructure financing. Where issues are raised, these relate more to issues covered 
elsewhere in this report, such as the development of the corporate bond market. 
                                                          
67 Although ASIC data suggests that most companies that enter voluntary administration fail, 
data does not suggest that these companies would have remained viable with an informal 
work-out. 
68 Commonwealth of Australia 2012, Exposure Draft: Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2013, 
Canberra. 
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The major issues submissions raise relate to infrastructure project selection and design, 
and the implications for the pipeline of greenfield projects. This is consistent with the 
Productivity Commission’s recent draft Public Infrastructure report. The Commission 
found: 
There is no shortage of private sector capital that could potentially be deployed to finance 
public infrastructure in Australia. Private capital markets will finance most projects at 
the ‘right price’.69 
Submissions note a shortage of profitable infrastructure projects to invest in. Industry 
Super Australia states: 
Industry SuperFunds have already made clear that they would make infrastructure 
investment of up to $15 billion over the next five years if appropriate projects were made 
available. Reform of the bid process could well see them accelerate or even increase that 
projected level of investment.70 
A number of submissions suggest that funding for infrastructure has become more 
expensive since the GFC. Interest rate spreads on infrastructure projects have 
increased, including in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.71 However, this mainly reflects the general re-pricing of risk. 
Investments in infrastructure are viewed by some as being illiquid. Infrastructure 
investment could be facilitated by developing liquid, tradable claims on infrastructure 
projects. This could provide greater scope for retail and institutional investors, 
including superannuation funds, to invest in infrastructure. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
What are the impediments to the development of liquid, tradeable claims on 
infrastructure projects? 
                                                          
69 Productivity Commission 2014, Public infrastructure — Draft Report, Canberra, page 33. The 
final report was sent to Government on 27 May 2014, but had not been released at the time 
this report was published. 
70 Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 9. 
71 Work by McKinsey Global Institute suggests that interest rate spreads (over LIBOR) for 
infrastructure projects in advanced economies have increased by less than 100 basis points 
since the GFC. McKinsey Global Institute 2013, Infrastructure Productivity: How to Save 
$1 trillion a Year, McKinsey, Dubai, page 21. 
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Impact investment and social impact bonds 
Impact investment allows investors to align their financial objectives with their 
personal values by investing in opportunities that offer both social and financial 
returns. Capital can flow from impact investments made by mainstream financial 
institutions, institutional investors and philanthropic funds, either directly into social 
enterprises or via specialist financial intermediaries (Figure 3.2). Capital held by 
intermediaries then flows into social enterprises through avenues such as direct 
lending, social investment funds and social investment products managed by these 
intermediaries. 
Figure 3.2: Sources of funding for social enterprises 
 
Unlike socially responsible investment, which takes a more passive approach to asset 
allocations (for example, a managed investment scheme that avoids investments in 
tobacco businesses), impact investors actively seek social or environmental objectives. 
As many social benefits cannot be captured by a particular individual, impact 
investment can increase the level of investment in projects with a high social return. 
Impact investment is an important source of capital for organisations that may not be 
able to access funding from mainstream financial markets. It can encourage new 
markets, entrepreneurship and innovation to solve entrenched social issues. Recent 
examples of impact investment include: 
• The GoodStart syndicate raised $165 million for 650 ABC Learning day care centres, 
which GoodStart now runs on a not-for-profit basis. 
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• The NSW Government launched a pilot of Australia’s first two social impact bond 
programs in 2011: $7 million in capital was raised for UnitingCare Burnside to 
support families in facilitating their child’s return from foster care, and $10 million 
was raised for the Benevolent Society to prevent family breakdowns. 
Barriers to impact investment 
More impact investment activity could trigger a marked change in the way 
governments deal with social or environmental problems by supporting entrepreneurs 
to find new solutions to entrenched problems. It could also shift governments’ 
approaches to dealing with these problems from paying for service delivery to paying 
for outcomes at the best price. However, mobilising the impact investment market may 
require government support, including removing barriers. 
Barriers to investors engaging in impact investment in Australia may include: 
• Some superannuation trustees consider their fiduciary duties to be a barrier to 
impact investment. This is despite there being no explicit prohibition to impact 
investment provided, superannuation trustees meet the sole purpose test.72 
• Private and public ancillary funds, which provide a link between donors and 
organisations that can receive tax deductible donations, are unclear whether they 
may count discounted returns toward minimum distribution requirements. 
• Some private ancillary funds do not meet sophisticated or professional investor 
tests under the exemptions from the prospectus regime, despite very high net 
worth individuals or organisations having established them. 
• Relatively simple instruments, such as social impact bonds, are subject to onerous 
disclosure requirements. 
Policy options for consultation 
Government could provide guidance to superannuation and philanthropic trustees by 
explaining how superannuation trustees can facilitate impact investment within the 
existing regulatory framework. There may also be benefits in exploring options to 
better use the underlying assets of private and public ancillary funds. To enable 
private ancillary funds to better reflect their sophistication, it may be possible for such 
funds to be considered sophisticated or professional investors if the founder of the 
                                                          
72 Donald, M S, Ormiston, J and Charlton, K 2014, The Potential for Superannuation Funds to make 
Investments with a Social Impact, University of New South Wales, Centre for Law, Markets 
and Regulation, working paper no. 14-3, May. 
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fund meets either of these thresholds. Finally, moves to simplify and streamline 
disclosure requirements could reduce the regulatory burden associated with social 
impact bonds. 
Some submissions propose more active Government involvement in expanding the 
impact investment market. These include Government providing risk capital to attract 
initial investments, developing a dedicated social investment bank and introducing tax 
concessions. The latter should be considered as part of the Tax White Paper process. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Provide guidance to superannuation and philanthropic trustees on impact 
investment. 
• Classify a private ancillary fund as a sophisticated or professional investor for the 
purposes of the exemptions from the prospectus regime if the sponsor of the fund 
meets either of these thresholds. 
• Simplify and streamline disclosure requirements associated with social impact 
bonds. 
• Undertake a more active role in expanding impact investment, such as providing 
risk capital and establishing social investment banks. 
Government 
In broad terms, governments’ main source of funds is tax revenue, and governments 
use funds to provide services, make transfer payments and fund gross fixed capital 
formation. For the Australian Government, spending on social security and welfare 
comprises over one-third of total expenditure.73 Spending on health, defence and 
education together accounts for close to another third.74 Fixed capital investment is 
another significant component of Government expenditure. 
                                                          
73 For the Australian general government sector (excluding state, territory and local 
governments). 
74 Commonwealth of Australia 2014, 2014–15 Budget, Budget Paper 1, Statement 6, Estimates for 
2014–15 expenditure, Commonwealth Government of Australia, Canberra, page 1. 
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Governments account for shortfalls in revenue over expenditure by issuing debt. Net 
issuance of Commonwealth Government Securities (CGS) increased sharply after 
2007–08 as the budget moved into deficit with the onset of the GFC.75 The stock of CGS 
on issue is expected to increase to $360 billion by the end of 2014–15, which would be 
equivalent to 0.2 years of GDP.76 
Role of government in the financial system 
The CGS market plays a very important role in Australia’s financial system. The CGS 
market is highly liquid. It provides a risk-free interest rate curve that other debt 
instruments can be priced from. The Australian Office of Financial Management 
recently extended the length of the CGS yield curves to 20 years, which provides a 
benchmark for longer-dated debt securities.  
Around 70 per cent of CGS on issue is held by non-residents.77 Investor confidence in 
the Australian sovereign debt market reflects the relative strength of Australia’s public 
finances and the Australian economy more broadly.  
CGS (and state government debt securities) represent a major source of high-quality 
liquid assets (HQLAs) for the financial system. HQLAs are unencumbered assets that 
can be readily converted to cash with little or no loss in value, even in stressed market 
conditions. To manage liquidity requirements, financial institutions (particularly 
banks) require holdings of assets that can be converted to cash, sometimes at short 
notice. Financial entities active in derivatives markets also require HQLAs to use as 
collateral in derivatives transactions.78 
The banking system 
The banking sector plays a central role in the Australian financial system. Banks 
transform short-term liabilities into long-term assets, but they must manage the 
liquidity, credit and other risks associated with this activity. This intermediation 
process is an important mechanism by which funds are channelled from savers to 
                                                          
75 Commonwealth of Australia 2014, 2014–15 Budget, Budget Paper 1, Statement 10, 
Commonwealth Government of Australia, Canberra, page 6. 
76 Commonwealth of Australia 2014, 2014–15 Budget, Budget Paper 1, Statement 7, 
Commonwealth Government of Australia, Canberra, page 5. 
77 As at the December quarter 2013, 67.5 per cent of total CGS on issue was held by 
non-residents of Australia. Commonwealth of Australia 2014, 2014–15 Budget, Budget 
Paper 1, Statement 7, Commonwealth Government of Australia, Canberra, pages 7–10. 
78 Reserve Bank of Australia 2012, Financial Regulation and Australian Dollar Liquid Assets, 
RBA Bulletin, September Quarter, RBA, Sydney. 
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borrowers to facilitate business investment and household purchases of major assets, 
and to help businesses and households manage their liquidity requirements. 
The effect of Basel III on bank funding 
Capital 
Some submissions argue that APRA’s approach to implementing Basel III capital has 
materially increased bank funding costs; however, these submissions do not quantify 
the effect new capital requirements have had on loan pricing. Submissions note that 
Basel III not only requires banks to use more capital funding, but that capital must be 
of a higher quality, which tends to be more expensive. Some submissions argue that 
APRA has taken a more conservative approach than in some other jurisdictions. While 
true, it can also be argued that APRA’s approach has, to some degree, reduced the risk 
premia paid by Australian banks on wholesale debt, which acts to reduce wholesale 
funding costs. Furthermore, as discussed in the Stability chapter, Australian banks’ 
actual capital ratios lie roughly in the middle of the pack when compared to other 
jurisdictions on a consistent basis. 
On balance, it is difficult to ascertain whether APRA’s approach to implementing Basel 
III capital will materially affect Australian banks in terms of pricing or access to 
funding (domestically or internationally) or whether it has had a significant effect on 
loan pricing in Australia. 
Liquidity 
Under the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), to be implemented in Australia from 2015, 
some banks will be required to hold unencumbered HQLAs to cover net cash outflows 
in a 30-day stress event.79 The proposed net stable funding ratio (NSFR) sets the 
required amount of longer-term funding against longer-term assets. The Inquiry notes 
that APRA has implemented a regime that is broadly in line with the Basel III liquidity 
framework. 
An important aspect of the implementation of the Basel III liquidity reforms in 
Australia was the establishment of the Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF) at the 
Reserve Bank of Australia. Use of a CLF is allowed under the Basel rules for 
jurisdictions like Australia with insufficient HQLAs. This means those authorised 
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) subject to the LCR are able to include the CLF 
amount towards meeting their LCR requirement. The CLF will also get some 
recognition in the proposed NSFR regime; third-party assets eligible for inclusion in 
                                                          
79 Those authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) with simple, retail-based business 
models are subject to a simple liquidity ratio requirement under the minimum liquidity 
holdings regime. 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
2-78 
the CLF will receive a treatment in the NSFR that reflects their enhanced liquidity 
characteristics. 
Overall, the new capital and liquidity arrangements do impose extra constraints on 
banks’ balance sheets, although it is less clear that these constraints are having a 
significant effect on lending activities. The capital requirements means banks must use 
more capital funding than they otherwise might choose and the liquidity requirements 
place extra constraints on banks’ sources of funding and uses of that funding. This 
could limit banks’ ability to finance new projects and slow the rate of gross fixed 
capital formation. However, APRA’s approach may put downward pressure on the 
cost of funds for banks. Using more capital funding and holding more liquidity is more 
likely to enhance the stability of the financial system and give more confidence to 
wholesale investors and depositors, which is reflected in lower risk premia required by 
these providers of funds. 
Funding credit growth 
Several submissions, mainly from the banking sector, question how the banking 
system would fund higher economic growth in Australia.80 These submissions argue 
that ADIs would be unable to fund higher credit growth with new deposits. The 
‘funding gap’ between credit and deposits is largely funded using wholesale debt. 
Some of this debt is issued overseas in foreign currency, which involves some risks if 
there are disruptions in these markets, such as the turmoil during the GFC. To 
ameliorate these risks, submissions argue that higher deposit growth should be 
encouraged, that further development of a corporate bond market is required, and that 
the superannuation system should be encouraged to allocate more funds to deposits 
and fixed income products. 
Stewart, Robertson and Heath (2013) argue there is no reason to believe that higher 
demand for credit or reduced supply of deposits would disrupt economic growth.81 
Lenders can change the interest rates they charge on loans, while the cost of different 
funding liabilities will be determined by investor preferences and the willingness of 
banks to supply different funding instruments.82 In its submission, ANZ states that 
                                                          
80 For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 64; Westpac 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 45. 
81  Stewart C, Robertson B and Heath A 2013, Trends in the Funding and Lending Behaviour of 
Australian Banks, Research Discussion Paper 2013–15, Sydney. 
82 Stewart C, Robertson B and Heath A 2013, Trends in the Funding and Lending Behaviour of 
Australian Banks, Research Discussion Paper 2013–15, Sydney. 
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markets for bank funding are generally efficient and do not impede the banking 
system’s ability to fund economic growth.83 
In the view of the Inquiry, high-quality projects and viable enterprises would still be 
able to obtain funding through other channels if insufficient credit was available. But it 
acknowledges entities that are more reliant on loans, such as small businesses, would 
have some difficulty accessing funding. 
Despite these arguments, the Inquiry acknowledges that the composition and stability 
of the funding for ADIs are important. A more stable funding composition enhances 
the ability of ADIs to fund long-term loans. The Inquiry recognises the need for some 
adjustments, particularly to tax, to ensure a more efficient allocation of funding in the 
economy. 
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Source: ABS.84 
In the period leading up to the GFC, banks had been using a greater proportion of 
wholesale debt funding (particularly from offshore) than they do today. In part, this 
was because of the ease by which short-term debt could be rolled over. When funding 
markets were dislocated during the GFC, Australian ADIs found it difficult to roll over 
short-term debt and to obtain wholesale funding. It also became difficult to sell 
securitised loans; securitisation markets had become an important source of funds for 
                                                          
83 ANZ Bank 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 1. 
84 Australian Bureau of Statistics 2014, Australian National Accounts: Financial Accounts, 
December 2013, cat. no. 52320, ABS, Canberra. 
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smaller ADIs and non-bank lenders. These events made it more difficult for ADIs to 
meet the demand for credit and led ADIs to their funding risks. 
Market pressures, including from ratings agencies, resulted in a shift of funding 
towards more stable sources, particularly retail deposits. Deposits now represent a 
larger share of bank funding than they did before the crisis, and banks increased the 
maturity structure of their wholesale debt to manage their liquidity risk better 
(Chart 3.7). The shift in the funding mix was driven by a re-pricing of bank liabilities, 
and some entities, such as superannuation funds, switched away from bank wholesale 
debt to wholesale deposits.85 However, more intense competition for deposits and the 
higher cost of alternative sources of funding led to an increase in the cost of deposits 
for ADIs. 
Deposits 
Some of the difficultly in attracting deposits from households relates to the tax 
treatment of products that pay returns in the form of interest. Compared to other 
savings vehicles, such as housing and equities, returns from deposits are taxed 
unfavourably. In its submission, Westpac states: 
Westpac recommends the Inquiry considers measures for tax equalisation between bank 
deposits and other competing savings options. The specific nature of these measures 
should be considered in the Government’s tax white paper process.86 
At the margin, this results in ADIs having to offer higher interest rates to attract 
deposits, which raises the cost of funds and lending rates in the economy. 
The relative unattractiveness of deposits to households has helped drive the trends in 
the composition of bank deposits (Chart 3.8). Deposits held directly by households 
have accounted for a declining share of total bank deposits. In contrast, the share of 
deposits from superannuation funds has been rising. Demand for deposits by 
superannuation funds has been driven by strong growth in member contributions and 
higher demand for liquid assets. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, some submissions suggest that superannuation 
funds should allocate more of their assets to deposits and long-term wholesale debt. 
Some stakeholders argue that a lower share of deposits directly held by households 
and a higher share of deposits from larger superannuation funds may, in fact, make it 
more difficult for ADIs to write long-term loans. Given that deposits made by large 
APRA-regulated superannuation funds are less sticky than retail deposits, ADIs would 
be required to hold a larger quantum of liquidity if they were managing their liquidity 
                                                          
85 Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 183. 
86 Westpac 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 48. 
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risks prudently. Under the LCR regime, the marginal liquidity required against an 
extra dollar of a superannuation deposit would come from self-securitised assets that 
already exist on the balance sheet of the LCR ADIs. Given the superannuation sector 
will become an increasingly large source of deposits for the banking system, it is 
unclear to the Inquiry what effect this will have on the banking system and the flow of 
funds in the economy more broadly. 
Chart 3.8: Sources of bank deposits87 
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Source: ABS.88 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• What effect is the implementation of the Basel III capital and liquidity regimes in 
Australia expected to have on the cost of funds, loan pricing and the ability of 
banks to finance new (long-term) loans? How large are these effects expected to 
be? 
• What share of funding for ADIs is expected to come from larger superannuation 
funds over the next two decades? What effect might this have on bank funding 
composition and costs? What effect will this have on the ability of ADIs to write 
long-term loans? 
                                                          
87 Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 183. 
88 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, Australian National Accounts: Financial Accounts, 
December 2013, cat. no. 5232.0, ABS, Canberra. 
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Superannuation 
The superannuation sector is a significant and growing source of funding for the rest 
of the economy. The asset allocation decisions made by the superannuation sector will 
have significant implications for the flow of funds in the economy. 
The size and composition of superannuation assets 
As of 31 March 2014, the superannuation sector held $1.8 trillion in assets.89 By 
comparison, the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) market capitalisation is roughly 
$1.6 trillion.90 Financial assets held in the superannuation system were 50 per cent of 
those of the banking system in 1997 but had grown to 60 per cent by the end of 2013.91 
Structural developments in the superannuation system have affected how assets in 
superannuation funds are allocated. These developments reflect changes to industry 
composition, particularly the growth of Self-managed Superannuation Funds and 
Australia’s ageing population. 
APRA-regulated funds have a vastly different asset allocation to that of SMSFs. They 
are more heavily invested in foreign equities and fixed income, while SMSFs have a 
higher allocation towards domestic equities, property, and cash and deposits 
(Chart 3.9). The differences in the asset allocations reflect certain features of SMSFs: 
• SMSFs have an older membership than APRA-regulated funds, so they are more 
likely to have a more defensive asset allocation. 
• APRA-regulated funds have better access to foreign equity and wholesale fixed 
income markets, although product developments, such as exchange-traded funds 
and retail bonds, will make it easier for SMSFs to access such asset classes in the 
future. 
• SMSFs typically cannot take advantage of the pooling benefits available to larger 
funds. 
                                                          
89 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Quarterly Superannuation 
Performance (interim edition), APRA, Sydney, Page 6. 
90 As at the end of April 2014. Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 2014, Historical market 
statistics, ASX, Sydney. 
91 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, Australian National Accounts: Financial Accounts, 
December 2013, cat. no. 5232.0, ABS, Canberra. 
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Chart 3.9: Asset allocation of superannuation funds, 2013 
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Future trends 
Australia’s superannuation assets are expected to continue to grow at high rates for the 
foreseeable future and exceed the growth of the economy. This growth will be driven 
by the increase in the Superannuation Guarantee (SG) rate to 12 per cent by 2022, 
investment returns, and tax concessions on superannuation contributions and 
earnings. There are a range of projections of future superannuation asset growth 
(Chart 3.10). Industry Super Australia projects superannuation assets will exceed those 
of the banking sector by the early 2030s.93 This reinforces the importance of the 
superannuation sector in funding economic activity. 
                                                          
92 Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2013, Self -Managed Super Fund Statistical Report — 
December 2013, ATO, Canberra. APRA 2013, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, June 2013 
(revised 5 February 2014). Asset allocation is for the default investment strategy. 
93 Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 117. 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
2-84 
Chart 3.10: Total superannuation assets: projections 
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Sources: Industry Super Australia, RiceWarner and Treasury.94 
Superannuation assets relative to GDP will eventually peak towards the end of the 
2030s, according to one submission, as the number of retirees continues to increase 
relative to the workforce.95 
As the assets in the superannuation system grow relative to the supply of domestic 
financial assets, superannuation funds may look towards other asset classes and 
increase their relative allocation of offshore assets. A report prepared by RiceWarner 
and commissioned by the Actuaries Institute for the Inquiry, argues it is possible that 
funds will allocate a higher proportion of their assets to overseas investments because 
of the reduced capacity for the Australian market to absorb those funds. This would 
have implications for Australia’s balance of payments. 
                                                          
94 Treasury 2014, Industry Super Australia 2013, RiceWarner 2014, Ageing and Capital Flows, 
commissioned by the Actuaries Institute. The projections by Rice Warner include the effects 
of inflation. 
95 RiceWarner 2014, Ageing and Capital Flows, commissioned by the Actuaries Institute, Sydney. 
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The other major development in the superannuation system is the trend towards a 
greater share of assets in the retirement phase. Currently, around 30 per cent of assets 
are held in the retirement phase, but this is expected to increase to more than 
40 per cent over the next 30 years.96 RiceWarner argues, among other points: 
• The conservatism of retirees as they age is likely to result in a greater proportion of 
total assets invested defensively, such as in Government and corporate bonds. 
Older superannuants are also likely to prefer yield over capital appreciation. 
• Defensive overlays will increasingly be used to protect members against significant 
falls in asset values. This will require greater depth in derivative markets and 
include balance sheet guarantees of banks and insurers, which will require them to 
expand their capital bases. 
• As argued in the Retirement income chapter, there will be increasing interest in 
products that protect against longevity risk. The increase in demand for products 
like lifetime annuities will increase the demand for and use of fixed income assets. 
The same report also argues that consolidation in the superannuation market will be 
accompanied by a shift to more illiquid assets as the cash flows for large funds become 
larger and more predictable. This is discussed further in the Superannuation chapter. 
The demand for fixed income products could also stimulate demand for securitised 
assets, which is an important funding source for smaller lenders. Further, 
superannuation funds could engage in direct lending to households and businesses in 
direct competition with the banking sector, which has already occurred in other 
economies, such as the United Kingdom. This would require superannuation funds to 
develop credit assessment capabilities and would have implications for how funds 
might be regulated. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
What effects will the trends in the size and composition of superannuation have on 
the broader flow of funds in the economy over the next few decades, including on 
international capital flows to and from Australia? 
                                                          
96 RiceWarner 2014, Ageing and Capital Flows, commissioned by the Actuaries Institute, Sydney. 
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The corporate bond market 
A deeper and more liquid corporate bond market would provide diversification 
benefits to both issuers and investors. 
Over recent years, bond issuance by Australian corporates has increased steadily, with 
80 per cent of issuance in offshore markets (Chart 3.11). On average, around 30 bonds 
are issued in the domestic market per year, with a slightly higher number of offshore 
issues, which are generally larger.97 Traditionally, private non-financial corporations 
have made relatively little use of the domestic market. In recent years, domestic 
issuance has been dominated by the major banks.98 
Observation 
Australia has an established domestic bond market, although a range of regulatory 
and tax factors have limited its development. 
Chart 3.11: Australian corporate bonds outstanding 
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Source: RBA. 
                                                          
97  Lowe, P (Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia) 2014, Opportunities and Challenges for 
Market-based Financing, speech to the ASIC Annual Forum 2014, 25 March, Sydney. 
98 From mid-2007 to the end of 2011, the major banks accounted for around 60 per cent of 
issuance since mid-2007. Black S, Kirkwood J, Rai A and Williams T 2012, A History of 
Australian Corporate Bonds, Reserve Bank of Australia, Research Discussion Paper 2012-09, 
Sydney. 
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In the international context, Australia’s pattern of corporate debt financing is fairly 
typical. The proportion of debt funding for Australian corporates that is intermediated 
by banks is broadly consistent with that of other advanced economies with the 
exception of the United States, which has an unusually large corporate bond market.99 
Corporates in Australia and other advanced economies tend to issue bonds in Europe 
and the United States. 
In Australia, it is more common for corporate bonds to be issued into the wholesale 
market and traded over the counter. Despite this, a small number of public offers of 
listed corporate bonds are made to investors each year. Unlike in the United States, 
there is limited public transparency in the over-the-counter corporate bond market in 
Australia.100 Since the corporate bond market in Australia is largely over-the-counter 
and lacks transparency, retail investors are effectively precluded from investing 
directly in these bonds. 
For lower-rated or unrated corporates, raising funds through bond issuance can be 
challenging, particularly for tenors longer than seven years. That said, market 
conditions for both lower-rated and longer-dated issuers have improved recently, with 
more Australian dollar BBB-rated issuance and at longer tenors in 2013 than in 
previous years.101, 102 
In recent years, the Government has taken a number of steps to stimulate the corporate 
bond market: 
• The Australian Office of Financial Management has extended the length of the yield 
curves for CGS to 20 years. 
• The RBA has begun publishing pricing data for non-financial corporate bonds.103 
                                                          
99 Reasons for the exceptionally large US corporate bond market include the fragmented 
banking system, a long history of credit ratings agencies, the size of the funds management 
industry, an investor base familiar with fixed income assets, the most liquid government 
debt market and the status of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. 
100 In the US, the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) is a vehicle that facilitates 
mandatory reporting of over-the-counter secondary market transactions in certain kinds of 
US corporate bonds. TRACE was developed by the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, a self-regulatory organisation of financial market participants. TRACE became 
operational on 1 July 2002. 
101 Debelle, G (Assistant Governor, Financial Markets, Reserve Bank of Australia) 2014, The 
Australian Bond Market, speech to the Economic Society of Australia, 15 April, Canberra. 
102 Lowe, P  (Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia) 2014, Opportunities and Challenges for 
Market-based Financing, speech to the ASIC Annual Forum 2014, 25 March, Sydney. 
103 See Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Tables, Aggregate Measures of Australian 
Corporate Bond Spreads and Yields (F3), RBA, Sydney. 
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• The Government has made exchange-traded Commonwealth Government Bonds 
available for trading on the ASX since May 2013, to provide a visible pricing 
benchmark for corporate bonds and to encourage retail investors to consider 
diversifying their asset portfolio to fixed income products.104 
In addition, legislation currently before Parliament aims to simplify the prospectus 
requirements for retail ‘vanilla’ bonds and reduce the liability of company directors 
issuing these simple bonds to retail investors.105 
Alternative funding sources for corporates 
Australian corporates generally have good access to alternative funding sources. Bank 
and syndicated loans are usually offered at interest rates similar to those available in 
the bond market (Chart 3.12). Loans can involve lower fixed costs, and funds can be 
accessed in a more flexible way. However, the tenor of funding available from banks 
may not be as long as bonds, and covenants in loan contracts can make bond funding 
more attractive. In some jurisdictions, syndicated loan participations are tradable and 
therefore available to other investors. This is rare in Australia. 
                                                          
104 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Commonwealth Government Securities Legislation 
Amendment (Retail Trading) Bill 2012. 
105 The Corporations Amendment (Simple Corporate Bonds and Other Measures) Bill 2014 was 
introduced into the winter sitting of Parliament, but is yet to be passed. ‘Vanilla bonds’ are 
defined in the Bill as having certain features including a face value of less than $1,000, a 
maturity of less than 15 years, and being issued by a listed entity or wholly owned 
subsidiary of one. 
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Chart 3.12: Interest rates on corporate debt 
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Source: RBA.106 
Offshore debt markets are often more attractive to Australian corporate issuers. These 
markets, particularly in the United States, often provide funding for Australian 
corporates at a lower cost, for longer tenors, in larger sizes and to lower-rated issuers 
than the domestic market. In some countries, the double taxation of dividends has 
tended to encourage debt funding over equity, which has directly contributed to the 
size of bond markets offshore. 
Domestic demand for corporate bonds 
Australian investors’ appetite for fixed income securities is arguably lower than in 
some other advanced economies.107 The tax system treats fixed income securities 
unfavourably compared to other savings vehicles (see Chart 3.2 in the Household saving 
section in this chapter). In addition, the dominance of defined contribution 
superannuation and the relatively low proportion of superannuation assets currently 
in the retirement phase explain why superannuation funds are more heavily invested 
in equities than in corporate bonds. The domestic corporate bond market is relatively 
illiquid compared to markets for other assets, and the lack of issuers limits investors’ 
ability to diversify credit risk in their portfolios. 
                                                          
106 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Statistical Tables, Aggregate Measures of Australian 
Corporate Bond Spreads and Yields (F3) and Interest Rates, Indicator Lending Rates (F5), RBA, 
Sydney. 
107 Particularly for pension funds. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 2013, Pension Markets in Focus, OECD, France. 
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Some potential wholesale investors in corporate bonds are only able to invest in rated 
securities under their investment mandates. Investors use credit ratings as a proxy for, 
or to provide comfort in the absence of, their own independent credit assessment. 
However, some issuers find the cost of obtaining a credit rating from major rating 
agencies to be prohibitive. A factor affecting public offerings is that some ratings 
agencies will not consent to ratings being used within a prospectus, due to liability 
concerns and a requirement to participate in mandatory dispute resolution 
mechanisms.108 
Issuers also face impediments in making public offers of listed corporate bonds, 
particularly to retail investors. Submissions raise issues with the application of the 
prospectus requirements for public offerings and the scope of exemptions from the 
prospectus regime for offerings to sophisticated individuals. Submissions also raise 
issues of cost and the liability regime associated with prospectuses. In particular, listed 
companies query why they cannot rely on a prospectus exemption similar to that for 
issuing further equity, which is based on compliance with the continuous disclosure 
regime, when they issue listed debt. To some degree, the reforms currently before 
Parliament deal with these issues.109 
Policy options for consultation 
Some trends could contribute to the natural deepening of the ‘vanilla’ corporate bond 
market. In particular, as the superannuation system matures and the population ages, 
demand for fixed income products is likely to increase. 
Some submissions suggest policy options to improve access for retail investors to the 
corporate bond market. Potential policy options include: 
• Allowing listed issuers (already subject to continuous disclosure requirements for 
at least 12 months in respect of their listed equity) to issue listed ‘vanilla’ bonds 
directly to retail investors without the need for a prospectus110 
• Reviewing the size and scale of corporate ‘vanilla’ bond offerings that can be made 
without a prospectus where the offering is limited to 20 people in 12 months up to a 
value of $2 million111 
                                                          
108 A ratings agency that provides ratings to retail investors through a prospectus is required to 
obtain an Australian Financial Services Licence as the rating amounts to general financial 
advice. As a licensee, the ratings agency would need to be a member of an external  dispute 
resolution scheme. 
109 The Corporations Amendment (Simple Corporate Bonds and Other Measures) Bill 2014. 
110  Consistent with Corporations Act, s708AA right issue relief. 
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• Reviewing the size and scale of corporate ‘vanilla’ bond offerings that can be made 
without a prospectus where the offering is less than $10 million and an offer 
information statement is offered to investors112 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Allow listed issuers (already subject to continuous disclosure requirements) to 
issue ‘vanilla’ bonds directly to retail investors without the need for a prospectus. 
• Review the size and scale of corporate ‘vanilla’ bond offerings that can be made 
without a prospectus where the offering is limited to 20 people in 12 months up 
to a value of $2 million, or for offers of up to $10 million with an offer 
information statement. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• As a greater share of the population enters retirement, would the demand for 
fixed income products increase in the absence of regulation or other incentives?  
• Would the development of annuity-style retirement income investment products 
encourage the growth of fixed income markets? 
• Could enhanced transparency of transactions improve liquidity in the 
over-the-counter Australian corporate bond market, including its attractiveness 
to retail investors? What commercial or regulatory impediments are there to the 
potential development of improved transparency in the over-the-counter 
corporate bond market? 
• Could alternative credit ratings schemes develop in Australia and would this 
help improve the appetite for bonds, particularly those of growing medium-sized 
enterprises? Could alternative standards of creditworthiness develop in 
Australia? What are the barriers to such developments, and what policy 
adjustments would assist such developments? 
                                                                                                                                                          
111  Corporations Act, s708: “where the offer is a personal offer, and offers or invitations have 
been made to fewer than 20 persons in the previous 12 months, and the new offer will not 
result in more than $2 million being raised in that 12 months”. The value ($2 million) has 
remained unchanged since its introduction in 2001. 
112  Corporations Act, s709(4).The change from $5 million to $10 million was in 2007. 
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Equity market 
Equity financing is the main source of funding for Australian corporations. During the 
GFC, secondary capital raisings by listed entities played a particularly important role 
in securing funding during a period when financial conditions deteriorated and there 
was greater uncertainty in wholesale debt and credit markets. 
Access to equity capital markets 
Almost 90 per cent of ASX-listed companies, or around 2,000, have a market 
capitalisation below $300 million. These companies are generally described as 
‘mid-caps’. They include a large number of smaller mining and prospecting companies 
and start-up companies. 
For mid-caps, the cost of issuing equity can be prohibitive. Compared to large 
corporates, mid-caps face disproportionately larger fixed costs of issuance. In addition, 
because mid-caps are generally not well known, they may have additional 
promotional costs. They are also less able to absorb costs associated with listing, such 
as complying with listing rules and corporate governance requirements. 
There may be scope for Australia’s listed markets to become more inclusive. This year, 
the London Stock Exchange has developed a market segment for high-growth 
companies, such as internet and technology companies that are expected to, in time, 
seek a listing on the main board.113 Options might be available to take a similar course 
in Australia to provide smaller entities easier access to equity market listing, although 
the ASX discontinued a second board market in 1992. 
Australian law provides some concessions on preparing prospectuses for low-value 
capital raisings. Submissions suggest these thresholds could be relaxed; for example, 
through higher limits for the amount of funding that can be raised under the ‘20 in 12’ 
prospectus exemption, or for a larger number of investors that can result in investing 
under that same exemption.114 
                                                          
113  This new high-growth segment was developed jointly by the UK Government and London 
Stock Exchange. It is in addition to the second board called AIM, High Growth Segment, 
<http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/companies
/hgs/hgs.htm>. 
114  Australian Shareholders Association 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 7. The ‘20 in 12’ prospectus exemption is in s708(1) Corporations Act. 
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Access for retail investors to new equity offers 
Some submissions raise concerns about equity issuance by companies during the GFC 
that excluded retail investors. In its submission, the Australian Shareholders’ 
Association (ASA) states: 
Retail investors were diluted out of more than $10 billion worth of value during the raft 
of capital raisings which occurred in the immediate aftermath of the global financial 
crisis. The primary causes were discounted institutional placements with no follow-up 
SPP (share purchase plan), unfairly restricted SPPs, a lack of renounceability in 
entitlement offers, separate book builds to deal with institutional and retail shortfalls and 
poorly marketed retail offers and limits on the ability of shareholders to apply for 
additional shares in entitlement offers.115 
In particular, submissions argue that institutional placements and non-renounceable 
entitlement offers dilute retail investors. These submissions argue that rules relating to 
these secondary equity issues should be modified so that such ‘dilution’ cannot 
occur.116 
Arguably, the fact that companies were able to use these methods enabled them to 
access funding more quickly and with greater certainty than otherwise would have 
been the case. An ASX report discussing the markets’ performance during the GFC 
noted that, as market conditions stabilised, the weighting companies applied to 
considerations of ‘fairness’ for all shareholders increased and the relative attractiveness 
of pro-rata issues rose, particularly for accelerated rights offers.117 
Submissions put forward a number of suggestions to address dilution concerns. The 
Inquiry notes that recent developments in market technology could make it easier for 
companies to offer placements to the market and rights issues to all shareholders. 
Suggestions to address dilution include modifying private placement requirements by: 
• Requiring that all existing investors be invited to participate in any on-market 
equity issue of continuously disclosing securities 
• Requiring by law that all issues of new equity by issuers be conducted fairly, 
transparently and efficiently, unless shareholders approve the issue, despite not 
satisfying these criteria 
                                                          
115  Australian Shareholders Association 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 21. 
116  Under listing rule 7.1, every listed entity has the ability to issue 15 per cent of its issued 
capital via a placement without security-holder approval in a 12-month period. Some 
entities with security holder approval have the ability to issue an additional 10 per cent of 
issued capital in a 12-month period under listing rule 7.1A 
117  Australian Securities Exchange 2010, Capital Raising in Australia: Experiences and Lessons from 
the Global Financial Crisis, ASX Information Paper, ASX, Sydney. 
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Access to crowd-sourced equity funding 
The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) recently released a 
Report with recommendations to help unlisted entities seek crowd-sourced equity 
funding (CSEF).118 The Report finds that the lack of a supportive regulatory 
environment for CSEF may result in worthwhile Australian entrepreneurs 
incorporating in other countries, or moving their businesses offshore to enable their 
ideas or projects to be more easily funded. The report is currently being reviewed by 
the Government. 
In the view of CAMAC, for this form of corporate fundraising to operate in the best 
interests of investors, as well as issuers, a regulatory structure specifically designed for 
CSEF needs to be developed. This would include introducing a new corporate status 
—  an ‘exempt public company’ — that would allow companies to seek crowd-sourced 
equity funding and a disclosure regime based on a standard offer disclosure template. 
Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Review the size and scale of offerings that can be made without a prospectus 
where the offering is limited to 20 people in 12 months up to a value of 
$2 million, or for offers of up to $10 million with an offer information statement. 
• Introduce additional protections for investors in relation to use of private 
placements and non-renounceable rights issues. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Is there a need to introduce differentiated markets to allow greater access to 
equity markets by smaller companies? 
• Should other capital-raising requirements be modified to reduce dilution effects? 
Would this affect the capacity of corporates to raise funds, particularly under 
conditions of market stress? 
 
                                                          
118  Australian Government, Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2014, Crowd 
Sourced Equity Funding, Australian Government, Canberra, May. 
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4: Superannuation 
Superannuation is primarily a long-term savings vehicle to fund retirement. 
Australia’s superannuation sector has grown rapidly in the period since the Wallis 
Inquiry and is an important source of funding for long-term capital formation, 
which is important for productivity growth. Although the superannuation system 
has considerable strengths, the efficiency of the system is a significant issue.  
The Inquiry has examined the superannuation issues most relevant to the financial 
system and the economy. In general, it is difficult to separate these issues from 
Government policy settings because the size and growth of the superannuation 
system are largely a creation of Government policy. The Inquiry acknowledges that 
options to address the issues related to the financial system need to take account of 
the Government’s broader policy objectives.  
The Inquiry has made the following observations about the superannuation system: 
• There is little evidence of strong fee-based competition in the superannuation 
sector, and operating costs and fees appear high by international standards. This 
indicates there is scope for greater efficiencies in the superannuation system. 
• If allowed to continue, growth in direct leverage by superannuation funds, 
although embryonic, may create vulnerabilities for the superannuation and 
financial systems. 
• Superannuation policy settings lack stability, which adds to costs and reduces 
long-term confidence and trust in the system. 
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Context 
Australia’s retirement income system 
The architecture of the retirement income system, which includes the superannuation 
system, has considerable strengths. Australia’s Future Tax System Review endorsed 
Australia’s three-pillar retirement income system (Figure 4.1).1 Submissions identify 
the following strengths of the system: 
• Increasing retirement incomes — the system is improving retirement incomes for 
many people. It has provided positive real returns over time2 although during the 
global financial crisis (GFC) many members nearing retirement were affected by 
significant declines in wealth. Returns reflect the investment risk borne by members 
as a result of large allocations to higher-growth but riskier assets.  
• Choice — the superannuation system delivers significant choice and diversity of 
fund structure. This includes investment options for those who want them and 
default options for the less engaged. 
• Funding Australia’s economy — the superannuation sector is a major source of 
funding for the rest of the economy, including banks and non-financial corporates. 
Given the long-term nature of its funds, the superannuation sector provides 
diversity, depth and stability to the financial system. The Financial Services Council 
(FSC) notes: “By maximising returns to superannuation fund members as required 
by legislation trustees of superannuation funds are also maximising returns to the 
Australian economy”.3 
The 2013 Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index ranked Australia’s pension system 
third out of 20 countries. Australia’s system was categorised as having “a sound 
                                                          
1  Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australia’s Future Tax System— The retirement income 
system: Report on strategic issues, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
2  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) data of large funds shows the average 
rate of return, net of all expenses and taxes, was 5.4 per cent per annum over the 17 years to 
June 2013. Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) shows returns after 
taxes and fees were 6 per cent per annum over the 15 years to June 2013 (3.1 per cent above 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)) and 7.2 per cent over 20 years (4.5 per cent above CPI) for funds 
which are representative of the average default investment arrangement. APRA 2013, Annual 
Superannuation Bulletin, June ed., revised February 2014, APRA, Sydney; APRA 2011, Annual 
Superannuation Bulletin, June ed., APRA, Sydney; and ASFA 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry. 
3  Financial Services Council (FSC), First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
Chapter 1, page 17.  
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structure, with many good features, but ... some areas for improvement”.4 Mercer 
notes that a major area for improvement relates to the retirement phase, which is 
addressed in the Retirement incomes chapter.5 
The vast majority of superannuation accounts are held in defined contribution 
schemes. These schemes, unlike employer-sponsored defined benefit schemes that 
were popular in the past, insulate members from the risks of potential fund insolvency 
arising from employer bankruptcy. However, they expose individuals to other risks, 
including investment, inflation and longevity risks.  
Figure 4.1: Australia’s three-pillar retirement income system 
 
Objectives of the retirement income system 
There is no legislative or formal statement of the guiding objectives for the retirement 
income system. However, Australia’s Future Tax System Review proposed the 
following objectives: 
• Broad and adequate — to protect those unable to save against poverty in their old 
age and provide the means by which individuals must or can save for their 
retirement.  
• Acceptable — to consider the income needs of individuals, both before and after 
retirement, to be equitable and not to bias saving decisions inappropriately.  
                                                          
4  Mercer 2013, Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index, Australian Centre for Financial Studies, 
Melbourne. 
5  Mercer 2013, Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index, Australian Centre for Financial Studies, 
Melbourne. 
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• Robust — to deal appropriately with investment, inflation and longevity risk. 
• Simple and approachable — to allow individuals to make decisions that are in 
their best interests. 
• Sustainable — to be financially sound into the future and detract as little as 
possible from economic growth.6 
Major changes since the Wallis Inquiry 
Superannuation assets are around six times their level in 1997 and are now over 
$1.8 trillion.7, 8 Australia has the fourth largest pool of superannuation assets in the 
world and is one of only a few countries with pension assets worth more than annual 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).9 Superannuation is the financial system’s second 
largest sector after banking and is growing rapidly, principally due to Government 
policy settings.  
The superannuation sector’s landscape has changed markedly since the Wallis Inquiry 
(see Chart 1.2 in the Overview chapter). Between June 1997 and March 2014, the 
number of funds regulated by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), 
excluding small APRA funds (SAFs), fell from more than 4,700 to 299.10, 11 This 
consolidation has largely been driven by the decline in the number of corporate funds. 
Assets held in self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) have expanded rapidly 
relative to the rest of the superannuation system. They are now more than 15 times 
their level in 1997 and have more than one million members.12, 13, 14 SMSFs currently 
                                                          
6  Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australia’s Future Tax System Review, The retirement income 
system: Report on strategic issues, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
7  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2007, Insight: Celebrating 10 years of 
superannuation data collection 1996–2006, Issue 2, Special Ed., APRA, Sydney. 
8  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: Quarterly superannuation 
performance (interim edition), March ed., APRA, Sydney. 
9  Towers Watson 2014, Global Pension Asset Study, January, viewed 24 June 2014, < 
http://www.towerswatson.com/en-AU/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2014
/02/Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2014>, page 5. Note: refers to 2012 data, in absolute terms.  
10  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2007, Insight: Celebrating 10 years of 
superannuation data collection 1996-2006, Issue 2, Special Ed., APRA, Sydney. 
11  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: Quarterly superannuation 
performance (interim edition), March ed., APRA, Sydney. 
12  Note: ‘Small funds’ is used as a proxy for SMSFs in 1997. Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) 2007, Insight: Celebrating 10 years of superannuation data collection 1996–2006, 
Issue 2, Special Ed., APRA, Sydney; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, 
Statistics: Quarterly superannuation performance (interim edition), March, APRA, Sydney. 
13  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Statistics: Quarterly superannuation 
performance (interim edition), March ed., APRA, Sydney. 
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account for around one-third of total superannuation assets, or $559 billion, compared 
to 11 per cent of assets in the superannuation system in 1997.15, 16 
Efficiency 
The efficiency of the superannuation system can be explored in a number of ways. This 
chapter examines both its operational efficiency — that is, the costs of the system and 
the after-fee returns it delivers to members — and the extent to which funds are 
invested to meet members’ needs over their lifecycle.  
Large superannuation funds generally hold diversified and professionally managed 
portfolios of assets. As superannuation funds are a large part of the financial system, 
the system’s operational efficiency has important implications for productivity in the 
broader economy. 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
There is little evidence of strong fee-based competition in the superannuation sector, 
and operating costs and fees appear high by international standards. This indicates 
there is scope for greater efficiencies in the superannuation system. 
The operating costs of Australia’s superannuation funds are among the highest in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Super 
System Review concluded superannuation fees were “too high”.17, 18 The Grattan 
                                                                                                                                                          
14  Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2014, Self-managed super fund statistical report — March 2014, 
ATO, viewed 25 June 2014, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/In-detail/Statistics/Quarterly
-reports/Self-managed-super-fund-statistical-report---March-2014/>. 
15  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2007, Insight: Celebrating 10 years of 
superannuation data collection 1996–2006, Issue 2, Special Ed., APRA, Sydney; Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Statistics: Quarterly superannuation performance (interim 
edition), March ed., APRA, Sydney. 
16  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: Quarterly superannuation 
performance (interim edition), March ed., APRA, Sydney. 
17  OECD 2013, Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing, viewed 
24 June 2014, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2013-en>. 
18  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 7. 
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Institute estimates fees have consumed more than a quarter of returns since 2004.19 
Although the Inquiry notes the difficulties of comparing costs or fees across funds, 
especially internationally, the evidence suggests there is scope to reduce costs and 
improve after-fee returns (see Chart 4.1). The Inquiry is investigating the costs and fees 
of the system further. 
Chart 4.1: International comparison of superannuation (pension) expenses 
Annual expenses, as a percentage of funds under management (FUM) 
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Source: Grattan Institute.20,21 
Fees can significantly affect retirement incomes. The Super System Review found that 
reducing fees by around 40 per cent — or 38 basis points22 — for the average member 
would increase their superannuation balance at retirement by approximately $40,000 
(or 7 per cent).23  
                                                          
19  Minifie, J, Cameron, T and Savage, J 2014, Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much 
for superannuation, Grattan Institute, Victoria, page 9. 
20  For the purpose of this chart, ‘defined benefit’ is a system where more than than 60 per cent 
of assets are in defined benefit plans; others are allocated to defined contribution.  
21  Minifie, J, Cameron, T and Savage, J 2014, Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much 
for superannuation, Grattan Institute, Victoria, page 6. 
22  The figure of 38 basis points is based on the estimated reduction in superannuation fees for 
the average member from a combination of MySuper and SuperStream initiatives. 
23  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. Based on Treasury estimates, 
assuming 37 years in the workforce. 
Growth and Consolidation – Superannuation 
2-101 
Fees are also important for the amount of funds available for long-term capital 
formation. As a guide, a 38 basis point reduction in average fees for the entire 
superannuation sector would deliver a total saving to members, and additional funds 
to invest, of around $7 billion per annum.  
That said, fees should not be considered in isolation. It is important that a focus on fees 
alone does not result in a shift towards lower-cost and lower-return asset allocations 
that would reduce after-fee returns. Ultimately, superannuation funds should be 
judged on their after-fee return for a given risk profile.  
These issues are not unique to Australia. According to the Squam Lake Working 
Group, which is a distinguished group of academics:  
High-fee funds argue that their fees are justified by superior performance. A large body 
of academic research challenges that argument. On average, high fees are simply a net 
drain to investors.24 
Costs, fees and competition 
Submissions and other reports identify a range of reasons for high superannuation 
costs, and hence fees, in Australia.  
Asset allocation 
Compared to those in other countries, Australian funds hold more growth assets.25 
They also invest in alternative asset classes, such as private equity and other unlisted 
investments. These assets tend to be more expensive to manage, but they are also 
expected to deliver higher after-fee returns for members. 
Economies of scale 
Although Australia’s superannuation sector is large by international standards and has 
undergone some consolidation, it remains highly fragmented. There are 299 large 
APRA-regulated funds and more than 530,000 small funds, which are predominantly 
SMSFs.26 The fragmentation is exacerbated by many members having more than 
one superannuation account.  
                                                          
24  Council on Foreign Relations 2009, Regulation of Retirement Saving, Working Paper, July, 
Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, New York, page 4. 
25  OECD 2013, Pension Markets in Focus, OECD publishing, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.oecd.org/pensions/PensionMarketsInFocus2013.pdf>. 
26  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: Quarterly Superannuation 
Performance (Interim Edition), March ed., APRA, Sydney. 
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The Super System Review found that fees had not fallen in line with what could have 
been expected given the substantial increase in scale (Chart 4.2).27 This issue is 
acknowledged in the Industry Super Australia submission: 
This increasing level of economies of scale, coupled with technological advancement and 
efficiency dividends, should have resulted in a notable fall in the level of fees. This has 
not been the case.28 
Chart 4.2: Superannuation fund size and average fees 
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Source: APRA29 and Rice Warner.30 
Rice Warner estimated that fees fell by around 25 basis points between 2002 and 2013 
but a number of offsetting factors have prevented fees from falling further. These 
include a shift towards investing in higher-cost asset classes, substantial growth in 
member engagement services and investment in modern administration platforms.31 
The Grattan Institute found the benefits of increased scale over the past decade have 
                                                          
27  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
28  Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 140. 
29  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2013, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, 
June ed., revised February 2014, APRA, Sydney. 
30  Rice Warner 2014, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 17 June 2014. 
31  Rice Warner 2014, FSC Superannuation Fees Report 2013, commissioned by the Financial 
Services Council, Sydney. 
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been largely offset by higher fund expenses.32 It is unclear whether this has been 
translated into higher after-fee returns.  
There is an opportunity for fees to fall significantly over time given the further 
expected increases in scale due to continuing superannuation fund consolidation and 
growth in superannuation assets.33 In work commissioned by the Actuaries Institute, 
Rice Warner predicts the number of funds (excluding small funds) will fall to around 
180 over the next five years and adds: “It is conceivable that the number of funds in 
30 years will be no more than 20”.34 Competition between superannuation funds is 
important for realising these potential fee reductions. 
Given the current extent of industry fragmentation, the Inquiry does not have major 
concerns about the effect of further consolidation in the superannuation market on 
competition, as long as fees are reduced in line with fund costs. The Super System 
Review concluded that larger and more efficient funds would be able to lower 
administration fees.35 Several submissions note that countries with lower-cost schemes 
tend to have a smaller number of pension funds.  
Competition 
Superannuation funds compete to attract and retain members. Competition between 
funds for members has largely been conducted on a non-fee basis, which has led to 
feature-rich and more costly superannuation products.36 Stakeholders suggest the 
behaviours of three groups of consumers contributes to this result. 
First, a majority of individuals are not actively engaged with the superannuation 
system and are not sensitive to the fees they are charged by their fund (Box 4.1).37 In 
some instances, complex investment structures and layers of investment fees can make 
it difficult for consumers to understand and compare fee structures across funds. Low 
                                                          
32  Minifie, J, Cameron, T and Savage, J 2014, Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much 
for superannuation, Grattan Institute, Victoria. 
33  Rice Warner predicts assets will triple in real terms over the next three decades. Rice Warner 
2014, Ageing and capital flows, research commissioned by the Actuaries Institute, Sydney, and 
provided to Financial System Inquiry, May 2014. 
34  Ibid, page 9. 
35  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.  
36  The Grattan Institute attributes cost increases to strong competition between funds on 
non-price factors in a market where consumers may not be price sensitive. See Minifie, J, 
Cameron, T and Savage, J 2014, Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much for 
superannuation, Grattan Institute, Victoria.  
37  Minifie, J, Cameron, T and Savage, J 2014, Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much 
for superannuation, Grattan Institute, Victoria. 
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rates of switching between large funds also contribute to the lack of fee competition.38 
The Super System Review found “the model of member‐driven competition through 
‘choice of fund’ …  has struggled to deliver a competitive market that reduces costs for 
members”.39 
Second, a minority of consumers, who are sensitive to fees and/or to after-fee returns, 
are able to access lower-fee products by ‘shopping around’. However, these actions 
have not exerted significant downward pressure on fees for the broader range of 
products available.40 
Third, a large number of individuals have established SMSFs. APRA-regulated 
superannuation funds compete to retain members by offering product features that 
give individuals more choice and control. Members can access a broad range of 
products and services, some of which provide individuals with substantially more 
flexibility to tailor their investment allocation.  
To address the lack of member-driven competition, the Super System Review 
recommended introducing a low-cost product — MySuper — to replace existing 
default funds. MySuper also introduces consistent disclosure requirements to address 
some of the issues listed in Box 4.1. A broader discussion about financial product 
disclosure is in the Consumer outcomes chapter. 
                                                          
38  A Roy Morgan Research report, based on approximately 30,000 interviews each year with 
members of superannuation funds, shows rates of switching between superannuation funds 
in the range of 2 to 5 per cent since 2005, when Super Choice legislation was introduced. 
Approximately 42 per cent of people moved to a new fund because they changed employers. 
Roy Morgan Research 2013, Superannuation and Wealth Management in Australia, Report, 
December 2013. 
39  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 8. 
40  Minifie, J, Cameron, T and Savage, J 2014, Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much 
for superannuation, Grattan Institute, Victoria. 
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Box 4.1: Why hasn’t competition delivered optimal outcomes already? 
Failure to exercise choice: Often a member does not choose the fund to which they 
belong. New employees typically become a member of their employer’s default 
fund. 
Lack of price awareness: Compulsory contributions do not come directly out of 
members’ pockets, nor do the fees and other costs charged by the fund — at least 
not until they retire. This makes people much less price aware and much less likely 
to make a decision based on price or cost. 
Lack of interest: Members are often not engaged with their superannuation until 
closer to retirement, so will not be sufficiently interested to respond to competitive 
behaviour on the part of funds until that time — if at all. 
Agency and structural issues: There are limited opportunities for member vigilance 
or incentives for agency vigilance to reduce prices. 
Complexity: Superannuation is inherently complex, and many consumers do not 
feel confident making decisions about it. 
Lack of comparability: Even if members are engaged, contestability is weak at 
consumer level. This is because of product complexity and the lack of information 
and transparency about fees and performance. 
Frictions: Even if members are interested in switching funds, often the paperwork 
and other ‘frictions’ in changing funds become too big a disincentive and they give 
up. 
Source: Super System Review.41 
Superannuation funds also attract members by being the default fund for mandatory 
employer contributions. Funds compete to be the default fund for large corporates, 
while many modern awards prescribe the employer’s default fund. Submissions raise 
competition for default fund status in awards as a major issue. The selection of default 
funds in awards largely reflects precedent and is not subject to a competitive process. 
Several submissions propose expanding award eligibility to all approved MySuper 
products to increase competition between funds.  
The costs of superannuation funds, and the features they offer to members, are affected 
by the degree of competition among those providing services to the funds. This 
includes fund managers competing for superannuation fund clients, fund managers 
competing for access to platforms, and platforms competing to attract advisers. A 
trend in the wealth management sector is towards more vertical integration. Although 
                                                          
41  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, page 7. 
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this can provide some benefits to members of superannuation funds, the degree of 
cross-selling of services may reduce competitive pressures and contribute to higher 
costs in the sector.  
Effectiveness of MySuper and SuperStream 
The Super System Review estimated that introducing MySuper and SuperStream 
would reduce superannuation fees for the average MySuper member by around 
40 per cent (or 38 basis points) in the long run.42, 43 
However, views on the likely effectiveness of these reforms to reduce costs and fees are 
mixed. Over the next few years, Rice Warner expects MySuper will cause average 
annual fees across the sector to converge to 1 per cent of assets from 1.12 per cent in 
2012–13.44 In contrast, the Grattan Institute argues MySuper will do little to force fees 
down. It also contends that, although SuperStream will reduce some costs, it will not 
address the costs of marketing, sales or asset management.45 On balance, the Inquiry 
considers it too early to assess whether these reforms will achieve their objectives. 
Regulation and insurance 
Several submissions highlight the costs of regulation in reducing member returns. 
Mercer and the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) cite the costs 
of complying with legislation, which Mercer notes “are inevitably passed on to the 
members”.46, 47 Mercer also suggests that disclosure requirements, which put too much 
emphasis on fees, encourage trustees to adopt lower-cost investment strategies, which 
may not have high after-fee returns.48  
Stakeholders also cite the direct costs to funds from developing MySuper products and 
getting approval from APRA and the Fair Work Commission for listing them in 
modern awards. These costs are passed on to MySuper members through higher fees. 
Implementing SuperStream also has costs, such as investing in modern administration 
platforms. However, since this aims to remove inefficiencies, such as manual data 
processing, funds can expect to recoup these costs over time. The costs of prudential 
regulation are discussed further in the Regulatory architecture chapter.  
                                                          
42  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
43  SuperStream is designed to improve administrative efficiency. 
44  Rice Warner 2014, FSC Superannuation Fees Report 2013, commissioned by the Financial 
Services Council, Sydney. 
45  Minifie, J, Cameron, T and Savage, J 2014, Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much 
for superannuation, Grattan Institute, Victoria. 
46  Mercer 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 28. 
47  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
48  Mercer 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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One submission also notes that fees charged for insurance within superannuation 
funds could reduce retirement savings. However, superannuation funds (excluding 
SMSFs) generally provide low-cost and sometimes tax-advantaged access to life, 
disability and income protection insurance, which provides net benefits to a broad 
range of people.  
Trust law forms the basis for the governance of superannuation. The Inquiry seeks 
views on whether the trust structure is best placed to meet the needs of all members in 
a cost-effective manner. 
Member investment switching 
Member investment switching contributes to higher fees and may be inefficient when 
not properly priced by funds.  
Many funds allow members to change their investment allocation frequently, often at 
short notice and generally at low or no cost to the member. Although member 
engagement should be encouraged, this behaviour can add to fund costs due to the 
need to rebalance investment allocations in the short term. It can also affect member 
returns by increasing the need for funds to hold liquid assets. The demand for liquidity 
is discussed below. 
Member investment switching can also result in a majority of fund members 
subsidising the cost of investment switches by a minority. This occurs where funds do 
not charge members the full cost of investment switching or as a result of timing lags 
on asset valuations. 
Active investment management 
Some submissions argue active investment strategies contribute to superannuation 
fund costs and fees. This is discussed in detail below. 
Short-termism 
Some submissions question whether a trend towards chasing short-term returns is 
affecting asset allocations and contributing to lower after-fee returns in Australia.  
The attention paid to quarterly superannuation return ‘league tables’, particularly by 
the industry itself, is cited by stakeholders as one explanation for superannuation 
funds targeting short-term returns and employing active asset managers. 
Understandably, funds and fund managers want to perform well relative to their peers 
for competitive reasons.  
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However, the publication of short-term returns is less useful for members as an 
indicator of future fund performance. According to the Squam Lake Working Group: 
A large body of research finds that past returns in general, and short-term returns in 
particular, are almost useless in forecasting subsequent investment performance.49  
Stakeholders also raise concerns that short-term behaviour is likely to lead to a more 
homogenous asset allocation across funds. 
The effect of short-term investment behaviour on long-term outcomes is unclear. The 
Squam Lake Working Group argues that short-term behaviour by some funds will 
create opportunities for others:  
There seems enough evidence to support a case that the balance is tilted at least a little 
too far towards the short-term, with potential adverse implications for market efficiency, 
volatility, corporate myopia and the efficiency of financial intermediation. However, to 
the extent that the balance is indeed tipped too far, this will create opportunities for those 
capable of adopting a longer horizon.50 
Active investment management  
Many funds adopt active management of superannuation assets in the pursuit of 
higher returns. Active management can often involve frequent adjustment to the 
investment portfolio in an attempt to outperform the market, particularly over shorter 
horizons. However, the costs of active management, including transaction costs and 
management fees, are widely acknowledged:  
High turnover is also a drag on average returns because it creates high transactions 
costs.51  
                                                          
49  Council on Foreign Relations 2009, Regulation of Retirement Saving, Working Paper, Squam 
Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, New York. 
50  Warren, G 2014, Long-term investing: What determines investment horizon?, Centre for 
International Finance and Regulation Research Working Paper No. 024/2014. 
51  Council on Foreign Relations 2009, Regulation of Retirement Saving, Working Paper, Squam 
Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, New York. 
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According to the Grattan Institute, active management of superannuation assets 
increases costs but not after-fee average returns in the sector.52 It is very difficult for the 
superannuation system as a whole to beat the market over the long run within an asset 
class, although it is possible for an individual fund to do so. As Nobel Laureate 
William Sharpe noted:  
Properly measured, the average actively managed dollar must underperform the average 
passively managed dollar, net of costs.53 
Rice Warner estimates fee differences of around 45 basis points between those 
MySuper funds for which less than 25 per cent of the portfolio is actively managed and 
those for which more than 75 per cent of the portfolio is actively managed.54 That said, 
some of these fee differences may be explained by differences in asset allocation. 
Rice Warner also presents evidence that some smaller industry funds have increased 
their proportion of passively managed assets to reduce costs and notes that retail funds 
have designed a range of MySuper products with significantly different levels of active 
management.55  
Lifecycle investment 
The time horizon of superannuation fund investments could be better tailored to 
individual members.  
A well-functioning and efficient superannuation system would be expected to invest to 
maximise returns over a horizon that reflects the demographics of its members. This 
approach would not only benefit members but may also improve the funding of 
long-term capital formation.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests a trend towards a ‘lifecycle investment’ approach in 
MySuper products; under this approach, funds are heavily invested in growth assets 
for younger members and invested more defensively as a member advances in age. 
This approach would reduce the risk of substantial falls in superannuation balances for 
people close to retirement, which occurred during the GFC. Superannuation funds 
have more information about their members than their age, including gender, 
contribution patterns and superannuation balance. There may be benefits in tailoring 
                                                          
52  Minifie, J, Cameron, T and Savage, J 2014, Super sting: how to stop Australians paying too much 
for superannuation, Grattan Institute, Victoria. 
53  Sharpe, W F 1991, ‘The Arithmetic of Active Management’, The Financial Analysts’ Journal, 
Volume 47, No. 1, CFA Institute, USA, pages 7–9.  
54  Rice Warner 2014, FSC Superannuation Fees Report 2013, commissioned by the Financial 
Services Council, Sydney, page 13. 
55  Rice Warner 2014, FSC Superannuation Fees Report 2013, commissioned by the Financial 
Services Council, Sydney, page 13. 
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asset allocation to members by asking members for more information, including about 
their retirement goals and risk preferences.  
The current focus of large superannuation funds is on maximising the balance at the 
point of retirement. DFA Australia (Dimensional) argues the focus should be on 
maximising income in retirement: “Sustainable income flow, not the stock of wealth, is 
the objective that counts for retirement planning”.56 This would involve a fundamental 
change to the approach to asset management.  
For example, the value of an inflation-indexed bond, if viewed as an asset to be 
marked to market every day, can be very volatile. In contrast, if viewed as a source of 
regular income, it provides stable inflation-protected cash flows for its life. For assets 
that are expected to be held to maturity, the book value may be a more appropriate 
measure of the asset value to members.  
The current focus on lump sum balances is evident from the absence of retirement 
income projections from annual statements sent to members. For many people, income 
projections, while difficult to calculate, would be far more useful than total accrued 
balances.  
The Inquiry is interested in views and evidence on whether funds are excessively 
focused on delivering short-term returns, whether this is a significant issue, how it 
could be addressed, and to what extent more tailoring of asset allocation to members 
would produce net benefits for members. 
Liquidity management 
A number of submissions highlight the demand for liquid assets by superannuation 
funds as a major issue for this Inquiry. The GFC tested the liquidity management of 
funds, which, along with the subsequent introduction of prudential standards, has 
raised superannuation funds’ awareness of the need for better liquidity management 
frameworks.  
All funds need liquidity to deal with a range of scenarios. However, if superannuation 
funds hold more liquid assets than needed, this may lower after-fee returns to 
members. 
The major drivers of the demand for liquid assets by superannuation funds are: 
• The need to make benefit payments — demand for more liquid assets will increase 
over time as more members retire with larger balances and the ratio of inflows to 
                                                          
56  DFA Australia (Dimensional) 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 16. 
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outflows falls. Currently, inflows are substantially larger than outflows. However, 
this change is largely predictable. Superannuation funds should be able to adjust 
their asset portfolios accordingly. 
• The portability of superannuation benefits between funds — demand for 
liquidity is higher because of the requirement for funds to action member requests 
to transfer their benefits to another fund within three business days, although this is 
extendable to up to 90 days in some circumstances. Funds must therefore provision 
for significant member movement despite the low risk of this occurring. Given that 
inter-fund transfers remain in the superannuation system, requiring each fund to 
provision for member movements results in the sector collectively holding more 
liquid assets than it needs. Funds can apply to APRA to extend the time period for 
portability. However, funds may be concerned about the reputational consequences 
from making such a request. 
• The need to maintain target asset allocations within a fund — when asset 
allocations fall outside a superannuation fund’s internally set target ranges, the 
portfolio needs to be rebalanced. Superannuation funds should allow themselves 
sufficient time to rebalance assets, in part through member contributions, over a 
time horizon that is in the best interests of members. 
• The need to cover margins on currency hedging positions — superannuation 
funds invest in international assets and seek to limit their exposure to currency 
fluctuations. ASFA notes that funds generally hedge half their international 
currency exposures.57 When the Australian dollar depreciates, funds are required to 
cover margin calls. 
• Member investment switching — as discussed above, when a member elects to 
change how their superannuation benefits are invested, funds need liquidity to 
adjust the member’s portfolio. However, the timing of this switching may not 
reflect the liquidity characteristics of the assets being bought and sold. Although 
only a small minority of superannuation members switch their investment 
allocation regularly, at times members will react concurrently and shift their asset 
allocation in the same direction. This was particularly evident during the GFC, 
when members increased allocations to more defensive assets.58 Given older 
members (with higher balances) are more likely to change their asset allocations 
than younger members, the need for liquidity to manage this risk may increase over 
time as the population ages.59 
                                                          
57  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
58  Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
59  Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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Policy options for consultation 
A number of options for reducing fees and increasing after-fee returns are outlined 
below.  
Fees 
Competition and default funds 
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of MySuper reforms in stimulating competition 
and improving after-fee returns for default fund members. MySuper only replaced 
default superannuation products for new accounts from 1 January 2014, and 
superannuation funds have until 1 July 2017 to transfer balances of members in 
existing default funds into a MySuper account. There has been a substantial cost to 
industry in establishing MySuper products. 
The Productivity Commission recommends introducing more competition in relation 
to default employer contributions through changing awards.60 The Government is 
currently considering policy options on this issue.61 
Other mechanisms could also be deployed to drive fees down. One example is the 
approach introduced in Chile in 2008, where — unlike Australia — superannuation 
contributions of all new members are placed in the same default fund. Default fund 
management is auctioned on the basis of fees, creating stronger competition between 
funds for default fund status. Since these arrangements started, the fees charged by 
successful bidders in Chile have fallen by 65 per cent, although fees on other funds 
have not fallen to the same degree.62 This policy option raises a number of other policy 
issues that would need to be considered before being contemplated for Australia, such 
as the number of default funds, concentration risk, asset allocation and regulation. 
Member investment switching 
Proper pricing of investment switching would result in more efficient outcomes for the 
sector and more equitable outcomes for members. Superannuation funds could be 
encouraged to price and schedule investment switching appropriately, so the costs of 
switching are not imposed on other members of the fund. The timing of an investment 
switch should reflect the benefits to all members of giving effect to investment 
switching after all assets of the fund have been revalued. NAB notes: “As highlighted 
                                                          
60  Productivity Commission 2012, Default Superannuation Funds in Modern Awards, 
Report No. 60, Final Inquiry Report, Productivity Commission. 
61  For further detail, see the consultation paper released by the Government in November 2013, 
Better regulation and governance, enhanced transparency and improved competition in 
superannuation, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
62  Berstein Jáuregui, S (ed) 2010, El Sistema Chileno de Pensiones, Superintendencia de Pensiones, 
Santiago . 
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by the GFC, funds which held illiquid assets and used infrequent crediting rates 
exposed members to intra-fund member arbitrage”.63 
Liquidity 
ASFA notes the need “to reassess the ways in which we require superannuation funds 
to manage liquidity risk, potentially exploring innovative solutions to this issue”.64 
Liquidity facility 
Some stakeholders argue for APRA-regulated superannuation funds to have access to 
a liquidity facility at the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). This facility would both 
provide superannuation funds with reliable access to liquidity during times of stress 
and increase their capacity to invest for the long term. 
The Inquiry notes that to access the RBA liquidity facility, superannuation funds 
would need to hold repo-eligible assets, which tend to be highly liquid. It is therefore 
unclear how access to such a facility would reduce holdings of liquid assets by 
superannuation funds. The Inquiry also notes that superannuation funds can compete 
indirectly for liquidity at the RBA through an entity that already participates in the 
open market operations of the RBA, as long as the fund has eligible assets to exchange 
with this entity. Alternatively, superannuation funds can participate directly in open 
market operations by becoming a member of the Reserve Bank Information and 
Transfer System (RITS) and holding their liquid assets in Austraclear. 
The Inquiry is not convinced that access to a liquidity facility at the RBA would 
overcome the concerns raised in submissions. 
Portability requirements 
Stakeholders note a longer maximum time period for portability transfers could be 
legislated. This could include allowing trustees to transfer member balances in stages, 
based on the liquidity characteristics of a member’s underlying asset allocation. A 
longer time frame would apply for illiquid assets compared to liquid assets. ASFA 
believes the relaxation of liquidity requirements could apply to “products that are 
mainly invested in by younger members with longer investment horizons”.65 
Implementing a time-sequenced approach raises other issues. For example, members 
with assets split between two funds during the transfer period will potentially incur 
additional fees. 
                                                          
63  NAB 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 18. 
64  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 42. 
65  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 42. 
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The regulator could also extend the maximum portability time period for the entire 
industry — as opposed to individual funds, which currently occurs — during times of 
financial stress. This could reduce the need for the sector as a whole to hold higher 
levels of liquidity for intra-sector transfers. It may also mitigate the reputational risk of 
individual funds applying for an extension of time to transfer funds. 
A principles-based approach to portability transfers may be more effective than the 
current prescriptive approach. The Actuaries Institute believes principles-based 
regulation is better equipped than prescription-based regulation to respond to the 
broader societal changes occurring. Under a principles-based approach, 
superannuation funds could be required to make portability transfers in a timely and 
efficient manner and could report to the regulator on the time it takes to effect 
portability requests. The regulator could then deal with any funds that were not 
implementing requests in a timely manner. However, without an objective benchmark 
with which to judge the amount of time to complete a transfer to another 
superannuation fund, this approach may create more ambiguity for all parties 
involved, including the regulator. 
There is a trade-off between the desire for greater competition in the superannuation 
sector and the desire for funds to be invested for the long term. However, there is little 
evidence that portability is currently generating competition between funds. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements and review the effectiveness of the MySuper 
regime in due course. 
• Consider additional mechanisms to MySuper to achieve better results for 
members, including auctions for default fund status.  
• Replace the three-day portability rule: 
– With a longer maximum time period or a staged transfer of members’ 
balances between funds, including expanding the regulator’s power to extend 
the maximum time period to the entire industry in times of stress. 
– By moving from the current prescription-based approach for portability of 
superannuation benefits to a principles-based approach. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Does, or will, MySuper provide sufficient competitive pressures to ensure future 
economies of scale will be reflected in higher after-fee returns? What are the costs 
and benefits of auctioning the management rights to default funds principally on 
the basis of fees for a given asset mix? Are there alternative options? 
• Is the recent trend of greater vertical integration in the wealth management and 
superannuation sectors reducing competitive pressures and contributing to 
higher superannuation fees? Are there mechanisms to ensure the efficiency of 
vertical integration flow through to consumers? 
• Are there net benefits in tailoring asset allocation to members and/or projecting 
retirement incomes on superannuation statements? 
• Is there an undue focus on short-term returns by superannuation funds? If this is 
a significant issue, how might it be addressed?  
• To what extent is there a trend away from active asset management within asset 
classes in superannuation funds? Is this a positive or negative development for 
members? 
• How could funds price switching properly and take into account differences in 
liquidity between asset classes? 
• Could other arrangements be developed to facilitate asset transfers between 
funds when members switch? Do funds require additional mechanisms to 
manage liquidity beyond the need for liquidity for portability and member 
investment switching? 
• Is the trust structure best placed to meet the needs of members in a cost-effective 
manner? 
Leverage 
The use of leverage in superannuation funds to finance asset purchases is embryonic 
but growing. The proportion of SMSFs with borrowings increased from 1.1 per cent in 
2008 to 3.7 per cent in 2012. The average amount borrowed increased over this period 
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from $122,000 to $357,000. Total borrowings in 2012 were over $6.2 billion.66 More 
recently, Investment Trends research found that, over the year to April 2014, the 
number of SMSFs using geared products increased by more than 11 per cent to 
38,000.67 Leverage in APRA-regulated funds is small, with total borrowings of under 
$2 million reported each quarter over the past year.68 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
If allowed to continue, growth in direct leverage by superannuation funds, although 
embryonic, may create vulnerabilities for the superannuation and financial systems. 
Leverage is widespread across the financial system and magnifies risk on both the 
upside and downside. In superannuation, direct leverage, other than to address 
very-short-term cash flow and liquidity needs, was originally prohibited to reduce the 
risk to retirement incomes but has since been incrementally permitted.69 In 2007, the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act) was modified to allow all 
superannuation funds to borrow with the primary intent to legitimise investing in 
instalment warrants, which have embedded leverage. Further amendments in 2010 
clarified the terms of this borrowing.  
The GFC highlighted the benefits of Australia’s almost entirely unleveraged 
superannuation sector. The general absence of direct leverage in superannuation funds 
meant that losses were not magnified. This enabled the superannuation sector to have 
a stabilising influence on the financial system. A clear example of this was the amount 
of equity funding the sector provided to the banking system in 2009. This was 
beneficial for superannuation fund members, taxpayers, the financial system and the 
economy. 
The ability of funds to borrow may, over time, erode this strength and could contribute 
to systemic risks to the financial system. For example, a fund with directly leveraged 
exposure to asset price volatility may have to post margins if asset prices fall. If many 
                                                          
66  Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2013, Self-Managed Super Funds: A statistical overview 
2011-2012, ATO, viewed 24 June 2014, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/In-detail/Statistics/Annual
-reports/Self-managed-superannuation-funds--A-statistical-overview-2011-2012/>.  
67  Investment Trends 2014, SMSF Investor Report, April. Note: Based on a survey of 2,163 SMSF 
trustees. 
68  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, data provided to the Financial System 
Inquiry, 3 June 2014. 
69  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part Two, Overview and 
Recommendations, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
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funds are exposed to the same assets, or at least assets with correlated returns, they 
may be forced to sell some assets to fund these margin calls. This could cause the price 
of the assets to fall further and potentially trigger a downward spiral, which could 
have flow-on effects to other parts of the financial system. Moreover, it could 
compromise the superannuation system’s ability to provide adequate incomes in 
retirement and transfer risk to the Government in the form of higher Age Pension 
outlays. 
Some evidence also suggests that borrowing in superannuation is often associated with 
poor financial advice. For example, an Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) review of over 100 selected investors’ files found that much of the 
poor advice on setting up SMSFs provided by financial advisers and accountants 
related to establishing an SMSF as part of a geared investment strategy.70 This Inquiry 
shares the Super System Review Panel’s view that leverage should not be a core focus 
of SMSFs — or any superannuation fund — and is inconsistent with Australia’s 
retirement income policy.71 
Policy options for consultation 
The general prohibition on borrowing in superannuation was introduced for sound 
reasons. Although levels of direct leverage in the superannuation sector are low, they 
are increasing. Removing direct leverage in superannuation is consistent with the 
concept that superannuation tax concessions should apply to funds that have been 
saved and not borrowed. There are ample opportunities — and tax benefits — for 
individuals to borrow outside superannuation. 
However, borrowing on a short-term basis to address unexpected liquidity needs is 
appropriate. This has always been permitted under the SIS Act. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy option or other alternatives: 
Restore the general prohibition on direct leverage of superannuation funds on a 
prospective basis. 
                                                          
70  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, SMSFs: Improving the quality 
of advice given to investors, Report 337, ASIC, Sydney. The majority of files selected to review 
involved investors with a fund balance of $150,000 or less and included some, or all, of the 
following features: older members, low incomes, borrowing and investment in a single asset 
class. 
71  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Chapter 8 — Self-managed 
super solutions, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
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Stability of superannuation policy settings 
Superannuation policy settings have undergone substantial change since the Wallis 
Inquiry. Regulation, taxation, legislation, and the development and refinement of 
broader policy settings have changed frequently (Figure 4.2). Submissions express 
concern about the frequency of policy changes. 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
Superannuation policy settings lack stability, which adds to costs and reduces 
long-term confidence and trust in the system. 
Long-term perspective 
Constant change in superannuation and retirement income policy settings imposes 
costs on superannuation funds, which are borne by members. As a long-term savings 
vehicle, superannuation would benefit from policy stability to build long-term 
confidence and trust in the system and encourage long-term savings. This theme has 
been raised in several submissions. For example, AMP argues:  
If the goal of public policy is to maintain confidence in superannuation as a retirement 
savings vehicle, predictability and stability in policy settings is a must.72 
Almost half of individuals surveyed by Investment Trends in the accumulation phase 
and aged 40 years or older said they were worried about the effect of regulatory 
changes on their retirement.73 The Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 
suggests: “A focus on short-term policy change needs to be replaced by a long-term 
perspective”.74 Mercer argues: “A more holistic approach is required, taking into 
account both superannuation and the Age Pension, to make the sort of long-term 
policy needed to ensure Australians’ retirement security”.75 
To ensure policy stability, the system needs to achieve, and be seen to achieve, its 
objectives efficiently and equitably, and the fiscal costs associated with the policy 
                                                          
72  AMP 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 8. 
73  Investment Trends 2013, December 2013 Retirement Income Report. Noted: Based on a survey of 
5,730 Australians aged 40 years or older. 
74  Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 5. 
75  Mercer 2013, Taxation & superannuation: The shortcomings of the superannuation taxation 
expenditures, Mercer, Melbourne. Attachment to Mercer’s first round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, 2014. 
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settings need to be sustainable. However, some submissions, coupled with other 
evidence provided below, cast doubt over whether current policy settings will stand 
the test of time. 
Figure 4.2: Timeline of major superannuation policy changes 
 
(a) Broad indication of tax treatment of defined contribution schemes. 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
2-120 
Submissions raise whether the superannuation and retirement income systems should 
have a clearer purpose. Dimensional suggests: “a priority should be to set a clearly 
defined objective for superannuation”.76 There may be value in the Government 
seeking Parliament’s agreement to the objectives of the superannuation and retirement 
income systems, so any future changes are judged against those objectives. ASFA 
argues: “at the whole of system level, there should be monitoring to ensure the system 
is delivering against its retirement objectives”.77 
Superannuation tax concessions 
As the population ages, the cost to Government of the current retirement income 
system is likely to be a major source of pressure to change policy settings. To credibly 
promise superannuation tax concessions in retirement and an adequate Age Pension 
for those who will need it in the future, a strong Government balance sheet and policy 
settings that do not disproportionately increase the costs to Government over time are 
important. 
There should be a reasonable expectation that the objectives of the system will be 
achieved over the longer term. While not conclusive, some evidence raises questions 
about whether the current policy settings are efficiently targeted and robust. 
For example, the large number of individuals with very large superannuation balances 
suggests the superannuation system is being used for purposes other than providing 
retirement incomes (Figure 4.3). The large number of accounts with assets in 
retirement in excess of $5 million could each receive annual tax concessions more than 
five times larger than the single Age Pension.78, 79 
                                                          
76  DFA Australia (Dimensional) 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 4. 
77  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 22. 
78  The calculations are based on a superannuation account in the retirement phase (0 per cent 
earnings tax). 
79  In June 2012, around 8,500 individuals had balances above $5 million. Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) 2014, Self-managed super fund statistical report — March 2014, ATO, viewed 
25 June 2014, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/In-detail/Statistics/Quarterly
-reports/Self-managed-super-fund-statistical-report---March-2014/>.  
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Figure 4.3: Superannuation accounts by asset size 
 
Source: Treasury.80 
Furthermore, the majority of superannuation tax concessions accrue to the top 
20 per cent of income earners (Chart 4.3). These individuals are likely to have saved 
sufficiently for their retirement, even in the absence of compulsory superannuation or 
tax concessions. Some stakeholders question whether this is equitable. It is not clear 
that superannuation tax concessions for this income cohort will significantly reduce 
future Age Pension costs. 
                                                          
80  Treasury 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 11 June 2014. Analysis based 
on de-identified 16 per cent sample of personal income tax and member contribution data for 
2011–12, sourced from the ATO. Some caution is required in interpreting these figures due to 
the larger number of accounts compared to people in the system. 
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Chart 4.3: Share of total superannuation tax concessions by income decile 
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Source: Treasury.81 Based on analysis 2009–10 ATO data. 
Recent changes to concessional and non-concessional contribution caps and a higher 
contributions tax rate for very-high-income earners (30 per cent above $300,000) have 
attempted to achieve more equitable outcomes. Further adjustments to policy settings 
may be required. 
Imputation credits and tax-free superannuation 
A growing proportion of Australian equities has been, and is expected to be, held in 
superannuation accounts in retirement. The Inquiry notes that, due to refundable 
imputation credits and tax-free superannuation in retirement, a growing proportion of 
company tax collected could be refunded to superannuation funds and retirees over 
time. Although this is of enormous benefit to retirees, it may erode one of the largest 
sources of revenue for the Australian Government at the same time expenditure 
pressures are increasing. 
The combination of population ageing and the projected growth in superannuation 
assets increases the urgency and importance of getting the right policy settings in 
place. Policy settings should be designed to minimise the need of future governments 
to change them to maintain confidence and trust in the system. Some of the settings 
could be considered as part of the Tax White Paper process. 
                                                          
81  Treasury 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 11 June 2014. 
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Self-managed superannuation funds 
SMSFs have grown rapidly to become a large share of the superannuation sector, in 
terms of both the number of entities and funds under management.82 The value of 
assets held in SMSFs is expected to grow further. 
Preliminary assessment 
Control, choice and competition 
A number of submissions highlight the benefits of SMSFs to individuals and the 
superannuation system. SMSFs deliver members greater flexibility and control, 
because members can tailor their investments to suit their individual needs. Several 
stakeholders say this is often the main motivation of people participating in SMSFs.83 
Other drivers of the growth in SMSFs include perceived or actual lower fees and better 
tax outcomes. The growing number of SMSFs may be a positive sign that more 
Australians are actively engaging with their retirement savings.  
Several submissions note that SMSFs provide a source of competition to 
APRA-regulated funds. Industry and retail funds have expanded their range of 
products in response to the growth in SMSFs and also provide administrative services 
to them. Some APRA-regulated funds are trying to match SMSF flexibility by 
providing more options that allow members to determine their investment allocation. 
                                                          
82  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: quarterly superannuation 
performance (interim edition),  March ed, APRA, Sydney. 
83  Switzer Financial Group 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 2; Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry, page 11. 
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Cost effectiveness 
Investment Trends data suggest that over than a third of SMSFs were set up to reduce 
the amount members pay in fees.84 However, evidence on the effectiveness of this 
strategy is mixed. Rice Warner research suggests the average fee rate for SMSFs is 
lower than the industry average.85 However, SMSFs with low balances are significantly 
more expensive to run. Several submissions highlight the negative correlation between 
the average operating expense ratio and the size of the fund (Chart 4.4).86 
Chart 4.4: SMSF average operating expense ratio, by fund size (2012) 
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Source: ATO87, Rice Warner.88 
                                                          
84  Investment Trends 2014, SMSF Investor Report, April. Note: Based on a survey of 2,163 SMSF 
trustees. 
85  Rice Warner 2014, FSC Superannuation Fees Report 2013, commissioned by the Financial 
Services Council. 
86  SMSF Owners Alliance 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry; 
Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry; 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
87  Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2013, Self-Managed Super Funds: A statistical overview 2011–
2012, Table 22, ATO, Canberra. Care must be taken when using the operating expense ratio 
figures because comparisons between SMSFs and APRA-regulated funds may not be 
meaningful. While the methodology used to estimate the operating expense ratio is as close 
as possible to the method used by APRA, the data collected are not the same. 
88  Rice Warner 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 24 June 2014. 
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Estimates suggest that a SMSF requires a balance between $200,000 and $500,000, 
depending on how much work trustees outsource, to achieve equivalent costs to 
APRA-regulated funds.89 Yet, in 2011–12, almost one-quarter of SMSFs had a balance 
of $200,000 or less.90 Even after being established for three years, 50 per cent of SMSFs 
had balances under $330,000.91  
Benefits of scale 
It is more difficult to diversify the asset allocation of a low-balance SMSF, both within 
and between asset classes, although new financial products are increasingly making 
this easier. Less diversification can result in SMSF members being subject to higher 
levels of risk in their portfolio. In addition, low balances may contribute to funds 
holding a higher proportion of cash due to minimum investment thresholds, which is 
likely to reduce returns. Exchange-traded funds provide a cost-effective vehicle for 
SMSFs to access the benefits of pooled and diversified investments. 
When they purchase insurance policies, SMSFs are generally unable to realise the same 
cost economies as larger funds. Life, disability and income protection insurance may 
therefore be more expensive for individual SMSFs compared to other superannuation 
funds.  
Financial advice 
Marketing and financial advice are encouraging individuals to establish SMSFs. 
According to Investment Trends, major reasons for establishing an SMSF include 
accountants’ advice (30 per cent of respondents) and financial planners’ advice 
(20 per cent of respondents).92  
However, the quality of advice varies. ASIC’s 2013 review of SMSF advice, as 
discussed in the Leverage section, found that around 1 per cent of advice provided was 
                                                          
89  Research by Rice Warner found SMSFs with balances of $200,000 and above can provide the 
same value as retail or industry funds, provided the trustees do some of the administration. 
Where balances are $500,000 and above, SMSFs are competitive with industry and retail 
funds on a full-service basis and may be the cheapest option. Rice Warner 2013, Costs of 
operating SMSFs, commissioned by ASIC. 
90  Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2014, Self-Managed Super Fund Statistical Report — 
March 2014, ATO, viewed 25 June 2014, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/In-detail/Statistics/Quarterly
-reports/Self-managed-super-fund-statistical-report---March-2014/?page=2#Total_asset_range
_table>. 
91  Australian Taxation Office 2014, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 6 June 2014. This 
is evident in each of the last three years of data; that is, for SMSFs established in 2007–08, 
2008–09 and 2009–10.  
92  Investment Trends 2014, SMSF Investor Report, April. Note: Based on a survey of 2,163  SMSF 
trustees.  
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considered ‘good’ and around 28 per cent was rated as ‘poor’.93 Concerns about the 
quality of financial advice are discussed further in the Consumer outcomes chapter, 
including policy options to raise standards in the financial advice industry. The SMSF 
Professionals’ Association of Australia notes:  
We believe that there could be some improvements to the current financial advice 
environment to protect consumers and promote high quality, independent financial 
advice.94 
Tax 
A number of submissions highlight tax as a driver of the growth in the number of 
SMSFs. According to Investment Trends, 27 per cent of SMSFs were established 
because they were “more tax effective”.95 Several submissions argue that SMSFs have 
tax advantages that APRA-regulated funds do not have. Currently, the tax treatment 
of all superannuation funds is the same, although in practice SMSFs may achieve 
better tax outcomes. This is due to more SMSFs being in the retirement phase and to 
the ability of SMSF trustees to tailor the choice and timing of investment decisions to 
their individual circumstances.96, 97 
The Tax White Paper could examine the tax outcomes of SMSFs and APRA-regulated 
funds and measures to ensure that setting up an SMSF is not motivated purely by tax 
outcomes.  
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• To what extent should the Inquiry be concerned about the high operating 
expenses of many SMSFs?  
• Should there be any limitations on the establishment of SMSFs?  
 
                                                          
93  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Report 337 — SMSFs: 
Improving the quality of advice given to investors, ASIC. 
94  SMSF Professionals’ Association of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 25. 
95  Investment Trends 2014, SMSF Investor Report, April. Note: Based on a survey of 2,163 SMSF 
trustees. 
96  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2014, Statistics: Annual Superannuation 
Bulletin, June 2013 (revised 5 February 2014), APRA, Sydney. 
97  Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2013, Self-managed superannuation funds: A statistical 
overview 2011-12, ATO, viewed 25 June 2014, 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/In-detail/Statistics/Annual
-reports/Self-managed-superannuation-funds--A-statistical-overview-2011-2012/>. 
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Post-GFC Regulatory Response 
The GFC tested both the resilience of the Australian financial system generally and 
the performance of its regulators. We can learn many lessons from the GFC. This has 
been reflected in the substantial volume of regulatory change over recent years in 
Australia and internationally. 
The Inquiry considers this an opportune time to revisit Australia’s approach to 
stability and the prudential framework, consumer and conduct regulation, and our 
regulatory architecture, and in light of the GFC experience, to consider the need for 
any change. 
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5: Stability 
Maintaining stability in the financial system requires prudent management by 
financial institutions, sound macroeconomic policy, and a strong regulatory and 
supervisory framework. The Government should minimise the expectation of 
taxpayer funds being used to support the financial system. Nonetheless, given the 
Government may intervene during a financial crisis to avoid disorderly failures, a 
strong Government balance sheet is important.  
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) provided many lessons about the global financial 
system. This included: complexity and interconnectedness was greater than 
appreciated; many global financial institutions had too little capital to withstand a 
large shock; moral hazard was prevalent; liquidity can disappear in a crisis; and 
there was a lack of focus on system-wide risks. In response, governments and 
regulators implemented, or will implement, a number of international and domestic 
policy reforms. 
The Inquiry has made the following observations about stability in the Australian 
financial system: 
• During the GFC, significant government actions in a number of countries, 
including Australia, entrenched perceptions that some institutions are 
too-big-to-fail. These perceptions can be reduced in Australia by making it more 
credible to resolve these institutions without Government support. 
• A number of jurisdictions have implemented new macroprudential toolkits to 
assist with managing systemic risks. The effectiveness of these for a country like 
Australia is not yet well established, and there are significant practical difficulties 
in using such tools. 
• Australia has implemented some aspects of global prudential frameworks earlier 
than a number of jurisdictions. It has also used national discretion in defining 
capital ratios. When combined with other aspects of the prudential framework 
and calculated on a consistent basis, Australian banks’ capital ratios (common 
equity tier 1) are around the middle of the range relative to other countries. 
However, differences such as those in definitions of capital do limit international 
comparability. 
• To contribute to the effectiveness of the financial system, sound corporate 
governance requires clarity of the responsibilities and authority of boards and 
management. There are differences in the duties and requirements of governing 
bodies for different types of financial institutions and, within institutions, 
substantial regulator focus on boards has confused the delineation between the 
role of the board and that of management. 
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Context 
Australia has had a relatively stable financial system for most of the past two decades, 
following considerable disruption at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. Other 
than the failure of several non-systemic financial service providers, the only major 
failure since the early 1990s was HIH insurance in 2001.1, 2 This period of stability is the 
result of a number of factors, including: a stable macroeconomic environment; a strong 
regulatory and supervisory framework; prudent risk management by financial 
institutions themselves; and a traditional, comparatively low-risk commercial banking 
model that remained profitable. 
Financial instability limits the financial system’s ability to allocate funds, facilitate 
payments, transfer risk and create liquidity. Instability can result in losses for users of 
the financial system and damage to the financial sector’s ability to serve the economy. 
As shown by the GFC, it can also have severe negative effects on the economy, 
including low growth and high unemployment, and result in responses that lead to 
higher government debt. Financial instability can manifest in a number of ways. Most 
damaging is when several financial institutions fail at once or when a systemically 
important institution fails. Instability can also lead to large swings in asset prices, 
markets seizing up, and rapid changes in investor and depositor confidence. 
Instability can come from many sources. Regulation is most focused on the parts of the 
financial system where the consequences of an institution failing are generally highest 
— such as banking and insurance — although risks can also arise from outside this 
regulatory perimeter. 
Balancing stability and efficiency 
A systemic crisis can impose significant costs on the financial system and the broader 
economy. Globally, a Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) literature 
survey puts estimates of the median cumulative global output cost of a financial crisis 
over a number of years at around 19 per cent of pre-crisis GDP, if growth returns to 
                                                          
1  In other instances, weaker institutions were acquired by stronger institutions, avoiding 
potential failure. 
2  A number of non-prudentially regulated financial service providers have failed, including 
during the GFC. In some cases these involved significant losses for individual investors but 
did not destabilise the financial system or discernably damage the economy. 
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trend, or up to 158 per cent of pre-crisis GDP if the crisis has a permanent effect.3 
Haldane suggests the cumulative cost could be at least 90 per cent of 2009 world GDP.4 
Within a country, the costs of instability are felt in their effect on the financial system, 
broader economy and in any taxpayer support required to minimise further damage. 
Academic studies suggest that the average cost of a banking crisis results in real GDP 
per person falling by 9 per cent and unemployment increasing by 7 percentage points.5 
During the crisis, United Kingdom taxpayer exposure to the financial sector peaked at 
£1.2 trillion (75 per cent of United Kingdom GDP),6 while in Ireland financial sector 
support increased gross public debt by 40 per cent of GDP.7 The Australian 
Government did not make a financial loss from its support to the financial system, but 
seasonally adjusted real GDP growth slowed from 4.8 per cent in the year to 
September 2007 to less than 1 per cent in the year to September 2009. The seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rate also increased from 4.0 per cent in August 2008 to 
5.9 per cent by June 2009. 
Stability can also come at a cost. Many measures to promote stability introduce barriers 
to entry to the financial system. These may reduce competition, place regulatory costs 
on financial institutions and reduce the availability of credit during economic 
upswings.8 Policy makers need to be cognisant of this and balance any loss of 
efficiency or competition against the benefits of a stable system. 
Financial institutions 
Different financial institutions pose different risks to stability. 
The business of banking creates particular risks of failure. Banks are exposed to a wide 
range of risks through their core activities of credit intermediation and maturity 
transformation, including credit, liquidity, market and operational risks.  
                                                          
3  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2010, An assessment of the long-term economic 
impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements, BCBS, Basel. 
4  Haldane, A 2010, The $100 billion dollar question, speech at the Institution of Regulation & Risk 
North Asia (IRRNA), 30 March 2010, Hong Kong. 
5  Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K 2009, This Time it is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, 
Princeton Press, Princeton, NJ. 
6  UK National Audit Office, Taxpayer support for UK banks FAQ, viewed on 18 July 2014 
<http://www.nao.org.uk/highlights/taxpayer-support-for-uk-banks-faqs/>. 
7  IMF 2013, IMF Fiscal Monitor, April 2013. 
8  See for example Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2011, Basel III: Long-term impact on 
economic performance and fluctuations, BIS Working Papers No. 338, BIS, Basel and Lowe, P 
2012, Bank Regulation and the Future of Banking, remarks to the 41st Australian Conference of 
Economists, 11 July, Melbourne. 
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Insurers are less likely to generate or amplify systemic risk within the financial system 
or in the economy. This is because traditional insurance underwriting risks are less 
correlated with the economic business cycle and financial market risks. Although, in 
broad terms, financial market losses do not affect the magnitude of insurance 
liabilities, insurers do write business and conduct activities that are connected to the 
financial markets. Thus, the disorderly failure of a large insurer and the consequent 
cessation of coverage can damage the economy, as seen in the case of HIH.9 
Since the Wallis Inquiry, superannuation funds have grown substantially in size and 
importance to the financial system. They are subject to market risk and so are 
susceptible to the failure of other financial institutions. However, their current limited 
direct leverage restricts superannuation funds’ tendency to transmit or amplify 
financial shocks. 
Financial market infrastructure (FMI), including trading platforms, high-value 
payment systems, clearing and settlement systems, and trade repositories, is the 
‘plumbing’ of the financial system. Failure of these institutions could in some instances 
severely compromise the entire financial system’s operation and be particularly costly. 
The shadow banking sector includes many of the non-prudentially regulated financial 
institutions, such as mortgage finance companies, securities lenders, structured 
investment vehicles and hedge funds. The sector is a source of financial innovation but 
can also develop systemic risks. In part, this is because ‘regulatory arbitrage’ can see 
risky activity move from the regulated sector into the shadow banking sector. It can be 
difficult to identify risks in the shadow banking sector, as there is often a lack of 
transparency and relevant data. 
Regulatory framework 
Domestic 
Australia’s financial stability relies on its prudential framework. This framework seeks 
to avoid financial crises and minimise the incidence and cost of financial institution 
failures, while not unduly limiting competition or impeding innovation. A number of 
agencies have mandates to promote financial stability in conjunction with the 
Government, with the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australian Securities and Investment 
                                                          
9  AIG in the United States is an example of a large insurance group failure that had systemic 
implications. The failure was primarily caused by losses in the group’s non-insurance 
business. 
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Commission (ASIC) most prominent. For an overview of the regulatory structure, see 
the Regulatory architecture chapter. 
The RBA has an implied mandate for the stability of the entire financial system. In this 
capacity, it provides ongoing monitoring and analysis of the system, using its public 
communications to highlight emerging risks. It is the provider of system liquidity and, 
in a crisis, can act as a lender of last resort. 
APRA has responsibility for prudential supervision and financial stability. APRA 
regulates and supervises banks, building societies and credit unions, insurance 
companies and most segments of the superannuation industry. In terms of financial 
stability, its mandate is to set requirements for and supervise these institutions to 
reduce the likelihood they will fail. If an institution becomes financially distressed, 
APRA has primary responsibility for ensuring its return to health or managing its 
orderly failure. 
ASIC does not have a formal mandate for ensuring financial stability. However, it 
provides oversight of a broad range of financial entities that fall outside the prudential 
perimeter. It can assist with identifying emerging systemic risks, for example in the 
shadow banking sector. 
International 
The GFC was followed by a considerable international policy response. Financial 
supervisors around the world sought to coordinate their actions and achieve broad 
consistency across jurisdictions. This process is ongoing, with further change likely 
over the next few years. 
Since 1988, the BCBS — of which Australia is a member — has set global standards to 
promote banking sector stability. All major economies follow the Basel framework, 
leading to a relatively consistent global approach to bank regulation, despite some 
differences in implementation.  
Basel III, which was developed in the wake of the GFC, seeks to significantly increase 
the robustness of banks globally. Australia is adopting some aspects of Basel III earlier 
than a number of other jurisdictions and, although adhering to the minimum 
‘headline’ capital ratios, has been more conservative in some details of its 
implementation. 
The post-GFC era has also seen greater international coordination on policies 
regarding insurers and FMI. This work has generally been overseen by the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) at the request of the G20, with the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) developing insurance capital standards and the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) FMI standards.  
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Too-big-to-fail10 and moral hazard 
Global history records governments of all political persuasions using taxpayer funds to 
support distressed institutions. As undesirable as it may be to put taxpayer funds at 
risk to support financial institutions, in the midst of a crisis it is often the fastest and 
most certain option to stabilise the system and avoid widespread economic damage. 
Investors can rationally surmise that the government is likely to rescue systemically 
important institutions if no other options exist, as their collapse would cause the most 
damage to the financial system and broader economy. This leads to a belief that some 
institutions are too-big-to-fail — that they receive an implicit government guarantee. 
Perceptions of this implicit guarantee have costs. A government may need to rescue a 
troubled institution in a crisis, putting taxpayer funds at risk. It may also cause ‘moral 
hazard’. This means it may encourage systemically important institutions to take on 
more risk than is optimal, since they believe they receive any benefits from the risk 
taking while the government will bear the cost of failure. Further, investors may 
believe they will not make a loss, even if the institution fails, so they have less 
incentive to monitor the institution’s risks and apply market discipline. This can lead 
to a lower cost of funding for these institutions.11 Any lower funding costs might allow 
the institutions to become larger and more systemically important. The overall system 
can therefore become larger than is economically efficient, exacerbating the size of the 
potential cost of a crisis and therefore the size of the perceived guarantee. 
                                                          
10  Too-big-to-fail is a term often used in international policy discussions to refer to systemically 
important financial institutions that, were they to fail, would cause significant economic and 
financial damage. An institution may be systemically important because it is large, but also 
because of its complexity, market importance, interconnectedness or a lack of substitutes for 
critical service it provides. 
11  See for example Tarullo, D 2009, Confronting Too Big to Fail, speech at the Exchequer Club, 
October 21, Washington DC. 
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Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
During the GFC, significant government actions in a number of countries, including 
Australia, entrenched perceptions that some institutions are too-big-to-fail. These 
perceptions can be reduced in Australia by making it more credible to resolve these 
institutions without Government support. 
 
During the GFC, a number of countries provided financial support to struggling 
financial institutions, including capital injections and debt guarantees.12 The goal was 
to avoid wider systemic impacts if these institutions were to fail, as happened in the 
case of Lehman Brothers. However, in doing so these governments entrenched a belief 
that some institutions were too-big-to-fail. The challenge since the crisis has been to 
alter these beliefs. 
Government can take measures to make it more likely, or more credible, to be able to 
impose losses on creditors, avoiding future Government interventions and lowering 
the cost or probability of a large institution failing. No single measure is a complete 
solution, but each strengthens the likelihood or credibility of orderly resolution with 
minimal taxpayer support, which in turn reduces the contingent liability to the 
Government and perceptions of an implicit guarantee.  
Policy options for consultation 
It is hard to completely eliminate perceptions that some institutions are too-big-to-fail, 
as there will always be pressure on governments to prevent the disorderly failure of a 
financial institution. However, the Government can take measures to minimise the 
extent of these perceptions through making an orderly resolution more likely with 
minimal need for Government support, and reducing the probability that such 
institutions will fail.  
Globally, the GFC revealed: complexity and interconnectedness was greater than 
appreciated; many global financial institutions had too little capital to withstand a 
large shock; moral hazard was prevalent; liquidity can disappear in a crisis; and there 
was a lack of focus on system-wide risks. International forums, particularly the G20, 
have taken these lessons and sought international policy responses to reduce the 
potential for taxpayer funds being put at risk from government support for 
                                                          
12  Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2010, Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important 
financial institutions, interim report to G20 Leaders, FSB, Basel. 
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systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Among other things, this has 
resulted in strengthened international frameworks for capital, liquidity, financial 
market infrastructure and resolution. 
Australia has been part of this international process, including through its 2014 
Presidency of the G20, and has adopted many of the measures. However, other 
countries have pursued a range of additional steps — or gone further than Australia — 
to reduce the potential costs posed by systemically important institutions. These 
additional measures are worth examining in the Australian context:13  
• Further strengthening recovery and resolution frameworks 
• Further enhancing regulatory requirements for systemic financial institutions, 
including higher capital requirements and stronger risk management and stress 
testing requirements  
• Mandating structural changes for individual banks, or imposing general 
ring-fencing requirements or banning certain activities considered to be high risk  
The options discussed aim to reduce the costs associated with too-big-to-fail 
institutions. They aim to make the financial system safer and reduce the likelihood of 
taxpayer funds being used to support a financial institution. Many of these measures 
could also have an effect on competition.  
Some of these options would be relatively straightforward to implement with minimal 
cost. However, others are much more difficult to adopt and would require significant 
change to the Australian financial system.  
Recovery and resolution preparedness 
It is not possible to eliminate failure from the financial sector. It is not even desirable; 
the ability of good institutions to prosper and inefficient ones to fail is a key feature of 
competition. However, liquidating financial institutions is a complex and slow process, 
which can weaken confidence and lead to contagion in the broader financial system. 
Financial institutions need a strong, effective and credible recovery and resolution 
regime to help ensure any failure is orderly and has a minimal cost to the financial 
system, the broader economy and the Government. 
Many recovery and resolution options have little or no compliance cost for industry; 
for example, powers are only relied upon where an institution is facing acute financial 
                                                          
13  APRA’s submission raises ways in which its crisis management powers could be enhanced, 
while the RBA submission discusses macroprudential policy, structural banking reforms and 
powers relating to financial market infrastructure.  
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distress. In normal times, the regulatory burden of these options can therefore be 
negligible or non-existent. However, some options, such as requirements for industry 
to structurally preposition, do impose costs.  
Imposing losses on creditors 
When a business fails, it would ordinarily enter corporate insolvency or administration 
procedures to be sold or liquidated, with any value returned to creditors. Generally, 
the value of the assets will not be enough to repay all creditors the whole amount 
owing, and some will take a loss. Achieving this in a manner that meets financial 
stability objectives is more difficult in the context of a financial institution. Critical 
services provided by the institution may need to be continued or wound down in an 
orderly manner outside normal insolvency processes. In addition, creditors are often 
other financial institutions — imposing losses on these institutions, especially in the 
middle of a financial crisis, can worsen the situation. Disorderly resolution of one 
institution can create instability through a loss of confidence and changes in investor 
risk appetite. In many past instances, both in Australia and elsewhere, this has led 
governments to intervene to restore stability. 
Introducing credible ways to impose losses on creditors in the event of failure assists in 
achieving orderly resolution with minimal use of taxpayer funds. This goes some way 
to addressing perceptions that some institutions have an implicit guarantee by 
reducing expectations of Government support, and encouraging investors to pay 
greater attention to risk. This is evident in Moody’s decision to place Canadian banks 
on a negative outlook, which was “taken in the context of previously announced plans 
by the Canadian government to implement a ‘bail-in’ regime”, which “may reduce 
[Moody’s] systemic support assumptions”.14 
There are complexities involved in making it more credible to impose losses on the 
creditors of financial institutions. These include: questions around the nature of the 
liabilities that may best be able to absorb losses in resolution; ensuring that relevant 
creditors are capable of bearing loss without systemic contagion; appropriate 
mechanisms and triggers for imposing losses on creditors; interaction with the existing 
regulatory capital framework;15 and the effect on funding costs in normal times. 
The G20 continues to consider elements of these issues, in particular through its work 
on the adequacy of global systemically important institutions’ loss absorbing capacity 
when they fail (gone concern loss absorbing capacity, or GLAC). There is value in an 
internationally consistent approach to promote a level playing field globally. The 
                                                          
14  Moody’s 2014, Rating Action: Moody’s changes outlook to negative on Canadian banks’ supported 
ratings, Moody’s Corporation, New York. 
15  For example, some Australian banks have already issued securities with ‘bail-in’ clauses that 
qualify as Tier 2 capital for meeting minimum capital requirements. 
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proposals include government and regulator discretion to impose losses on particular 
classes of creditors, and mandating issuance of financial instruments that resolution 
authorities can confidently expose to loss or convert to equity in resolution, while 
minimising financial instability and risks to other public interest objectives. The 
proposals seek to ensure resources are available to provide solvency to a systemic 
institution via a bridge or a bail-in transaction sufficient to sustain its critical services 
until the institution can be subjected to an orderly wind-down or solvent restructuring. 
Although these proposals are being developed for globally systemically important 
banks, it is possible that they will have implications for Australian institutions. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Increase the ability to impose losses on creditors of a financial institution in the 
event of its failure. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
Is it possible to reduce the perceptions of an implicit guarantee for systemic financial 
institutions by imposing losses on particular classes of creditors during a crisis, 
without causing greater systemic disruption? If so, what types of creditors are most 
likely to be able to bear losses? 
Financial market infrastructure oversight and resolution 
FMI includes trading platforms, high-value payment systems, clearing and settlement 
systems, and trade repositories. Such facilities are critical in a modern financial system, 
as they match buyers and sellers and facilitate the transfer of both funds and title to 
assets, and thus trading of goods, services and financial assets. If these facilities fail, it 
can cause severe systemic disruption. 
FMIs are regulated and supervised by the RBA and ASIC. Broadly, the RBA is 
responsible for ensuring the stability and safety of FMIs, while ASIC is responsible for 
their fair and effective provision of services. 
The Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) has identified a number of gaps in the 
regulatory framework for FMIs, particularly related to resolution.16 These include: a 
                                                          
16  Stevens, G 2012, ‘Review of Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation’, Letter to The 
Hon. Wayne Swan, MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer, 10 February. 
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lack of appropriate direction powers; the ability to step in to control an FMI, if 
appropriate; the ability to mandate the location of services; and lack of fit and proper 
standards for FMI directors and officers. A large focus of these proposed changes is 
ensuring that, if an FMI fails, regulators are able to step in to keep its critical services 
operating. 
The Inquiry understands that CFR agencies have developed a set of legislative 
proposals for future Government consideration to address the gaps identified, and 
supports this process. 
Resolution powers 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and FSB analysis concluded that Australia’s 
resolution regime for banks and insurers was broadly consistent with international 
best practice.17 However, a comparison with the FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution revealed several gaps in resolution tools and powers. 
The gaps identified include: powers to address a distressed foreign bank branch in 
Australia; the ability to require restructuring of a regulated entity to facilitate 
resolution; deficiencies in powers to resolve group distress; a lack of statutory ‘bail-in’ 
powers to impose losses on particular creditors; no resolution or privately funded 
protection funds; and no formal mechanism for recovery of taxpayer funds. Options 
identified by the IMF to address these gaps included giving regulators additional 
directions powers and the ability to levy the industry for any non-financial claims 
scheme (FCS)-related resolution expenditure by the authorities.  
The previous Government consulted on measures to address most of the gaps, with 
little industry concern except on a small number of specific proposals. The Inquiry 
supports this continuing process.18 Although many of the gaps identified for change 
were relatively minor in isolation, their cumulative closing would enhance APRA’s 
crisis management powers and more closely align Australia with international 
standards and best practice.  
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements 
• Strengthen regulators’ resolution powers for financial institutions. 
                                                          
17  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF 
Country Report No. 12/308, IMF, Washington DC. 
18  Australian Treasury 2012, Strengthening APRA’s Crisis Management Powers, consultation 
paper, Treasury, Canberra. 
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Pre-planning and pre-positioning 
Strong resolution powers are not enough. Regulators and Government need to be 
willing and prepared to use them. Many crisis management options are only credible 
with significant pre-planning. In a crisis, the more options available, the more likely a 
credible, low-cost option to prevent a disorderly collapse can be found that does not 
involve putting taxpayer funds at risk. Pre-planning can also increase the consistency 
of Government approaches to crises and, through public communication, can increase 
the predictability and transparency of Government responses. 
Australia could do more to be in a position to use resolution powers effectively. This 
could involve pre-planning for failure, both generically and by developing plans for 
specific institutions, and testing these plans through crisis simulations.19 The regulators 
can oversee that institutions build credible sources of loss absorbency in resolution 
and, at the same time, Government can ensure its balance sheet remains strong. 
Pre-planning is not without cost. It can be resource intensive for regulators. It can also 
impose a burden on the industry, which may have to devote resources to develop 
internal recovery plans, provide data to regulators and make business changes to 
address any identified barriers to resolution. However, compared to other options, 
additional pre-planning is likely to be relatively low cost. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Invest more in pre-planning and pre-positioning for financial failure. 
Capital requirements 
In December 2013, APRA identified the four major banks as domestic systemically 
important institutions and increased their capital requirements, from 2016, by  
                                                          
19  Under the current framework, the CFR runs crisis simulation exercises every two years, with 
other crisis management training events held every alternate year. Individual agencies also 
run internal crisis simulations.  
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1 percentage point.20 Increased capital requirements for systemically important banks 
are in line with international practice. Most jurisdictions adopting the Basel framework 
have introduced, or will introduce, similar measures. Australia’s requirement is at the 
low end of the international spectrum, which ranges from 1 percentage point to 
around 6 percentage points for the largest banks in Switzerland (Chart 5.1). In their 
submission, the regional banks suggested that a higher capital add-on for systemically 
important banks could be warranted. 
Chart 5.1: Capital ratio add-ons for systemically important banks(a), (b) 
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(a) Includes capital add-ons for both Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and Domestic 
Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs). For the European Union this is for ‘other systemically important 
institutions. 
(b) Where countries have a range of possible capital add-ons, ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ show the floor and 
ceiling of that range. Where countries have the same capital add-on for all systemically important banks, 
this is showed as its ‘minimum’. 
Sources: APRA, BCBS, China Banking Regulatory Commission, De Nederlandsche Bank, Swiss Financial 
Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Japan Financial Services Agency, 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, Reserve 
Bank of India, Sveriges Riksbank. 
Increasing capital requirements reduces the likelihood of institutional failure. It gives a 
greater capital buffer to systemically important banks, whose collapse would cause 
significant damage to financial markets and the economy. Higher capital also helps 
ameliorate the effects generated by perceptions of an implicit guarantee.  
Some stakeholders have argued Australian banks already have adequate levels of 
capital. ADIs have increased capital levels since the GFC and have arguably reduced 
                                                          
20  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2013, Domestic Systemically Important 
Banks in Australia, APRA Information Paper, APRA, Sydney. 
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the risk in their asset portfolios.21 In addition, equity funding is typically thought to be 
more expensive than debt funding, although a greater use of equity funding reduces 
bank failure risk and therefore may lower investors’ required return on equity and the 
cost of borrowing.22 
The Inquiry notes that the FSB’s framework for global systemically important 
institutions includes insurers as well as banks. The IAIS is currently finalising the 
methodology for identifying global systemically important insurers, although this is 
unlikely to include any Australian institutions. It is not yet clear what arrangements, if 
any, will be made for domestic systemically important insurers. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Further increase capital requirements on financial institutions considered to be 
systemically important domestically. 
The Financial Claims Scheme 
The FCS was introduced as part of the Government’s response to the GFC. It provides 
a government guarantee of retail deposits held at Authorised Deposit-taking 
Institutions (ADIs) up to the value of $250,000 per account holder per ADI. The scheme 
fully covers around 99 per cent of eligible depositors and over half of deposits by 
value.23 The deposit guarantee aims to give depositors confidence in the safety of their 
money during a crisis, preventing panic and bank runs that may exacerbate the crisis. 
A similar scheme is in place for general insurance policy holders should an insurer fail. 
Like all government guarantees, the FCS could create moral hazard for depositors by 
removing credit risk.24 The depositor can place funds with any ADI without regard to 
the riskiness of the institution. In the context of reducing the adverse effects of 
too-big-to-fail, the FCS assists smaller institutions; absent such a guarantee, depositors 
                                                          
21  Coffey, P 2014, Financial System Inquiry: Funding Australia’s Economic Future, presentation to 
the Committee for Economic Development of Australia, 13 June, Sydney 
22  Admati, A and Helwig, M 2013, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and 
What to Do about It, Princeton Press, Princeton NJ. 
23  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial Safety Net and Crisis Management 
Framework — Technical Note, IMF Country Report No. 12/310, IMF, Washington DC. 
24  It should be noted that, unlike other guarantees, the FCS may not materially affect the 
market discipline of deposit-taking institutions in normal times. This is because retail 
depositors are typically not able to adequately assess the relative riskiness of banks due to 
the information asymmetries. 
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could be expected to move their funds to the larger institutions if they perceive these to 
be the safest. 
Some submissions criticise the form of the FCS, noting that pre-positioning for 
implementation is complicated and has been expensive. In particular, the ‘single 
customer view’ required per individual, per ADI has practical difficulties. In addition, 
complexity may make it challenging to distribute funds to affected depositors in a 
timely manner. This may undermine the scheme’s effectiveness in a crisis; it is 
important to meet depositors’ expectations of fast and accurate payouts, both to ensure 
system stability and to avoid losses for individuals. It should be noted that the 
increased confidence from the presence of the FCS may assist in preventing a crisis 
from occurring. 
The FCS threshold of $250,000 is high by comparison to most deposit insurance 
schemes internationally,25 and some submissions argue it is too high.26 This threshold 
should be high enough to cover the average depositor’s funds to avoid people 
withdrawing funds during a crisis. However, the higher the threshold, the greater the 
allocative efficiency distortion it can cause, giving greater incentive for individuals to 
invest in deposits compared to other assets.27 
Currently, the FCS is post-funded. This means that, if it were activated, the 
Government would initially pay out claims and then recover those funds from the 
assets of the failing institution. If that was not sufficient, the remainder would be 
recovered through a levy on the rest of the banking sector, which could be delayed 
until the crisis was over to avoid exacerbating the situation. 
An option is to charge ADIs an ex ante fee, or pre-funding, for the FCS; the IMF 
recommended that Australia “Re-evaluate the merits of ex ante funding for the FCS”.28 
Ultimately this fee would likely be passed on to depositors, which would satisfy a 
‘user pays’ principle for the deposit insurance provided. In addition, depending on 
how it was structured, an ex ante fee could collect a dedicated pool of funds that could 
be rapidly accessed to meet FCS claim needs. Broadening the allowable use of these 
funds to include measures that reduce the magnitude of FCS claims — such as 
assisting in resolution — may reduce the overall burden of the scheme.  
However, an ex ante model would impose a cost on the financial sector. In particular, 
industry would need to pay a fee that would likely be passed on, at least in part, to 
                                                          
25  Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2012, Thematic Review on Deposit Insurance Systems, peer 
review report, 8 February, FSB, Basel. 
26  For example, Challenger 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
Attachment 15. 
27  The Funding chapter discusses tax factors that make deposits less attractive to households. 
28  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF 
Country Report No. 12/308, IMF, Washington DC, November. 
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depositors in the form of lower deposit interest rates or higher fees. This would be the 
case even if there was no need to activate the FCS. By contrast, the current ex post 
funding only imposes a cost on industry if the guarantee is needed. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Modify the FCS, possibly including simplification, lowering the insured 
threshold or introducing an ex ante fee. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• What measures could be taken to simplify the FCS with minimal burden on 
industry, while still ensuring the effectiveness of the scheme? 
• What is an appropriate threshold for the FCS guarantee of deposits? 
Ring-fencing 
Following the GFC, several major jurisdictions introduced or proposed significant 
structural reforms to their banking sectors through ring-fencing. The goal of 
ring-fencing is to ‘carve out’ specific financial activities to protect them from other 
activities that are less critical to economic activity — and are likely to be riskier. This 
might involve separating commercial banking from investment banking, or insulating 
domestic operations from risks in offshore activity. There is no one way to implement 
ring-fencing, with approaches differing by country (Box 5.1). 
Such measures help address the costs of too-big-to-fail institutions in three ways: 
1. Although all parts of a bank may collectively be too-big-to-fail, each individual part 
may not be. This is not a matter of size — the complexity of an institution also 
affects whether it is possible to resolve in an orderly fashion. A simpler internal 
bank structure, where core activities are already separate, would make resolution 
easier.  
2. Although there may be a political and economic imperative to provide government 
support to core services, such as access to retail deposits, this is less likely to be the 
case for investment banking activities. Ring-fencing can allow Government greater 
ability to limit support to only the core aspects of the business, reducing the 
associated perceived implicit guarantee.  
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3. By separating different types of activities, an institution’s approach to risk appetite, 
including remuneration structures which affect risk taking, may become more 
appropriately aligned to those activities. 
Ring-fencing in Australia 
Currently, the share of Australian banks’ balance sheets used for investment banking 
activities, and the extent of proprietary trading, is lower than in many other 
jurisdictions.29 Among other things, this could reflect a lack of retail competition that 
makes ‘plain vanilla’ banking profitable without the need to take on riskier business, 
or relative returns to investment banking in Australia being low. 
Ring-fencing would come at a cost. Of the measures discussed in this section, it is 
likely to be the most burdensome. It involves costs to institutions of restructuring, 
ongoing efficiency costs through reduced diversification benefits, and may introduce 
barriers to foreign entrants and limit Australian banks’ ability to expand 
internationally.  
The United Kingdom Treasury estimates ring-fencing United Kingdom institutions 
will involve a transition cost of around £3 billion, with ongoing costs of around 
£420 million to £1.9 billion per annum (0.04 to 0.16 per cent of United Kingdom GDP). 
Efficiency can also be a casualty, as firms are forced into a corporate structure other 
than what they would choose if not constrained. However, the estimated net present 
benefit of the United Kingdom reforms is £114 billion through reduced probability and 
severity of future financial crises.30  
Unlike in the United Kingdom, the mixture of retail and investment banking in 
Australia is more limited. This means the immediate costs and benefits of such a policy 
may also be more limited. That said, introducing ring-fencing now could assist in 
avoiding future issues if banks were to move more into riskier activities. For example, 
banks may move into riskier investment bank activities searching for higher returns, as 
increased competition or other factors make safer lending less profitable. 
Although implementing ring-fencing now would be costly, it would be less costly than 
if it were introduced at a time when banks were engaged significantly in both 
ring-fenced and other activities. 
                                                          
29  IMF data show that in 2012 the share of bank income from trading activities was 4.6 per cent 
in Australia, 27.3 per cent in Germany, 15.3 per cent in the United Kingdom and 6.2 per cent 
in the United States. Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) and Australian 
Bankers’ Association (ABA) 2012, Joint ABA and AFMA response to the Fundamental Review of 
the Trading Book, 7 September, also states that countries like Australia have “less complex 
trading books, compared to European or North American jurisdictions”.  
30  HM Treasury 2013, Impact Assessment: Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill, July 2013. 
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It is worth noting that Australia had a type of de facto ring-fencing before the 1990s, 
when the major banks each had separate trading bank and savings bank arms, but 
Government policy during deregulation removed that distinction. 
The Inquiry seeks views on whether ring-fencing could be of net benefit to Australia 
and, if so, what model of ring-fencing would best suit our conditions. In particular: 
what types of activity should be ‘inside’ the fence and what should not; and how ‘high’ 
should the fence be — that is, how strongly should activities be separated? 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Ring-fence critical bank functions, such as retail activities. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Is there a case for introducing ring-fencing in Australia now, or is there likely to 
be in the future? 
• If ring-fencing is pursued, what elements should be protected and from what 
risks? For example, should deposit-taking functions be protected from 
proprietary trading. Is one of the models used overseas appropriate for 
Australia? 
• How ‘high’ should any ring-fence be? Do ring-fenced activities need to occur in 
entirely separate financial institutions, or could they be part of a group structure 
that has other business activities? Within a group, what level of separation 
would be necessary? 
• Are there ways to achieve the same benefits as ring-fencing without the costs of 
structural separation? 
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Box 5.1: International approaches to ring-fencing 
United States — The ‘Volcker rule’ 
The Volcker rule aims to reduce banks’ exposure to speculative investments that 
could put depositor funds at risk. It does this by prohibiting banks (including 
foreign banks) from engaging in proprietary trading. They cannot buy or sell assets 
for speculative reasons for the bank’s own purposes — only on behalf of a client — 
but they can still undertake hedging activity to manage their risks. The Volcker rule 
also prohibits banks from investing in hedge funds and private equity funds.  
United States — Glass-Steagall Act 
Operating prior to the GFC, for most of the 20th century the Glass-Steagall Act 
required that commercial banks and investment banks be separate entities. Its goal 
was to protect deposits in commercial banks from being exposed to the riskier 
activities conducted by investment banks. This provision of the Act was repealed 
in 1999. 
United Kingdom — Vickers 
Following the Independent Commission on Banking (the Vickers report), the 
United Kingdom is in the process of introducing ring-fencing of United Kingdom 
banks’ core activities, ensuring that core services can continue, even if the risky 
parts of the business get into difficulty. This requires core financial services, such as 
retail deposits and overdrafts, to be placed in a separate subsidiary within a holding 
company, ring-fenced from any securities trading and other risky activities. 
Ring-fenced subsidiaries must be separately capitalised, with each meeting the 
regulator’s capital and liquidity requirements, and should be legally, financially and 
operationally independent. 
European Union — Liikanen 
Current proposals in the European Union ban proprietary trading and, potentially, 
separate particular trading activities from deposit-taking entities. This draws on 
recommendations in the Report of the European Commission’s High-level Expert 
Group on Bank Structural Reform (the Liikanen report). Hedging, trading on behalf 
of clients and trading for cash management purposes would still be allowed. If the 
regulator required a function to be separate, the function would need to be legally 
and operationally distinct from the rest of the bank. 
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Systemic risk 
The GFC highlighted that focusing on the soundness of individual institutions, 
without stepping back to consider the overall financial system, is not sufficient to 
ensure financial stability. Externalities and spill-over effects can mean that, even where 
an individual institution’s capital, risk exposure and liquidity look sound, systemic 
risks can be building up. Yellen described it as “akin to caring for an entire ecosystem 
rather than individual trees”.31 
The issue is that, if a regulatory system is primarily focused on institutions, it can be 
hard to both monitor and respond to systemic risk. This is particularly true when data 
on institutions outside the prudential regulatory perimeter is scarce. Australia’s 
regulatory framework deals with this issue by being designed to enable a focus on the 
system as a whole, yet allowing for tools to be applied to individual institutions to 
achieve systemic goals. 
Preliminary assessment 
Monitoring 
APRA, the RBA and ASIC have a well-established system for monitoring systemic risk 
in Australia.32 APRA considers system-wide issues as part of its approach to 
supervising financial institutions. The RBA complements this with its own analysis of 
the financial system, with an eye to emerging systemic risks. The two agencies 
coordinate and share their analysis with each other and other agencies through the 
CFR, as well as through day-to-day contact between the agencies. The RBA’s 
semi-annual Financial Stability Reviews make this analysis available to the broader 
public. ASIC’s monitoring of FMI and non-prudentially regulated financial service 
providers contributes to identifying systemic risks outside the prudential perimeter. 
APRA’s mandate for pursuing financial system stability was codified in the 2006 
amendment to the APRA Act, which required the regulator “to promote financial 
system stability in Australia”. The RBA takes its mandate to promote financial stability 
as implied under the Reserve Bank Act 1959. Financial stability is also explicitly 
                                                          
31  Yellen, J 2009, Linkages between Monetary and Regulatory Policy: Lessons from the Crisis, 
presentation to the Institute of Regulation & Risk, North Asia, November, Hong Kong. 
32  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF 
Country Report No. 12/308, IMF, Washington DC, November. 
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included in the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy agreed between the 
Treasurer and the Governor of the RBA, most recently in October 2013.33 
Significant reforms to improve the transparency of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
since the GFC strengthen the monitoring of these instruments. Uncertainty about the 
derivatives exposures of institutions in the GFC negatively affected market confidence, 
increased perceptions of counterparty risk and made resolution of institutions with 
large derivatives books difficult. Reforms have included work to: standardise OTC 
derivative contracts; mandate that some OTC derivatives be traded on platforms and 
cleared through central counterparties; and record transactions on trade repositories. 
As markets continue to develop, financial and technological innovations are emerging 
rapidly. These developments result in new products and services to enable consumers 
to manage and conduct their financial activities. Allowing activity outside regulatory 
perimeters encourages innovation and competition. However, new products can bring 
new risks. This was highlighted by the GFC, where the proliferation of new and 
complex asset-backed securities structures, such as collateralised debt obligations, 
contributed to risk transparency problems in the United States. 
History tells us that the next financial crisis never looks quite like the last.34 It is not 
possible to know for certain where systemic risks will arise; however, it is perhaps 
more likely that they will emerge outside the prudentially regulated part of the 
financial system, such as in the shadow banking sector, where oversight is more 
limited. It is therefore important that monitoring arrangements are adequate for 
identifying risks wherever they might develop. This will require regulators to have 
adequate access to data.35 
Global regulators have expressed their concern about the increasing use of shadow 
banking and its potential to generate systemic risks.36 The CFR recently considered 
developments in shadow banking in Australia, concluding that risks to stability 
remain limited. This is consistent with the size of the shadow banking sector as a share 
of financial sector assets declining substantially since the GFC (Chart 5.2). However, 
the CFR still recommended ongoing monitoring of emerging risks outside the 
perimeter. 
                                                          
33  RBA and Treasury 2013, Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, 24 October 2013. 
34  Edey, M 2011, Basel III and Beyond, speech to Basel III Conference, 24 March, Sydney. 
35  See the Regulatory architecture chapter for discussion of regulator data access. 
36  The FSB has a workstream focused on the shadow banking sector — see Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) 2013, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2013, FSB, Basel. 
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Chart 5.2: Shadow banking sector(a) 
Share of financial system assets, end December 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Per centPer cent
 
(a) Based on the FSB’s definition of ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ estimates of shadow banking. Estimate excludes 
assets that are part of prudentially-regulated banking groups and assets related to equity trusts and 
self-securitisation. 
Sources: ABS, APRA, RBA. 
Current tools to address systemic risks are mostly applicable within the prudential 
perimeter, as discussed in the next section. This could be problematic if such risks are 
identified in other parts of the financial system, since the most effective way to manage 
these risks may be to subject the relevant institutions or activities to heightened 
regulatory and supervisory intensity. This is a gap in the current arrangement. 
Macroprudential powers 
Observation 
A number of jurisdictions have implemented new macroprudential toolkits to assist 
with managing systemic risks. The effectiveness of these for a country like Australia 
is not yet well established, and there are significant practical difficulties in using 
such tools. 
 
In conducting prudential policy, APRA has an eye to both the soundness of individual 
institutions and the financial system more broadly. APRA’s existing prudential tools to 
deal with emerging systemic risks include supervising particular institutions or lines 
of business more intensively, and changing capital or other prudential requirements 
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for individual institutions. As part of the Basel III implementation, APRA can also 
activate a counter-cyclical capital buffer for the whole deposit-taking industry.  
Communication is important as it can mould risk perceptions and affect risk-taking 
behaviour.37 In normal times, the RBA primarily relies on its public communications — 
such as speeches and the semi-annual Financial Stability Review — to highlight its 
concerns about any build-ups in systemic risk and potentially shape the expectations 
and actions of other parties. The RBA also takes any such risks into consideration in 
formulating monetary policy. In addition, in a crisis, the RBA can supply the financial 
system with liquidity and is the lender of last resort. 
Unlike some other jurisdictions, Australia has not explicitly introduced 
macroprudential tools in the wake of the GFC.38 These tools are designed to address 
build-ups of systemic risk. They are typically applied in a counter-cyclical fashion at a 
system-wide level, rather than tailored to different institutions. Often, they take the 
form of limits on loan-to-value ratios (LVRs) in mortgage lending and maximum 
debt-servicing-to-income ratios. 
Another example is the provision in Basel III to allow time-varying capital 
requirements for banks. This builds up capital in good times which can be run down 
during stress periods. This is similar to the dynamic provisioning used by countries 
such as Spain before the GFC, where banks build up larger provisions for impaired 
assets during good times, in recognition that regular provisioning under international 
accounting rules often does not reflect the actual experience in a downturn.  
Some studies suggest that these tools can be of benefit in the right circumstances.39 
Their purpose is to manage systemic risks by, for example, curbing the excesses in 
asset price inflation, risk appetite or credit growth. In doing so, they aim to limit the 
incidence and severity of financial crises in the future. However, the RBA’s submission 
notes that evidence on the effectiveness of such tools is still limited, especially on their 
application in advanced economies. 
                                                          
37  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
2012, Macroprudential Analysis and Policy in the Australian Financial Stability Framework, APRA 
and RBA, Sydney. 
38  Aside from the counter-cyclical capital buffer contained in Basel III. 
39  Lim, C, Columba, F, Costa, A, Kongsamut, P, Otani, A, Saiyid, M, Wezel, T and X Wu 2011, 
Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country 
Experience, IMF Working Paper WP/11/238, IMF, Washington DC. 
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There are practical difficulties to using macroprudential tools.40 
• Deciding when to use macroprudential tools involves identifying unsustainable 
trends such as asset price or credit bubbles and build-ups of risk in the financial 
system. Although the problem is usually obvious in hindsight, identifying these 
trends ex ante has proven extremely difficult for regulators, central banks and 
investors globally.  
• In many ways, the macroprudential tools being proposed and implemented today 
are not too different from the quantitative restrictions used in Australia prior to 
financial deregulation in the 1980s. That experience showed that such restrictions 
can have large negative effects on efficiency and cause financial activity to move to 
the unregulated part of the system; for example, the shadow banking sector. 
• Many macroprudential tools are focused on the housing market, such as LVR caps, 
but will have little effect on other possible sources of systemic risk. Having the right 
tools to address all potential sources of risk would require granting a substantial 
degree of power to the responsible regulator. 
• Whereas monetary policy is relatively transparent and predictable, with a clearly 
articulated target, the targets of macroprudential policy are more numerous and 
less clearly defined. This makes it harder for the public to predict the use of these 
tools, adding additional uncertainty to the financial system. It may also send 
conflicting policy signals; for example, if monetary policy is being loosened while 
maximum LVR ratios are being lowered. 
                                                          
40  RBA 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, contains a fuller 
discussion of some of the difficulties with operationalising these kinds of macroprudential 
tools. 
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Box 5.2: Macroprudential tools in other countries 
Approaches to using macroprudential powers vary significantly among countries. In 
some instances they are used by countries as a substitute for independent monetary 
policy — often the result of a managed exchange rate regime.  
Approaches include: 
• Authorities in Singapore have focused on measures to limit house price inflation. 
These include mortgage LVR caps, mortgage tenure restrictions, increased 
property stamp duty and increased land allocated to residential development.41 
• The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) has identified four macroprudential 
tools that it may use: the (Basel III) counter-cyclical capital buffer; adjustments to 
the minimum core funding ratio; sectoral capital requirements; and restrictions 
on high-LVR residential mortgage lending.42 Concerned that the housing markets 
posed a growing threat to financial stability, in 2013 the RBNZ restricted the 
portion of banks’ new residential mortgage lending that could have an LVR 
greater than 80 per cent. 
• In the United Kingdom, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) can issue 
directions on sectoral capital requirements and set the counter-cyclical capital 
buffer, and has asked for the power to impose a time-varying leverage ratio.43 It 
can recommend other changes to the United Kingdom Treasury or other 
regulators to address systemic risks, including changes to regulation such as 
when existing rules are out of date or activity has moved beyond the regulatory 
perimeter. 
China has intensive state involvement in the financial sector, both through 
state-owned banks and its regulatory regime. Authorities use caps on LVRs, credit 
growth ceilings, counter-cyclical capital requirements, reserve requirements, taxes 
and property ownership limits.44 
                                                          
41  Menon 2013, Securing Price Stability as Singapore Restructures, address to Asian Bureau of 
Finance and Economics Research Opening Gala Dinner, 21 May, Singapore. 
42  RBNZ 2014, Macro-prudential policy — FAQ, RBNZ, Wellington, viewed 18 June 2014, 
<http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/financial_stability/macro-prudential_policy/5163689.html >. 
43  Bank of England (BoE) 2013, Macroprudential policy at the Bank of England, Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, Quarter 3, BoE, London. 
44  Lim, C, Columba, F, Costa, A, Kongsamut, P, Otani, A, Saiyid, M, Wezel, T and X Wu 2011, 
Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country 
Experience, IMF Working Paper WP/11/238, IMF, Washington DC. 
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Policy options for consultation 
Assess the prudential perimeter 
Along with needing to identify risks outside the prudential perimeter, regulators must 
also be able to respond to those risks. In the current system, where the majority of the 
tools available to address systemic risks reside with APRA, and can only be applied 
within the prudential perimeter, this may be problematic. The Inquiry welcomes 
stakeholder views on the most appropriate way to ensure such risks can be managed. 
One option would be to allow for some permeability of the prudential perimeter. That 
is, on the rare occasion a systemic risk is identified outside the prudential perimeter, 
some mechanism allows for affected institutions or activities to be brought within 
APRA’s remit and subjected to more intensive regulation and supervision. This may 
include when an institution or activity becomes of such size, interconnectedness, 
complexity or market importance that it poses a risk to overall system stability.45 
Currently, legislation must be passed to enact such a change. This has the advantage of 
strong accountability, but can also take a significant amount of time. A more timely 
option could be to allow the appropriate Minister to designate institutions or activities 
to be brought into APRA’s purview, on systemic risk grounds, on advice from the RBA 
or CFR. This may be advantageous if significant delays in addressing the risk may let it 
build up further. Any such mechanism would need a high threshold for activation, 
with clear processes to ensure accountability for the decision. 
Heightened regulatory and supervisory intensity for activities that pose systemic risk 
is not out of step with international practice. Some jurisdictions are setting thresholds 
for defining systemically important institutions. The Dodd-Frank Act authorises the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council to issue rules to require prudential supervision of 
systemically important non-bank entities or FMI entities. 
                                                          
45  For example, see the proposals in Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2014, Assessment 
Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-Insurer Global Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions, consultative document, FSB, Basel. 
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The Inquiry seeks views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the following 
policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Establish a mechanism, such as designation by the relevant Minister on advice 
from the RBA or CFR, to adjust the prudential perimeter to apply heightened 
regulatory and supervisory intensity to institutions or activities that pose 
systemic risks.  
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas:  
• Is new legislation the most appropriate mechanism to adjust the prudential 
perimeter to respond to systemic risks, or could a more timely mechanism be of 
benefit? What alternative mechanisms could be used? 
• What accountability processes would be necessary to accompany any new 
mechanism? 
• What criteria could determine when an institution or activity was subject to 
heightened regulatory and supervisory intensity? 
Additional macroprudential powers 
APRA and the RBA have argued on a number of occasions that APRA’s existing 
toolset is adequate to undertake macroprudential supervision.46 APRA has the ability 
to vary its intensity of supervision, prudential standards and capital requirements 
through the economic cycle. Although APRA has not publicly stated under what 
circumstances it will use it, the counter-cyclical capital buffer enshrined in Basel III is 
also available. The RBA does not have specific macroprudential tools in the traditional 
sense, but it does extensively use public communications to address concerns and 
manage particular risks.  
                                                          
46  See Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) 2012, Macroprudential Analysis and Policy in the Australian Financial Stability Framework, 
APRA and RBA, Sydney; Ellis, L 2012, Macroprudential Policy: A Suite of Tools or a State of 
Mind?, speech to Paul Woolley Centre for Capital Market Dysfunctionality Annual 
Conference, 11 October, Sydney; and Edey, M 2012, Macroprudential Supervision and the Role of 
Central Banks, remarks to the Regional Policy Forum on Financial Stability and 
Macroprudential Supervision, 28 September, Beijing. 
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For two decades, Australia has effectively navigated systemic risk without the kinds of 
tools being introduced in some countries. Although there is no guarantee this will 
always be the case, Australia should be cautious regarding unproven tools while 
empirical evidence of their effectiveness remains limited. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Introduce specific macroprudential policy tools. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Are there specific macroprudential tools that Australia should adopt to manage 
systemic risk? 
• What agency or agencies should have these macroprudential tools? 
Stress testing 
In its recent Financial Sector Assessment Program, the IMF recommended that 
Australian regulators enhance their stress-testing capabilities. In particular, that APRA 
devotes more resources to stress testing and the RBA develops the capability to 
undertake in-house macroeconomic stress tests. 
A number of other jurisdictions make extensive use of stress testing. In some cases, 
such as in the United States, stress tests are a key input into supervision, helping to 
assess institutions’ compliance with prudential standards. Enhanced capabilities could 
aid APRA in supervising institutions, and assist both APRA and the RBA in 
monitoring systemic risk. Given the differences in their mandates and areas of focus, 
having both agencies conduct independent stress tests would provide a useful check 
and balance on the process. It would also encourage cross-agency discussion and 
deeper analysis to understand any differences in outcome. 
However, robust stress testing has a resource cost for both regulators and industry. 
During stress testing, industry participants are typically required to provide data or 
respond to questions — some large banks involved in United States and European 
Union stress tests reported up to 100 staff members being used in the process.47 Stress 
                                                          
47  Moody’s 2013, Stress Testing: European Edition, Risk Perspectives, vol. 1, September, Moody’s 
Corporation, New York. 
Post-GFC Regulatory Response – Stability 
3-31 
testing is likely to be on the lower end of the cost spectrum compared to other options 
for improving financial stability. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Australian regulators make greater use of stress testing with appropriate 
resourcing. 
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Box 5.3: A high-level scenario analysis 
The FSI Secretariat, in conjunction with the Treasury and the RBA, conducted a 
qualitative scenario analysis as a simple stress test. The test was a useful tool to 
examine systematically, at a high level, the effect of several hypothetical financial 
shocks on the financial system. It did not examine the robustness of individual 
institutions’ balance sheets to these shocks or the adequacy of capital. 
This work suggested that financial and economic shocks would have to be severe, 
and several would need to occur at once, to threaten the viability of the Australian 
financial system. This is similar to the conclusions made by APRA and the IMF in 
2012 when they performed their own stress tests of the banking system.48 
The exercise found: 
• A prolonged and pronounced deflation in housing prices would have a direct 
effect on the capital adequacy of the banking system, impairing the ability of 
banks to intermediate funds and leading to a large economic adjustment. Weaker 
economic outcomes could lead to a further deterioration of bank balance sheets, 
which would exacerbate already impaired bank lending conditions. 
• A severe shock to international financial markets that reduces or removes access 
to foreign funding for Australian financial institutions would sharply increase the 
interest rates on bank lending and significantly reduce bank lending across the 
economy. This would in part be offset by an easing in monetary policy. Weaker 
economic outcomes could increase non-performing loans and deteriorate banks’ 
asset quality, which would further increase the cost, and reduce the availability, 
of credit. 
• An offshore growth shock from a large trading partner would largely have an 
indirect effect on the financial system — weaker economic outcomes could lead 
to an increase in non-performing loans and a deterioration of bank balance 
sheets. The magnitude of the effect would depend largely on the degree to which 
financial imbalances had built up prior to the shock. 
 
                                                          
48  See the following publications: International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial 
System Stability Assessment, IMF Country Report No. 12/308, IMF, Washington DC, and 
Laker, J 2012, The Australian banking system under stress — again?, AB+F Randstad Leaders 
Lecture 2012, 8 November, Brisbane. 
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Box 5.3: A high-level scenario analysis (cont.) 
The scenarios considered mainly affected the financial system in two dimensions: 
through access to and management of liquidity and through compromising the 
capital base of the banks. However, many of the regulatory measures put in place 
since the North Atlantic financial crisis, as well as some of the measures and 
mechanisms financial institutions have implemented themselves, have served to 
increase the resilience of the financial system to shocks since the GFC.  
Implementation of international prudential 
frameworks 
Australia is an active member of many international policy and standard-setting 
bodies, including the FSB, BCBS and IAIS. Using these positions, Australia has been 
successful in influencing international standards to be broadly appropriate for the 
domestic environment. 
As a global benchmark, the Basel framework is not designed to the particular 
circumstances of any one country. It is designed to apply a common minimum to a 
broad range of countries with different financial systems. A number of submissions, 
including from APRA, note that Australia has decided on a stricter approach to 
calculating capital ratios than the Basel III baseline. Further, in the case of capital 
requirements and the liquidity coverage ratio, APRA is implementing changes faster 
than a number of other countries.  
Submissions raise three concerns, which are assessed in this section: 
1. More conservative capital definitions mean that Australian banks use more equity 
funding than overseas peers, placing Australian banks at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
2. Differences in capital definitions reduce transparency and make it difficult to 
compare capital ratios in Australia to those overseas. This can make Australian 
banks seem less sound than they really are. 
3. Faster implementation of Basel requirements puts Australian banks at a 
competitive disadvantage in overseas markets, until other jurisdictions complete 
their own implementation. 
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Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
Australia has implemented some aspects of global prudential frameworks earlier 
than a number of jurisdictions. It has also used national discretion in defining capital 
ratios. When combined with other aspects of the prudential framework and 
calculated on a consistent basis, Australian banks’ capital ratios (common equity 
tier 1) are around the middle of the range relative to other countries. However, 
differences such as those in definitions of capital do limit international 
comparability. 
Capital requirements 
Prudential frameworks have many different aspects, making it difficult to compare the 
relative strictness of one regime to another. Table 5.1 shows a number of these different 
settings for a variety of countries; in general, Australia is in line with the Basel 
framework minimum requirements, while a number of countries have higher 
requirements. On this basis, Australia’s overall framework does not seem to require 
excessive capital levels. 
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Submissions raise concerns that Australia’s approach to calculating capital ratios leads 
to Australian banks requiring higher levels of equity funding than international peers. 
In fact, banks’ actual capital ratios do not appear excessively high, including when 
compared to countries at a similar level of financial development (Chart 5.3). 
Chart 5.3: Global distribution of banks’ actual capital ratios(a) 
As at end June 2013 
 
(a) Calculated on a consistent basis across countries by the BCBS. The sample includes 102 Group 1 
banks - those with at least €3 billion in tier 1 capital and that are internationally active - from 21 BCBS 
countries. 
Source: BCBS. 
A recent BCBS review of Australia’s implementation of the Basel framework identified 
27 areas in which APRA’s implementation, taking advantage of national discretions, 
was more conservative than the Basel baseline.49 However, Australia was also less 
conservative than the baseline in several areas. Similar reviews for China, Brazil and 
Canada identified 17, 20 and 7 areas respectively that were more conservative.50 These 
are not the same areas as Australia (or each other), making comparison difficult. 
Switzerland and Singapore were ‘super equivalent’ to the Basel framework through 
setting higher capital ratios rather than through stricter capital definitions. 
Unfortunately, these BCBS reviews currently cover only a limited number of countries. 
                                                          
49  Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2014, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program 
(RCAP) Assessment of Basel III Regulations — Australia, BIS, Basel. 
50  Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2013, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program 
(RCAP) Assessment of Basel III Regulations — China, BIS, Basel, BIS 2013, Regulatory Consistency 
Assessment Program (RCAP) Assessment of Basel III Regulations in Brazil, BIS, Basel and BIS 
2014, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP) Assessment of Basel III Regulations — 
Canada, BIS, Basel. 
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Differences between capital ratios internationally are also driven by diversity in 
minimum capital requirements, leverage ratios, additional capital requirements for 
systemically important banks and regulator-imposed non-public capital requirements. 
Calculating what is required in Australia compared to other jurisdictions is therefore 
very difficult.  
The BCBS collects data on bank capital ratios on a consistent basis among its member 
countries. These data show that Australian banks are roughly ‘middle of the pack’ in 
terms of common equity tier 1 capital ratios when calculated on this basis. Given that 
banks in many countries are still raising capital to meet incoming Basel standards, 
Australia’s prudential framework does not seem to require excessive capital levels. 
International comparability 
Some submissions are concerned that calculation differences make Australian banks’ 
capital ratios appear lower than if they had been calculated under many other 
jurisdictions’ implementation of the Basel rules. The exact magnitude of this difference 
is uncertain. It will vary by balance sheet composition and the comparator jurisdiction. 
Table 5.2 shows how Australian bank common equity tier 1 capital ratios change when 
self-calculated in an ‘internationally harmonised’ fashion — essentially, trying to adopt 
the Basel framework with minimal discretionary changes. These self-calculated capital 
ratios are higher than those calculated by the BCBS (Chart 5.3), but still fall around the 
middle of the range relative to other countries. 
Table 5.2 Common equity tier 1 capital ratios 
In 2013 bank annual reports 
  APRA capital ratio  Self‐reported 
internationally 
harmonised capital 
ratio 
Difference 
ANZ 8.5% 10.8% 2.3% 
CBA 8.2% 11.0% 2.8% 
NAB 8.4% 10.3% 1.8% 
WBC 9.1% 11.6% 2.5% 
Memo: APRA 
submission 
8.3% 10.2% 1.9% 
Memo: CBA 
submission 
8.5% 11.4% 2.9% 
Sources: APRA submission to the Inquiry, CBA submission to FSI, bank annual reports. 
The difficulty in calculating consistent capital ratios lends weight to claims that 
international investors do not make such comparisons. The differences may be to the 
detriment of Australian banks, as they result in reported capital ratios appearing lower 
than if they had been calculated in some other countries. Although some Australian 
banks publish internationally harmonised ratios, as in Table 5.2, they argue that 
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investors are sceptical of their accuracy.51 In addition, where banks are issuing debt 
that contains ‘triggers’ based on their capital ratio, Australian banks may be seen to 
have less of a buffer above the trigger. This may raise the costs of issuing such 
instruments. 
Implementation schedule 
The Basel III capital ratio requirements will be fully implemented in Australia by the 
start of 2016, while the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) will start in full in 2015. This is 
sooner than in many other jurisdictions, which are phasing the new requirements in 
over a longer period. Submissions argue that implementing these requirements ahead 
of other countries places Australian banks at a competitive disadvantage during the 
transition. 
Australia is not the only jurisdiction adopting Basel III without the extended 
transitional phase-in period. Other countries with strong financial systems, including 
Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and some of the Nordic countries, are also requiring 
full compliance before the end of 2019, the allowable transition period. 
In addition, Australia’s major banks are well placed to meet the new capital 
requirements.52 This reflects both that Australian banks have been building up capital 
in anticipation of the incoming requirements, and that the capital requirements were 
not significantly higher than banks’ existing capital levels. Compared to some 
jurisdictions, such as particular European nations where post-GFC bank capitalisation 
was very low, Australia had less need to use extended phase-in periods.  
Early implementation can have a cost to the extent that it requires Australian banks to 
move to more expensive capital funding earlier than they might otherwise have and 
faster than their international peers. RBA Governor Stevens noted it is important to 
take advantage of the current good macroeconomic environment to build capital, as it 
will not last forever: “This is a reason to go faster, rather than slower, in accumulating 
capital to higher minima, while one can”.53 
                                                          
51  Internationally harmonised capital ratios aim to recalculate the banks’ capital ratio as if the 
bank were subject to the ‘baseline’ Basel rules (with no national discretion applied) or subject 
to the rules in another specific country. 
52  APRA 2013, ‘ADI Industry Risks’, APRA Insight, issue 2 notes that: “Having strengthened 
their capital positions over recent years in response to market expectations and in 
anticipation of higher Basel III requirements, all ADIs already meet this minimum 
requirement, with current CET1 ratios above 7 per cent”. 
53  Stevens, G 2014, Financial Regulation: Some Observations, speech to Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco’s Symposium on Asian Banking and Finance, 10 June, San Francisco. 
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For liquidity standards, Australia arguably does not need a phase-in period because of 
the Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF) that was introduced to account for the low 
levels of Government debt in Australia. The CLF effectively allows easier compliance 
with the LCR and is not available in most other countries. However, banks will be 
required to demonstrate to APRA that they have taken ‘all reasonable steps’ to meet 
the LCR through their own balance sheet management, before relying on the CLF for 
this purpose. Moreover, the majority of global internationally active banks already 
meet the LCR requirement. 
Policy options for consultation 
Calibrate the prudential framework 
The Inquiry considers it appropriate for Australia to maintain its compliance with 
global standards, such as the Basel framework for banking.54 There would be 
significant costs to Australia if it did not materially adopt the minimum standards set 
out in these agreements, including:  
• Australia’s reduced integration with the international financial system 
• Reduced ability to influence future global standards  
• Less international comparability 
• Australia being seen as more risky, potentially raising financial institutions’ 
funding costs 
• Opportunities for overseas regulators to impose more restrictive requirements on 
Australian financial institutions than at present, to compensate for a lack of 
regulatory comparability 
Historically, Australia has taken a stronger approach to financial stability than 
required under global standards. This contributed to the robustness of the Australian 
financial system during the GFC, relative to North Atlantic countries, and to an 
international reputation for a sound system. Since then, global efforts to improve 
financial stability have resulted in stronger frameworks and requirements in many 
other countries than was previously the case — and some increase in Australia’s 
requirements. 
                                                          
54  Australia may adopt international standards through Government commitments, legislation, 
domestic standard setting, and regulator rules and guidance. 
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Starting from the premise that, at a minimum, Australia’s prudential framework 
should be consistent with the global median, the Inquiry seeks stakeholder views on 
where Australia should aim to sit on the global financial stability spectrum given these 
global changes. 
At one end of the spectrum, Australia may be comfortable with where the global 
settings have settled and see no need to go beyond this standard for its prudential 
framework. At the other end, Australia may want to be above the global median, 
particularly where there are clear Australian policy reasons for lifting the bar; for 
example, Australia is a capital importing nation and a stronger system may help assure 
international investors that Australia is a safe and attractive investment destination. 
The weight of evidence suggests that having a more conservative approach to 
prudential requirements in the past has not placed Australian banks at a significant 
competitive disadvantage. 
• Historically, where the gap between Australia’s approach to capital and those in 
large economies such as the United States and United Kingdom was much greater, 
Australian banks were profitable. 
• To the extent that Australian banks are at a competitive disadvantage from being 
more conservative than the rest of the world, this should have decreased with 
Basel III, which closes the gap between requirements in Australia and those in 
several major markets. 
• Overseas bank branches operating in Australia do not comply with Australian 
capital requirements. Evidence does not suggest overseas branches are more 
competitive in Australia. 
In addition, a growing body of work suggests that the social costs to higher bank 
equity funding are smaller than is often presumed. The argument is broadly that better 
capitalised banks are less risky, lowering the cost of wholesale debt and deposit 
funding.55 Further, although equity may be more privately expensive to banks, this is 
affected by the different tax treatment of debt and equity funding.56 Thus, from 
society’s perspective, which accounts for the foregone tax revenue from debt funding, 
equity may not be so expensive. 
                                                          
55  See for example Admati, A and Helwig, M 2013, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with 
Banking and What to Do about It, Princeton Press, Princeton NJ, and Babihuga, R and 
Spaltro, M 2014, Bank Funding Costs for International Banks, IMF Working Paper WP/14/71, 
IMF, Washington DC. 
56  This difference is possibly less pronounced in Australia, however, due to the dividend 
imputation system — see the Funding chapter for further discussion. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Maintain the current calibration of Australia’s prudential framework. 
• Calibrate Australia’s prudential framework, in aggregate, to be more 
conservative than the global median. This does not mean that all individual 
aspects of the framework need to be more conservative. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
Is there any argument for calibrating Australia’s overall prudential framework to be 
less conservative than the global median? 
International comparability of Australia’s prudential requirements 
APRA’s approach to implementing parts of the Basel framework has been stricter than 
the international standards imply. This reflects a tailoring of the regulatory capital 
framework to, in APRA’s view, better reflect the capital adequacy of ADIs. The main 
differences are stronger definitions of capital and floors for loss given default (LGD) 
estimates for residential mortgage exposures under the internal ratings-based 
approach to credit risk. APRA does not include certain capital items allowed under 
Basel III that are not truly loss absorbing, as these were included to accommodate 
weak banking systems in some jurisdictions. Australia has imposed LGD floors as 
historical data on losses used to calculate risk weights may not reflect a true downturn, 
given Australia has not had a major recession in two decades.  
A number of submissions note that these differences can create difficulties for 
Australian banks; for example, making them appear less well capitalised than their 
international peers, even where there is no real difference. A lack of transparency 
could prove a disadvantage in funding markets, particularly where an instrument has 
a trigger based on a bank’s capital ratio. However, banks can and do publish 
internationally harmonised capital ratios to account for the difference. One might 
expect sophisticated international investors to be aware of differences in regulatory 
approaches.  
To avoid banks relying on ‘unofficial’ internationally harmonised capital ratios, which 
may not be seen as credible by international investors, robust, regulator-approved 
ratios could be published. APRA and industry are currently working to develop 
official reporting for this purpose. This would improve transparency at a relatively low 
cost. 
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A second option to improve transparency is to adopt the Basel framework for 
calculating prudential ratios, without national adjustment.57 APRA could then use its 
discretion to set the headline capital ratio (or other prudential tools) at the level it felt 
appropriate to achieve the desired level of system safety. Switzerland has taken this 
approach, setting a much higher headline capital ratio for its medium-sized and large 
banks.58 This option would also address banks’ concerns about capital ratio triggers in 
some types of debt instruments, such as where the debt instrument converts to equity 
when the official capital ratio falls below a specified threshold.  
There are difficulties with such an approach. First, there is no ‘standard’ Basel 
framework to work off— all countries have implemented the framework in different 
ways, and the framework includes scope for national discretion. Second, while it 
would be possible for APRA to reduce its use of national discretion, this may lead to 
rules that are less suited to Australia’s particular circumstances. Third, allowing banks 
to include items in capital calculations that APRA deems to be significantly more 
uncertain in value, or less loss-absorbing, than current capital would increase the 
riskiness of the system and penalise more prudent banks that choose to hold larger 
portions of high-quality capital. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Develop public reporting of regulator-endorsed internationally harmonised 
capital ratios with the specific objective of improving transparency. 
• Adopt an approach to calculating prudential ratios with a minimum of national 
discretion and calibrate system safety through the setting of headline 
requirements. 
 
                                                          
57  See, for example, CBA 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
58  Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2013, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme 
(RCAP): Assessment of Basel III regulations — Switzerland, BIS, Basel. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Would adopting a more internationally consistent approach to calculating capital 
ratios materially change Australian banks’ cost of accessing funding? 
• How would using minimal national discretion distinguish between prudent 
banks that hold capital as currently defined and those that rely on less loss 
absorbing capital? 
• How might APRA need to adjust minimum prudential requirements to ensure 
system safety is not altered if using minimal national discretion in calculating 
prudential ratios? 
Corporate governance 
Good governance is a vital part of any corporation, both within and beyond the 
financial sector. The culture of an organisation, its appetite and its approach to 
managing risk ultimately flow from the policies and practices set at the very top. The 
rules and requirements set by regulators and internally within the institution will only 
go so far; an organisation’s culture and risk appetite determine how an institution 
responds to the spirit of the requirements and circumstances that are not addressed by 
the rules. 
Equally, weak corporate governance can have severe repercussions. This is particularly 
true within the financial sector, where failures in governance and risk management can 
have an effect on the entire financial system and broader economy. Overseas, financial 
institution boards’ lack of understanding about the risks faced by their institutions, 
and an absence of robust governance frameworks through which they could monitor 
the risk-taking actions of management, were major contributors to the GFC.59 The 
significant effect of the GFC on economic growth, employment and the financial 
system in many countries underscores the importance of strong governance 
frameworks. 
                                                          
59  G30 2012, Towards Effective Governance of Financial Institutions, G30 Special Report, G30 
Working Group, Washington DC. 
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Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
To contribute to the effectiveness of the financial system, sound corporate 
governance requires clarity of the responsibilities and authority of boards and 
management. There are differences in the duties and requirements of governing 
bodies for different types of financial institutions and, within institutions, 
substantial regulator focus on boards has confused the delineation between the role 
of the board and that of management.  
Importance in the financial industry 
Reflecting the importance of corporate governance to all industries, standards and 
requirements are placed on company boards and management from several sources. 
The Corporations Act 2001 places a common set of requirements on all corporates to 
provide a baseline for corporate governance, including that the primary duty of the 
board is to the company. Listed entities are also subject to ASX’s corporate governance 
standards, which aim to promote accountability to shareholders and maintain the 
integrity of the market. The latter incorporate disclosure standards, including risk 
management practices that assist shareholders and creditors assessing the risk appetite 
and practices of the company. 
In the financial industry, the relevant prudential Acts provide that insurer directors 
and superannuation fund trustees place the interests of policyholders and members 
ahead of those of shareholders. There are no equivalent provisions for ADIs under the 
Banking Act 1959. Duties of governing bodies therefore differ across types of financial 
institutions. The Inquiry invites further information from stakeholders on whether the 
diversity of duties of governing bodies in different parts of the financial industry is 
appropriate.  
Corporate governance prudential standards, set by APRA, are common for ADIs and 
insurers. These place requirements on the structure of boards and the independence of 
directors. The respective standards for superannuation do not have structure or 
independence requirements but do cover conflicts of interest. In 2013, the Government 
released a consultation paper on how best to ensure an appropriate provision for 
independent directors on superannuation trustee boards.60 This included how 
independence could be defined and the optimal board structure. 
                                                          
60  Commonwealth of Australian 2013, Better regulation and governance, enhanced transparency and 
improved competition in superannuation, Discussion paper, Canberra. 
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There is a sound public policy rationale for requirements and oversight in the financial 
sector of corporate governance generally, and risk management specifically.61 A 
function of the financial sector is to transform and manage financial risk. This can 
involve higher use of leverage, increasing the risk of stakeholders exposed to poor risk 
management. Appropriate frameworks, which enable institutions to understand and 
manage often complex risks, are crucial. Adequate reporting of these frameworks is 
important in promoting market discipline and allowing investors to make informed 
choices about the risks they take on.  
Understanding and managing risk are particularly important, as excessive risk taking 
has the potential to disrupt the entire financial system and economy. This was 
evidenced during the GFC, demonstrating that, in the absence of good corporate 
governance, the benefits of appropriate Government interventions can be high.  
Internationally, where the impact of the GFC was greatest, regulators have taken a 
strong approach to corporate governance in financial institutions. In a number of cases, 
other jurisdictions have placed significantly more onerous requirements on 
management and boards than in Australia. For example, in the United States, financial 
institutions are prevented from making capital distributions if stress-tests reveal 
weaknesses; in New Zealand the regulator can bring criminal cases against directors in 
specific circumstances, including misleading disclosures in offer documents; and in 
Europe, there are significant remuneration controls. 
The role of boards and management 
Ultimately, the board is accountable for the actions of the institution. Good corporate 
governance across all industries involves clear and distinct duties performed by the 
board and senior management. A board’s obligations are: overseeing, directing and 
monitoring the performance of the company; approving and overseeing strategic 
policies and frameworks, including for risk management; and satisfying itself that such 
policies and frameworks are effective. Management is responsible for operational 
day-to-day activities and implementing strategic policies and frameworks. Generally, 
boards oversee what management implements. In the Inquiry’s view, although there is 
a public policy case for specific corporate governance requirements on financial 
institutions, there is no case for regulation to alter the delineation of responsibilities 
between boards and management. 
A number of submissions raise concerns that APRA’s requirements have become too 
prescriptive and do not respect the appropriate division between the responsibilities of 
the board and those of management. This includes where supervisory matters are 
                                                          
61  Tarullo, D 2014, Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation, remarks at the Association of 
American Law Schools 2014 Midyear Meeting, 9 June, Washington DC. 
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referred by APRA directly to the board, which is often taken to imply the board itself 
must take responsive action. Many industry participants believe the requirements 
imply an excessive level of managerial ownership by the board and, in some cases, 
overstate the board’s influence. Submissions argue that this diminishes boards’ ability 
to focus on governance and strategic direction, hampering their capacity to perform 
their core functions. 
This is not unique to Australia. Speaking in a United States context, Federal Reserve 
Governor Tarullo noted: 
“But it has perhaps become a little too reflexive on the part of regulators to jump from 
the observation that a regulation is important to the conclusion that the board must 
certify compliance through its own processes. We should probably be somewhat more 
selective in creating the regulatory checklist for board compliance and regular 
consideration”.62 
Submissions and consultation also revealed discontent with the increased management 
time and attention on governance and regulatory matters that require a number of 
levels of review — including independent reviews requiring the appointment of 
external consultants — adding to the cost of compliance. 
Given the breadth of concern, the Inquiry invites further information from 
stakeholders on where they specifically believe corporate governance requirements 
unduly place managerial responsibilities on boards. Consultation to date suggests that 
at least part of the issue appears to be uncertainty about APRA’s expectations of how 
boards need to meet governance requirements.  
Remuneration 
Remuneration structures and policies are a specific aspect of corporate governance that 
can materially affect the risks taken by the institution. In the lead-up to the GFC, 
compensation practices around the world contributed to a culture of excessive risk 
taking within firms, as short-term gains were rewarded with little regard for the 
longer-term risks.63 On the cause of the crisis, Adair Turner concluded that 
“inappropriate incentive structures played a role in encouraging behaviour which 
                                                          
62  Tarullo, D 2014, Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation, Remarks to Association of 
American Law Schools Midyear Meeting, 9 June, Washington DC. 
63  See for example Blinder, A 2009, ‘Crazy Compensation and the Crisis’, The Wall Street Journal, 
28 Mayand Rajan, R 2008, ‘Bankers’ pay is deeply flawed’, Financial Times, 9 January. 
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contributed to the financial crisis” although he also noted that they likely made a 
smaller contribution than other factors.64 
The FSB has produced principles to address risk created by remuneration structures. 
Broadly, these involve linking compensation to the long-term performance of 
investments to discourage excessive short-term risk taking. Overseas regulators have 
taken a variety of approaches, ranging from high-level principles on how 
remuneration should be set — including the ability to ‘claw back’ past bonuses — 
through to regulator approval for bonuses paid. 
APRA considers remuneration in its supervision of financial institutions. To date, 
Australia has taken a principles-based approach to remuneration, requiring financial 
institutions to align incentives with long-term performance. This appears appropriate 
in the Australian context, where there have been fewer financial failures and where 
remuneration packages are more contained than in some other countries.  
The more prescriptive approach to remuneration policy taken in some jurisdictions, 
such as the regulator approving senior management bonuses, is unlikely to be 
appropriate for Australia. It presupposes that the regulator is better placed to assess 
the performance of individuals than the institution itself, or that the regulator has 
specific capacity in this regard. It also has challenges, such as the possibility the 
regulator will be overly risk averse due to public scrutiny and popular political 
pressure to lower bonuses. This could lower risk taking below an efficient level. 
Policy options for consultation 
Requirements on boards 
Submissions are critical that the current regulatory and supervisory system does not 
delineate appropriately between the role of boards and management. 
Consultations suggest that part of this may reflect a lack of understanding about 
APRA’s expectations of boards. Reflecting a desire to not be in breach of the 
requirements, this has resulted in disproportionate compliance measures by a number 
of institutions. According to APRA, its standards do not require boards to 
micro-manage the organisation. Instead, they aim to ensure boards implement 
appropriate policies and frameworks, particularly relating to risk, and are satisfied that 
these policies are effective. In addition, correspondence is often addressed to boards 
with the intention of ensuring that they are aware of APRA’s concerns and ensure that 
                                                          
64  Turner, A 2009, The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis, Financial 
Services Authority, London. 
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management addresses them, not for the board’s direct action. If this is the case, APRA 
should clarify its expectation of boards to dispel misconceptions. The Inquiry notes 
that actions are already underway in this regard.65 This should assist with concerns in 
this area. 
A further step would be for regulators to review their frameworks for corporate 
governance requirements, potentially with input from independent advice.66 A review 
would aim to determine whether requirements imposed upon boards are consistent 
with the fundamental obligations of a company director. This could be used to identify 
areas where management could more appropriately undertake such obligations. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Review prudential requirements on boards to ensure they do not draw boards 
into operational matters. 
• Regulators continue to clarify their expectations on the role of boards. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area:  
Is it appropriate for directors in different parts of the financial system to have 
different duties? For example, differences between the duties of directors of banks 
and insurers and trustees of superannuation funds. Who should directors’ primary 
duty be to? 
 
                                                          
65  See Littrell, C 2014, Letter to all CEOs of ADIs, general insurers and life companies, 8 May. 
66  CBA 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 93. 
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 6: Consumer outcomes 
The financial system should meet the financial needs of Australians. Consumer 
outcomes can be enhanced by supporting effective competition in the system, which 
can drive lower prices and encourage innovation. Further, the regulatory framework 
of the Australian financial system is designed to protect consumers through 
prudential regulation, generic consumer regulation, and licensing and conduct 
obligations. Fundamental to the financial system operating effectively is the 
appropriate allocation of risk between participants. Consumers, like other 
participants, must take responsibility for both the risk and reward of their financial 
decisions. 
The Inquiry has made the following observations about consumer outcomes in the 
financial system: 
• The current disclosure regime produces complex and lengthy documents that 
often do not enhance consumer understanding of financial products and services, 
and impose significant costs on industry participants. 
• Affordable quality financial advice can bring significant benefits for consumers. 
Improving the standards of adviser competence and removing the impact of 
conflicted remuneration can improve the quality of advice. Comprehensive 
financial advice can be costly, and there is consumer demand for lower-cost 
scaled advice. 
• Technological developments have the potential to reduce insurance pooling. This 
will reduce premiums for some consumers; however, others will face increased 
premiums, or be excluded from access to insurance. Underinsurance may occur 
for a number of reasons including personal choice, behavioural biases, 
affordability, and lack of adequate information or advice on the level of 
insurance needed. 
Context 
This chapter focuses on the issues confronting retail consumers (individuals and 
households) when they engage with the financial sector. Some of the issues discussed 
are also relevant to many small businesses. In some cases, small businesses are similar 
to retail consumers in their level of sophistication and bargaining power. This chapter 
specifically discusses loans for small businesses, and the Funding chapter considers the 
funding needs of businesses in general. 
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To meet consumer needs, the Inquiry considers the financial system should deliver 
five outcomes:1 
1. Consumers should have access to products and services that help them meet their 
individual financial needs. Consumers need to be able to make and receive 
payments, borrow, invest and manage risk. Products should be designed to meet 
the needs of consumers. 
2. Consumers should have access to the information, advice and education necessary 
to make effective decisions about products and services that help them meet their 
financial needs. Informed consumers can better stimulate effective competition, 
driving system efficiency. 
3. Consumers should have confidence and trust in the financial system and be able to 
expect fair treatment. Effective regulation that minimises misconduct and promotes 
fair outcomes will drive confidence and trust in the financial system. 
4. Financial services and products should meet the purposes for which they are sold. 
Products and services should be accurately described, and perform as they are 
described, especially in the trade-off between risk and return.  
5. Consumers should have access to timely, low-cost and efficient dispute resolution 
and remedies when problems arise. Effective avenues for redress provide access to 
justice for consumers and promote confidence and trust in the system. 
In this chapter, consumer outcomes will be assessed against these five outcomes.  
Consumer protection framework in financial services 
Prudential regulation by APRA provides an important mechanism for protecting 
depositors, insurance policyholders and superannuation fund members, as discussed 
in the Stability chapter. Prudential regulation is a fundamental consumer protection 
mechanism, which operates as a preventative measure to promote sustainable financial 
institutions that can deliver on their financial promises. 
                                                          
1  Similar high-level principles were endorsed by the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors in 2011, <www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/48892010.pdf>. In addition 
to the outcomes discussed in this chapter, these principles recognise the importance of 
competition in driving consumer outcomes, as discussed in the Competition chapter, and the 
protection of consumer data and privacy, discussed in the Technology chapter. 
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The framework for non-prudential regulation of financial services consists of two tiers:  
1. Generic consumer regulation contained in the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act), which covers all financial products and services, 
including credit. The provisions of the ASIC Act reflect the relevant provisions of 
the Australian Consumer Law and give ASIC responsibility for administering these 
provisions. 
2. Industry-specific consumer regulation, which includes the licensing, conduct and 
disclosure regimes as set out in the Corporations Act 2001 and the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009. 
This framework reflects the Wallis Inquiry’s view that ASIC should have exclusive 
responsibility for consumer protection (outside prudential regulation) in the financial 
sector. Industry-specific consumer regulation offers the benefit of preventing some 
consumer detriment on an ex-ante basis through licensing and positive conduct 
obligations, rather than simply providing remedies for dealing with misconduct after it 
has emerged. 
There is a clear requirement for a balanced and effective consumer protection 
framework, including industry-specific consumer regulation in the financial sector. 
This is due to the: complexity of financial products; limitations of consumer financial 
literacy and engagement; significant (and often long-term) consequences of poor 
financial decisions; and propensity for consumer decision making to be biased or 
influenced by behavioural factors. Figure 6.1 shows the consumer protection regime in 
Australia as currently administered by ASIC. 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
3-52 
Figure 6.1: The regulatory framework for consumer protection in financial 
services (non-prudential) 
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The Financial Services Reform (FSR) framework 
The Wallis Inquiry intended the FSR framework to apply across the financial services 
industry,2 to both prudentially regulated and non-prudentially regulated entities. It 
was concerned about the impact of fragmented regulation on an industry that was 
consolidating across regulatory boundaries — and where product distinctions were 
blurring. 
Since the FSR framework was introduced in 2001, changes have been made to the 
consumer protection regime, including: 
• Ongoing attempts to improve the quality and usefulness of disclosure documents3 
• Introducing the financial claims scheme (FCS) to protect depositors of authorised 
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) and policyholders of general insurance 
companies from potential losses, should these institutions fail4 
• Adding more sector-specific rules and exemptions through legislation, regulations, 
and ASIC’s exemption and modification powers 
The National Consumer Credit framework 
In 2010, the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (NCCP Act) commenced, 
which includes the National Credit Code (NCC) as Schedule 1 to the Act. The NCCP 
Act replaced the previous state-based consumer credit codes and the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code. The NCCP Act, which is administered by ASIC, introduced 
licensing and responsible lending obligations where credit or credit assistance is 
provided for personal, domestic and household purposes and also for residential 
investment loans. Submissions support the introduction of this framework, saying it 
has improved lending and mortgage broking practices. 
In 2013, the NCCP Act was amended to introduce enhanced financial hardship rules, 
additional obligations on small amount, or ‘payday’, lenders and interest rate caps on 
all loans where the credit provider is not an ADI. 
                                                          
2  Although significant carve-outs were introduced for basic deposit products and basic 
insurance products. 
3  For example, the Government recently introduced shorter product disclosure statements for 
superannuation, margin lending products and simple managed investment products 
4  Note that the Financial Claims Scheme is discussed separately in the Stability chapter. 
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Assessing the regulatory framework 
The regulatory framework relies on effective enforcement by the regulator. In some 
cases, the current framework may not need substantial change. Instead, consumer 
outcomes may be improved through better or more intensive supervision or 
enforcement of existing rules. Enforcement and the adequacy of penalties are 
discussed in the Regulatory architecture chapter. Further, in some cases, industry may be 
able to play a greater role in improving consumer outcomes. Greater supervision, more 
effective enforcement and/or industry self-regulation may be appropriate alternatives 
to further regulation, which may reduce innovation and competition or result in leave 
some consumer needs partially or wholly unmet.5 
Disclosure 
To make decisions about financial products and services, consumers will collect 
information from many sources and may be influenced by many factors, but they also 
need access to accurate information from product issuers. The format of information 
may influence the degree to which consumers can effectively use the information.  
The Wallis Inquiry’s approach to consumer regulation was based primarily on 
disclosure. It did not restrict either the design of financial products or the type of 
financial products that could be marketed to retail clients. The focus of consumer 
protection was on regulating disclosure rather than products themselves. The 
disclosure regime was implemented as a principles-based approach to allow maximum 
flexibility for product issuers. However, it has subsequently been driven by an 
industry culture of legal compliance, rather than a focus on how best to inform 
consumers. This has resulted in lengthy and complex documents, rather than short, 
targeted documents that highlight product features, risks and rewards.  
Although disclosure is an important part of the regulatory regime for providing 
financial products and services, alone it has not been sufficient to enable consumers to 
make informed decisions and consistently purchase financial products and services 
that meet their needs. Consumers are often disengaged and do not invest the time — 
and some consumers also lack the financial literacy skills — to understand disclosure 
documents. Disclosure has also been costly for industry. These problems remain 
despite numerous efforts to improve the regime.
                                                          
5  Following the implementation of the Retail Distribution Review in the UK, a number of 
major UK banks stopped providing wealth management advice to those with only moderate 
amounts to invest. See also Cass Consulting, City University, Cass Business School, 2013, 
The impact of the RDR on the UK’s market for financial advice, challenge and opportunity, London. 
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Disclosure for financial products and services is important for a range of participants:  
• Consumers — helping them make informed, efficient choices by understanding the 
features of a product, whether it is suitable for purpose, its terms and conditions, its 
risk and price, and any conflicts of interest involving the provider. Disclosure is 
designed to minimise information asymmetry. Informed consumers can also drive 
competition between providers. 
• Intermediaries (financial advisers, analysts, dealers, comparators and mortgage 
brokers) — helping them understand the detailed features of a product and assess 
its suitability for particular clients, and enabling comparison between products. 
• Financial product and service providers — defining the product or service they are 
providing or advising on, allocating risk, and defining the legal terms and 
conditions of the product or service, which can be relied on in case of a dispute. 
Although submissions recognise that disclosure has a role to play, many argue that it 
has not always been effective at informing consumers about the features and risks of 
financial products. There was no strong proposal for reviewing the prospectus regime 
in submissions. The Inquiry has therefore focused on the product disclosure statement 
(PDS) and credit disclosure regimes. 
Current disclosure obligations 
The current regulatory regime requires all financial services licensees (and their 
authorised representatives) to give consumers information about their services via a 
Financial Services Guide (FSG), while personal advice must be documented through a 
Statement of Advice (SOA). 
Financial product issuers are required to prepare a PDS covering the product’s 
characteristics, risks and fee structure. PDSs were intended to provide concise and 
directed information to consumers, as compared with the more principles-based, 
open-ended prospectus requirements that continue to apply to securities and 
debentures.6 In common with prospectuses, PDSs are not approved by the regulator.7 
Investment product issuers are also subject to ongoing disclosure and periodic 
reporting requirements. 
Licensees under the consumer credit framework must give consumers a Credit Guide, 
setting out their services and costs (similar to an FSG). Licensees have to provide key 
fact sheets for home loans and credit cards, and for credit products must disclose 
                                                          
6  Which includes shares, company issued options, finance company debentures, bonds, 
preference shares and convertible securities. 
7  Although ASIC can issue a stop order when problems with a proposed financial product 
have been brought to its attention. 
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key information in a financial table in the contract document, with more limited 
disclosure requirements in relation to consumer leases. 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
The current disclosure regime produces complex and lengthy documents that often 
do not enhance consumer understanding of financial products and services, and 
impose significant costs on industry participants. 
Disclosure is important in the financial system; however, it is not always effective in 
meeting its objectives. 
• Although disclosure can be an effective regulatory tool, it is currently applied in 
many instances where it may not be the best tool to overcome a particular market 
problem. For example, disclosure has not been effective in addressing conflicts of 
interest. 
• Despite the range of prescribed disclosure documents provided to retail consumers, 
many do not easily assimilate information about product information, risks, 
product features or conflicts. A number of research projects into consumer 
understanding of disclosure documentation have concluded that documents are 
long and complex and consumer understanding is poor.8 In one study, 50 per cent 
of consumers found the PDS to be too long and over 50 per cent thought there was 
too much jargon.9 Effective disclosure documents should enable consumers to 
easily locate and understand the information they need to make a decision.  
                                                          
8  O’Shea, P 2010, Simplification of Disclosure Regulation for the Consumer Credit Code: Empirical 
Research and Redesign — Final Report, Uniquest, Queensland; Wallis Consulting Group 2008, 
Report of Findings of Qualitative Research into Effective Disclosure (Stage II); Access 
Economics 2008, Factors Affecting the Drafting of Product Disclosure Statements, Access 
Economics Pty Limited for the Treasury; Susan Bell Research 2008, The Provision of Consumer 
Research Regarding Financial Product Disclosure Documents, Financial Services Working Group, 
Forestville, NSW. Note that significant changes have occurred since some of these reports 
were prepared. Also refer: Ben-Shahar, O and Schneider, C 2014, More than you wanted to 
know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
9  Susan Bell Research 2008, The Provision of Consumer Research Regarding Financial Product 
Disclosure Documents, Financial Services Working Group, Forestville, NSW. Note that some 
improvements have been made to disclosure documents since this study. A recent study into 
the sale of consumer credit insurance found that over half of consumers did not read the 
policy. The consumers who did not read the policy document cited a number of reasons for 
not doing so, including literacy issues, language barriers, time demands, and the expectation 
that the document would be long and complex. 
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Factors that prevent disclosure from enabling informed consumer decision making 
include: 
• Disengagement — many consumers are disengaged from their financial affairs and 
decisions, due to time or motivation, and do not read disclosure documents. 
• Complexity — disclosure documents are typically long and complex for most 
consumers. They contain large amounts of information that most consumers 
consider irrelevant. This makes it difficult for consumers to compare products, 
understand risks and make informed decisions.10 However, attempts to make 
disclosure documents shorter risk the information becoming oversimplified or 
generalised, which may make consumers overconfident about their understanding 
of a product and its risks. 
• Consumer behaviour — research in behavioural economics shows consumers have 
cognitive biases that can lead to poor financial decisions.11 
• Supply-side conflicts and other issues — disclosure alone is unlikely to correct the 
effect of broader market structures and conflicts that drive product development or 
distribution practices, especially where the interests of issuers and distributors are 
fundamentally misaligned with those of investors. 
• Financial literacy — many consumers lack the literacy to understand disclosure 
documents. Evidence has emerged showing deep deficiencies in financial literacy.12 
Submissions state that disclosure requirements impose significant costs on industry 
and that industry often takes a compliance mentality to producing disclosure 
documents. In its submission, Westpac states:  
“[T]raditional disclosure regimes are heavily process-based in terms of both the composition of 
disclosure information and the dissemination of that information to consumers, because each of 
these features of the regime are subject to relatively inflexible statutory mandates. This can 
generate a tick-the-box mentality towards compliance with those mandatory requirements on 
the part of financial products and services providers”.13 
In some areas, the regulatory regime has already moved to address some of the issues 
raised above with shorter and more focused disclosures. For example, the shorter PDS 
                                                          
10  Access Economics 2008, Factors Affecting the Drafting of Product Disclosure Statements, Access 
Economics Pty Limited for the Treasury, Canberra. 
11  See Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, Report 230: Financial 
literacy and behavioural change, Sydney; and UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 2013, 
Applying behavioural change at the Financial Conduct Authority, FCA, London. 
12  ANZ 2011, Survey of Adult Financial Literacy in Australia, ANZ, Sydney. 
13  Westpac 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 101. 
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regime mandates tailored, prescriptive disclosure for a limited number of products, 
including superannuation products, simple managed investment schemes and margin 
loans.14 Some submissions argue that the new shorter PDS regime has not resulted in 
significant consumer benefits to date.  
In many areas, regulation has moved away from relying on simple disclosure. The 
Government has also intervened in some areas of product design and marketing. For 
example, in the area of superannuation, the Government has mandated detailed design 
requirements for MySuper products. Other examples include the Insurance Contracts 
Act and the ban on unfair contract terms.  
The design of credit products has been regulated for a considerable time. The previous 
state and territory Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) contained prescriptive 
requirements relating to interest charges and early payout amounts. Recent 
amendments to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 have further regulated 
the design of reverse mortgages and small amount credit contracts. 
Further attempts can be made to improve the effectiveness of disclosure. Alternatively, 
it may be possible to remove some disclosure requirements where they have proven 
ineffective and adopt alternative approaches. Such alternatives could include: 
• Regulating product features 
• Introducing more default product designs, similar to the MySuper default 
superannuation funds 
• Subjecting product issuers to distribution requirements to promote provision of 
suitable products to consumers 
• Giving ASIC product intervention powers  
Policy options for consultation 
Submissions suggest that disclosure should only be seen as part of a more flexible 
framework to inform consumers in their financial decision making.  
                                                          
14  The shorter PDS regime for simple managed investment schemes and superannuation 
products was introduced in the Corporations Amendment Regulations 2010 (No.5) following the 
FSR Refinements Process. See Commonwealth of Australia 2005 Refinements to Financial 
Services Regulation: Proposals Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. The margin 
lending shorter disclosure was introduced as part of the credit reforms in 2010. 
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Improving disclosure 
One approach is to supplement the existing disclosure regime with mechanisms to 
enhance consumer understanding of product information. Options include: 
• Layered disclosure — place less reliance on long hard-copy documents and move 
to make layers of disclosure available to consumers. This could include taking 
forward the recent changes to mandate hard-copy key facts documents across all 
product segments, and providing different information at important points in time. 
Technology can also be used to provide disclosure more effectively at points in time 
most relevant to the consumer’s need. 
• Better information presentation — improve disclosure through greater use of 
shorter disclosure documents, plain English and graphics, and by breaking down 
complex information to improve consumer understanding. In particular, 
information about fees and charges, risk profiles, term of product, unusual terms, 
features or exclusions. 
• Risk profile disclosure — improve consumers’ ability to understand risk. The 
recent introduction of the MySuper product dashboard is intended to provide 
consumers with important information about MySuper products, and for this 
information to be presented in a standardised manner to allow products to be easily 
compared, so consumers can make more informed choices.15 
• Online comparators and choice engines — place more reliance on making financial 
product and service information more accessible to consumers, including 
information brought together by third-party providers through online tools and 
comparators. The growth of these services will be facilitated by better access to 
data, both about financial products and about consumers’ behaviour.16 
                                                          
15  For MySuper products, the dashboard requirements took effect on 31 December 2013 and for 
Choice investment options (non-default), the dashboard provisions are scheduled to take 
effect from 1 July 2014. The product dashboard needs to display the level of risk for each 
product in accordance with a standard risk measure. Risk must be labelled in terms of the 
anticipated number of years of negative returns for the product over 20 years, with each 
number corresponding to a risk description that ranges from very low to very high. See 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013, Rep 378: Consumer testing of the 
MySuper product dashboard, ASIC, Sydney. 
16  The UK midata project works with businesses to give consumers better access to electronic 
personal data that companies hold about them. Midata aims to get more private sector 
businesses to release personal data to consumers electronically, make sure consumers can 
access their own data securely, and encourage businesses to develop applications that will 
help consumers make effective use of their data. See also Thaler, R and Tucker, W 2013, 
‘Smarter information, smarter consumers’, Harvard Business Review, Jan–Feb, pages 47–54. 
The trade-off is the risk of imperfect data and embedded assumptions for comparison 
websites and calculators.  
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Internationally, governments and regulators are looking at ways that data and 
choice engines can be used to empower consumer decision making and drive 
competition.17 
• Financial literacy — many stakeholders have expressed the importance of 
supporting and implementing financial literacy strategies that may assist 
consumers to make more informed financial decisions using the information 
available to them.18 However, studies are inconclusive about the extent to which 
financial literacy strategies have been able to improve consumer decision making in 
relation to financial services. Although the Inquiry considers that financial literacy 
strategies are important, alone they are not sufficient to ensure adequate consumer 
outcomes. 
Regulation of financial product features 
The alternative to supplementing the current disclosure regime is moving towards a 
more flexible regulatory toolkit. Strategic, targeted regulation of product features may 
be appropriate in cases where certain features are clearly detrimental to consumers or 
frequently abused; for example, features that inhibit demand-side competition. 
Examples of where this approach has been used are banning early exit fees from home 
loans and introducing caps on interest rates for credit contracts. However, extending 
product regulation in this way may have the potential to stifle innovation and limit 
competition. Another option is to implement further measures that shift responsibility 
for assessing the suitability of products from the consumer to the product issuer. 
However, any substantial shift in the regulatory regime would require compelling 
evidence to support it. 
Default product design 
Another option is to move towards mandated product design, as has happened with 
MySuper and with credit products under the NCCP Act. The impact of using default 
products can be substantial, as eight years after Super Choice came into effect, 
                                                          
17  The type of data that might be used includes data personal to the consumer (for example, 
patterns of usage) and data relevant to specific products or providers.  
18  In Australia, ASIC shares responsibility for implementing the National Financial Literacy 
Strategy with the business, community, government and education sectors. ASIC’s financial 
literacy work includes providing tools and resources to the general public and specific 
groups in the Australian community. For example, ASIC’s MoneySmart website is an 
important channel through which ASIC delivers information and tools to consumers. See 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, MoneySmart, ASIC, Sydney, viewed 
24 June 2014, <www.moneysmart.gov.au>. However, note that the recent Commission of 
Audit recommended that ASIC’s financial literacy functions should cease.  
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69 per cent of members were still in a fund they ‘chose’ by default.19 Superannuation 
defaults are discussed further in the Retirement income chapter. 
Suitability of financial products 
Product issuers could be subject to more positive obligations with respect to the 
suitability of their products for retail clients. Credit providers and credit intermediaries 
are already subject to an obligation that the product be ‘not unsuitable’ for the 
consumer. Financial advisers are required to comply with a ‘best interests’ test and 
comply with related obligations. A product issuer could be required to state the 
particular classes of consumers for whom the product is suitable and for whom the 
product is unsuitable, and the potential risks of purchasing/investing in the product. 
Alternatively the issuer could be required to determine that the product is suitable for 
a particular individual.20 
Product intervention powers 
In the United Kingdom, the regulator has been given a number of temporary product 
intervention powers to address specific issues.21 It will also periodically review 
financial services industry sectors to examine how products are developed and the 
governance standards in place to ensure fairness to consumers. 
ASIC could be given the ability to prescribe the marketing terminology used for 
complex or more risky products. For example, 2013 ASIC research indicated that 
consumers often misunderstand the terms ‘capital protected’ and ‘capital guaranteed’. 
Given capital protected structured products may involve significant potential for 
investors to lose money due to failure of the guarantor, this labelling may distract 
consumers from investigating the underlying risks and risk/return profile of the 
product.22 
ASIC could also be given the power to ban products or product features. However, the 
challenge with this type of approach is ensuring regulator accountability. It would 
                                                          
19  Investment Trends 2013, Member Sentiment and Communications Report, June. Note: Based on a 
survey of 9,607 Australians with superannuation. 
20  European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 April 2014 (EU), No 1093/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Financial Instruments, Article 25 
Paragraph 3, states: “Member States shall ensure that where an investment firm provides 
investment advice recommending a package of services or products bundled pursuant to 
Article 24(11), the overall bundled package is suitable”. 
21  See Financial Services Authority 2013, The FCA’s use of temporary product intervention rules, 
Policy Statement PS13/3, FSA, London. 
22  Refer Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Report 340: ‘Capital 
protected’ and ‘capital guaranteed’ retail structured products, ASIC, Sydney and ASIC 2013, Report 
341: Retail investor research into structured ‘capital protected and ‘capital guaranteed’ investments, 
Sydney (which both update and supplement ASIC 2010, Report 201: Review of disclosure for 
capital protected products and retail structured or derivative products, ASIC, Sydney). 
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only be appropriate if the regulator could demonstrate that a significant number of 
consumers are being caused significant detriment. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Improve the current disclosure requirements using mechanisms to enhance 
consumer understanding, including layered disclosure, risk profile disclosure 
and online comparators. 
• Remove disclosure requirements that have proven ineffective and facilitate new 
ways of providing information to consumers, including using technology and 
electronic delivery. 
• Subject product issuers to a range of product design requirements, such as 
targeted regulation of product features and distribution requirements to promote 
provision of suitable products to consumers.  
• Provide ASIC with additional powers such as: 
– Product intervention powers to prescribe marketing terminology for complex 
or more risky products. 
– A power to temporarily ban products where there is significant likelihood of 
detriment to consumers. 
• Consider a move towards more default products with simple features and fee 
structures. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Do similar issues in relation to the PDS disclosure regime apply to prospectuses, 
and is there a need to review prospectus requirements? 
• What evidence is there on the effectiveness of financial literacy strategies in 
enhancing consumer confidence and decision making at particular points in 
time, and in achieving increasing literacy over the long term? 
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Financial advice 
Submissions highlight the critical role that financial advice can play for consumers, by 
providing guidance with financial planning, debt management, insurance and product 
recommendations. Given mandated superannuation investment, and the fact that 
increasing numbers of consumers are entering retirement with substantial 
superannuation investments, as well as the complexity of some financial products, 
financial advice is becoming increasingly important. 
The main issue with financial advice is variability in its quality. In addition, many 
consumers have difficulty assessing the quality of advice they are receiving and 
understanding the risks and rewards inherent in particular products. Access to 
affordable advice for consumers is also an issue, although lower-cost advice still needs 
to be of reasonable quality to provide a benefit. 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
Affordable, quality financial advice can bring significant benefits for consumers. 
Improving standards of adviser competence and removing the impact of conflicted 
remuneration can improve the quality of advice. Comprehensive financial advice 
can be costly, and there is consumer demand for lower-cost scaled advice. 
Regulation of financial advice 
Financial advice is regulated under the Corporations Act.23 Financial advice is defined 
as a recommendation or statement of opinion intended to influence a consumer’s 
decision. There are two types of financial advice: general and personal. Personal advice 
is provided if the adviser has (or could reasonably be expected to have) considered a 
person’s objectives, financial situation or needs. All other advice is general advice. 
Factual information about financial products is not defined as advice. The regulation of 
financial advice and information is described in Figure 6.2. 
Licensed financial advisers are subject to an overall obligation to be “efficient, honest 
and fair” and to manage conflicts of interest. Licensees must ensure representatives are 
                                                          
23  Credit assistance (such as mortgage broking/advice) is covered by the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009. Responsible lending requires a consideration of the personal 
circumstances of a borrower to determine the affordability and suitability of a loan. The 
Inquiry does not propose to discuss credit assistance services such as mortgage broking in 
this chapter, as submissions have mainly been concerned with issues relating to financial 
advice. 
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adequately trained and competent. Personal advice, general advice and factual 
information are subject to generic consumer protection provisions, for example those 
against misleading or deceptive conduct.  
Under the Corporations Act, financial advisers are required to have a reasonable basis 
for personal advice, which includes the requirement that the advice provided is 
appropriate; and to warn their client if advice is based on incomplete or inaccurate 
information. The introduction of Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) in 2012 (with 
mandatory application from mid-2013) has built on these requirements. In particular, it 
introduced a ‘best interests’ duty, and a requirement to put the interests of the client 
ahead of those of the adviser. These provisions have provided greater clarity over the 
expectations and requirements for financial advisers. 
FOFA also introduced a ban on conflicted remuneration for both personal and general 
advice24 to align better the interests of financial advisers and consumers. The 
Government has recently announced amendments to FOFA which, while prohibiting 
the payment of upfront and trailing commissions for general advice,25 would allow 
incentive payments for general advice in situations where the:  
• Payment is not a commission 
• Person providing general advice is an employee of the product provider 
• Person providing general advice has not provided personal advice to any retail 
client (other than in relation to a basic banking product, a general insurance 
product or a consumer credit insurance product) 
• Product is issued or sold by the product provider 
Conflicts of interest have been a longstanding issue in financial advice. There has been 
a tension between providing financial advice for the benefit of consumers and the 
product distribution role played by advisers. Shadow shopping studies carried out by 
ASIC found a strong relationship between advisers giving non-compliant advice and 
                                                          
24  While the ban has technically commenced, a large portion of the benefits currently being 
paid would be grandfathered. There are exceptions to the ban on conflicted remuneration in 
certain circumstances, including benefits relating to basic banking products, general 
insurance and life risk insurance outside superannuation. 
25  In addition to explicitly banning commissions, the Government has flagged that it also 
intends to put in place a regulation-making power that may prescribe circumstances in 
which all or part of a benefit is to be treated as conflicted remuneration. See Cormann, M 
(Minister for Finance and Acting Assistant Treasurer) 2014, The Way Forward on Financial 
Advice Laws, media release MC 61/14, 20 June, Canberra.  
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conflicts of interest in business models.26 ASIC’s submission argues that, in recent cases 
of substantial consumer loss, conflicts of interest held by financial advisers have often 
been a driver.27 
The Inquiry considers the principle of consumers being able to access advice that helps 
them meet their financial needs is undermined by the existence of conflicted 
remuneration structures in financial advice. 
                                                          
26  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, Report 251: Review of 
financial advice industry practice, ASIC, Sydney, paragraph 43.  
27  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
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Figure 6.2: Regulation of the provision of financial information and 
financial advice 
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Personal advice 
The quality of personal advice is an ongoing problem. Personal advice is a 
recommendation that takes into account personal circumstances. Many submissions 
state that the quality of advice is variable and ASIC shadow shopping exercises 
indicate that consumers often receive poor-quality advice.28 This poor-quality advice 
mainly relates to two factors, the: 
• Relatively low minimum competence requirements that apply to advisers 
• Influence of conflicted remuneration arrangements 
The price of personal advice has often been hidden by opaque price structures and 
indirect payments. FOFA has driven a move to fee-for-service structures; however, 
some consumers are reluctant or unable to pay for financial advice through upfront 
fees. 
Adviser competence 
The competence of advisers varies widely. Some advisers are highly qualified and 
competent, others less so. Consumers find it difficult to know the difference.29 Some 
submissions propose stronger education requirements for advisers, especially for more 
complex Tier 1 products30 and for self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs).31 
Submissions raise a range of options for lifting standards for providing advice, 
including: 
• Strengthening education and training requirements for advisers 
                                                          
28  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, Report 251: Review of 
financial advice industry practice, Sydney. Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2013, Report 362: Review of financial advice industry practice: Phase 2, ASIC, Sydney. Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Report 337: SMSFs: Improving the quality 
of advice given to investors, ASIC, Sydney. 
29  See Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2012, Report 279: Shadow 
Shopping Study of Retirement Advice, ASIC, Sydney. Participants in the study rated their 
advisers and the advice they received highly: 86 per cent of participants felt they had 
received good-quality advice and 81 per cent said they trusted the advice they received from 
their adviser ‘a lot’, despite ASIC concluding that 58 per cent of the advice was ‘adequate’, 39 
per cent of the advice was ‘poor’ and only 3 per cent was ‘good quality’ advice. 
30  Tier 1 products are all financial products except general insurance products, consumer credit 
insurance, basic deposit products, non-cash payment products and First Home Saver 
Account deposit accounts. However, personal sickness and accident insurance are also 
classed as Tier 1 products. 
31  In January 2014, the Government announced that it will consider opportunities to work with 
industry to enhance the professional standards (including education and training 
requirements) of financial advisers and improve confidence in the financial services sector. 
See Senator the Hon Arthur Sinodinos 2014, Address to South Australia Liberal Party Luncheon, 
31 January, Sydney. 
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• Introducing a national exam for advisers 
• Introducing a specific training requirement for advisers who advise on SMSFs 
• Introducing an enhanced national public register of advisers, including employee 
advisers 
• Enhancing ASIC’s power to include banning individuals from managing a financial 
services business 
Strengthening education and training requirements 
ASIC has proposed lifting the current minimum educational requirements set out in 
ASIC Regulatory Guide 146: Licensing: Training of financial product advisers.32 This view 
has been supported by the Financial Planners Association, which set out a goal of all 
advisers having tertiary qualifications as part of ongoing efforts to professionalise the 
industry. Another alternative is to recognise higher educational standards by 
introducing concepts such as an ‘accredited adviser’. 
National exam 
ASIC has proposed introducing a national exam for financial advisers.33 Many other 
jurisdictions have national examinations; for example, Canada, Hong Kong SAR, 
Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. The risk of introducing a 
national exam is that consumers may place too much expectation on the regulator 
guaranteeing the competence of advisers who have successfully passed the exam. 
SMSF training requirement 
Stakeholders have raised concerns about the adequacy of advice in relation to SMSFs, 
in particular that some consumers are advised to establish SMSFs where it is not 
cost-effective and appropriate for their needs. Financial advice competency standards 
for SMSFs, and other specialised products, could be lifted by requiring specific training 
or qualifications for advisers giving advice on particularly complex products or 
arrangements. SMSFs are discussed in further detail in the Superannuation chapter. 
Enhanced national register 
Currently, authorised representatives of licensees must be registered with ASIC; 
however, there is no obligation for employee representatives to be registered. In its 
submission, ASIC argues that an enhanced register of financial advisers, including 
                                                          
32  See Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Consultation Paper 212: 
Licensing: Training of financial product advisers — Update to RG 146, ASIC, Sydney. 
33  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, Consultation Paper 153: 
Licensing: Assessment and professional development framework for financial advisers, ASIC, 
Sydney. 
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their employees, would help raise competence standards in the industry by providing 
transparency about an adviser’s qualifications and employment history. It may also 
help address the issue of disreputable advisers moving between firms and increase 
consumer confidence and trust in the sector.  
Banning individuals from management 
Currently, ASIC has powers to cancel an AFSL or credit licence and ban persons from 
providing financial services or engaging in credit activities. However, ASIC cannot 
prevent a person from managing a financial services or credit business. ASIC submits 
that the combination of an employee register, together with the power to ban a person 
from managing a financial services business, would assist it to locate and remove 
advisers who do not comply with legal requirements. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Raise minimum education and competency standards for personal advice 
(including particular standards for more complex products or structures, such as 
SMSFs) and introduce a national examination for financial advisers providing 
personal advice. 
• Introduce an enhanced public register of financial advisers (including employee 
advisers) which includes a record of each adviser’s credentials and current status 
in the industry, managed either by Government or industry. 
• Enhance ASIC’s power to include banning individuals from managing a financial 
services business. 
Accessibility 
Access to quality financial advice helps consumers make informed financial decisions; 
however, the cost of personal financial advice may reduce its accessibility. 
High-income earners or high net worth individuals are more likely to seek personal 
financial advice. 
Less than 42 per cent of adult Australians have ever used a financial adviser.34 Life 
stage and socioeconomic factors are the most consistent factors determining whether 
people use financial advisers. Individuals earning over $150,000 per annum are two 
                                                          
34  Roy Morgan Research 2012, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 18 June 2014. 
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and a half times more likely to be receiving advice than those earning under this 
amount.35 ASIC argues a range of reasons for consumers not seeking advice, including 
financial literacy, perceptions that advice is out of reach, lack of trust in financial 
advisers, not wanting comprehensive advice and lack of availability of scaled advice, 
lack of access to general advice and information, and the cost of advice.36 
It is challenging to increase the quality of advice and make it more affordable and 
accessible. The cost of regulation and compliance will ultimately be passed on to 
consumers. Further, higher education and training requirements may make advice less 
available, rendering it more expensive and encouraging existing advisers to leave the 
industry rather than upgrade their qualifications. As a result, some individuals may no 
longer be able to afford financial advice.  
In the absence of quality financial advice, consumers may make inappropriate 
investment decisions, or fail to make appropriate financial planning decisions. 
According to Investment Trends, 49 per cent of consumers surveyed say that they have 
unmet advice needs that they would pay to fill. Of the consumers with unmet advice 
needs, 42 per cent say they would like advice on retirement planning or transition to 
retirement.37 However, consumers are also looking for lower-cost options, including 
limited or scaled advice on particular issues. A third of consumers would prefer to 
receive scaled advice, either face-to-face, by phone or online, when cost is factored in, 
as shown in Table 6.1. 
                                                          
35  Blackrock 2013, Investor Pulse Survey, quoted in Industry Super Australia 2014, submission to 
Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Corporations Amendment 
(Streamlining of Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2014, pages 8–9. Further, around 42 per cent of 
people who contacted a financial adviser/planner in the last 12 months were in the top 
20 per cent of people based on the value of wealth management products (including 
superannuation). (Roy Morgan Research 2014, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 
18 June 2014.) 
36  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, paragraph 720. 
37  Investment Trends 2013, Advice Report, September. Note: Based on a survey of 5,412 adults. 
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Table 6.1: How consumers prefer to receive advice 
Preferred method of advice (when cost is 
recognised as a factor) 
Cost  Percentage of 
consumers who 
prefer this 
Willing to pay for advice   
 Scaled advice — phone and online Low 19% 
 Scaled advice — face to face Medium 14% 
 Comprehensive advice — phone Medium 11% 
 Comprehensive advice — face to face High 7% 
Not willing to pay for advice   
 Can’t afford advice – 21% 
 Do it myself – 27% 
Source: Investment Trends September 2013 Advice Report, based on a survey of 5,412 Australian adults.38 
To make advice more accessible to consumers, one approach may be for advisers to 
provide more cost-effective scaled or limited personal advice. Scaled or limited advice 
is personal advice on a single topic or that is not intended to be comprehensive. This 
can be provided at lower cost. Many consumers only need personal advice at key 
stages in their life; in many cases, consumers may prefer scaled or limited advice that 
deals with particular issues. 
However, scaled advice may raise issues about the extent of assessment of an 
individual’s circumstances required to receive appropriate and quality advice. The 
FOFA reforms were intended to facilitate access to quality scaled financial advice; in 
addition, the Government has recently announced changes to enhance this objective.39 
Technology, including automation and ‘mass customisation’ techniques, provides an 
opportunity to offer consumers more cost-effective advice. It may also enable new 
business models, such as scaled or automated online advice. Although regulations do 
not impede the provision of online or automated advice, providing personal advice 
requires a sufficient process to allow the consumer’s relevant circumstances to be taken 
into account. Otherwise, it may not lead to advice that adequately reflects the 
consumer’s relevant circumstances. 
                                                          
38  Investment Trends 2013, Advice Report, September. Note: Based on a survey of 5,412 adults. 
Participants were asked to state how they would prefer to be advised, recognising that cost 
was a factor.  
39  See Cormann, M (Minister for Finance and Acting Assistant Treasurer) 2014, The Way 
Forward on Financial Advice Laws, media release MC 61/14, 20 June, Canberra. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• What opportunities exist for enhancing consumer access to low-cost, effective 
advice? 
• What opportunities are there for using technology to deliver advice services and 
what are the regulatory impediments, if any, to those being realised? 
• What are the potential costs or risks of this form of financial advice, and what 
measures could be taken to mitigate any risks? 
Independence 
Some submissions argue that lack of structural independence can impair the quality of 
advice. Others argue it is not ownership but remuneration that creates conflicts that 
reduce quality. 
Currently, approximately 15 per cent of advisers are fully independent (part of a 
practice with its own AFSL); 29 per cent of advisers are part of a majority independent 
dealer group40 (0–49 per cent institutionally owned); whereas, 56 per cent belong to 
dealer groups that are majority owned by institutions or other wealth managers, or are 
part of a bank branch network.41 
The current framework does not require personal advice to be independent. It simply 
limits who can call themselves independent. Some submissions argue it can be difficult 
for consumers to know whether an adviser is aligned or independent, and that 
consumers may not fully appreciate the potential implications for the range of 
products they are offered. The United Kingdom has recently gone further than 
Australia in dealing with conflicts by labelling these advisers as ‘restricted’ rather than 
‘independent’, although restricted advisers are subject to the same professional 
standards as their independent counterparts.  
There have been notable instances of losses incurred by the customers of financial 
advisers from both independent and aligned groups. 
                                                          
40  Use of ‘independent’ in this study does not equate to the definition of independent in the 
Corporations Act 2001. 
41  Investment Trends 2014, Planner Business Model Report, May. Note: Based on a survey of 1,038 
financial planners. The survey question asks planners which dealer group they belong to. 
One of the options is ‘Own AFSL’ — which means they are not part of a dealer group (or 
their practice is not part of a dealer group). 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Is there is a case to more clearly distinguish between independent and aligned 
advisers, and what options exist for doing this? 
• Would consumers be likely to understand the difference between aligned and 
independent advisers and, if so, to what extent would this be likely to factor into 
a consumer’s decision to take the advice? 
• Would consumers be likely to be sensitive to differences in the price of 
independent or aligned advice? 
General advice 
Some intermediaries only provide general financial advice, some only provide 
personal financial advice, and others provide both. General advice also covers a broad 
range of conduct, such as media commentary, analyst reports, internet comparison 
sites and aggregators, opinions by credit rating agencies and advertising by product 
issuers. In some cases, the boundary between personal and general advice may be 
difficult to draw. 
One issue with general advice is whether it is properly labelled. Some submissions 
argue that some of the conduct currently regulated as general advice could more 
accurately be described as sales information, advertising or guidance. The aim of this 
relabelling would be to give consumers a clearer indication of what is involved. The 
general advice model encompasses recommendations made in general terms, but may 
nonetheless be persuasive to individual consumers, depending on their personal 
circumstances and the trust they put in the entity providing the recommendation.  
Issues around labelling different types of advice were raised in the Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee’s report on the Government’s Bill to amend FOFA.42 The report 
recommended that further consideration be given to distinguishing the meaning of 
terms such as information, general advice and personal advice. 
Some submissions question whether general advice is currently over-regulated or 
appropriately regulated, given the nature of general advice and the approach of many 
other countries. Other submissions argue that the risks to consumers from poor sales 
practices for financial products are sufficiently large that all financial product selling 
should be regulated. Further, consumers place a high degree of reliance on financial 
product issuers when making decisions. In 2006, the Government considered a 
                                                          
42  Senate Economics Legislation Committee June 2014, Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of 
Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2014 [Provisions], Canberra. 
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proposal to exempt sales conduct from licensing. However, this proposal was rejected 
due to concerns that consumers may not understand the difference between sales and 
advice (even with a disclaimer). The Inquiry does not consider there is a case to further 
pursue options of this nature. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options: 
• No change to current arrangements 
• Rename general advice as ‘sales’ or ‘product information’ and mandate that the 
term ‘advice’ can only be used in relation to personal advice. 
Other significant consumer issues 
Underinsurance 
It is important that consumers have access to products that help them meet their 
financial needs, including managing their risk. General insurance assists consumers to 
protect their assets and provides a safety net in the event of loss. Life insurance and 
income protection insurance help protect consumers and their dependants if they are 
unable to earn an income, whether due to death, critical illness, or temporary or 
permanent disablement.  
The decision to insure is a personal choice, meaning there will always be a level of 
non-insurance or underinsurance. However, insurance can mitigate the risk of 
significant loss and financial hardship for consumers. In addition to the negative effect 
of non-insurance or underinsurance on the consumer where they suffer loss, costs can 
be passed on to Government and the non-government organisation sector, particularly 
in the case of natural disasters. 
More granular risk-based pricing of insurance may make it less affordable for some, 
but can also play an important risk-mitigation role, providing incentives for consumers 
to implement measures that reduce their risk. 
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Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
Technological developments have the potential to reduce insurance pooling. This 
will reduce premiums for some consumers; however others will face increased 
premiums, or be excluded from access to insurance. Underinsurance may occur for a 
number of reasons including personal choice, behavioural biases, affordability, and 
lack of adequate information or advice on the level of insurance needed. 
Submissions have raised the issue of underinsurance in both the general and life 
insurance sectors. A number of industry submissions raise the issue of affordability, 
with a focus on the affordability of flood and cyclone cover for those in high-risk 
locations. Many consumer group submissions focus on availability and affordability 
for particular segments.  
General insurance 
Because underinsurance often only becomes apparent after a loss, and often in a 
large-scale natural disaster, it is difficult to measure the exact level of underinsurance. 
One difficulty in measuring underinsurance is that, following a natural disaster, 
building costs often rise, meaning that a consumer who was adequately insured in 
normal circumstances may become underinsured in a subsequent natural disaster 
situation. 
In 2013, Quantum Market Research estimated that only 4 per cent of homeowners do 
not have building insurance, but that 63 per cent of renters do not have contents 
insurance. However, Quantum also estimated that 83 per cent of homeowners and 
renters view that they would be worse off in a total loss situation.43 This non-insurance 
or underinsurance may be due to one or more of four issues: 
1. A lack of understanding about the amount of cover required. In most cases, 
buildings and contents are insured according to the consumer’s evaluations. 
Further, consumers do not regularly update their sum insured to cover increasing 
value or new items. 
                                                          
43  Quantum Market Research October 2013, The Understand Insurance Research Report, 
Melbourne. See also Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2005, 
Report 54: Getting Insurance Right, A Report on Home Building Underinsurance, ASIC, Sydney, 
where it was estimated that structures destroyed by the Canberra bushfires were 
underinsured by an average of between 27 and 40 percent of the building cost. 
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2. Deliberate self-insuring for the whole or only a proportion of the value, sometimes 
driven by a desire for lower premiums.44 Alternatively, consumers may not see 
value in holding insurance, because they have few valuables to insure, they are not 
risk averse or they are sufficiently wealthy that a potential loss would not be 
significant. 
3. A lack of affordability of suitable cover. People may not insure due to the high cost 
of insurance relative to their financial circumstances.45 
4. Behavioural factors, which may influence consumers’ decision to insure, or the 
extent to which they adequately insure.46 
On the issue of affordability, the overall cost of comprehensive motor vehicle 
insurance and home contents insurance has remained broadly static as a proportion of 
annual income since 1997. However, the cost of home building insurance has increased 
significantly since 2008 (Chart 6.1). This reflects the increasing incidence of natural 
disasters and greater number of claims insurers have incurred as a result (Chart 6.2). 
                                                          
44  Of those who estimated their own building insurance level, 10 per cent deliberately 
underestimated the value to lower their premium. For contents insurance, the same figure is 
9 per cent. See Quantum Market Research October 2013, The Understand Insurance Research 
Report, Melbourne. 
45  Insurance Council of Australia 2007, The Non-Insured: Who, Why and Trends, report prepared 
by Tooth R, and Barker G, Sydney. This report reflects that people may also not insure 
because consumers find purchasing insurance a significant administrative burden. This is 
supported by the fact that consumers are more likely to take out contents insurance once 
they take out building insurance. 
46  Consumers have a tendency to focus on short time horizons when comparing upfront costs 
which impact on low-probability, high-consequence events. For example, consumers may 
not buy flood insurance as they perceive the risk of damage as being extremely low. 
See Wharton Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes 2013, ‘Informed Decisions 
on Catastrophe Risk: Insurance and Behavioural Economics, Improving Decisions in the 
Most Misunderstood Industry’, Issue Brief, Winter 2013, University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia. 
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Chart 6.1: Insurance cost as a proportion of annual income 
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Source: Insurance Statistics Australia, ABS Catalogue 6302.0: Average Weekly Earnings.47 
                                                          
47  Insurance Statistics Australia is a membership organisation for a number of insurers and has 
collected and disseminated statistics since 1994. The membership comprises the majority of 
the Australian market. The average premium per policy for domestic motor, home buildings 
and home contents is determined from the data provided. It is then normalised by Average 
Weekly Earnings as published by the ABS. 
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Chart 6.2: Cost of claims due to catastrophes (2013 values) 
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Source: ICA and Risk Frontiers.48 
Submissions argue that insurance affordability is a problem for low-income 
consumers, who require low-value insurance, such as contents insurance of $10,000. 
These types of policies are proportionately more expensive, because there are fixed 
costs that do not decrease in proportion to the policy’s value. The second area of 
concern is locations with a high risk of natural disasters such as floods or cyclones. 
Submissions also raise concerns about the impact of state taxes that apply to insurance, 
raising the cost of insurance premiums.49 
Life insurance 
Superannuation funds now play an important role in providing life insurance to 
members through group insurance policies. Latest estimates indicate more than 
90 per cent of the working age population now has some life insurance.50 Introducing 
default insurance into many superannuation funds has extended the number of people 
                                                          
48  The Insurance Council collates from its members the cost of claims from declared 
catastrophe events. Risk Frontiers (part of Macquarie University) developed an index to 
bring the costs to current values based on changes in building density and building costs. 
49  Refer also to the Australian Financial Centre Forum 2009, Australia as a Financial Centre: 
Building on our Strengths, Canberra; Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of 
Commonwealth-State Financial Relations, 1999; and Commonwealth of Australia 2009, 
Australia’s Future Tax System Review: Report to the Treasurer, Canberra. 
50  Rice Warner 2013, Underinsurance in Australia, Rice Warner, Sydney. This refers to life risk 
only. The report also estimates that 68 per cent of the working age population holds lump 
sum disability insurance. 
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holding life insurance; however, submissions question the adequacy of this coverage. 
Some submissions put forward the view that underinsurance for life and disability is 
significant, requiring policy measures to close the ‘underinsurance gap’. Rice Warner 
estimates that current life insurance cover is 64 per cent of the amount needed, with 
disability insurance much lower again.51 
Risk-based pricing 
Submissions argue that underinsurance and non-insurance are likely to become more 
acute as insurers use data and technology to price individual risk more accurately. 
Increased risk-based pricing has the potential to advantage some consumers by 
reducing costs, but disadvantage others through increasing costs — potentially to the 
point of unaffordability. In addition, increased risk-based pricing may mean some 
consumers are not offered insurance at all. This issue arose in relation to riverine flood 
insurance following the 2011 Brisbane floods, with residents of flood-prone areas 
experiencing significantly higher premiums for cover, or finding none available.52 
The trend towards individualised risk-based pricing is growing, as firms access larger 
data sets, including data from outside their own businesses, and develop more 
sophisticated analytical techniques. For example, the Insurance Australia Group now 
prices at the household or address level for personal building, home and contents 
insurance for flood and cyclone risk. Its NRMA brand also prices at the household 
level for risks such as theft and domestic house fires.53 Product issuers who fail to use 
better information to differentiate risk will be exposed to adverse selection. They will 
be more likely to acquire higher risks, while more sophisticated competitors will 
attract lower risks at lower prices. 
Governments sometimes limit the use of certain types of information for pricing and 
access decisions.54 In Australia, some protections exist in the form of 
anti-discrimination legislation, but usually with an exemption for insurance decisions 
based on actuarial or statistical data. The Financial Services Council standard on 
genetic testing, which has been in place since 2002, states that an insurer must not 
request genetic testing, but can access testing that has already been done. 
                                                          
51  As income protection insurance is only available to a limited range of people in certain types 
of employment, it is not possible to judge the level of underinsurance. 
52  However, 93 per cent of all home building and/or contents policies now have flood cover as 
a standard feature. See Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) 2013, Aggregated Flood Policy 
Data, ICA, Sydney. 
53  Insurance Australia Group 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
54  In 2009, the US Federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act was implemented to 
provide protection from genetic discrimination in health insurance. In 2011, the European 
Court of Justice prohibited gender-based discrimination. Consequently, the cost of UK 
comprehensive car insurance for first-time female drivers increased by 104 per cent but fell 
27 per cent for their male counterparts. See Insurance Australia Group 2014, First round 
submission to Financial System Inquiry. 
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Price signals are important in influencing people’s decisions about risky behaviour, 
such as whether to live in a location prone to cyclone, bushfire or flood, or whether to 
buy a particular car. Price signals may also be beneficial for efficiency and competition. 
Future developments, such as vehicle telematics, mean that technology and premium 
prices may directly influence behaviour and reduce the level of risk to the community. 
Accessibility can be improved if insurers and lenders better understand the risks 
involved, especially where the risk is found to be less than previously assumed. 
However, the better understanding of risk can cause problems for people who are 
found to be a higher risk. They may face higher premiums or a loss of access. This is a 
particular problem where consumers are not able to change their risk profile or find it 
difficult to do so. 
Policy options for consultation 
The information available on the extent of underinsurance is limited, including no 
agreed measure of what level of insurance is desirable. Further evidence beyond that 
already in submissions would be welcomed. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Does Australia have a problem with underinsurance that warrants some form of 
policy response? Specifically: 
– How does Australia compare internationally on adequacy of insurance 
coverage? 
– Has the issue of underinsurance been increasing over time? 
– What evidence and data are available to support a conclusion about our level 
of underinsurance? 
– What evidence and data are available to assess whether more granular 
risk-based pricing will lead to exclusion or further underinsurance? 
• If warranted, what are possible approaches to lessen the existence of, or mitigate 
the impact of, underinsurance? 
Access to credit 
Low-income consumers 
Submissions raise issues with access to fair and affordable credit for some consumer 
segments. Consumers require access to products and services that help them meet 
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their individual financial needs, including credit products, which can smooth 
consumption. Low-income consumers, consumers with low financial literacy and those 
precluded from obtaining mainstream credit often use small amount loans to meet 
everyday expenses.  
Submissions contend that such consumers are frequently unable to access suitable 
credit from mainstream lenders, as they do not meet the eligibility criteria. Instead, 
they use high-cost products, such as consumer leases, which are regulated differently 
to credit contracts under the NCCP Act. Or they rely on ‘fringe’ credit providers, such 
as payday lenders, where they may enter into loans on a recurring basis without being 
able to use the credit to improve their financial position.  
Although lenders will make lending decisions on risk-based criteria and other 
commercial considerations, access to reasonably-priced small amount credit may have 
individual and societal benefits. Community organisations and financial institutions 
are seeking to address this issue with a growing number of joint microfinance 
initiatives, such as the No Interest Loan Scheme and the StepUP Low Interest Loan.55 
However, these schemes provide a very small supply of reasonably priced fringe 
credit, compared with overall demand. Outstanding payday loans are currently 
estimated in excess of $380 million.56 
Policy options for consideration 
A 2013 report by NAB and the Centre for Social Impact on financial exclusion in 
Australia57 concluded the Government should explore ways of scaling up the supply of 
microfinance products to improve access to credit for low-income consumers. 
Microfinance initiatives are not-for-profit schemes that provide access to affordable 
credit for essential goods or savings programs, which aim to help consumers establish 
positive financial habits. They are designed to address issues of financial exclusion.  
Submissions propose that Government and/or industry could facilitate further 
development of microfinance initiatives, in collaboration with the not-for-profit and 
community sector, to improve access to small amount credit. This option relies on both 
the voluntary participation of industry and Government funding. It will likely take 
                                                          
55  Good Shepherd Microfinance 2013, An Outcomes Evaluation of the Good Shepherd Microfinance 
No Interest Loan Scheme (NILS), report prepared by Bennett, S. Georgouras, M, Hems, L, 
Marjolin, A and Wong, J, Centre for Social Impact, University of New South Wales, Sydney. 
According to the 2014 NILS evaluation, 42 per cent of respondents who had obtained fringe 
credit in the past stopped or reduced their use of fringe credit due to their NILS loan. 
56  Estimated by ASIC based on previous studies into the industry and information from annual 
reports. 
57  Centre for Social Impact for NAB, 2013, Measuring financial exclusion in Australia, Centre for 
Social Impact, Sydney. 
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time for microfinance initiatives to grow sufficiently to address the needs gap, or they 
may not be able to grow sufficiently to meet demand in this area. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
Is there a role for Government and/or industry to facilitate further development of 
microfinance initiatives, in collaboration with the not-for-profit and community 
sector? To what extent would this improve access to small amount credit? 
Small business borrowing 
Banks provide the majority of lending to small business.58 Access to credit helps small 
businesses meet their start-up, expansion or ongoing costs and manage their liquidity. 
Generally, small business lending is more risky than most consumer lending, which 
mainly consists of low-risk residential loans. This is discussed in the Funding chapter. 
As a result, when banks lend to small businesses they tightly control lending decisions, 
providing limited flexibility, and often with detailed and paper-based assessment 
procedures. Following the GFC, banks have become more selective in determining 
eligibility. Some banks are reducing their exposure to small- and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) borrowers, and lowering loan-to-valuation ratios to reduce their 
credit exposure.59 
Yet individual borrowers and small business borrowers often face similar issues. 
Preliminary assessment 
Some submissions are concerned about finance for small business, particularly about 
the restrictive covenants in small business loan contracts. Non-price covenants of loan 
contracts can make bank loans unattractive to some small businesses. Some 
submissions label non-price terms on small business loans ‘very restrictive’ and 
‘vague’, with concerns that the way some of these terms have been applied has not 
been transparent. Small businesses are also concerned about the onerous nature of the 
loan application processes employed by some lenders. To some extent, this can reflect 
the quantity and quality of information that some small businesses provide to lenders. 
                                                          
58  RBA data for December 2013 shows the value of outstanding bank business loans for 
amounts under $2 million was $242.5 billion. See Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2013, 
Statistical Table D7: Bank Lending to Business — Variable-rate Loans Outstanding by Size and by 
Interest Rate, RBA, Sydney. Note: this lending includes an unknown amount of loans 
provided to businesses that do not fall within the definition of a small business. 
59  As observed in Treasury 2010, Regulatory Impact Statement: Small business credit’ (as part of the 
National Credit Reforms), Canberra. 
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The regulatory regime that currently applies to credit only regulates credit provided to 
individuals or strata corporations for personal, domestic or household purposes, or in 
relation to residential investment. As part of the credit reforms process, a proposal to 
introduce targeted reforms to small business lending was consulted on in the context 
of the draft National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment (Credit Reform Phase 2) 
Bill. The Bill proposed mandatory external dispute resolution, product and services 
cost disclosure by lenders and brokers, and a specific remedy to address practices by 
some lenders in unfairly refinancing small businesses in financial distress. The reforms 
were part of the COAG National Partnership Agreement to Deliver a Seamless 
National Economy. However, the agreement wound up on 30 June 2013, before the 
reforms were complete and the Bill was never passed. 
Similarly, when the unfair contracts provisions now present in the ASIC Act were first 
announced in 2008, they were initially intended to apply to all standard form contracts, 
including business-to-business contracts. However, the legislation was restricted to 
consumer contracts, in response to criticism by the business community that such laws 
might create uncertainty. 
A balance needs to be struck between facilitating access to credit on equitable terms 
and allowing lenders to effectively manage their risk and price accordingly. Regulating 
business credit more intensively may reduce access to or the affordability of credit for 
small business. 
The Inquiry notes that Treasury is undertaking a consultation process on behalf of 
Consumer Affairs Australia and New Zealand on extending unfair contract term 
protections to small business. A consultation paper was released on 23 May 2014.60 The 
Inquiry will continue to monitor this consultation process until the Final Report is 
issued. 
Consumer loss and compensation 
Consumers require access to remedies and redress in the financial system where they 
may have been subject to misconduct. When investing, some consumers have suffered 
significant, uncompensated losses when non-prudentially regulated institutions have 
collapsed and/or where there has been misconduct on the part of financial services 
providers. A number of collapses have led to significant consumer losses, including 
Storm Financial, Trio Capital, Opes Prime, Westpoint and Commonwealth Financial 
Planning. In some cases, consumers received partial compensation; however, a 
significant proportion of losses remain uncompensated. Although the system is not 
                                                          
60  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Extending Unfair Contract Term Protections to Small 
Businesses, Consultation Paper, Canberra. 
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designed to eliminate all risk of loss, submissions raise a number of issues relating to 
consumer loss and compensation, including the: 
• Adequacy of the regulatory framework for managed investment schemes 
• Appropriateness of compensation mechanisms 
Adequacy of framework 
Consumers have experienced significant losses from investing in the managed 
investment sector, although these losses are small compared to the overall size of the 
sector. Major sources of loss include failed agricultural schemes, mortgage and direct 
property schemes, and unlisted mortgage common enterprise schemes.61 Although 
some losses reflect poor underlying asset investments, or market price declines, others 
reflect poor business models, poor advice or fraud. 
This raises the issue of whether the framework for regulating managed investment 
schemes adequately safeguards the rights of investors, especially compared with 
companies. 
In a recent report, the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee made a range of 
recommendations and proposals, which included to:  
• Change the ‘trustee like’ obligations of responsible entities 
• Review the structural requirements of managed investment schemes 
• Prohibit common enterprise schemes  
• Amend the definition of what can be called a liquid asset  
• Clarify what is meant by ‘scheme property’ and how the client money provisions 
are applied to monies held by responsible entities 
• Improve the external administration framework for failed managed investment 
schemes62 
                                                          
61  Common enterprise schemes are a kind of managed investment scheme that is generally 
structured as a series of agreements between the member, the responsible entity and various 
external parties. The ‘scheme’ in this case is not a pool of assets under management, but 
rather the common enterprise carried out in accordance with those agreements. See 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2012, Managed Investment Schemes 
Report, CAMAC, Sydney. 
62  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2012, Managed Investment Schemes 
Report, CAMAC, Sydney and Corporations and Capital Markets Advisory Committee 
(CAMAC) 2014, Managed Investment Schemes Discussion Paper: The establishment and operation 
of managed investment schemes, CAMAC, Sydney.  
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Policy options for consultation 
Given recent financial collapses, submissions question the adequacy of the regulatory 
framework for managed investment schemes to protect the interests of their investors. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Amend the existing regulatory framework for managed investment schemes.  
Compensation arrangements 
Overall, stakeholders have said that dispute resolution systems are working well.63 
Despite this, some stakeholders consider that current compensation arrangements may 
not be adequate to provide redress to consumers who have suffered financial loss. This 
is evidenced by the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) submission, which reports 
significant unpaid determinations and uncompensated loss. Since 1 January 2010, 
19 financial services providers have been unable to comply with 105 determinations 
exceeding $8.3 million.64 According to FOS, the level of unpaid determinations as at 
31 December 2013 is approximately 33 per cent of all determinations made in its 
investments jurisdiction. 
Other submissions raise specific issues about the sufficiency of relying on professional 
indemnity (PI) insurance as a compensation mechanism. Submissions contend that PI 
insurance fails as a complete compensation mechanism because: 
• Where there is significant consumer detriment, aggregate funds available under the 
policy may be insufficient to meet all claims. 
• The policy may not cover conduct giving rise to the compensation. 
• The amount of the award may be below the applicable excess under the policy.65 
                                                          
63  The requirement to have a dispute resolution system applies to AFSL holders and credit 
licence holders. It also applies to product issuers and product issuers that deal with retail 
clients but do not require an AFSL for various reasons (for example, a legislative licensing 
exemption). 
64  Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) 2014, Unpaid FOS determinations by financial services 
providers: An overview, FOS, Melbourne. Note that the Credit Ombudsman Service Limited 
has only reported three unpaid determinations, totalling about $227,000. 
65  Financial Ombudsman Service 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 22. 
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Policy options for consultation 
Submissions are mixed on the need for any statutory compensation scheme. Some 
argue that any scheme would increase moral hazard risk and would ultimately come 
at a cost to consumers. Others argue that a simple capped default compensation 
scheme should be considered to promote consumer confidence and trust in the 
financial system.  
The Wallis Inquiry recommended against statutory compensation schemes in the 
financial sector, including deposit insurance. A report released by Richard St John in 
2012 also concluded that it would be inappropriate and possibly counterproductive to 
introduce a last-resort compensation scheme.66 The report concluded that a better 
measure would be to reduce the incidence of misconduct and loss in the first place 
through improved regulator surveillance and stronger PI insurance requirements. The 
main downside of a statutory compensation scheme is that the better participants in 
the industry are likely to subsidise other participants, who do not have high standards 
of compliance and conduct. 
Another option, which could proactively reduce loss through misconduct, would be to 
increase ASIC’s resourcing and capability for proactive surveillance of its regulated 
population. This is discussed in further detail in the Regulatory architecture chapter. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
Given the limitations of professional indemnity insurance, what options, if any, exist 
for addressing the issue of consumer loss?  
Product rationalisation of ‘legacy products’ 
A number of submissions raise concerns about the operational risks and costs 
associated with the ongoing operation of ‘legacy products’. These are often managed 
investment schemes or life insurance products that have become outdated and closed 
as a result of commercial and legislative changes. 
In 2009, industry estimated that up to $220 billion of funds under management may be 
in legacy products, adding an industry-wide operational cost of between $120 million 
                                                          
66  Commonwealth of Australia 2012, Compensation arrangements for consumers of financial 
services, prepared by St John, R, Canberra. 
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and $350 million per year.67 These costs represent an inefficiency drag on the funds 
management sector and, ultimately, a cost passed on to consumers. 
Submissions are most concerned about the lack of a practical, cost-effective and 
consistent product rationalisation regulatory framework to enable the conversion or 
consolidation of legacy products into products with equivalent features and benefits. 
This issue creates a trade-off that needs to be balanced between the interests of 
consumers who hold legacy products and product issuers. 
Policy options for consultation 
Government consulted on proposals for a new product rationalisation framework in 
2009.68 The paper also discussed proposals for designing relevant taxation relief where 
assets are transferred under product rationalisation. These proposals have not been 
acted on to date. Thus, the operational risks and costs to consumers relating to legacy 
product operation remain today. The Inquiry considers that taxation relief issues 
related to product rationalisation should be considered in the Tax White Paper process. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Government to renew consideration of 2009 proposals on product rationalisation 
of legacy products.  
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Are there elements of the consumer framework not covered in this chapter that 
require consideration? 
• In addition to the current regulatory framework, what role can industry 
self-regulation play in improving consumer outcomes generally? 
                                                          
67  Treasury 2009, Product Rationalisation of Managed Investment Schemes and Life Insurance 
Products, Proposals Paper, Canberra.  
68  Treasury 2009, Product Rationalisation of Managed Investment Schemes and Life Insurance 
Products, Consultation Paper, Canberra. 
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7: Regulatory architecture 
Australia’s current regulatory model has served us well. The global financial crisis 
(GFC) tested regulatory arrangements globally and domestically, and Australia’s 
twin peaks model has proven robust and effective. A number of overseas 
jurisdictions have looked to aspects of Australia’s model to address weaknesses the 
GFC exposed in their financial systems. 
Submissions have not called for significant change to Australia’s regulatory 
framework. However, both submissions and stakeholder consultations yielded a 
wide range of suggestions for improving the existing architecture. Based on these 
views, the Inquiry proposes policy options for consideration and further feedback. 
The Inquiry has commissioned work on the costs and benefits of the extent of 
regulation in the financial system and seeks further evidence in this regard.  
The Inquiry also notes that, concurrent with the preparation of this report, the 
Senate has been examining the performance of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission. The Senate Committee’s Report contained a large number 
of recommendations that are of relevance to the work of this Inquiry. The Senate 
Report was issued at the time the Interim Report was being finalised for printing. 
The findings of the Senate Report will be carefully examined by this Inquiry in the 
lead-up to its Final Report. 
Based on evidence to date, the Inquiry observes: 
• The regulatory perimeters could be re-examined in a number of areas to ensure 
each is targeted appropriately and can capture emerging risks.  
• Australia generally has strong, well-regarded regulators, but some areas of 
improvement have been identified to increase independence and accountability.  
• During the GFC and beyond, Australia’s regulatory coordination mechanisms 
have been strong, although there may be room to enhance transparency. 
• Regulators’ mandates and powers are generally well defined and clear; however, 
more could be done to emphasise competition matters. In addition, ASIC has a 
broad mandate, and the civil and administrative penalties available to it are 
comparatively low in relation to comparable peers internationally. 
• To be able to perform their roles effectively in accordance with their legislative 
mandate, regulators need to be able to attract and retain suitably skilled and 
experienced staff. 
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Context 
Sound regulation underpins confidence in the system, encourages participation and 
facilitates efficient allocation of funding and risk in the economy. However, regulation 
also imposes costs on institutions and the economy more broadly. Regulation should 
strive to meet its objectives, without placing an undue burden on the regulated 
population. 
Figure 7.1 sets out the current Australian regulatory framework at a high level. 
Figure 7.1: The Australian financial system regulatory framework 
 
Prudential regulation 
The Wallis Inquiry considered financial safety as fundamental to the sound operation 
of the economy. Recognising that regulation with a financial safety objective can affect 
efficiency, competition and innovation, the prudential perimeter was tightly 
circumscribed — targeted to where the intensity of promise is highest, such as deposits 
and insurance.  
Prudential regulation in Australia applies directly to authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs), general insurers, life insurers, and registered superannuation 
entities and their trustees.  
Today, prudential regulation takes a group-wide view. International standards require 
a group’s financial and operational aspects to be understood and assessed, as well as 
the individual prudentially regulated entities within them. The largest and most 
complex groups are expected to have the greatest level of supervisory intensity. A 
group-wide framework is in place for banking and insurance groups. 
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Retail payment systems regulation 
The Wallis Inquiry considered the most intense of financial promises are those that 
provide payment services. At the time, banks were the main providers of payment 
services and the primary interface with payment systems. The Payments System Board 
(PSB) was created as a separate board of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to make 
decisions related to regulating the payment system. The PSB has a clear objective to 
ensure stability and confidence in the system, while improving efficiency and 
competition.  
Today, the payments landscape has changed considerably. Cash and cheque 
transactions have declined significantly and electronic payments have grown strongly. 
Technology advances and payment product innovation are expected to continue. This 
is consistent with international experience. It has also resulted in a range of models in 
different countries to regulate the payments sector. 
Conduct regulation 
The Wallis Inquiry considered that financial markets cannot work well unless 
participants act with integrity and there is adequate disclosure to facilitate informed 
decisions. Conduct regulation was designed to cover all financial products and 
services, with the intention of ensuring financial markets are sound, orderly and 
transparent; users are treated fairly; and markets are free from misleading, 
manipulative or abusive conduct.  
Today, conduct regulation applies to most financial services. The number of financial 
products has extended through growth in market-based instruments, structural 
changes in financial markets, and technology and innovation. Products and markets 
have become more sophisticated and complex, making the application of conduct and 
disclosure requirements more extensive.  
Regulatory burden 
Stakeholders have told the Inquiry that Australia has a strong regulatory framework. 
However, many stakeholders argue that complying with regulation is costly, the pace 
of change has increased costs and practices for introducing new regulation could be 
improved. 
Following the GFC, the considerable international policy response included new and 
strengthened regulation for financial system entities. In this context, a number of 
submissions are concerned about implementing new regulation.  
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Other chapters address a number of specific issues relating to the burden of regulation. 
The main issues raised by stakeholders in the context of this chapter relate to: 
• The general need to weigh the costs and benefits of new regulation adequately, 
the need to look for other solutions before applying regulation, or the possibility 
that, because these processes are not being applied adequately, Australia is 
potentially over-regulated.1 
– A related concern was a lack of time taken for industry consultation or 
implementation or, in some cases, inadequate consultation processes more 
generally. 
• Regulation potentially having a disproportionate impact on smaller players.2 
• Concerns about the impost of foreign regulation and international standards since 
the GFC, especially prudential regulation, including that it should be 
implemented with more Government policy input/oversight or that it has not 
supported Australia’s needs.3, 4 
– Foreign regulation and international standards are discussed in more detail 
in the International integration chapter. 
– An analysis of Australia’s prudential regulatory framework is discussed in 
the Stability chapter. Further information is sought on costs of prudential 
regulation. 
• A blurring of the distinction between the role of boards and management, 
especially through the application of prudential regulation.5 
– This issue is discussed in more detail in the Stability chapter. 
• Blurring of the distinction between prudential and non-prudential regulation, and 
potential overlap between the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) and ASIC.6 
                                                          
1 For example: First round submissions to the Financial System Inquiry by the Australian 
Bankers’ Association, major banks and QBE. 
2 Customer Owned Banking Association 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 53. 
3 ANZ 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 49. 
4 Westpac 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 31. 
5 ANZ 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 49. 
6 Treasury 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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– This is considered in the Regulatory perimeter section of this chapter. 
Preliminary assessment 
Costs and benefits of regulation 
Measuring whether the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs is challenging, since 
regulation imposes both direct and indirect costs and benefits. Even where 
respondents express frustration with the costs of regulation in Australia, they 
acknowledge that the cost of excessive or unnecessary regulation can be difficult to 
measure.7 Aside from direct costs incurred by businesses in complying with regulatory 
change, regulation also has hidden costs.8 For example, regulatory costs and 
complexity can create barriers to entry for new participants or innovations.  
Benefits can also be difficult to measure. As APRA points out in its submission: “Many 
of the specific benefits of prudential regulation and supervision, such as lower losses 
and increased trust within the financial system, are [difficult] to isolate”.9 
Despite these difficulties, it is essential that the costs and benefits of Government 
intervention are assessed to the extent possible.10 Many stakeholders suggest current 
processes for doing so are inadequate, potentially leading to over-regulation. 
Currently, the Inquiry lacks evidence on both the costs and benefits of reforms to 
support firm conclusions on this issue, although some information is available around 
costs. The Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) estimates the four major banks have 
spent $1.67 billion on implementation costs for the following projects: Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),11 Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) law reform, 
anti-money laundering (AML) from 2005–06, privacy (including credit reporting), 
e-payments, the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS), over-the-counter (OTC) derivative 
reforms and National Consumer Credit Protection.  
In 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) studied the relative costs and benefits 
of post-GFC regulatory reform for Europe, the United States and Japan. The report 
                                                          
7 QBE 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
8 Some organisations provided confidential estimates of the costs of complying with recent 
regulatory changes to the Inquiry. 
9 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 63. 
10 It should be noted that to date the RBA, APRA and ASIC have been fully compliant with 
Regulatory Impact Statement requirements as set out by the Office of Best Practice 
Regulation. 
11  Note: FATCA is US legislation but must be implemented by Australian companies in certain 
circumstances. According to the ABA, FATCA contribution to costs is approximately 
14 per cent. 
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found: “the benefits in terms of less frequent and less costly financial crisis would 
indeed outweigh the costs of regulatory reforms in the long run”.12 Importantly, the 
IMF assessment assumed the way regulation was implemented did not create 
unnecessary costs. However, this assumption is unlikely to hold in practice. Costs and 
benefits go beyond the content of the regulation: how it is implemented also matters. 
Stakeholders suggest that, in some areas, implementation has been poor in cases where 
otherwise the reform is supported; for example, very short consultation periods.13 
Stakeholders report the main drivers of the implementation costs include: 
• IT system changes 
• Staff costs (i.e. employing specialists to implement regulations) 
• Legal advice  
In addition, implementation costs can be increased by: 
• Poor timing around the start of regulation, particularly when there are changing 
or uncertain compliance dates or unrealistic timelines for compliance, or where 
compliance dates are set for resource-constrained periods. Examples raised by the 
ABA included implementing AML and the OTC reforms. 
• Poor domestic/ international regulatory coordination. For example, the ABA 
highlighted problems around coordination in the OTC reforms. 
• Inadequate consultation processes with industry, or insufficient weight given to 
industry information, resulting in higher-cost, less effective regulatory solutions 
being selected and implemented. 
• Overly prescriptive legislation, which both adds to cost and complicates delivery, 
particularly if it makes no allowance for variations in process and systems 
capability. 
To help assess the costs and benefits of regulation more generally, the Inquiry has 
commissioned further work on the burden of regulation resulting from both domestic 
and international reforms. As part of the Government’s deregulation process, Treasury 
is also managing a substantial ‘stocktake’ and analysis of regulation in the Australian 
financial system. 
                                                          
12 Elliot, D, Salloy, S and Santos, A 2012, Assessing the Cost of Financial Regulation, IMF Working 
Paper, IMF, page 68.  
13 CBA, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 124. 
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The World Bank Doing Business 2014 ranked Australia 11th on its ‘Ease of Doing 
Business’ category, behind the United Kingdom (10), the United States (4), Hong Kong 
(2) and Singapore (1). In the ‘Getting Credit’ category Australia ranked 3rd, with the 
United Kingdom and Malaysia ahead, while in the ‘Starting a Business’ category it 
ranked equal 4th. Yet, for ‘Protecting Investors’, Australia ranked much lower — at 
68th.14 In that category, the World Bank “measured the strength of minority 
shareholder protections against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal 
gain,” and gave Australia a relatively low ranking.15 
In summary, this source suggests that, compared to the rest of the world, Australia 
may not have a regulatory burden problem. Conversely, QBE estimates the total cost 
stemming from over-regulation at an average of over $100 per policy, or in the range of 
10 to 15 per cent.16  
Deregulation and improving policy development processes 
Concurrent with this Inquiry, the Government has a deregulation process in place that 
is consistent with many of the suggestions made by submissions. This includes 
improved guidance for Regulation Impact Statements and a clear policy statement that 
the default position of policy makers and regulators should be ‘no new regulation’.  
Further, in March 2014, the Productivity Commission developed a Regulator Audit 
Framework that could be used for auditing the performance of regulators, in regard to 
the compliance costs they impose on business and other regulated entities. Based on 
this report, the Government is preparing a framework for assessing the performance of 
regulatory agencies, such as ASIC, APRA, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The International 
integration chapter considers options for further process improvement to have regard 
to international regulation. 
As part of the deregulation process, the Government is undertaking a stocktake and 
audit of all regulation. This will provide a baseline for measuring the Government’s 
                                                          
14  World Bank Doing Business 2014 accessed at: 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/australia#protecting-investors>. 
15  The indicators used by the World Bank assess “3 dimensions of investor protections: 
transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure index), liability for 
self-dealing (extent of director liability index) and shareholders’ ability to sue officers and 
directors for misconduct (ease of shareholder suits index). The data come from a 
questionnaire administered to corporate and securities lawyers and are based on securities 
regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules of evidence. The ranking 
on the strength of investor protection index is the simple average of the percentile rankings 
on its component indicators.” For further information see: 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/protecting-investors>. 
16 QBE 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 41. 
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progress in reducing red tape and assist in identifying useful areas for future 
reductions. 
Impact on competitive neutrality 
As noted, implementing many post-GFC regulations has created substantial costs. 
Although large institutions have faced the biggest absolute costs, their smaller 
competitors may face a higher relative burden, particularly where change imposes 
fixed costs of implementation. Larger firms may also have more capacity to influence 
the direction of regulatory change.  
On the other hand, smaller firms do not generally want to be subject to different 
regulatory frameworks than their larger competitors if they consider this will change 
customer preferences or their access to funding. For this reason, concessional licensing 
regimes or frameworks can be problematic.  
This raises the issue of whether Government and regulators need to take more account 
of the potential implications of regulatory change on competitive neutrality. This 
applies to both the design of regulation and the volume of regulatory change to which 
industry segments are subject. 
Volume of regulation 
Typically, defining regulation that imposes a burden on industry takes into account 
any standards, codes, rules, data requirements and guidance material produced by 
regulators, whether domestic or international.17 However, some of this material, such 
as guidance material, helps the regulated population comply with regulation. 
The volume of regulation will depend on a range of factors, including the approach of 
the regulator and, to some extent, the approach taken by the regulated population.  
Seeking to address real or perceived gaps in the regulatory regime can lead to 
increasingly complex or voluminous regulation. Instead, it may be possible to close 
perceived gaps or improve poor outcomes without necessarily changing the law.  
In some instances, regulators may be able to address issues by reducing the 
overarching volume of rules and regulations placed on industry, but directing more 
resources towards supervising high-risk participants, taking stronger or more frequent 
enforcement action, or both. Increasing the intensity of supervision or enhancing 
                                                          
17  The Office of Best Practice Regulation defines regulation as “any ‘rule’ endorsed by 
government where there is an expectation of compliance”. Also see the ABA submission, 
which defines regulation as ‘all legislation, codes, rules, (prudential) standards and guidance 
material produced by any government department or agency that imposes limitations on, or 
otherwise seeks to modify the behaviour of, individuals or companies”. 
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enforcement may require either additional resources or re-prioritising existing 
activities. 
Financial system data 
Financial system data is useful for policy makers, regulators, industry, academics and 
others. In conducting the first stage of the Inquiry, data gaps had an impact on the 
Inquiry’s deliberations. For example, there are gaps in data for infrastructure financing 
and small business lending. On the other hand, stakeholders have told the Inquiry it 
can be costly and time consuming to provide data and, in some instances, multiple 
agencies have duplicate requests. 
If new data is to be provided to address gaps, it will be important to look for ways to 
reduce the reporting burden of data that is either not used or is less useful. Changes in 
data requirements should also weigh the benefits of collecting it against the potential 
costs of changing systems and processes to comply with new requirements. 
Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry has commissioned further work on the costs and benefits of financial 
system regulation in Australia and welcomes empirical evidence on this point. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Is there evidence to support conclusions that the regulatory burden is relatively 
high in Australia when considered against comparable jurisdictions? 
• Are there examples where it can be demonstrated that the costs of regulation 
affecting the financial system are outweighing the benefits? 
• Are there examples where a more tailored approach could be taken to regulation; 
for example, for smaller ADIs? 
• Are there regulatory outcomes that could be improved, without adding to the 
complexity or volume of existing rules? 
• Could data collection processes be streamlined? 
• If new data is required, is there existing data reporting that could be dropped?  
• Instead of collecting new data, could more be made of existing data, including 
making more of it publicly available? 
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Regulatory perimeters 
The perimeters of financial sector regulation establish the population regulated within 
the prudential, conduct18 and retail payments frameworks. Each framework has 
unique objectives and, to the extent possible, should be clear and targeted. 
Prior to the Wallis Inquiry, financial system regulators supervised by type of financial 
institution rather than regulatory function. The Wallis Inquiry sought to simplify the 
structure19 and redefine perimeters through the concept of ‘intensity of promise’.20 The 
RBA retained responsibility for stability of the financial system and for regulating the 
payments sector via the new PSB.  
Today, the Wallis Inquiry’s structure remains; however, it has been adjusted for new 
and evolving markets, services and products. For example, the development of 
financial groups has resulted in adjustments to how the frameworks apply. Standards 
have also been developed under the licensing regime for clearing and settlement 
systems. Financial market infrastructure (FMI), such as central counterparties and 
securities settlement systems, is now regulated and overseen under a framework based 
on international standards.  
An illustrative summary of the perimeter for each framework is depicted in Figure 7.2. 
                                                          
18 Conduct regulation refers to both regulating markets and the conduct of market participants 
and other financial product providers. 
19 The Wallis Inquiry merged 11 Federal and state regulatory organisations to create APRA, 
including parts of the RBA responsible for banking regulation.  
20 The Wallis Inquiry held that “the higher the intensity of a promise, the stronger the case for 
regulation to reduce the likelihood of breach”. 
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Figure 7.2: Current regulatory perimeters – illustrative summary by 
institution/activity type 
 
Market developments and stakeholder consultations suggest re-examining the 
perimeters for:  
• Prudential regulation — consider the case for prudential versus conduct 
regulation of superannuation funds. 
• Retail payment systems — consider a simplified and/or graduated framework 
with clear and transparent thresholds. 
• Conduct regulation — consider the case to extend regulation for fund 
administrators and technology service providers of sufficient scale and apply 
select market integrity rules to securities dealers. 
Observation 
The regulatory perimeters could be re-examined in a number of areas to ensure each 
is targeted appropriately and can capture emerging risks. 
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Prudential regulation of superannuation 
The growing importance of superannuation has warranted an in-depth treatment in 
this Inquiry, including re-examining the regulatory framework.  
Prudential regulation and supervision has costs, both in terms of direct regulatory 
costs and costs to efficiency and competition. However, prudential regulation also 
brings benefits to the economy, as discussed in the Stability chapter. 
The Wallis Inquiry recognised that superannuation and managed investments were 
operationally equivalent, but recommended that superannuation’s unique 
characteristics provided a case for prudential regulation: the compulsory nature of 
some superannuation savings, the lack of choice for a large proportion of members, the 
mandatory long-term nature of superannuation, and the contribution to 
superannuation of tax revenue forgone.  
In the past 15 years, the superannuation industry has grown and evolved to reach 
more than $1.8 trillion in assets under management.21 Superannuation is now the 
second largest sector after banking and is continuing to grow rapidly. The wealth 
management divisions of financial institutions have also grown, resulting in a greater 
degree of vertical integration. Large financial groups with a material cross-industry 
presence account for approximately 40 per cent of total superannuation assets.22 The 
Superannuation chapter provides further detail on this sector. 
On the one hand, imposing higher-intensity regulation and supervision comes at a 
cost, potentially affecting long-term returns to superannuation members. On the other 
hand, the unique characteristics of superannuation that the Wallis Inquiry recognised 
have largely persisted. This includes the expectation that superannuation is integral to 
the retirement income system. 
Preliminary assessment 
APRA’s prudential regulation of superannuation involves promoting safety and 
soundness in business behaviour and risk management on the part of trustees and 
superannuation funds. The primary supervisory focus is on the soundness of the 
governance arrangements, the competence and effectiveness of the trustee board and 
senior management, and the risk management and control framework. Where 
necessary, it also involves remediation and enforcement activities.  
                                                          
21  Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) 2014, Quarterly Superannuation 
Performance (interim edition), March 2014, APRA, Sydney. 
22  Ibid. 
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Registered managed investment schemes (MISs) and their operators (responsible 
entities) are regulated by ASIC with similar aims and, in some areas, broadly similar 
requirements to superannuation entities.23 
Differences lie predominantly in the intensity of the requirements applying to 
governance and risk management and the intensity of supervision applied in respect of 
these standards. Differences also exist in the requirements for financial resources, 
reserving and liquidity (see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Differences in regulatory requirements for MISs and 
APRA-regulated superannuation funds 
  Managed investment schemes  APRA‐regulated superannuation funds 
Financial 
resources 
Net tangible assets (NTA) 
requirement — where scheme 
property is not held by a custodian, 
the responsible entity (RE) is 
required to have a minimum NTA 
of an amount between $150,000 and 
$5 million or, if greater, 10 per cent 
of average RE revenue. Where held 
by a custodian, it is required to have 
NTA of at least $10 million, or if 
higher, 10% of the custodian’s 
average revenue.  
Cash needs requirement for REs — 
requirements for projecting cash 
flows over 12 months  
Operational risk financial requirement 
— required reserve against operational 
risk losses.  
APRA expects a reserve of at least 
0.25 per cent of funds under management 
to be held by the trustee or 
APRA-regulated fund. There is some 
offsetting of this allowed within groups. 
Liquidity  REs are able to freeze scheme 
redemptions in certain 
circumstances if the scheme 
becomes illiquid — as occurred 
during the GFC for some schemes. 
APRA — regulated funds are required to 
have a liquidity management plan.  
Legislated portability requirement — 
funds must meet rollover requests within 
three days.  
Although not directly comparable, the MIS NTA requirements may be higher for 
smaller entities, whereas the superannuation operational risk requirement is likely to 
be higher for larger entities. The liquidity management requirements for MISs are not 
as detailed as those for superannuation, and MIS liquid assets include such assets as 
                                                          
23  Some managed investment schemes are not required to be registered with ASIC. For 
example, schemes with only certain classes of wholesale members. 
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property. MISs do not have the legislative portability requirements that apply for 
superannuation and which affect the liquidity needs for superannuation.  
Applying prudential regulation to superannuation is likely to impose additional costs. 
However, low levels of loss in the sector are a significant benefit that may justify or 
outweigh these costs. In the past decade, there have been lower levels of failure and 
loss in the prudentially regulated superannuation sector than in the MIS sector. In 
APRA-regulated superannuation, compensation is available to cover loss arising in 
cases of fraud, whereas there is no statutory compensation for MISs. Where there has 
been fraud, superannuation industry-funded compensation has been provided, and 
where there has been loss due to market movement, members have borne the loss. 
The existing regulatory arrangements for superannuation reflect a number of 
differences between superannuation and MISs. This includes that superannuation is 
integral to retirement income policy, which is explicitly recognised through taxation 
incentives, mandatory participation in the system and restricted access prior to 
retirement.  
Some stakeholders argue that prudentially regulating superannuation can lead to 
members having a greater expectation of Government support, and this can lead to 
moral hazard for the Government. Another concern is that imposing higher-intensity 
regulation and supervision comes at a cost, potentially affecting long-term returns to 
superannuation members. System inefficiencies can also be created by the complexity 
of having different regulatory arrangements for large financial groups that provide 
both superannuation and managed investments. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that most members are not aware of the regulation 
that applies to superannuation, and members’ expectations of Government support for 
a failure in superannuation are linked to other characteristics such as its mandatory 
nature. Low levels of non-market losses in superannuation may offset additional costs 
of prudential regulation. It can also be argued that higher standards on 
superannuation trustees are appropriate to address reduced market discipline, 
potentially arising from the mandatory nature of superannuation. Prudential 
regulation takes a group-wide view and the high proportion of large financial groups 
with a material cross-industry presence, means that groups that contain 
superannuation benefit from consistency in governance and risk management 
standards and common supervisory practices.  
The Inquiry is interested in views on whether there is a strong case for change.  
Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry seeks views on whether the regulation of APRA-regulated superannuation 
trustees and funds should be aligned with responsible entities and management 
investment schemes.  
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With respect to prudential regulation, the Inquiry also seeks views on establishing a 
mechanism to adjust the prudential perimeter to apply heightened regulatory and 
supervisory intensity to institutions or activities that pose systemic risks. The Stability 
chapter provides further detail on this option. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Align regulation of APRA-regulated superannuation trustees and funds with 
responsible entities and registered management investment schemes.  
Retail payment systems regulation 
Payment systems regulation has two functions: 
1. It seeks to address systemic risk and promote stability, thereby limiting failure and 
disruption to essential payment services within the financial system. In this case, 
the focus is primarily on high-value payment systems.  
2. It has a focus on competition and efficiency in payment systems. In this case, the 
focus is on retail payment systems, such as the card systems, where a large number 
of low-value payments are processed.  
Regulatory perimeter issues are more likely to arise in the latter case.  
In recent years, market and technological developments have gathered pace in the 
payments sphere. It is important that regulatory settings are well calibrated to prevent 
disruption, but also allow for continued innovation.  
A number of submissions suggest re-examining the current regulatory framework for 
retail payment systems, specifically in relation to: 
• Simplifying the current framework 
• Inconsistent treatment of like products, that may result in an unlevel playing field 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
3-104 
Preliminary assessment 
Simplify the current framework 
The complex structure of retail payment systems, and the level of public interaction 
with them, has resulted in the sector’s regulation being fragmented. Part of the 
complexity comes from the fact that regulation needs to be considered separately for: 
• The payment systems – the rules, infrastructure and arrangements that enable 
payments to be exchanged; for example, a card payment scheme 
• Payment system participants — the entities (in most cases financial institutions) that 
provide the services of a particular payment system to the public; for example, an 
issuer of credit cards under the rules of a card payment scheme  
Submissions, particularly those from non-ADI payment participants, argue that the 
current regulatory framework is fragmented and unnecessarily complex due to the 
number of regulators providing oversight of retail payment activities. Although there 
are a number of regulators, this is not inconsistent with regulation in other areas of the 
financial system.  
The sector is currently subject to regulation by the RBA, APRA, ASIC and Australian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). Each regulator has its own 
definitions and concepts relating to payment systems and provides a number of 
disparate exemptions. See the Technological innovation and Competition chapters for 
additional discussion of payments regulation. 
Unlevel playing field 
Submissions have also raised concerns with an unlevel playing field for providers.  
The PSB regulates both retail and wholesale payment systems. The PSB’s approach is 
to encourage industry to undertake reform as required, and it has therefore not 
licensed and regulated every payment system. Instead, it has designated specific 
systems where there are concerns with respect to stability, competition or efficiency.  
Concerns with regard to an unlevel playing field may also relate to participants that 
are not supervised by APRA being permitted to participate in a payment system.  
One example of potential inconsistent treatment relates to stored value payment 
systems (purchase payment facilities or PPFs in the Australian legislation), which 
among other things may include prepaid cards and ‘mobile money’. These systems 
differ from other payment systems because they have a deposit-like element — a 
function that is the focus of APRA and RBA’s regulatory responsibilities, rather than 
the payment function per se. 
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In its submission, the RBA supports a closer look at the regulatory status of stored 
value systems, given that they hold customer funds and there is the potential for 
increased adoption via mobile devices and e-wallets. 
The RBA is also monitoring the development and growth of open-loop virtual 
currencies in Australia.24 ASIC considers that virtual currencies are not, of themselves, 
financial products. However, where payments are enabled in a virtual currency, such 
as wallet software, these may be financial products. Further consideration should be 
given to whether these kinds of arrangements should be regulated. Presently, there is 
considerable divergence internationally in the way virtual currencies are treated for 
regulatory purposes. 
Submissions also raise AML and Know Your Client (KYC) verification as a potential 
concern. New technologies in payments are also testing the perimeter of AML 
legislation. With the growth in a range of stored value systems, which could be used to 
launder money, this may develop into an issue. Strengthening the perimeter for 
transaction activity is on AUSTRAC’s agenda, including ongoing discussions with 
regulators in other jurisdictions. 
Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry would welcome views on opportunities to simplify or streamline the 
current regulatory framework. 
In establishing a level playing field for retail payment systems and participants, the 
RBA supports a review of the regulation of PPFs (including stored value payment 
systems) to provide adequate protection of customer funds. The submission notes that 
imposing regulation equivalent to ADIs on these players could be onerous, and a 
graduated framework may be more appropriate. 
A graduated framework should consider aligning risk and the scale of activities with 
compliance requirements. Such a framework could be tiered with clear thresholds for 
when an activity or participant becomes regulated. Thresholds should take account of 
the risk posed by unregulated new entrants and new technologies weighed against the 
costs of imposing regulation and its potential effects on innovation and competition. 
Regulation should also aim to apply to any payment system or participant in a 
technology-neutral manner. 
                                                          
24 Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 229. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Consider a graduated framework for retail payment system regulation with clear 
and transparent thresholds.  
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Is there firm evidence to support opportunities for simplifying the regulatory 
framework for retail payment systems and participants?  
• What are practical and appropriate options to simplify the current regulatory 
framework for retail payment systems and participants? 
Conduct regulation: fund administrators and technology 
service providers 
There are a number of areas where risks may be developing outside the conduct 
perimeter, specifically in relation to service providers of scale. Further, market 
integrity rules do not apply to securities dealers. 
Preliminary assessment 
Service providers of scale 
Some service providers outside the regulatory perimeter are of such size and potential 
influence that service disruption or failure would affect regulated institutions. There 
are requirements on regulated entities to ensure certain standards. However, with 
service providers of scale, there may be a case for considering direct regulation. As for 
all regulation, the costs and benefits of doing so need to be carefully considered to 
ensure undue burdens are not imposed. Two potential direct regulation cases include 
administrators and technology service providers of scale.  
Administrators of scale  
The provision of fund or investment administration is not currently subject to direct 
regulatory oversight, although such providers often provide services to regulated 
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entities.25 Such administrators are used by trustees of superannuation funds, operators 
of MISs and investment platforms, investment companies and life companies. 
Many administrators service a significant number of funds, including self-managed 
superannuation funds (SMSFs). The industry is becoming more concentrated, and this 
trend is expected to continue. If an administrator of scale collapsed, this could cause 
disruption and loss for members of the superannuation funds and MISs reliant on the 
administrator.  
Requiring an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) for these entities would 
allow monitoring and minimum standards to be set.  
Technology service providers of scale 
A similar concern relates to vendors of IT systems relied on by market participants and 
financial market operators. If such an IT system failed, this could impede the fair and 
orderly operation of financial markets.  
Technology service providers are subject to limited oversight, as any obligations to 
have appropriate risk management systems and resources fall on regulated entities, 
rather than the vendors. With providers of scale, there may be a case for considering 
direct regulation. 
Requiring an AFSL for these entities would allow monitoring and minimum standards 
to be set.  
Securities dealers 
Securities dealers are AFSL holders that provide investor services. These dealers can 
provide services that are substantially similar to those provided by ‘market 
participants’ captured within ASIC’s regulatory perimeter. However, ASIC is currently 
unable to use market integrity–specific remedies to address misconduct by securities 
dealers, or their clients, in an equivalent manner to market participants. This includes 
suspicious trade reporting and market manipulation provisions.  
Policy options for consultation 
In relation to the conduct perimeter, the Inquiry has identified the following options 
for consideration:  
• Extend AFSL requirements to administrators and technology service providers of 
scale. Such an option has practical implementation challenges, including setting 
                                                          
25  Custodians are subject to AFSL requirements by ASIC, but this does not cover their activities 
as administrators. 
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clear and appropriate risk-based criteria to identify appropriate entities without 
imposing undue burden on all service providers.  
• Apply market integrity rules for licensed securities dealers that provide investor 
services substantially similar to market participants of a licensed financial market.  
• Create a mechanism to allow a heightened level of regulatory intensity to be 
applied where risk arises outside the conduct perimeter. This option also has 
practical implementation challenges, including setting clear and appropriate criteria 
for making determinations.  
The Inquiry seeks views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Impose AFSL requirements for providers of fund administration and technology 
service of sufficient scale.  
• Apply market integrity rules for licensed securities dealers that provide investor 
services substantially similar to market participants of a licensed financial 
market.  
• Introduce a mechanism to allow a heightened level of regulatory intensity to be 
applied where risk arises outside the conduct perimeter. 
Independence and accountability 
Observation 
Australia generally has strong, well-regarded regulators but some areas of possible 
improvement have been identified to increase independence and accountability. 
Strong, independent and accountable financial regulators are crucial to the efficient, 
stable and fair operation of the financial system. Independence is important to ensure 
supervisory effectiveness, maintain Australia’s reputation as a safe and attractive 
investment environment, and meet relevant international standards.  
To this end, independence should be maximised to the greatest extent possible, 
together with clear and robust accountability mechanisms that provide appropriate 
checks and balances. Balancing these objectives is challenging. 
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In practice, the degree of independence and accountability of regulators will not only 
depend on the legislative and institutional frameworks it will also depend on the 
culture of the regulatory agencies themselves. Independent regulators need to be 
equipped to withstand external pressure — both political pressure and undue industry 
influence. Accountable regulators need to be respectful in the way they discharge their 
powers and open to questioning, feedback and new ideas or evidence. 
Evidence suggests Australian regulators generally are independent from Government. 
APRA, ASIC and the RBA are established under statute to independently execute their 
mandate. For example, the APRA Act establishes APRA as an independent statutory 
authority charged with responsibility for prudential regulation of the financial sector. 
Thus, in evaluating areas for future improvement, the Inquiry has focused on 
operational independence and budgetary independence.  
Independence 
Preliminary assessment 
Operational independence — ministerial intervention 
The relevant Minister can give a direction to APRA, ASIC and the RBA. For example: 
• The Minister has the power to give a direction in writing to APRA or ASIC “about 
policies [they] should pursue, or priorities [they] should follow”.26 Ministers cannot 
give a direction about a particular case, but can direct ASIC to investigate a 
particular matter.  
• The Reserve Bank Act 1959 allows the Treasurer, with the advice of the Federal 
Executive Council, to determine the policy the RBA should adopt, if there is a 
difference of opinion as to whether the monetary and banking policy is “directed to 
the greatest advantage of the people of Australia”.27 
Historically, the value governments placed on independence has meant, the ministerial 
intervention power has only been used in rare and exceptional circumstances. The 
Inquiry was only able to find one example of its prior use: in 1992, the 
Attorney-General gave a direction to ASIC’s predecessor body, the Australian 
                                                          
26 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, s 12(1); Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority Act 1998, s 12(1). 
27  Reserve Bank Act 1959, s 11. 
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Securities Commission (ASC), to require increased cooperative arrangements between 
the Director of Public Prosecutions and the ASC.28 
In its 2012 report, the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of Australia 
found that, although such powers have rarely been used, their existence could 
potentially diminish APRA and ASIC’s ability to carry out their supervisory and 
regulatory functions effectively.29  
Whether or not the power is explicitly used, its existence can potentially encourage a 
regulator to follow the wishes of the Minister. This highlights the uneasy balance 
between accountability to Government and the independence of regulators.  
In New Zealand, the Ministerial directions power is less likely to erode regulator 
independence, as it relates only to broad performance goals, strategies and measures.  
The Inquiry seeks further views on whether Ministerial intervention powers erode 
regulator independence. If the Ministerial direction powers were to be removed or 
scaled back, additional accountability mechanisms could be introduced, as discussed 
in the Accountability section. 
Budgetary independence 
A number of principles underpin a best-case funding model for financial regulators:30 
• Total funding should be proportionate to the size, complexity and nature of the 
regulated population. This aligns regulatory funding to changes in the level of risk 
in the regulated population. 
• Regulatory costs should be proportionately borne by those contributing to the 
need for regulation or benefiting from that regulation. Proportional allocation of 
regulatory costs promotes the principle of horizontal equity: that market 
participants should be treated fairly, as outlined in the Australian Government’s 
guidelines on cost recovery models for regulators. 
• Funding should have a high degree of stability and certainty year to year. This 
promotes long-term planning and increases efficiencies by avoiding unnecessary 
short-term costs. 
                                                          
28  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2007, Annual Report, 2006–07, 
ASIC, Sydney, page 43. 
29  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF, 
Washington 
30  Oliver Wyman 2012, Regulatory Funding Models, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 
22 May. Referencing source: Department of Treasury and Finance 2010, Cost Recovery 
Guidelines, and IOSCO 2010, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. 
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• Funding should promote operational independence. This encourages effective 
and unbiased regulation. 
The suitability of the current funding models for ASIC and APRA are assessed below. 
It is important to note that the Inquiry has not assessed the adequacy of funding 
currently received by either ASIC or APRA. Rather, the assessment focuses on whether 
the funding models meet the principles underpinning a best-case funding model.  
ASIC 
An assessment against these principles suggests ASIC has a low degree of budgetary 
independence, with only a weak link between its regulatory functions and the way it is 
funded. 
Like APRA, ASIC’s funding level is decided by Government, but funds flow to ASIC 
from general revenue, rather than an industry-funded levy. Costs for ASIC are borne 
by the public, in proportion to their tax contributions. Members of the public, as 
beneficiaries of regulation, do not bear these costs in proportion to that benefit. 
Equally, market participants, who contribute to the need for regulation, generally do 
not bear its cost directly.  
Furthermore, industry fees are increasingly misaligned with the cost of ASIC 
performing its regulatory function. Funding is not proportionate to the level of risk in 
the industry. For example, ASIC notes: 
[It] costs ASIC about $108 million to regulate AFS licensees; however, ASIC collects … 
only $3.7 million in registry fees from AFS licensees, approximately 3.5% of the cost of 
regulation.31 
ASIC’s funding is more variable than APRA’s. ASIC’s ‘core’ funding levels have 
remained relatively stable, with a sufficient degree of certainty through the current 
new policy proposal (NPP) process. However, special purpose ‘non-core’ funding, 
which has a higher degree of uncertainty, has increased in the last few years.  
ASIC’s submission highlights significant differences between the forward projections 
of its budget expenditure and realised expenditure. The differences between the 
forward and realised expenditure constrain ASIC’s ability to forward plan in response 
to market and regulatory developments.  
In recent reviews of Australia’s financial system and regulatory framework, both the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the IMF raised concerns about ASIC’s lack of stable 
funding and inability to commit resources to longer-term projects. According to the 
                                                          
31  Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 52. 
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IMF, this limited degree of budgetary independence in turn inhibits ASIC’s ability to 
dedicate sufficient resources to conducting proactive supervision. Recent commentary 
from the IMF and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
generally supports a move towards an industry-funding model.  
Globally, most securities and markets regulators are employing industry funding–
based models.32 Adopting an industry-funding model, if designed carefully, may 
increase the degree of certainty in funding. Despite the advantages of an 
industry-funding model, a number of potential challenges require consideration. For 
example: 
• Cost of implementation on business.  
• Appropriately balancing costs and benefits between industry and the public, where 
the benefits are seen by some as a public good. 
• Method of allocating costs. Using levies gives rise to potential cross-subsidy 
concerns.  
APRA 
APRA’s budget is proposed by the APRA members and is determined by the 
Government as part of its budget deliberations. There is scope to improve the model 
for determining APRA’s funding. Changes to the funding model could increase 
stability year to year and promote operational independence. 
The Government primarily recoups the cost of prudential regulation from annual 
levies collected from supervised institutions, with a smaller contribution from interest 
earnings, fees for services and miscellaneous cost recoveries. Stakeholders are 
concerned about having insufficient time to comment on the Government’s annual 
proposed levies, expressing a desire for more detail on APRA’s costs and activities. 
Policy options for consideration 
The Inquiry has identified a range of options for addressing the issues discussed 
above. Views are also sought on maintaining the status quo. 
Move APRA and ASIC to a more autonomous budget and funding process 
Enhance the process for APRA’s budget approval 
APRA could be required to publish a comprehensive budget proposal with associated 
levy proposals and business plans each year, ahead of the Government’s annual 
budget process. 
                                                          
32  Oliver Wyman 2012, provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 16 June 2014. 
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The enhanced external consultation process would drive greater internal and external 
scrutiny of how APRA’s resources are allocated across its functions and opportunities 
for efficiencies. Under this process: 
• APRA would publish detailed budget projections for a multi-year period.  
• Industry and other stakeholders would receive an opportunity to comment on the 
budget proposals and the level of APRA resourcing proposed. 
• A final budget and levies proposal would then be submitted to Government for 
approval, including a summary of the comments from stakeholders and APRA’s 
response. Subsequently industry would be levied. 
Move ASIC to an industry funding model  
As discussed above, ASIC’s predominantly Government-funded model poses 
limitations in meeting the principles of a best-case funding model. There is a case for 
moving to an industry-funding model for ASIC, based on approaches taken in the 
United Kingdom, Canada and other jurisdictions. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Move ASIC and APRA to a more autonomous budget and funding process. 
Accountability 
Preliminary assessment 
Australian regulators are subject to similar external accountability arrangements to 
comparable peer jurisdictions. They are held accountable through a range of 
mechanisms, including Parliament, courts and tribunals, public media reporting and 
freedom of information, and reviews by international bodies, such as the IMF FSAP. 
The Inquiry recognises that there is room to further strengthen or implement new 
accountability mechanisms for regulators, particularly in light of proposals to increase 
independence. 
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Statement of Expectations and Statement of Intent 
The Uhrig Report33 recommended that Ministers should communicate Government’s 
expectations of statutory authorities, such as regulators, in a public written Statement 
of Expectations (SOE). Regulators respond to SOEs in a public written Statement of 
Intent (SOI), which outlines how the authority will meet the Government’s 
expectations. 
To date, SOEs issued in Australia do not provide strong guidance on the Government’s 
expectations about either regulatory outcomes to be achieved or risk tolerance. In turn, 
SOIs do not provide clear metrics or expectations against which regulators intend to 
measure their performance. Regulators are not required to report against the SOI on a 
regular basis, so it is difficult to monitor the extent to which expectations are being 
met. 
In contrast, New Zealand’s SOIs appear to be one of the principal accountability 
mechanisms for Crown entities. As such, they clearly articulate how regulators will 
meet the Government’s expectations. The New Zealand SOI process has the added 
advantage of being regular, systematic and transparent. 
Elements that would make Australia’s SOEs more effective could include: 
• Sufficient detail to address the regulator’s full range of responsibilities  
• A broad outline of the Government’s tolerance for risk in the financial system 
• A statement of the strategic direction the Government expects regulators to take 
Improving accountability through these mechanisms will require the development of a 
set of performance metrics that focuses on outcomes. 
Regulator efficiency 
The efficiency dividend is an important accountability tool that acts as a check on 
public sector growth. However, it is arguably a blunt instrument that is not well suited 
to smaller agencies with lower levels of discretionary costs. 
Both APRA and ASIC are subject to the ‘efficiency dividend’ requirements, including 
‘additional’ dividends imposed over and above the standard 1.25 per cent annual 
dividend. In particular, the imposition of ‘additional’ dividends increases budget 
uncertainty and variability for regulators, making it difficult to develop long-term 
strategic plans.  
                                                          
33 Uhrig, J 2003, Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
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Other issues 
Regulators’ activities are overseen by a number of bodies, including the Office of Best 
Practice Regulation (OBPR) in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the 
Auditor-General, and the Ombudsman. However, in general, these bodies are limited 
in their scope to make regulators accountable because they can only make 
recommendations, generally to the Minister or the regulator concerned. There may be 
some scope to bring together the roles of the Government authorities that oversee and 
ensure the accountability of regulators.  
At the same time, external bodies, such as the IMF, focus on the performance of the 
sector as a whole. This level of oversight does not involve in-depth reviews of the 
performance, culture and capabilities of individual regulators. Regular, frank and 
independent assessments of regulators’ performance would provide an additional 
accountability mechanism to industry, Government and the community. 
Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry acknowledges policy options need to consider the current accountability 
mechanisms already in place. Simply imposing new requirements in addition to 
existing ones is likely to result in some overlap. 
The Inquiry has identified a range of options for increasing regulator accountability.34 
Conduct periodic, legislated independent reviews of the performance and 
capability of regulators  
These legislated reviews would take account of whether regulators (ASIC, APRA and 
the PSB) were adequately balancing their respective objectives. The review would 
assess whether regulators could use their resources more efficiently and effectively. 
These reviews, performed by independent experts appointed by the Government, 
would have deep access to assess structural, organisational and cultural issues within 
the regulator.  
Regular reviews would build a strong evidence base for regulator performance, 
identify areas where capability could be improved and introduce a new accountability 
mechanism.  
Clarify the metrics for assessing regulatory performance 
A set of clear performance metrics for regulators could be a prerequisite for improving 
the SOE and SOI process. Various metrics may be good long-term indicators of 
                                                          
34 We note that the National Commission of Audit and the Productivity Commission have also 
highlighted a range of mechanisms for assessing regulator behaviour and accountability. 
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performance, but in the short to medium term may be too strongly impacted by other 
factors to be reliable indicators of performance. 
Enhance the role of SOEs and SOIs 
Consideration could be given to removing or modifying the Ministerial directions 
power, in favour of developing an SOE/SOI process modelled on the New Zealand 
system. Regulators would be expected to report annually against the Government’s 
expectations set out in the SOE. 
Additional options  
• Replace the efficiency dividend with tailored budget accountability mechanisms, 
such as regular audits and reviews to assess the regulators’ potential for savings. 
– Conduct regular audits of agency efficiency as a basis for developing, 
maintaining and reporting against efficiency measures. For example, to assess 
the potential for savings within the agencies and the level of funding needed. 
– Require regulators to establish and publish appropriate performance and 
efficiency measures to strengthen accountability. This is consistent with the 
requirements of the new Public Governance, Performance and Accountability 
Act 2013, which will come into force on 1 July 2014. From 1 July 2015, regulators 
and other government entities covered by the new legislation will be required to 
publish an annual corporate plan, covering strategic objectives, strategies to 
achieve them and an environmental risk assessment.  
– Match growth in expenditure to a relevant index, such as a wage cost index or 
CPI.35 
• Stakeholders have raised a number of policy options to improve the process for 
overseeing financial sector regulators. For example:  
– An Inspector-General of Regulation36 
– A unified oversight Government authority for financial regulators, combining 
the roles of the OBPR, Auditors-General, Ombudsman and other specialist 
bodies 
                                                          
35 Customer Owned Banking Association 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry, page 58. 
36  Australian Financial Markets Association and Business Council of Australia 2014, First round 
submissions to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements.  
• Conduct periodic, legislated independent reviews of the performance and 
capability of regulators. 
• Clarify the metrics for assessing regulatory performance. 
• Enhance the role of Statements of Expectations and Statements of Intent. 
• Replace the efficiency dividend with tailored budget accountability mechanisms, 
such as regular audits and reviews to assess the regulators’ potential for savings. 
• Improve the oversight processes of regulators. 
Regulator structure and coordination 
Australia’s regulatory structure and coordination mechanisms performed well during 
the GFC, contributing to Australia’s strong performance through the crisis. Following 
the GFC, other jurisdictions have adopted Australia’s ‘twin peaks’ approach, with 
separate prudential and conduct regulators.  
Submissions focused on coordination between the regulators, rather than their 
individual structures. 
Preliminary assessment 
Regulator cooperation and coordination 
Observation 
During the GFC and beyond, Australia’s regulatory coordination mechanisms have 
been strong, although there may be room to enhance transparency. 
The GFC demonstrated the importance of having strong coordination mechanisms to 
ensure domestic regulators form a consolidated view of risks in a particular sector and 
implement coordinated activities. Internationally, there has been a push to increase the 
coordination and cooperation mechanisms between domestic agencies. 
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A review of the Australian regulatory landscape highlights a clearly defined 
mechanism for cooperation and coordination actions between regulatory agencies. 
Underlying these structures is a culture of cooperation and collegiality.  
Based on the issues raised by submissions, the Inquiry’s assessment of regulator 
cooperation and coordination mechanisms has focused on the role, transparency and 
accountability of the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR). There was a strong sense 
from submissions that the CFR was the right body for high-level coordination, but that 
its role could be strengthened. 
The Inquiry notes that beyond the CFR, a number of other mechanisms promote 
effective inter-agency cooperation and coordination on financial sector policy and 
enforcement issues through, for example, overlapping representation on the agencies’ 
boards and bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOU) between CFR members. 
Role and responsibilities of CFR 
The CFR provides a forum for the main financial system agencies (i.e. the RBA, APRA, 
ASIC and Treasury) to facilitate coordination and information exchange on financial 
sector policy issues. As specified in its Charter, the CFR’s ultimate objective is to 
contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation, by providing a 
high-level forum for cooperation and collaboration.  
The CFR has proven to be a flexible, low-cost approach to coordination.37 The current 
structure also provides for frank discussion and collaboration between its members. 
Importantly, the CFR has no regulatory functions separate from those of its members. 
Submissions point to the interactions between the regulatory agencies and Treasury as 
being inclusive and fostering knowledge transfer, promoting the CFR’s effectiveness. 
The CFR is also recognised internationally as a well-functioning coordination 
mechanism: the IMF has highlighted that the CFR plays a key role in coordinating 
financial regulation and stability issues.  
However, submissions raise issues with the CFR’s membership, transparency and 
accountability. Some stakeholders recommend the CFR should not be given any 
additional responsibilities beyond coordination, as this would dilute and blur the 
responsibilities of individual regulators. The following discussion addresses these 
points. 
                                                          
37 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2012, 
Macroprudential Analysis and Policy in the Australian Financial Stability Framework, Australia. 
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Membership 
The Inquiry recognises that the four CFR members do not have direct responsibility to 
address some objectives relevant to the financial system; for example:  
• Anti-competitive behaviour — regulated by the ACCC 
• AML and counter-terrorism financing — regulated by AUSTRAC 
• Compliance-based regulation of SMSFs — regulated by the ATO  
However, broad inter-agency cooperation and coordination mechanisms enable the 
four CFR member agencies to seek input from other agencies as required. To the extent 
the CFR members see relevance in doing so, other agencies are invited to participate in 
Council meetings. For example, the ACCC has been invited to participate on issues 
relating to contestability and competitiveness.  
Transparency and accountability  
The CFR has a website with information on how it operates, as well as publications by 
its members. In addition, many of the issues discussed by the CFR to date are reported 
on in the RBA’s semi-annual Financial Stability Review, with input from other CFR 
member agencies.  
Policy options for consultation  
There are a range of options for potentially increasing the role, transparency and 
external accountability mechanisms of the CFR. If options were pursued, it would be 
important that the CFR remained a vehicle for coordination and cooperation, and did 
not assume powers that appropriately sit with the relevant member agencies. 
Formalise the role of the CFR within statute 
Some submissions suggest legislating the CFR’s powers and functions. On one hand, 
legislating the CFR would mandate continued inter-agency cooperation if informal 
collaboration breaks down in the future. On the other hand, the RBA’s submission 
highlights that the CFR is best seen as the collaborative dimension of the regulatory 
agencies’ activities, rather than as a separate body with its own ability to make the 
regulatory agencies cooperate.  
A number of factors should be considered before pursuing this option. In particular: 
• Legislation cannot be relied on to promote a culture of cooperation, trust and 
mutual support between domestic regulatory agencies. These have been 
highlighted as essential elements of an effective financial stability framework, 
especially during a crisis.  
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• If powers were formalised in statute, this could suggest that the regulatory 
functions are separate from those of its members and could engender confusion as 
to whether the regulatory agencies’ obligations to coordinate arose from their 
respective charters or that of the CFR. 
Increase CFR membership to include the ACCC, AUSTRAC and the 
ATO 
Some submissions felt consideration could be given to widening the CFR’s 
membership to include other financial sector regulators, such as the ACCC, AUSTRAC 
and the ATO, who are currently only invited to participate in Council meetings as and 
when required. Widening its membership would strengthen the Council’s ability to 
perform its role as a coordination body on a whole-of-sector basis.  
The effectiveness of the CFR relies on maintaining the clarity of its scope and frankness 
in discussions. For this purpose, extending its membership to other agencies with 
much broader mandates may divert its focus.  
Increase the reporting by the CFR 
To increase transparency and accountability, the CFR could produce a report each year 
setting out its activities for the year under review.  
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Consider increasing the role, transparency and external accountability 
mechanisms of the CFR: 
– Formalise the role of the CFR within statute.  
– Increase the CFR membership to include the ACCC, AUSTRAC and the ATO. 
– Increase the reporting by the CFR.  
Execution of mandate 
A range of factors impact a regulator’s ability to execute its mandate, in particular: 
• The scope and clarity of the regulator’s mandate and powers  
• Ability to attract and retain experienced and talented staff  
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• Sufficient, stable and clear funding, discussed in the Independence and accountability 
section 
Preliminary assessment 
Regulator mandates 
Observation 
Regulators’ mandates and powers are generally well defined and clear; however, 
more could be done to emphasise competition matters. In addition, ASIC has a 
broad mandate, and the civil and administrative penalties available to it are 
comparatively low in relation to comparable peers internationally. 
The competition mandates of Australian financial sector regulators compare 
favourably to international peers. For example: 
• APRA’s mandate, like that of Canada’s prudential regulator, includes an explicit 
reference to competition. New Zealand refers to competition less directly through 
efficiency, while the United Kingdom prudential mandate appears solely stability 
focused. 
• ASIC’s mandate is similar to peers, with the exception of the United Kingdom 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which has a specific objective to promote 
competition. 
However, more could be done to strengthen competition considerations through 
mechanisms other than amending the regulators’ mandates.  
As a conduct regulator in an advanced, complex economy, ASIC’s mandate is broad. 
The Inquiry seeks views on the breadth of ASIC’s mandate and whether this causes or 
exacerbates challenges for ASIC. 
Additionally, gaps in ASIC’s powers may reduce its ability to enforce market conduct 
regulation. 
Balancing objectives: competition 
The Inquiry recognises that, although the individual parts of Australia’s regulatory 
mandates are clear, they are not entirely unambiguous. Regulators are required to 
make judgements in balancing sometimes competing objectives. Submissions typically 
raise this issue in the context of competition. 
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Some submissions suggest that, in balancing objectives, APRA tends to prioritise 
stability above competition. APRA has stated that “the GFC has dispelled any 
simplistic notion that there is a ‘trade-off’ between financial stability and sustainable 
competition”.38 Some stakeholders consider that APRA’s mandate should be adjusted 
to give more weight to competition and competitive neutrality. However, others reject 
the idea that there is too much focus on stability. For example, APRA’s policy-making 
process demonstrates its routine consideration of competition issues. Additionally, 
APRA’s discussion papers and responses to submissions contain references to 
competition where a proposal may have an effect on competition or where the 
industry has raised competition concerns in submissions. 
Submissions, including from ASIC itself, also argue that ASIC should be given a 
mandate to promote competition. However, like APRA, ASIC’s mandate with respect 
to competition is broadly similar to international peers, with the exception of the 
United Kingdom FCA, which has been given a mandate to promote competition, 
rather than take account of efficiency. 
Breadth of mandate: ASIC 
ASIC’s mandate broadly covers two areas: 
1. Financial markets, financial services and corporate regulation 
2. Business and company registration  
ASIC’s powers and responsibilities in the first area are broadly consistent with 
financial conduct regulators in other jurisdictions, although most do not have the 
extent of ASIC’s coverage. Some regulators are moving closer to the ASIC model; for 
example, the United Kingdom FCA is now taking over responsibility for consumer 
credit.  
ASIC’s responsibilities in the second area are unique compared to conduct regulators 
overseas. 
ASIC’s mandate has grown considerably over the last two decades, generally in 
response to major reform processes and reviews (see Figure 7.3). In the first instance, 
the Wallis Inquiry saw significant benefits in having investor and consumer protection 
within the one agency, especially given the growing inter-linkages between different 
financial products and services. Subsequent expansions have also been the outcome of 
policy reforms designed to ensure greater consistency in regulation for both consumers 
                                                          
38 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry, page 26. 
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and businesses; for example, the move of consumer credit from a fragmented, 
state-based regulatory system to a single national regulator. 
The responsibilities in ASIC’s registry business have also expanded; for example, 
through the recent takeover of business name registration from the states and 
territories. 
Thus, ASIC now manages a diverse range of tasks and therefore requires a cultural and 
skills mix that allows it to perform supervision, business guidance, consumer 
education, law enforcement and corporate registry. One issue is whether these 
increased responsibilities have been sufficiently matched by increased resources. 
Figure 7.3: Breadth of ASIC mandate 
 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
3-124 
The Inquiry notes the Senate inquiry into the performance of the ASIC which is 
currently underway. Relevant findings will be considered by the Inquiry in the lead-up 
to the Inquiry’s final report. 
Given the breadth of ASIC’s mandate, it can be argued that ASIC has too many 
regulatory functions, with staff spread between too many responsibilities. It is possible 
that narrowing ASIC’s mandate may allow it to become a more tightly focused 
regulator and target higher-risk entities, although there are also benefits and 
efficiencies from bringing together similar functions. 
Some stakeholders have raised the option to split consumer protection functions from 
conduct and market integrity functions.  
Some stakeholders suggest generic consumer regulation contained in the ASIC Act 
could be moved to the ACCC. The main challenge with this option would be drawing 
a clear line between generic consumer protection provisions and specific provisions 
tailored to financial products and services. 
Other stakeholders have suggested moving industry-specific consumer regulation, 
which includes relevant licensing regimes, either to a new, specialised consumer and 
conduct regulator or to the ACCC. This would leave ASIC responsible for corporate 
regulation, and markets and wholesale activity. 
Both these options could potentially lead to duplication and issues of boundary 
definition, and would mean that the agency acquiring the new responsibilities would 
need to develop (or acquire from ASIC) the relevant financial services expertise. 
Other options include:  
• Splitting market supervisory activities (i.e. FMI and participants licensing and 
oversight) into a specialised market supervisor 
• Moving insolvency functions to the Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA) 
• Moving the registry function out of ASIC 
Regarding this last option, the Government has already announced a scoping study 
into options for future ownership of this function. Arguably, the registry function 
aligns least well with other core ASIC functions. 
It may also be possible to increase the emphasis on oversight of self-regulating bodies. 
This would allow ASIC to lift its focus to higher-level breaches and leave lower-level 
investigations to industry bodies. ASIC itself has raised this possibility, but has noted 
that this depends on the capacity of these bodies to police their own members. 
As for any proposed changes, significant evidence or arguments for change would be 
needed. The Inquiry generally opposes creating new regulatory bodies. 
Enforcement powers: ASIC 
Regulators require a sufficient set of powers to execute their mandate and foster 
credibility with the market. Given the size and diversity of the regulated population, 
ASIC cannot conduct the intensive supervision typically performed by a prudential 
regulator.  
Post-GFC Regulatory Response – Regulatory architecture 
3-125 
Enforcement sends a deterrent message to industry and is an important aspect of the 
consumer regulatory framework. Effective supervision and enforcement builds trust 
and confidence in the financial system. However, ASIC cannot pursue all complaints 
received. Its enforcement activity targets areas of strategic priority and incidents with 
evidence or likelihood of consumer detriment. 
When applying the market conduct and disclosure framework, ASIC’s submission 
demonstrates that criminal penalties in Australia appear to be broadly consistent with 
overseas regimes, but civil and administrative penalties are comparatively low, as 
shown in Table 7.2 below. 
ASIC’s mandate also has important gaps when compared to major domestic and 
international jurisdictions. For non-criminal proceedings, ASIC does not have the 
power of disgorgement available in Canada, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. ASIC cannot impose fines on AFSL holders, although it can suspend or 
revoke their licence. Penalties available to the ACCC are higher than those available to 
ASIC. 
Table 7.2: Comparison of Australian and overseas jurisdictions’ civil and 
administrative penalties for individuals (AUD) 
 Insider 
trading 
Market 
manipulation 
Disclosure  False 
statements 
Unlicensed 
conduct 
Inappropriate 
advice 
Australia Civil: 
$200,000 
Civil: $200,000 Civil: 
$200,000 
– – Civil: 
$200,000 
Canada Admin: 
$1.05 
million 
Admin: $1.05 
million 
Admin: 
$1.05 
million 
Admin: 
$1.05 
million 
Admin: 
$1.05 
million 
Admin: $1.05 
million 
Hong 
Kong 
Admin: 
unlimited 
– Admin: 
$1.12 
million 
– – Admin: $1.4 
million, or 3 
times the 
benefit gained 
United 
Kingdom 
Civil and 
admin: 
unlimited 
Civil and 
admin: 
unlimited 
Civil and 
admin: 
unlimited 
Civil and 
admin: 
unlimited 
– Admin: 
unlimited 
United 
States 
Civil: 
three 
times the 
benefit 
gained 
Civil: greater 
of $111,000 or 
the benefit 
gained 
Civil: 
greater of 
$111,000 
or the 
benefit 
gained 
Civil: 
greater of 
$111,000 
or the 
benefit 
gained 
Civil: 
greater of 
$111,000 or 
the benefit 
gained 
Admin: 
$83,850 
 
Source: ASIC.39 
                                                          
39 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry, page 48. 
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Talent management 
Observation 
To be able to perform their roles effectively in accordance with their legislative 
mandate, regulators need to be able to attract and retain suitably skilled and 
experienced staff. 
Regulators face challenges in recruiting and retaining staff, given regulatory staff 
remuneration falls short of salaries in the industry they regulate, and against whom 
they compete for personnel. Another hurdle is the perception that APRA and ASIC’s 
operational independence and effectiveness is unduly hampered by public sector 
operating constraints. For example: 
• The public service enterprise bargaining process, and the constraints it imposes on 
APRA and ASIC’s abilities to negotiate an appropriate enterprise agreement with 
their staff, have created uncertainty for APRA and ASIC staff with respect to future 
remuneration and advancement opportunities. The constraints on APRA and 
ASIC’s abilities to set terms and conditions for staff may detract from the 
regulators’ ability to attract and retain qualified staff. 
• ASIC has advised that the inflexibilities involved in Australian public service 
employment under the Public Service Act 1999 can make it difficult for ASIC to 
shape the workforce and culture that it requires to meet the organisation’s 
priorities. Examples of inflexibilities relate to: 
– Classification and remuneration of staff 
– Length of employment of temporary staff 
– Management decisions affecting staff 
– The terms and conditions of any enterprise agreement  
Unlike ASIC, neither APRA nor the RBA are subject to the Public Service Act 1999. 
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Policy options for consultation 
Strengthening of competition considerations through mechanisms other 
than amending the regulators’ mandates 
The Inquiry seeks views on the following options to emphasise competition matters 
beyond amending mandates:  
• Requiring the RBA to report every three years on the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the Australian financial system. 
• Appointing an additional APRA member or establishing another mechanism for 
considering the impacts of regulatory intervention on competition. APRA’s view is 
that appointing an additional member would be counter to best-practice 
governance principles, under which all members are responsible for decisions.  
• Requiring APRA’s annual report to include a section on competition.  
Introducing stronger accountability mechanisms for the regulators could assist in 
ensuring all existing objectives are given due consideration.  
Refine the scope and breadth of ASIC’s mandate 
Options for narrowing ASIC’s mandate could include moving consumer protection 
functions to the ACCC or a new financial consumer protection agency, creating a new 
financial services and conduct regulator, creating a new specialised market supervisor, 
moving insolvency functions to AFSA and removing the registry function. 
Review the penalty regime in the Corporations Act 
A stronger penalty regime could strengthen the impact of ASIC’s enforcement action 
and provide a more effective deterrent message against misconduct. A review of 
penalties under ASIC-administered legislation could explore: 
• The adequacy of maximum criminal penalties 
• The availability and level of civil penalties, including the potential of using 
multiples of benefit obtained and converting the current maximums into penalty 
units 
• The availability of administrative penalties 
• Introducing disgorgement in non-criminal proceedings to remove any financial 
benefit, including profits or avoided losses, obtained illegally 
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• Whether the infringement notice regime should be expanded to cover more 
contraventions 
Review mechanisms to attract and retain staff, including terms and 
conditions 
The incentives and remuneration necessary to attract the highest quality pool from 
which to select and retain regulator staff could be broadened. A range of policy 
options follow to achieve this outcome. 
APRA and ASIC should have flexibility regarding the terms and conditions under 
which they employ staff and determine remuneration. One option for providing this 
flexibility would be to exempt APRA and ASIC from the public sector bargaining 
framework and, to the extent it applies, the Public Service Act.40 APRA and ASIC could 
strengthen transparency and accountability in this area by providing appropriate 
additional information on remuneration levels and other staffing metrics (such as 
projected staff levels) in annual reports. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Strengthen competition considerations through mechanisms other than 
amending regulators’ mandates. 
• Refine the scope and breadth of ASIC’s mandate. 
• Review the penalty regime in the Corporations Act. 
• Review mechanisms to attract and retain staff, including terms and conditions. 
 
                                                          
40  Note the starting positions of the two regulators are different: APRA is subject to the public 
sector bargaining framework, but is exempt from the Public Service Act employment 
conditions. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Are changes needed to strengthen and/or refocus ASIC? 
• Is the current enforcement regime adequate? Does ASIC have adequate powers? 
• Are there alternative mechanisms for promoting better consideration of 
competition within financial sector regulation? 
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Emerging Trends 
Over the coming decades, Australia will confront a number of continuing trends as 
well as new drivers of change for the financial system, creating both opportunities 
and risks. These changes include our ageing population, technological change and 
Australia’s international integration. To varying degrees, these trends are already 
manifesting themselves. 
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8: Retirement income 
Australians save for retirement during their working years. When they retire, they 
use their accumulated wealth to generate income and help manage risks over the 
remainder of their lives. They require appropriate financial products and services to 
help them achieve their retirement goals. 
There is an opportunity for financial and policy innovation to deliver better 
outcomes for retirees and assist Australia to meet the challenge of an ageing 
population. This chapter explores some of the weaknesses of the retirement income 
system and impediments to the development of new products. In particular, 
longevity risk is not currently managed efficiently. 
The Inquiry has made the following observations about Australia’s retirement 
income system: 
• The retirement phase of superannuation is underdeveloped and does not meet 
the risk management needs of many retirees. 
• There are regulatory and other policy impediments to developing income 
products with risk management features that could benefit retirees. 
Context 
Approach to retirement income 
Australia has an inconsistent approach to its retirement income system. Policy related 
to the accumulation phase is based on the premise that many people underprovision 
for their retirement and are prone to behavioural biases, which motivates the use of 
default and compulsion arrangements. The policy settings for the decumulation (or 
drawdown) phase generally take a more laissez-faire approach. There is an implicit 
assumption that individuals have the capacity and options available to them to 
manage their income and risks in retirement. 
A large body of evidence in behavioural economics — much of which has emerged 
since the Wallis Inquiry — demonstrates that poor outcomes can emerge from complex 
decision making at critical junctures, such as for retirement. Making decisions to 
manage income and risks in retirement is complex, even for people with specialised 
financial training. As stated in the Consumer outcomes chapter, affordable and 
high-quality financial advice can bring significant benefits for retirees, and the quality 
of financial advice could be improved. 
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If superannuation benefits are not transformed into retirement income streams 
effectively, taxpayers ultimately carry significant risk in the form of higher Age 
Pension costs. 
Demographic challenge 
Australia faces a significant demographic challenge. The number of people aged 75 or 
older is expected to rise by 4 million between 2012 and 2060; this represents an increase 
from about 6½ to 14½ per cent of the population.1 The ageing population and higher 
life expectancy is expected to result in lower workforce participation rates, which will 
tend to lower the trend rate of growth in the economy and raise costs for governments. 
The life expectancy of Australians is among the longest in the world. For the first half 
of the 20th century, life expectancy for 65-year-olds was broadly constant, but it has 
increased by one to two years each decade since the 1970s. Life expectancy at age 65 is 
forecast to increase further (Chart 8.1). In 2014, the most commonly used life 
expectancy measure for a 65-year-old male is about 20 years.2 However, because of 
likely future improvements in longevity, 22 years is a more realistic estimate.3 
                                                          
1  Productivity Commission 2013, An Ageing Australia: Preparing for the Future, Productivity 
Commission, Canberra. 
2  Life expectancies are usually reported as ‘period’ life expectancies. Period life expectancies 
take into account improvements in mortality that have been observed to date but not 
projected future changes to mortality. They may therefore understate life expectancies.  
3  Australian Government Actuary 2014, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 
21 May 2014. 
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Chart 8.1: Life expectancy of a 65-year-old Australian male 
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Source: Australian Government Actuary.4 
The ageing population presents a major challenge for the financial system. Australia 
needs a suitable range of financial products and services to enable a greater number of 
individuals to manage income and risks in retirement and to help manage the 
transition from work to retirement. 
The ageing population also has implications for government finances. This will 
contribute to higher government costs from the Age Pension, health and aged care.  
The growing size of retirement assets 
The volume and proportion of superannuation assets held by retirees is forecast to 
increase substantially (Chart 8.2). This growth is due to the maturing superannuation 
system and population ageing.5 
                                                          
4  Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australian Life Tables 2005–07, Canberra. ‘Period’ life 
expectancies using 25-year mortality improvement factors.  
5  The superannuation system could be considered mature when retirees have benefited from 
contributions at the maximum Superannuation Guarantee rate over their entire careers. 
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Chart 8.2: Superannuation assets in the retirement phase 
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Source: Rice Warner.6 
Available products 
Currently, Australians who wish to convert their superannuation assets into an income 
stream within the tax-advantaged superannuation environment largely have the choice 
of two products: 
• Account-based pensions account for at least 94 per cent of current pension assets.7 
They allow retirees to choose their investment strategy. People can decide how 
much to draw down (subject to prescribed minimums), and they can make a lump 
sum withdrawal at any time. Most people draw down the minimum amount.8, 9 
Account-based pensions are offered by superannuation funds. 
• Annuities provide a guaranteed regular income stream for an upfront lump sum 
payment or a series of smaller payments. Retirees receive income over a specified 
time horizon (fixed-term annuities) or for the remainder of their life (lifetime 
                                                          
6  Rice Warner 2014, Ageing and capital flows, commissioned by the Actuaries Institute for the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
7  Plan for Life 2014, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 23 June 2014. 
8  Rothman, G and Wang, H 2013, ‘Retirement income decisions: Take up and use of Australian 
lump sums and income streams’, paper presented at the 21st Colloquium of Superannuation 
Researchers, Sydney, 9–10 July. 
9  The minimum drawdown rate to qualify for the tax exemption on earnings currently ranges 
from 4 per cent for those aged under 65 to 14 per cent for those aged over 95. 
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annuities). ‘Indexed annuities’ protect this income from the effects of inflation. 
Annuities are sold by life insurance companies. 
The current dominance of account-based pensions over annuities is due to a range of 
factors, including the flexibility of account-based pensions, which allow both lump 
sum withdrawals and residual assets for bequests, the perceived lack of value 
provided by annuities, and the fact that individuals can rely on the Age Pension to 
help manage longevity risk. 
International comparison 
A striking difference between Australia’s retirement income market and those of other 
developed countries is the size of its annuity market. According to the OECD, the size 
of Australia’s annuity market is only around 0.3 per cent of GDP, compared with 
28.8 per cent in Japan, 15.4 per cent in the United States, and more than 40 per cent of 
GDP in some European countries.10, 11 The Government bears much of Australia’s 
longevity risk by providing the Age Pension, which contributes to the low demand for 
longevity-protected income products. 
Implications for funding the economy 
The investment allocations underlying income stream products can affect aggregate 
demand for different assets and the depth of certain markets. This will become 
increasingly important as retirement assets increase. Current retirement income 
products invest in different ways: 
• Individuals with account-based pensions typically invest in portfolios that are 
evenly split between growth and defensive assets.12 
• Annuity liabilities are used to fund assets that are predominantly invested in fixed 
income investments, although a portion of these assets are infrastructure and 
property investments with appropriate characteristics, such as providing regular 
cash flows.13 
                                                          
10  OECD 2013, ‘Survey of Annuity Products and their Guarantees’, paper presented at the 
Insurance and Private Pensions Committee meeting, Paris, 5–6 December.  
11  The OECD defines size as the amount of assets backing products (where dedicated or 
separated accounts back the products) or technical provisions or reserves. 
12  Rice Warner 2014, Ageing and capital flows, commissioned by the Actuaries Institute for the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
13  Plan for Life 2014, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 18 March 2014. 
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Framework 
At retirement, individuals face complex decisions about whether and how to convert 
an accumulated superannuation balance to an income stream to fund their retirement. 
In this chapter, the retirement income system and products are assessed against how 
well they provide the three main attributes of income streams desired by retirees:14 
• Income — the expected income during retirement from a given accumulated 
balance.15 
• Risk management — including protection from longevity, investment and inflation 
risks. 
• Flexibility — a range of characteristics, including access to one-off withdrawals 
during retirement, the ability to bequeath assets and control over investments. 
The Inquiry is also considering the effects of retirement income system settings on the 
distribution of risk between the government and the private sector and, to some extent, 
the implications for future growth in fiscal costs. Fiscal sustainability is an important 
feature of any retirement income system, although it is not something that can be 
comprehensively examined in isolation from the rest of the government’s budget. 
The Inquiry is not considering a range of policy settings outside of, or peripheral to, 
the financial system, including the ages at which individuals can access their benefits 
and receive these benefits tax-free. 
The retirement income system 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
The retirement phase of superannuation is underdeveloped and does not meet the 
risk management needs of many retirees. 
                                                          
14  Similar features of income products, which create a ‘trilemma’ for retirees, are described in 
Mercer 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 23. 
15  The measure of ‘income efficiency’ used is based on a ‘value for money’ concept. It is the 
expected present value of income in retirement, as a percentage of a product’s purchase 
price. 
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Individuals are justifiably concerned about outliving their savings. As it is currently 
designed, the retirement income system does not adequately enable many individuals 
to manage their income and risks in retirement effectively.  
During the accumulation phase, employers make Superannuation Guarantee 
contributions automatically on behalf of employees, with defaults applying to those 
who are less engaged with the system. This framework effectively guides individuals 
through the accumulation phase. However, such a framework does not exist for the 
retirement phase. Instead, retirees make critical once-in-a-lifetime decisions regarding 
when and how to draw down their savings over the remainder of their lives. 
Individuals also have to manage the investment, inflation and longevity risks 
associated with these decisions. Many, but not all, individuals are unprepared for 
these important decisions. 
The lack of effective risk management, particularly longevity risk management, is a 
major weakness of Australia’s retirement income system. 
Assessment of current products 
As discussed in the Framework section of this chapter, retirees require income products 
that deliver three main features: income, risk management and flexibility. No product 
provides all of these features (Table 8.1). Account-based pensions are more flexible 
than annuities but provide much less risk management. Thus, current retirees benefit 
from two of the three features they need, but the majority do not effectively manage 
risk. 
Table 8.1: Features of retirement income products 
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One important feature of a retirement income product is the expected income it 
delivers during retirement from a given accumulated balance. In this report, ‘income 
efficiency’ is defined as the expected present value of this income as a percentage of 
the purchase price of the product. 
A lifetime annuity has an estimated income efficiency of 76 per cent for an average 
65-year-old male (for reasons discussed later in this chapter).16 The income efficiency of 
an account-based pension that is drawn down at the minimum rate for a 65-year-old 
male is around 70 per cent.17 The remaining funds in an account-based pension will 
typically be left to beneficiaries. 
There are trade-offs between income efficiency, flexibility and risk management. For 
example, a higher drawdown rate will increase the income efficiency of an 
account-based pension, as a larger portion of the pension is expected to be paid as 
income during the life of the retiree, but will increase the risk of outliving savings. 
Longevity risk 
Most individuals risk outliving their savings. Uncertainty around the length of time in 
retirement makes it difficult for people to manage their wealth efficiently. For example, 
although the life expectancy of a 65-year-old female today is about 89 years, 10 per cent 
of 65-year-old females will die before they reach 77 years and 10 per cent will live past 
100 years (Chart 8.3). 
                                                          
16  Ganegoda, A 2007, ‘Explaining the Demand for Life Annuities in the Australian Market’, 
Centre for pensions and superannuation, discussion paper, May 2007. 
17  Estimate provided to the Financial System Inquiry by the Australian Government Actuary, 
11 June 2014. 
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Chart 8.3: Distribution of cohort life expectancy for a 65-year-old 
female 
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Source: Australian Government Actuary.18 
This uncertainty makes it difficult for people to choose the ‘right’ rate at which to draw 
down their wealth from an account-based pension. Retirees risk either exhausting their 
retirement savings prematurely (and falling back on the Age Pension), or drawing 
down their benefits too conservatively and having a lower standard of living in 
retirement. 
Managing longevity risk on an individual basis can lead to a dynamically inefficient 
allocation of resources. To reduce the risk of outliving their assets, individuals need a 
higher savings rate during their working life to target a given level of consumption in 
retirement. This can lead to inefficiently low consumption during an individual’s 
working life. Alternatively, insufficient provisioning for retirement leads to 
inefficiently low levels of consumption in retirement. 
In Australia, the total cost of this inefficiency is likely to be substantial, given both the 
large number of people with account-based pensions who draw down their funds at 
the minimum rate, and the large proportion of older Australians receiving the Age 
Pension.19 The cost is largely borne by retirees and, to a lesser extent, the Government 
through the total cost of tax concessions and Age Pension payments. 
                                                          
18  Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australian Life Tables 2005–07, Canberra. Using 25-year 
mortality improvement factors. 
19  As discussed earlier, at least 94 per cent of pension assets are in account-based pensions and 
most drawdowns are at minimum rates. 
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A large body of evidence, including from surveys, supports the assertion that people 
value longevity risk protection. Results from one survey suggest that more than 
90 per cent of Australians over the age of 50 believe that ’money that lasts my lifetime’ 
is somewhat important or very important.20 Over half of respondents to another 
survey were either worried or extremely worried about outliving their savings.21 When 
asked to identify the single most important feature in a retirement income product, 
twice as many members in the accumulation phase identified ’income that lasts a 
lifetime‘ as identified the second most popular response. 
Lump sums 
Several submissions refer to Australia’s (real or perceived) ‘lump sum culture’ and call 
for a shift towards income streams and longevity risk management in retirement. 
In general, superannuation funds seek to maximise a member’s lump sum balance at 
retirement, rather than target a level of income in retirement. This is a common feature 
of defined contribution schemes globally. 
Around half of superannuation benefits in retirement are currently paid as lump 
sums.22 Close to half of retirees take a lump sum only — having never received an 
income stream payment.23 For people with small superannuation balances, taking the 
entirety of their benefits as a lump sum may be an optimal strategy because the income 
stream generated from a small balance is negligible and has relatively high costs and 
no tax advantages. However, as more people retire with higher account balances, there 
has been a gradual trend towards purchasing income stream products (Chart 8.4). 
                                                          
20  National Seniors Australia and Challenger 2013, Retirees’ needs and their (in)tolerance for risk, 
National Seniors Australia, Brisbane. 
21  Investment Trends 2013, December 2013 Retirement Income Report. Note: Based on a survey of 
5,730 Australians aged 40+. 
22  APRA 2013, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, June 2013 (revised 5 February 2014). 
23  Rothman, G and Wang, H 2013, ‘Retirement income decisions: Take up and use of Australian 
lump sums and income streams’, paper presented at the 21st Colloquium of Superannuation 
Researchers, Sydney, 9–10 July. 
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Chart 8.4: Superannuation benefit payments — lump sums and 
pensions 
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The ability to use superannuation lump sums to extinguish debt can encourage higher 
pre-retirement consumption and borrowing:25 
• Approximately 44 per cent of retirees who take a lump sum use it to pay off 
housing and other debts, to purchase a home, or make home improvements. 
• A further 28 per cent use their lump sum to repay a vehicle or holiday loan or to 
purchase a holiday or new vehicle. 
The number of households entering retirement with debt, particularly a mortgage, is 
increasing. 
                                                          
24  APRA 2013, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, June (revised 5 February 2014), APRA, Sydney. 
Lump sum benefit payments are benefit payments paid as a lump sum and includes (but is not 
limited to) retrenchment, redundancies, resignation and disability benefit payments. This 
item does not include lump sum rollovers or pension benefit payments. Pension benefit 
payments refer to benefits paid to members in the form of a pension and include complying 
pensions, allocated pensions and annuity payments. 
25  Rothman, G and Wang, H 2013, ‘Retirement income decisions: Take up and use of Australian 
lump sums and income streams’, paper presented at the 21st Colloquium of Superannuation 
Researchers, Sydney, 9–10 July. 
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Age Pension means-test 
The Age Pension means-test can distort financial decisions made before and during 
retirement. 
Butler, Peijnenburg and Staubli concluded that a pension means-test can substantially 
reduce demand for longevity insurance products.26 The Age Pension in Australia is the 
primary source of longevity insurance and is contributing to the low demand for 
market-based products that provide such insurance. 
Similarly, Hulley, McKibbin, Pedersen and Thorp found that means-tests for the public 
pension encourage eligible and near-eligible retirees to decumulate assets faster and 
choose riskier portfolios, especially early in retirement.27, 28 This distorts the amount of 
risk eligible and near-eligible retirees expose themselves to and shifts longevity risk to 
the Government. 
Stakeholders have suggested that some individuals with small- and medium-sized 
asset balances tend to structure their affairs around the Age Pension means-test. 
Indeed, maximising access to the Age Pension is (understandably) a central feature of 
financial advice for retirees. Mercer’s submission illustrates the reasons for this by 
looking at the case of ‘Fred’29: 
Fred is a single (home-owner) retiree with a $500,000 account based pension. He is 
drawing down the minimum 5 per cent of the account each year. By spending $100,000 
of his superannuation account on an overseas trip, Fred increases his age pension by 
$150 a fortnight ($3,900 a year). 
If he continues to draw down the minimum allowed from his account based pension, his 
withdrawals reduce by $5,000 a year meaning he is only $1,100 a year (or $21 per week) 
worse off after his $100,000 overseas trip. 
There is no empirical evidence of this behaviour on a large scale. However, a 
significant portion of superannuation savings are being depleted before reaching Age 
Pension age. On average, around one-third of superannuation assets are withdrawn by 
                                                          
26  Butler, M, Peijnenburg, K and Staubli, S 2011 ‘How Much Do Means-Tested Benefits Reduce 
the Demand for Annuities?’ CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3493, Munich. 
27  Hulley, H, McKibbin, R, Pedersen, A, and Thorp, S 2013, ‘Means-Tested Public Pensions, 
Portfolio Choice and Decumulation in Retirement’, Economic Record, Volume 89, Issue 284, 
pages 31–51. 
28  For people with large balances, there are tax incentives to decumulate assets more slowly. 
Slower drawdown also reduces the risk of outliving assets. The interaction of these effects 
differs depending on individual circumstances. 
29  Mercer 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 11. 
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the time an individual reaches the Age Pension eligibility age.30 Around one-quarter of 
people with a superannuation balance at age 55 have depleted their balance by age 
70.31 Aligning incentives with desired outcomes would tend to reduce the longevity 
risk borne by the Government. It would also improve the capacity of future 
Governments to provide the Age Pension to the many Australians who will need it in 
retirement. 
Defaults cease at retirement 
Many individuals are not required to interact with their superannuation fund during 
their working lives. Employers make Superannuation Guarantee contributions 
automatically on behalf of employees. If employees do not nominate a fund or 
investment option, contributions are made to a default fund chosen by the employer, 
and investment decisions are made by professionals. 
These superannuation defaults cease at retirement. Retirees make once-in-a-lifetime 
critical decisions about how to manage their assets, ideally to deliver an income stream 
and to manage effectively the associated investment, inflation and longevity risks. The 
consequences of a poor decision can be severe and costly to rectify; individuals 
typically have limited or no capacity to top up their funds after they retire. Benefits 
remain in a superannuation fund until an active decision is made. Assets held in a 
superannuation account are not used to provide income, and the returns on these 
assets are not exempt from tax. 
A number of studies have reported that Australians are unprepared for the financial 
decisions they need to make as they approach retirement. They know neither how 
much to save for retirement nor how to create income from their accumulated balance: 
most people in their 50s and 60s have not planned the main aspects of their 
retirement,32 and only one-third of accumulating superannuation members have heard 
of lifetime annuities.33 As discussed in the Consumer outcomes chapter, this highlights 
the importance of high-quality financial advice for retirees and those near retirement. 
Other countries with defined contribution schemes face similar challenges to those in 
Australia. The prestigious Squam Lake Working Group found that defined 
contribution schemes “place much greater burdens on consumers to make good 
                                                          
30  Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australia’s future tax system — The retirement income system: 
Report on strategic issues, Canberra. 
31  Bray, J 2013, ‘In the red and going grey? Wealth and debt as Australians approach Age 
Pension eligibility age and retirement’, Crawford School Research Paper No. 04/2013, Canberra.  
32  Agnew, J, Bateman, H and Thorp, S 2012, ‘Work, money, lifestyle: Plans of Australian 
retirees’, ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research Working Paper 2012/22.  
33  Bateman, H, Eckert, C, Geweke, J, Iskhakov, F, Louviere, J, Satchell, S and Thorp, S 2013, 
‘Disengagement: A Partial Solution to the Annuity Puzzle’, UNSW Australian School of 
Business Research Paper No. 2013ACTL10. 
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financial decisions. There is widespread concern that many households are not up to 
the task”.34  
Low demand for longevity-protected products 
There is low demand in Australia for products that provide protection against 
longevity risk. Annuities are currently the only market-based products that provide 
longevity insurance. 
Academics have struggled to solve the ‘annuity puzzle’ — the fact that while annuities 
deliver desirable characteristics, demand for annuities is very low.35, 36, 37 A range of 
behavioural biases have been found to discourage people from purchasing products 
with longevity protection: 
• Annuities are perceived to be risky gambles rather than insurance. 
• Individuals underestimate their life expectancy. 
• Retirees want the flexibility to meet unforeseen cash requirements and leave their 
residual assets as a bequest. 
• Individuals undervalue future consumption relative to current consumption. 
• Annuities are not perceived to deliver value for money. 
A range of factors reduce the attractiveness of annuity pricing and increase the 
attractiveness of account-based pensions. 
Life insurance companies impose various margins on annuities that increase their price 
for a given income stream. These companies must use significant capital to fund their 
assets and minimise the risk of failure. They must cover administrative costs and 
provide profits to shareholders. 
                                                          
34  Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation 2009, ‘Working paper on the regulation 
of retirement saving’, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York. 
35  When asked about their worries in retirement, two of the three most common responses of 
retirees were “outliving retirement savings” and “falls in financial markets”. Source: 
Investment Trends 2013, December 2013 Retirement Income Report. Note: Based on a survey of 
5,730 Australians aged 40+. 
36  The seminal paper showing that rational retirees should annuitise their benefits was Yaari, M 
1965, ‘Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer’, The Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 1965, pages 137-150. 
37  Recently, Australian research found that longevity-protected products form part of the 
optimal portfolios for retirees. Hanewald, K, Piggott, J and Sherris, M 2013, ‘Individual 
post-retirement longevity risk management under systematic mortality risk’, Insurance: 
Mathematics and Economics, vol 2013, Elsevier, London, pages 87–97. 
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Annuities are also made more costly by adverse selection. Individuals usually have 
more information about the factors affecting their own life expectancy than retirement 
product providers. Those expecting to live longer are more likely to buy 
longevity-protected products. Providers will respond by setting prices appropriate for 
those likely to live longer lives, which makes the pricing unattractive for others. 
Challenger estimates that for a 65-year-old male buying an annuity in the current 
environment, adverse selection lowers indexed annuity payments by around 7 per cent 
(from around $6,000 annually per $100,000 premium to $5,600).38 
Annuity prices are also affected by the level of interest rates when they are purchased. 
The lower level of interest rates over the past 20 years has reduced the income 
generated from annuities (and some other investments), although this has also been 
associated with a reduction in inflation. 
Finally, retirees have what they perceive to be attractive alternatives to annuities:  
• Account-based pensions invested in high-yielding equities may offer attractive 
returns compared to annuities, in part due to the benefits of dividend imputation.  
• The Financial Claims Scheme removes counterparty risk for retirees who save 
through bank deposit products and term deposits, but not annuities. 
• The Age Pension provides government-backed longevity protection. 
Policy options for consultation 
Perspectives on retirement income policy options 
A number of reviews, and other countries, have found that a retirement income system 
should provide a guide to retirees for managing longevity risk and achieving outcomes 
that suit their individual circumstances, regardless of their level of financial literacy, 
engagement or superannuation balance. 
As a general principle, major changes to the retirement income system need to 
consider the policy settings in the tax and transfer system. These settings are outside 
the scope of the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference. 
                                                          
38  Challenger 2014, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 4 June 2014. 
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The Super System Review 
The Super System Review Panel’s ten ‘Super policy principles’ included the following: 
Financial literacy is an important long term goal, but a compulsory superannuation 
system cannot depend on all its participants having the skills necessary to comprehend 
complex financial information or being investment experts. 39 
The OECD roadmap 
The OECD has developed a roadmap for improving defined contribution pension 
plans to produce better outcomes in retirement.40 Four of the recommendations are 
relevant to the retirement phase:41 
1. Encourage annuitisation as a protection against longevity risk 
2. Promote the supply of annuities and cost-efficient competition in that market 
3. Develop appropriate information and risk-hedging instruments to facilitate dealing 
with longevity risk 
4. Ensure effective communication and address financial illiteracy and lack of 
awareness 
These recommendations provide a guide only. For example, as discussed later in this 
chapter, there are products other than annuities that provide longevity protection. The 
elements of the roadmap mentioned above have not been implemented in Australia. 
International comparisons 
Australia is unusual in neither mandating nor encouraging the use of income streams 
with longevity protection in retirement (Table 8.2). Information provided to the 
Inquiry by Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR) notes that 
Australia “is the only developed economy with mandatory retirement saving to have 
no decumulation structure”.42 
                                                          
39  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Canberra. 
40  OECD 2012, The OECD roadmap for the good design of defined contribution pension plans, OECD, 
viewed 12 June 2014, <http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/50582753.pdf>.  
41  Financial literacy and disclosure are discussed in the Consumer outcomes chapter. 
42  Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research 2014, data provided to Financial System 
Inquiry, 10 June 2014. 
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Table 8.2: Requirements for benefits to be taken as an income stream for 
countries with defined contribution systems 
Country What are the requirements, if any, where a retirement benefit from a defined 
contribution (DC) plan is to be taken as an income stream? 
Australia There is no requirement to take an annuity but for those who convert their benefit into a 
tax-advantaged drawdown product, there is a minimum drawdown each year based on 
the member’s age. 
Canada In most circumstances, the benefit from a registered DC plan must be transferred to a 
locked-in retirement account, a Life Income Fund (LIF) or an annuity. There are 
minimum and maximum withdrawal amounts from the LIF, which take into consideration 
the member’s balance and age. 
There is no requirement for Registered Retirement Savings Plans but for those who 
convert their benefit into a tax-advantaged Registered Retirement Income Fund, there 
is a minimum withdrawal percentage based on age. 
Chile All benefits must be converted into a life annuity or a programmed withdrawal product, 
except for any portion of the benefit that is above the specified maximum. 
Denmark The tax rules provide no limit on the contributions paid into a DC plan if the benefit is 
taken as an annuity. However, there is a limit on the contributions if the benefit is paid 
out as instalments for a period of between 10 and 25 years. Contributions for other 
forms of benefits cannot be claimed as a tax deduction. 
Netherlands All retirement benefits must be converted into an annuity. Annuity payments are fixed 
but may be increased if profit sharing results allow for it. Several annuity options are 
available at retirement. 
Singapore The retirement benefit is converted into a life annuity if it is above a prescribed 
minimum. Amounts above the prescribed maximum do not need to be converted. 
Sweden All retirement benefits from a DC plan must be converted into an annuity, which could 
be a life annuity or a fixed term annuity, depending on the options available from the 
insurance company. However, the individual bears some risks as the insurance 
company can vary its assumptions and payments, even after the payments have 
commenced. Some policies guarantee a return of premiums.  
United 
Kingdom 
Following recently announced changes, from April 2015 up to 25 per cent of the 
accumulated retirement benefit may be taken as a tax-free lump sum. The remainder 
can be withdrawn as a lump sum (taxed at the individual’s marginal tax rate), or taken 
as an annuity or other drawdown product. 
United States There are no requirements for DC plans (such as 401(k) plans) to provide annuities or 
income stream products. 
Source: Mercer.43 
A spectrum of policy options 
Policy settings should ensure that retirees can manage their accumulated balances in a 
way that improves retirement income and risk management, without transferring an 
excessive amount of longevity risk to the Government.  
A spectrum of policy options is available to achieve the objectives of the retirement 
income system and position Australia to manage its demographic challenges better 
                                                          
43  Mercer 2013, Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index, Australian Centre for Financial Studies, 
Melbourne (with the information for the United Kingdom updated following a change to 
arrangements there). 
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(Table 8.3). There are policy trade-offs along the spectrum between the degree of 
individual flexibility and freedom, and the benefits of effective pooling of risks. 
This spectrum does not consider alternative approaches that involve more 
fundamental changes to the retirement income system, such as to the Age Pension. 
Table 8.3: A spectrum of policy options for superannuation in retirement 
STATUS QUO
POLICY 
INCENTIVES DEFAULTS COMPULSION
Key 
features
Significant freedom 
for individuals
Tax incentives for 
income streams
Create incentives 
for retirees to take 
benefits as 
longevity-protected
income streams
Part of retirees’ 
benefits to be 
taken in a 
longevity-protected 
product by default
A portion of 
benefits must be 
used to purchase a 
longevity-protected 
product 
Pros Individuals free to 
use their assets to 
fund retirement as 
they see fit
Can be effective 
while still allowing 
members freedom
Guides decision
making
Defaults are 
powerful drivers of 
behaviour
Members retain 
the right to opt out
Ensures 
superannuation is 
used to provide 
income in retirement
Addresses adverse 
selection issues
Cons Limited access to 
effective risk 
management in 
retirement 
Significant risk to 
the Government of 
people falling back 
on the Age 
Pension
May require 
significant tax and 
social security 
concessions/ 
penalties to be 
effective
Potential 
Government fiscal 
implications
Limited ability for the 
member to opt out
after the member is 
in a product
Members have ability 
to opt out, take lump 
sums and fall back 
on the Age Pension
Denies individuals 
the ability to use 
their assets as they 
see fit
Sub-optimal 
outcomes for some 
individuals, given 
heterogeneous 
circumstances
Could disadvantage 
groups with lower 
life expectancies
MORE FLEXIBILITY AND FREEDOM
MORE RISK MANAGEMENT
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Status quo 
A major theme of this chapter is how the retirement income system does not meet the 
risk management needs of many retirees. Potential improvements to the status quo, 
which do not necessarily involve fundamental changes to the system, include: 
• Improving financial advice provided to individuals prior to retirement — as 
discussed in the Consumer outcomes chapter, affordable and high-quality financial 
advice can bring significant benefits for retirees. 
• Removing barriers to developing new income products — as discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Policy incentives 
The taxation and social security systems could be used to create strong incentives for 
retirees to take superannuation benefits as income streams that help manage longevity 
risk. There are already tax settings in place to encourage superannuation benefits to be 
taken as income streams, but these streams are not necessarily longevity protected. The 
Actuaries Institute submission notes: 
Given that the taxpayer ultimately bears the risk related to how individuals access and 
invest their retirement savings, it is reasonable that the Government proposes various 
incentives and/or restrictions on how superannuation fund assets can be drawn down. 44 
It may be appropriate to have policies that discourage lump sums. Several submissions 
recommend restricting or discouraging lump sum benefit payments. For people with 
very small superannuation balances, lump sums may be the most appropriate way to 
draw down their benefits. 
To be effective, the tax and social security implications of decisions may need to be 
significant. The fiscal costs of additional incentives would need to be appropriately 
targeted and offset by savings elsewhere to avoid increasing the overall cost of the 
retirement income system to Government. 
Defaults 
Defaults could be introduced to the retirement phase of the system, potentially in 
conjunction with policy incentives. The Government could require that part of an 
individual’s accumulated superannuation benefits be directed into a non-commutable 
income stream that provides protection against inflation and longevity risk, unless the 
individual opts-out. Potential products that could be appropriate defaults are 
                                                          
44  Actuaries Institute 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 8. 
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discussed later in this chapter. Default arrangements could differ based on the size of 
the account balance, or other individual circumstances.  
Defaults have powerful effects on decisions and can address the issue of low levels of 
financial literacy among retirees. One Australian experiment, which looked at the 
effect of default options on individuals allocating savings between account-based 
pensions and annuities, found that the distribution of allocations to annuities was 
strongly clustered around the default proportion (Chart 8.5).45 Pension schemes with 
annuities as the default option tend to have high rates of annuitisation.46 These 
findings are consistent with the high proportion of Australian employees who are 
members of their employers’ chosen default superannuation fund. 
Chart 8.5: Proportion of assets taken as an annuity with different 
default arrangements 
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Source: Bateman et al.47 
The World Bank recommends “countries that offer a constrained choice to retiring 
workers and do not mandate the use of a single retirement product for all should also 
specify the product that will be used as the default option. This will help workers who 
                                                          
45  Bateman, H, Eckert, C, Iskhakov, F, Louviere, J, Satchell, S and Thorp, S 2013, ‘Default and 
1/N Heuristics in Annuity Choice’, School of Risk and Actuarial Studies Working Paper 2014/1. 
46  Benartzi, S, Previtero, A and Thaler, R 2011, ‘Annuitization puzzles’, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, issue 25, vol 4, AEA Publications, Pittsburgh, pages 143–164. 
47  Bateman, H, Eckert, C, Iskhakov, F, Louviere, J, Satchell, S and Thorp, S 2013, ‘Default and 
1/N Heuristics in Annuity Choice’, School of Risk and Actuarial Studies Working Paper 2014/1. 
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are unable or unwilling to make a decision on their own and will protect them from 
abusive selling practices of brokers and selling agents of providers”.48 
The Super System Review recommended that default MySuper products should be 
’whole of life‘ by incorporating a retirement income stream product.49 Under the 
recommended arrangement, trustees would consider longevity, inflation and 
investment risks in selecting a product. However, the previous Government decided 
that MySuper products would only cover the accumulation phase initially, so 
MySuper retirement benefits can only be paid as lump sums. 
Default arrangements have other drawbacks. Since individuals can opt out, there 
remain incentives for retirees with small- and medium-sized balances to deplete assets 
early in their retirement and fall back on the Age Pension.  
Then there is the difficulty of choosing default arrangements. No single product, or 
suite of products, meets all the needs of all retirees. ASFA’s submission notes the 
difficulty of setting up a system that suits all individuals due to the “complex maze of 
tax, social securities and savings interactions”, which differ depending on personal 
circumstances.50 
Compulsion 
The Government currently mandates contributions into superannuation for a 
significant majority of Australian workers. At retirement, it could also require that all 
or part of superannuation benefits be moved into a non-commutable income stream 
that provides protection against inflation and longevity risk. 
If annuities were selected for mandatory take-up, this would address adverse selection 
problems and should reduce their price. Research into annuity prices in the United 
Kingdom found that the effects of adverse selection in compulsory annuity markets are 
substantially lower than in voluntary annuity markets.51 
                                                          
48  Rocha, R and Vittas, D 2010, ‘Designing The Payout Phase Of Pension Systems: Policy Issues, 
Constraints And Options’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5289, The World Bank, 
Washington. 
49  Commonwealth of Australia 2010, Super System Review Final Report, Part One, Overview and 
Recommendations, Canberra. 
50  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry, page 32. 
51  Finkelstein, A and Poterba, J 2002, ‘Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual 
Annuities Market’, The Economic Journal, issue 112, Wiley, Oxford, pages 28–50. 
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If longevity protection were to be mandated, deferred products (discussed later in this 
chapter) may be appropriate. CEPAR notes some of the benefits of mandatory 
purchase of deferred lifetime annuities.52 They include: 
• Affordability 
• The low amount of information asymmetry between retirees and providers 
regarding individual circumstances projected 20 or 25 years into the future 
• A definite time horizon in which to use other assets to fund retirement 
• Reduced problems associated with cognitive ability at older ages 
A strong argument against compulsion is that it restricts the ability of individuals to 
tailor their retirement plan to suit their specific needs. This could result in worse 
outcomes for some retirees. Rocha and Vittas advise against mandating a high level of 
annuitisation, noting the benefits of a portfolio of retirement income products.53 
CEPAR notes that “[i]ndividual circumstances are far more heterogeneous in later life 
than they at earlier life stages, and mandate design can therefore be challenging”.54 
Indeed, the United Kingdom has announced reforms that, once implemented, will 
remove the effective compulsory annuitisation of privately accumulated retirement 
balances. 
There are also concerns that a compulsory system would disadvantage groups in the 
community with lower-than-average life expectancies. However, this issue could be 
managed through product design. For example, in the United Kingdom, ‘enhanced’ or 
‘impaired’ annuities, which pay higher incomes for the same purchase price, are 
available to people with certain medical conditions that lower their life expectancies. 
Trade-offs 
There are trade-offs between individuals having more freedom and flexibility to decide 
how to draw down their benefits, and ensuring that the system facilitates effective risk 
management through pooling, which would more effectively deal with: 
• Low levels of financial literacy and awareness 
                                                          
52  Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research 2014, data provided to Financial System 
Inquiry, 10 June 2014. 
53  Rocha, R and Vittas, D 2010, ‘Designing The Payout Phase Of Pension Systems: Policy Issues, 
Constraints And Options’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5289, The World Bank, 
Washington. 
54 Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research2014, data provided to Financial System 
Inquiry, 10 June 2014. 
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• Behavioural biases preventing retirees from purchasing longevity protection 
• The Government’s exposure to longevity risk 
Ideally, the retirement income system should facilitate individuals achieving the mix of 
income, risk management and flexibility appropriate to their circumstances, given their 
level of accumulated assets. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
A spectrum of options to achieve the objectives of the retirement income system and 
position Australia to manage the challenges of having an ageing population: 
• Maintain the status quo with improved provision of financial advice and 
removal of impediments to product development. 
• Provide policy incentives to encourage retirees to purchase retirement income 
products that help manage longevity and other risks. 
• Introduce a default option for how individuals take their retirement benefits. 
• Mandate the use of particular retirement income products (in full or in part, or 
for later stages of retirement). 
Retirement income products 
Regardless of the design of the retirement income system, it must include a suitable 
range of products. 
Observation 
There are regulatory and other policy impediments to developing income products 
with risk management features that could benefit retirees. 
Preliminary Assessment 
Choosing retirement income products necessarily involves trade-offs between income, 
flexibility and risk management. Australia has an opportunity to introduce new 
products that could help retirees achieve their desired levels of income, provide them 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
4-26 
with flexibility and help them better manage risks. Currently, barriers are stifling 
innovation and adding costs to providers developing new products.  
That said, if people have not saved sufficiently during their working lives, they are 
unlikely to achieve their objectives in retirement with any combination of products. 
The range of products 
Mercer’s submission notes that the “major shortcoming [of the Australian 
superannuation system] is in respect of the availability of a broad range of post 
retirement products that meets the risks faced by retirees”.55 If the goal is to increase 
the use of products with longevity protection, Australia needs to have an appropriate 
and affordable range of products.56 
Two examples of products that could be useful to retirees are described below. 
Deferred lifetime annuities 
Deferred lifetime annuities (DLAs) are a form of lifetime annuity where income 
payments are delayed for a set amount of time. For example, a 65-year-old retiree may 
purchase a DLA that will provide a steady income stream after the retiree turns 85 and 
guarantee an income above that of the Age Pension for the remainder of the retiree’s 
life.  
From the provider’s perspective, DLAs insure the most risky period of a standard 
lifetime annuity. They require significant capital to manage risk. The income efficiency 
of DLAs cannot be estimated because demand for the product is very low in Australia, 
although they are likely to be less efficient than standard lifetime annuities. However, 
DLAs may be attractive to retirees because the commitment of funds for a given 
income stream declines with the length of deferral. There may be a death benefit 
payable if the annuitant dies before payments begin, but this benefit would increase 
the cost of a DLA. 
DLAs could be used to complement account-based pensions. Account-based pensions 
are more income-efficient when drawn down at a faster-than-minimum rate.57 
Drawdowns can be structured so that the balance is exhausted, or close to exhausted, 
at the time a DLA begins to make payments.  
                                                          
55  Mercer 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 1. 
56  Superannuation funds cannot directly provide guaranteed products (life insurance companies 
can). Superannuation funds are able to provide account-based pensions, and would be able 
to provide GSAs. 
57  That is, the expected present value of income in retirement is higher. 
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Group self-annuitisation  
In a group self-annuitisation (GSA), participants contribute funds to a pool that is 
invested in financial assets. Regular payments from the pool are made to surviving 
members. Pooling mortality risk delivers higher income in retirement than an 
account-based pension that is drawn down at the minimum rate, while also providing 
significantly more protection against longevity risk. GSAs allow pool members to 
share, but not completely eliminate, longevity risk and do not require capital to back 
guarantees. They can also be offered on a deferred basis like a DLA. 
GSA income is not guaranteed like annuity income, but it is expected to be higher due 
to the absence of capital requirements to back guarantees. The efficiency of the product 
is 100 per cent (excluding any administrative costs) as the entirety of a pool member’s 
contribution is expected to be paid as income. Income levels may be lower at older 
ages if, for example, the entire pool lives longer than expected. Members also lose 
flexible access to capital and are unable to bequeath residual assets. 
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund Lifelong Income For the Elderly (CPF LIFE) 
scheme has some characteristics of a GSA. Participation is mandatory for those with 
retirement account balances above a minimum level. Members choose between two 
plans: one pays a higher income but leaves less for bequests, the other pays a lower 
income but leaves more for bequests. Payments are not guaranteed to be constant but 
are designed to be relatively stable; they are adjusted to reflect actual investment 
returns and mortality. 
Other products with longevity risk management features might also emerge if policy 
settings are changed. 
A portfolio of products 
Given the different income, risk management and flexibility characteristics of 
products, retirees with sufficient savings will typically best meet their objectives by 
using a combination of products and taking some of their benefits as a lump sum. One 
option, but not the only option, is for an individual to invest a portion of their 
accumulated funds in a DLA to manage longevity risk. The remainder could be placed 
in an account-based pension to provide the flexibility to meet unforeseen expenditure 
needs and offer the potential to deliver higher investment returns (Chart 8.6).  
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Chart 8.6: Stylised example of annual income for a retiree with 
multiple income products 
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Regulatory barriers to product development 
SIS regulations 
For retirees aged 60 years or older, investment earnings on superannuation assets that 
support eligible income stream products are exempt from tax. Eligible income stream 
products must comply with the standards in the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Regulations 1994 (SIS Regulations). These standards are designed to 
accommodate products that provide retirement incomes.58 
Several submissions suggest that the rules are too inflexible to allow innovation and 
new products. Neither DLAs nor GSAs meet the standards set out in the SIS 
Regulations. In practice, if a product cannot qualify for a tax exemption, the market for 
that product is highly unlikely to develop. Many submissions call for removing the 
barriers to product innovation imposed by the SIS Regulations. 
                                                          
58  For account-based pensions, the rules specify that a minimum amount must be paid from the 
product each year. Other products must meet a prescriptive set of requirements including 
payments at least annually (which disqualifies DLAs), and restrictions on variations in 
annual payments (which disqualify GSAs). 
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Australia’s Future Tax System Review also recommended removing these rules, in 
conjunction with taxing superannuation assets in both the accumulation and 
retirement phases at a uniform rate.59 
Age Pension means-tests 
The Age Pension assets test and income test (through deeming an income on assets) 
apply to DLAs, even during the deferral period. Several submissions call for an 
exemption for non-commutable DLAs from the tests during the deferral period. 
Australia’s Future Tax System Review recommended “given the unique nature of 
deferred annuities, there is a case that they should only be means tested when they 
start to pay an income, unless a person can access the capital before this time”.60 
Multiple approvals required 
Tax and social security settings are major factors affecting demand for retirement 
income products, as noted above. Providers of new retirement income products must 
deal with multiple Government bodies for approvals, including the ATO, APRA, ASIC 
and the Department of Social Services. 
Risk management for product providers 
Longevity risk cannot be eliminated. It can only be transferred. The burden of 
managing longevity risk must fall on individuals, pools, insurers or government.  
Providers of guaranteed retirement income products, especially long-dated or 
whole-of-life products, are exposed to interest rate, investment and longevity risk. 
Mitigating these risks requires using more capital, obtaining reinsurance, or managing 
them in financial markets, for example, by taking offsetting positions in bond or 
derivative markets. Due to the long-tailed nature of these risks, capital requirements 
are high, which increases the price of the products. The lack of very long-dated bonds 
and longevity bonds in wholesale markets makes it difficult to transfer that risk in 
financial markets. 
Unpredictable systematic longevity improvement, potentially brought about by 
medical advancements, provides significant uncertainty around future longevity. This 
explains why capital charges on annuities are high, reinsurers are reluctant to take on 
the risk and there are no issuers of longevity bonds. If a medical breakthrough were to 
increase life expectancies substantially, longevity insurance providers could be put 
under financial pressure. It might be appropriate that only prudentially regulated life 
insurance companies be allowed to provide guaranteed products. 
                                                          
59  Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australia’s Future Tax System Review, Report to the 
Treasurer, Part Two, Detailed analysis, volume 1 of 2, Canberra. 
60  Ibid. 
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Providers have extremely long-dated liabilities and could more efficiently manage the 
resulting interest rate risk by investing in (say) 30-year Government bonds. In recent 
years, the risk-free Commonwealth Government yield curves (both nominal and 
inflation-linked) have been lengthened, but only to around 20 years. In part, this is 
because of limited investor demand for bonds with very long tenors. Several 
submissions call for the Government to issue longer dated bonds to facilitate interest 
rate risk management for retirement income product providers. Long-dated 
government bonds would also support the private provision of longevity bonds.61 
Challenger’s submission notes that capital requirements for Australian life insurance 
companies offering annuities are high by international standards.62 This provides 
greater assurance to recipients against the failure of the provider. However, it also 
makes annuities more expensive.  
Government provision 
If, after removing barriers to market development, the financial system cannot develop 
a market to manage longevity risk effectively, there may be a case for Government 
intervention. 
The Government could offer longevity insurance to individuals on a commercial basis, 
in addition to that provided by the Age Pension. For example, this could take the form 
of a premium paid at retirement, invested outside the consolidated revenue fund — 
potentially by the Future Fund Board of Guardians — and used to fund an income 
stream from age 85. 
Australia’s Future Tax System Review recommended: 
The government should consider offering an immediate annuity and deferred annuity 
product that would allow a person to purchase a lifetime income. This should be subject 
to a business case that ensures the accurate pricing of the risks being taken on by the 
government. To limit the government’s exposure to longevity risk, it should consider 
placing limits on how much income a person can purchase from the government.63 
However, this policy option would increase the Government’s already significant 
exposure to longevity risk. This risk would be mitigated if the Government offered a 
non-guaranteed GSA-type product. Alternatively, the Government could charge an 
appropriate price for the extra risk it took on. 
                                                          
61  Wills, S and Sherris, M 2010, ‘Securitization, Structuring and Pricing of Longevity Risk’, 
Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, vol 46, issue 1, Elsevier, London, pages 173–185. 
62  Challenger 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 22. 
63  Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Australia’s Future Tax System Review, Report to the 
Treasurer, Part Two, Detailed analysis, volume 1 of 2, Canberra. 
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Policy options for consultation 
Removing barriers to product development may allow innovation in retirement 
income products. UniSuper’s submission notes: “Government regulation over the past 
20 years has had as much, if not more, influence on product design than industry-led 
ideas”.64 
One policy option proposed in submissions is to streamline administrative 
arrangements for assessing the eligibility of products for tax concessions and Age 
Pension means-test treatment. This may reduce the regulatory costs of product 
development.  
Government could facilitate long-dated interest rate risk management for retirement 
income product providers and support the private provision of longevity bonds by 
issuing long-dated Treasury Bonds and Treasury Indexed Bonds — with payments 
linked to inflation. As long-term interest rates are typically higher than short-term 
interest rates, there may be a cost to Government of maintaining a longer yield curve. 
Given its current size, the longevity product market may not be able to ‘digest’ a 
significant supply of long-dated bonds. These costs would depend on the volume of 
long bonds issued and market conditions.  
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Take a more flexible, principles-based approach to determining the eligibility of 
retirement income products for tax concessions and their treatment by the Age 
Pension means-tests. 
• For product providers, streamline administrative arrangements for assessing the 
eligibility for tax concessions and Age Pension means-tests treatment of 
retirement income products.  
• Issue longer-dated Government bonds, including inflation-linked bonds, to 
support the development of retirement income products. 
 
                                                          
64  Unisuper 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 6. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Would deferred lifetime annuities or group self-annuitisation be useful products 
for Australian retirees? Are there examples of other potentially suitable products? 
• If part of retirees’ superannuation benefits were to default into an income stream 
product, which product(s) would be appropriate? 
• Will the private sector be able to manage longevity risk if there is a large increase 
in the use of longevity-protected products? How could this be achieved?  
• Should Government increase its provision of longevity insurance? How would 
institutional arrangements be established to ensure they were stable and not 
subject to political interference? 
• What are some appropriate ways to assess and compare retirement income 
products? Is ‘income efficiency’ a useful measure? 
Access to equity in the home 
For many retirees, the family home is their most valuable asset. Equity release 
products allow consumers to access the equity of a property while retaining 
ownership. The most common forms of equity release are reverse mortgages and home 
reversion schemes.65 A number of submissions note the potential benefits to retirees of 
a growing market for these products.  
The reverse mortgage market has grown steadily (Chart 8.7). However, fewer than 
five lenders currently offer the product, compared to more than 15 lenders before the 
GFC.66 
                                                          
65  A reverse mortgage is a credit product that allows a person to borrow money against the 
equity in the home in return for a lump sum, line of credit or regular payment. A home 
reversion scheme allows a consumer to sell a portion of their home in exchange for a fixed 
proportion of the proceeds of the home when it is sold. 
66  Deloitte and SEQUAL 2013, Australia’s equity release market — an opportunity being 
missed, media release, 16 September, viewed 17 June 2013, 
<http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_au/au/8a7f3ecfae321410VgnVCM3000003456f70aRCRD
.htm>. 
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Chart 8.7: Reverse mortgages provided by ADIs 
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Source: APRA.67 
One issue with releasing home equity is that an individual may later have insufficient 
equity to fund an accommodation bond for an aged care facility. 
The small size of the current market appears to reflect individual preferences and 
commercial considerations. The market is expected to grow further as the population 
ages, given the large amount of wealth tied up in dwellings. 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
• What, if any, regulations impede the development of products to help retirees 
access the equity in their homes? 
                                                          
67  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, Quarterly Authorised Deposit-taking 
Institution Property Exposures, Sydney, March. Includes ADIs with greater than $1 billion of 
term loans. 
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9: Technology 
Technology is a powerful force for change in the financial system, potentially 
improving efficiency and competition, and benefiting consumers. Consumers have 
better access to information and products to meet their needs. Firms can better 
customise products and enhance internal processes. Competition is emerging from 
technology-enabled alternative business models, new entrants and new services. 
Financial services boundaries are shifting as firms from inside and outside the sector 
harness the power of data to create and capture value in new ways. In particular, 
many are seeking to influence a greater share of consumers’ spending. Increasingly, 
technology firms and retail groups are also becoming part of financial service 
delivery. These trends and benefits bring new or intensified risks. 
The Inquiry has made the following observations about technology in the Australian 
financial system: 
• Technological innovation is a major driver of efficiency in the financial system 
and can benefit consumers. Government and regulators need to balance these 
benefits against the risks, as they seek to manage the flexibility of regulatory 
frameworks and the regulatory perimeter. Government is also well-positioned to 
facilitate innovation through coordinated action, regulatory flexibility and 
forward-looking mechanisms. 
• Access to growing amounts of customer information and new ways of using it 
have the potential to improve efficiency and competition, and present 
opportunities to empower consumers. However, evidence indicates these trends 
heighten privacy and data security risks. 
• The financial system’s shift to an increasingly online environment heightens 
cyber security risks and the need to improve digital identity solutions. 
Government has the ability to facilitate industry coordination and innovation in 
these areas. 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
4-36 
Context 
Changing consumer attitudes and behaviours 
Technological innovations are changing the products and services Australians buy, 
how they buy them, who they buy them from, and who they entrust with their 
information. The internet is Australia’s most popular form of media, having overtaken 
television consumption in 2007. Currently, 83 per cent of Australian households have 
internet access at home,1 compared to only 14 per cent2 at the time of the Wallis 
Inquiry; 10.8 million Australians now access the internet more than once a day; and 
7.5 million accessed the internet via their mobile phones in 2013, an increase of 
33 per cent from 2012.3 
The uptake rate for smartphones in Australia is among the highest in developed 
economies: 84 per cent of Australian mobile phone users have smartphones, a meteoric 
rise from a base of 19 per cent in 2007.4 More than 5 million Australians now have 
tablets, with penetration expected to rise to 70 per cent of the population by 2017.5 
Social media is increasing both the pressure on financial service providers to be 
responsive to consumer demands and the reputational risks of failing to do so. 
Increasingly, consumers trust reviews and recommendations on social networking 
sites from people they know over information sourced from manufacturers and 
retailers, third-party sites, in-store salespeople or advertising.6 
These trends are changing the ways Australians work, manage their finances, 
communicate, learn and access entertainment — and setting new standards for 
customer service. Increasingly, consumers expect online services to be personalised, 
                                                          
1  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, Household Use of Information Technology, 2012–13, 
cat. no. 8146.0, ABS, Canberra. 
2  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 1998, Household Use of Information Technology, 1997, 
cat. no. 8146.0, ABS, Canberra. 
3  Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 2013, Communications report 
2012–13, ACMA, Melbourne. 
4  Luger, J 2013, ‘The massive Australian mobile explosion explained’, Business Insider 
Australia, 9 July, viewed 1 May 2014, 
<http://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-massive-australian-mobile-explosion-explained-
2013-7>. 
5  Research by Telsyte cited in Moses, A 2013, ‘Tablets to reach 70% of Australians by 2017’, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 13 March, viewed 2 July 2014, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-news/tablets-to-reach-70-of-australians-
by-2017-20130312-2fz9o.html>. 
6  The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 2013, 2013 Global Consumer Sentiment Survey, BCG. 
Emerging Trends – Technology 
4-37 
interactive and engaging, available 24/7 and continuously improving. Self-service 
options, securely handled personal data, and speedy and reliable payments are a 
given.7 
More Australians shop online for insurance and financial services than their 
counterparts in the United States and major European Union economies.8 Of online 
Australians, almost all have compared and purchased products or services online, 
while more than two-thirds have used online comparison services. The main reasons 
cited for using these services were to obtain lower prices, save time and enable easier 
comparison for better-informed purchasing decisions.9 
Retail banking and payments 
These trends are fundamentally changing the way financial institutions interact with 
their customers. For instance, in banking, large segments of the population are shifting 
away from face-to-face services to online and mobile banking. Online and electronic 
banking applications (apps) are emerging as an important area of competition and 
product differentiation. 
Banks have increasing numbers of customers choosing to use apps rather than other 
online channels. For example, Westpac has more than 45 apps across its brands, 
designed for different technology platforms and devices.10 Banks are also starting to 
provide smart automated teller machines (ATMs) that offer customers more 
self-service options, along with real-time online ‘chat’ services. 
Increasingly, Australians use the internet and apps to conduct banking rather than 
visit branches. In 2013, 12.9 million Australians used the internet for banking and 
paying bills, a rise of 10 per cent from the year before.11 Although person-to-person 
contact in branches remains important, it is primarily becoming the domain of more 
complex transactions. By the end of 2015, following a gradual decline in the average 
number of transactions per branch, ANZ expects digital will be its customers’ 
preferred channel.12 
                                                          
7 IBM Institute for Business Value 2014, Digital reinvention: Trust, transparency and technology in 
the insurance world of tomorrow, IBM Global Business Services, January, Somers. 
8  The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 2013, 2013 Global Consumer Sentiment Survey, BCG. 
9  Research by Nielsen cited in iSelect Limited 2013, Prospectus: For the offer of 116.4 million 
shares in iSelect Limited at $1.85 per share, May, viewed 30 April 2014, 
<http://corporate.iselect.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/4-June-2013-Prospectus.pdf>. 
10  Westpac 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
11  Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 2013, Communications report 
2012–13, ACMA, Melbourne. 
12  ANZ 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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Contactless near-field communications (NFC) payments are growing rapidly, driven 
mainly by the speed of the transaction.13 NFC payments are made by tapping 
contactless cards or smartphones with embedded technology or smart stickers 
attached against terminals.14 In Australia, Visa now processes more than 28 million 
contactless payments per month, across more than 100,000 contactless terminals.15 
As digital banking has become widespread, security has improved commensurately, 
with measures such as the shift to EMV16 chip-based cards making it almost impossible 
to skim or counterfeit cards.17 The planned move to PIN-only verification is also 
expected to improve security.18 However, some suggest that the growth of NFC 
payments is resulting in a return to older forms of fraud, such as card theft.19 
Value of information 
Growing amounts of structured and unstructured data are being collected, stored and 
used by private sector firms and governments, a phenomenon known as ‘big data’. 
Firms increasingly seek to extract value from these vast stores of data through 
information analytics to create and capture value in new ways. In particular, many are 
seeking to influence a greater share of consumers’ spending. 
                                                          
13  Ossolinski, C, Lam, T and Emery, D 2014, The Changing Way We Pay: Trends in Consumer 
Payments — Research Discussion Paper, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney. 
14  Bender, A 2014, ‘Mobile Payments in Australia: State of the Banks’, Computerworld, 
29 January. 
15  Elsworth, S 2014, ‘Australia hooked on tap and go payments: Visa payWave’, News Corp 
Australia Network, 9 February, viewed 6 May 2014, 
<http://www.news.com.au/finance/money/australia-hooked-on-tap-and-go-payments-visa-
paywave/story-e6frfmci-1226821426268>. 
16  Europay, MasterCard and Visa 
17  Drummond, S 2014, ‘Top cyber cop warns over bank cards threat’, The Australian Financial 
Review, 30 May. 
18  PIN-only verification comes into effect in Australia on 1 August 2014. See Australian 
Associated Press 2014, ‘PIN-only purchases as credit card signatures to be phased out’, The 
Australian, 22 January. 
19  Donelly, B 2014, ‘Consumers told to check tap-and-go transactions as deception cases 
increase’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 May. 
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Figure 9.1: Examples of growth in data volumes 
 
Every 2 years to 
2020: the digital 
universe20 will 
double in size21 
Monthly: 
30 billion pieces 
of user content22 
Daily: 8 terabytes 
in Twitter feeds23 
Daily: 1 terabyte 
of market data24 
Per second: 
10,000 payment 
card transactions25 
With no physical products to manufacture and large existing repositories of consumer 
information, financial services firms are well placed to benefit from big data. In a 2012 
IDC survey, 71 per cent of financial services firms viewed information analytics as a 
potential source of competitive advantage for their organisations.26 
Cloud technology 
Firms are increasingly using cloud computing solutions to improve the efficiency, 
flexibility and availability of systems. The term ‘cloud’ refers to a delivery model 
rather than a particular technology. Cloud services use virtualisation and network 
technologies to enable sharing of hardware, software and databases, either singularly 
or in combination. Typically, delivery relies on the internet and uses the services of 
third-party providers. 
Figure 9.227 below shows the characteristics of cloud computing that make it so 
attractive to both private and public sector organisations. 
                                                          
20  Defined by IDC as all digital data created, replicated and consumed in a single year. See 
Gantz, J and Reinsel, D 2012, The Digital Universe in 2020: Big Data, Bigger Digital Shadows, 
and Biggest Growth in the Far East, IDC iView, December, viewed 22 May 2014, 
<http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idc-the-digital-universe-in-2020.pdf>. 
21  Gantz, J and Reinsel, D, IDC iView. 
22  Versace, M and Massey, K 2012, The Case for Big Data in the Financial Services Industry — 
White Paper, IDC Financial Insights, September, viewed 22 May 2014, 
<http://h20195.www2.hp.com/V2/GetPDF.aspx%2F4AA4-3900ENW.pdf>. 
23  Versace, M and Massey, K, IDC Financial Insights. 
24  Versace, M and Massey, K, IDC Financial Insights. 
25  Versace, M and Massey, K, IDC Financial Insights. 
26  IBM Institute for Business Value 2013, Analytics: The real-world use of big data in financial 
services — How innovative banking and financial markets organizations extract value from 
uncertain data, IBM Global Business Services, May, Somers. 
27  Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) 2013, 
The National Cloud Computing Strategy, DBCDE, Canberra. 
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Figure 9.2: Characteristics of cloud computing 
 
 
In Australia, cloud services revenue is projected to grow at a compound annual rate of 
15.3 per cent from 2012 to 2017.28 Globally, two-thirds of banks expect their IT 
infrastructure expenditure to grow by between 1 and 6 per cent in 2014, driven 
primarily by cloud computing investments.29 
Personal cloud service usage is also growing in Australia, as a result of increasing 
network capacity and individuals using multiple devices to access the internet. In 2013, 
14 million Australians used personal cloud services — including for email and social 
networking — an increase of 11 per cent on 2012 figures.30 
                                                          
28  Gartner research cited in Bajric, N 2013, ‘Cloud to become bulk of new IT spend by 2016: 
Gartner’, ARN, 25 October, viewed 16 April 2014, 
<http://www.arnnet.com.au/article/530054/cloud_become_bulk_new_it_spend_by 
_2016_gartner/>. 
29  Research by Ovum cited in Pinsent Masons 2013, ‘Need for regulatory compliance to drive 
2014 increase in IT expenditure in financial services sector, predicts Ovum’, Out-Law.com, 
16 December, viewed 23 May 2014, 
<http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2013/december/need-for-regulatory-compliance-to-
drive-2014-increase-in-it-expenditure-in-financial-services-sector-predicts-ovum/>. 
30  Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 2013, Communications 
report 2012–13, ACMA, Melbourne. 
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Regulation in a digital environment 
Observation 
Technological innovation is a major driver of efficiency in the financial system and 
can benefit consumers. Government and regulators need to balance these benefits 
against the risks, as they seek to manage the flexibility of regulatory frameworks 
and the regulatory perimeter. Government is also well-positioned to facilitate 
innovation through coordinated action, regulatory flexibility and forward-looking 
mechanisms. 
Technology neutrality 
Government and regulators face ongoing challenges from the need to apply existing 
regulatory frameworks to new participants and products in a rapidly changing 
environment. 
Preliminary assessment 
Some Federal and state-based legislation and regulations require (implicitly or 
explicitly) the use of certain forms of technology. For example, they may specify 
certain delivery mechanisms or products, or use terminology that assumes a 
paper-based environment. That is, they are not technology neutral. In other cases, new 
technologies put in doubt the operation of certain provisions of legislation or 
regulations. These circumstances can prevent the uptake of new technologies that 
could provide better outcomes for consumers, businesses and Government. They can 
also prevent Government and regulators from managing risks appropriately. 
Submissions suggest Government should aim to enable transactions and business to be 
carried out digitally end-to-end: regulation should not make it more difficult and 
expensive to conduct business through purely digital channels. Submissions mainly 
focus on the need to update disclosure and consent requirements to reflect both 
changing consumer preferences and the emergence of new technologies. 
Stakeholders identified various requirements, conceived in a paper-based era, that are 
not technology neutral and may restrict digital services. For example, at the Federal 
level, both Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 and the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 set out requirements for Financial Services Guides as to what must 
be on the “cover” or “at or near the front of” the “document”.31 At the state level, the 
Victorian Transfer of Land Act 1958 enables use of an electronic lodgement network for 
                                                          
31  Refer, for example, to ss942A(1) and 942D(2) of the Corporations Act 2001. 
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e-conveyancing. However, it contains requirements for retaining physical documents 
to authenticate electronic instruments,32 as well as requirements such as signature 
authorisation of instruments in writing.33 
Government has taken some steps to better enable digital services, with amendments 
set out in the Electronic Transactions Act 1999. The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) has also facilitated online financial services 
disclosures through its relief powers, as described in Regulatory Guide 221.34 However, 
not all issues have been addressed. One submission highlights the Electronic 
Transactions Regulations 2000 themselves are unclear on the form of customer consent 
required before documents can be sent out electronically.35  
Submissions also note that, where changes in technology create difficulties in 
interpreting provisions, firms are likely to take a conservative view to minimise 
regulatory compliance risks. Consequently, they may be reluctant to change and 
improve systems or processes. 
Legislators and regulators cannot anticipate all the new products and delivery 
mechanisms technology might enable. For example, s12DL of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission Act 2001 prohibits credit card issuers from sending out 
unsolicited cards. This provision was initially developed in 1975 to address the growth 
in unsolicited credit cards at the time.36 However, since then, many new developments 
in payments have brought the application of s12DL into doubt. For instance, today 
providers do not have to send a physical card to provide unsolicited access to credit 
accounts — they can simply provide NFC stickers or leverage mobile phone 
technologies. 
At the time s12DL was first drafted, these dramatic changes could not have been 
foreseen, making it impossible to design amendments to address likely developments. 
Therefore, where possible, future legislation and regulation should aim to be 
technology neutral. Sometimes, technology-specific requirements may be necessary; 
for example, the voluntary Electronic Funds Transfer Code of Conduct (EFT Code), 
now the ePayments Code, was developed to assist with consumer confidence and 
                                                          
32  Refer, for example, to s44B(2)(b) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (VIC). 
33  Refer, for example, to s44C(b) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (VIC). 
34  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2010, Regulatory Guide 221: 
Facilitating online financial services disclosures, ASIC, December. 
35  For example, the regulations refer to the debtor, mortgagor or guarantor providing ‘written 
consent’ to receiving communications electronically. 
36  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry. 
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uptake of non-cash payments.37 However, these should be the exception rather than 
the norm. 
Trade-offs 
In pursuing technology neutrality, Government needs to consider the text of legislation 
and regulation, as well as the approach of regulators. Technology neutrality in 
regulation can provide flexibility to adapt to the future and reduce the need for 
constant change. However, it can also result in ambiguity and interpretation 
difficulties. For example, the definitions of ‘financial product’ and ‘financial service’ 
under the Corporations Act 2001 are designed to be broad, technology neutral and 
applicable to different business models. Consequently, although the law applies 
widely, ASIC also regularly has to deal with questions of interpretation — and often 
issues regulatory exemptions for certain classes of products. 
Amending existing regulation and legislation requires significant Government and 
regulatory resources, and aiming for technology neutrality can be challenging. 
Frameworks often contain unintentional biases, which are only identified in hindsight. 
Lengthy regulatory processes can also create uncertainty for industry during the 
transition period. Yet, lack of consultation or rushed processes increase the risk of 
unintended consequences. However, failing to act may mean consumers, businesses 
and Government lose the benefits of potential innovation and competition. 
A number of submissions also highlight that, although enabling electronic service 
delivery might improve efficiency and outcomes for some consumers, it may also 
exclude others. For example, various community segments such as senior Australians38 
or those on lower incomes may have more limited ability to access the internet.39 As a 
result, they may be excluded in an environment where electronic service delivery is the 
default. Some of these issues may diminish over time; nonetheless, access issues must 
be carefully considered and managed — particularly through any transition period. 
Policy options for consultation 
Existing regulation 
Existing regulation and legislation should be reviewed to amend references that are 
not technology neutral. Regulatory settings should enable electronic service delivery to 
                                                          
37  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, 11-205MR ASIC releases 
new ePayments Code, media release 20 September, Sydney. 
38  Research by the Australian Communications and Media Authority cited in Joint Select 
Committee on Cyber-Safety 2013, Cybersafety for Seniors: A Worthwhile Journey — Second 
Interim Report, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, March, Canberra. 
39  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, Household Use of Information Technology, 2012–13, 
cat. no. 8146.0, ABS, Canberra. 
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become the default; however, opt-out provisions are required to manage access needs 
for certain community segments.  
For example, amendments could include removing references to specific forms of 
payment. They could include updates to consumer disclosure requirements and 
methods of consumer consent to accommodate electronic delivery, digital signatures 
or voice authentication. Where the text of legislation has been put in doubt by new 
technologies, it could also be updated to clarify interpretation. 
Future regulation 
In preparing for future developments, Government and regulators should take a 
technology-neutral approach to legislation and regulation. On an exceptions basis, 
technology-neutral frameworks may need to be supplemented with 
technology-specific regulation. For example, this might include situations where 
certain technologies introduce new risks requiring specific protections, such as the 
circumstances surrounding the introduction of the ePayments Code.40 
When technology-specific regulation is required, regulators should seek to be 
technology neutral within that class of technologies where possible. For example, in 
dealing with non-cash payments, regulation should not seek to favour one form of 
non-cash payment, such as credit cards, over another, such as direct debit. 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• No change to current arrangements. 
• Amend regulation that specifies using certain technologies with the aim of 
becoming technology neutral. Amendments should enable electronic service 
delivery to become the default; however, they should include opt-out provisions 
to manage access needs for segments of the community. 
• Adopt a principle of technology neutrality, for future regulation recognising the 
need for technology-specific regulation on an exceptions basis. Where 
technology-specific regulation is required, seek to be technology neutral within 
that class of technologies. 
 
                                                          
40  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, 11-205MR ASIC releases 
new ePayments Code, media release 20 September, Sydney. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following area: 
• What specific regulatory and legislative requirements should be prioritised for 
amendment in relation to technology neutrality? 
Regulatory perimeter 
Technological innovation has enabled firms outside the traditional financial sector to 
perform financial-type functions. Some of these firms may not be regulated at all or 
regulated in a different way to financial institutions. This raises challenges for the 
regulatory perimeter, in terms of whether certain risks are being addressed 
appropriately by firms and regulators. It also potentially raises level playing field 
issues, where firms may be performing similar functions but not being regulated 
equivalently. Developments in payments exemplify these issues. 
Preliminary assessment 
Advances in technology have reduced traditional barriers to market entry in 
payments, such as the need to construct a dedicated network. New entrants can 
leverage high levels of internet connectivity, penetration of smart devices and 
pre-existing networks to connect users to payments services more easily and cheaply 
than incumbents. The payment hub, being developed by eftpos Payments Australia 
Limited, and the New Payments Platform (NPP), an industry project being developed 
as a result of the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA’s) strategic innovation review, may 
further reduce barriers to entry and drive competition. 
Incumbents in the Australian payments industry are facing competitive challenges 
from new market entrants, such as PayPal, POLi, PayMate and Stripe. Closed-loop 
pre-paid systems operated by companies outside the financial sector, such as Apple, 
Skype and Starbucks, are holding growing amounts of customers’ funds. Apple has 
also recently signalled its interest in mobile payments more broadly and recently 
developed fingerprint biometric authentication for its phones.41 
Advances in cryptography42 and computer processing power have facilitated the 
development of virtual or crypto-currencies.43 A number of submissions note the 
potential risks these technologies present to the financial system: 
                                                          
41  Edwards, J 2014, ‘Apple Is Building Its Next Massive Business And No One Seems To Have 
Noticed’, Business Insider Australia, 23 February, viewed 10 April 2014, 
<http://www.businessinsider.com.au/apple-ecommerce-and-mobile-payments-plans-2014-2>. 
42  Cryptography refers to techniques for securing communications from third-party access. 
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• The safety of funds stored in them may be at risk in the case of system collapse or 
fraud, which may also occur in a third-party provider associated with the virtual 
currency. For example, in the recent collapse of the Mt Gox bitcoin exchange, 
850,000 bitcoins worth approximately US$474 million were lost.44 
• The highly speculative nature of virtual currencies may create investor protection 
issues, as demonstrated by bitcoin’s fluctuating values in relation to real-world 
currencies.45 
• The pseudonymity of payments makes them attractive for money laundering and 
other illegal activities. 
• Their cross-jurisdictional nature means coverage under any particular legal 
jurisdiction is unclear. Currently, use of virtual currencies in Australia is minimal, 
but regulators are monitoring developments in this area. 
Some submissions argue that firms performing similar functions should be regulated 
in the same way. This position is often made by large incumbent players concerned 
about the capacity of new players to operate around the edge of the regulatory 
perimeter. Failure to apply equivalent regulation may result in an uneven playing field 
and regulatory arbitrage. It may also incentivise those within the current regulatory 
perimeter to lower their own standards of compliance to compete. However, applying 
the full weight of prudential or conduct regulation to small players and new start-ups, 
regardless of the materiality of the risk they represent, may stifle valuable innovation 
unnecessarily. 
Policy options for consultation 
Whether new entrants should be brought within a regulatory perimeter depends on 
the nature and scale of the risk they present and who bears the risk. Government needs 
to strike a balance that allows the benefits of innovation to flow through the financial 
system, while maintaining stability. 
The Regulatory architecture chapter contains broader discussion of options for the 
regulatory perimeter. 
                                                                                                                                                          
43  Elwell, C K, Murphy M M and Seitzinger, M V 2013, Bitcoin: Questions, Answers, and Analysis 
of Legal Issues, US Congressional Research Service, Washington, 20 December. 
44  Hornyak, T and Kirk, J 2014, ‘10 things you need to know about Mt. Gox’s Bitcoin 
implosion’, PCWorld, 6 March. 
45  Colombo, J 2013, ‘Bitcoin may be following this classic bubble stages chart’, Forbes, 
19 December. 
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Facilitating innovation 
Technological innovation has the potential to improve financial system efficiency. It is 
a powerful force for competition, driving the development of products that better meet 
consumer needs and improve access. Firms can harness technologies to improve risk 
management and other internal processes. Although innovation has many benefits, it 
may also bring risks. Government must manage these risks, while enabling the benefits 
of innovation to flow through the system. 
Many technological developments adopted by financial institutions start life outside 
the sector. For example, while banking apps have proliferated in recent years, early 
apps were typically video games or basic functions such as calendars.46 In many ways, 
this pattern of taking up new, but tested, technologies benefits the sector: it lowers the 
risk of innovation, while taking advantage of its benefits. 
Preliminary assessment 
Coordinated action 
Government can play a role in facilitating technological innovation where there is a 
need to overcome divergent commercial interests and competitive forces. This is 
particularly the case where network benefits are involved. Government can assist 
industry to agree on standards for interoperability or to cooperate on developing 
common infrastructure. 
For example, the RBA has facilitated industry cooperation to develop a real-time 
payments system: the NPP. The RBA’s strategic review of innovation in the payments 
system concluded that market forces were not sufficient on their own to produce 
cooperative innovation.47 This became evident when previous industry-initiated 
projects, such as MAMBO (Me and My Bank Online) intended to enable a wider range 
of payments, were abandoned due to rising costs, ongoing delays and differing 
commercial interests of the major banks.48 The NPP will provide basic common 
infrastructure that industry can build on to provide innovative customer-facing 
services. The project is expected to be completed in late 2016.49 
                                                          
46  Clark, J F, ‘History of mobile applications’, Presentation for MAS 490: Theory and practice of 
mobile applications, University of Kentucky, viewed 16 June 2014, 
<http://www.uky.edu/~jclark/mas490apps/History%20of%20Mobile%20Apps.pdf>. 
47  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2012, Strategic Review of Innovation in the Payments System: 
Conclusions, RBA, Sydney. 
48  Australian Associated Press 2011, ‘Banks axe BPAY identity project’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
26 August. 
49  Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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Submissions raise other areas where Government could play a similar facilitation role. 
For example, one submission suggests Government could help coordinate 
development of a central utility to streamline superannuation administrative 
processes.50 Others suggest Government could assist with streamlining processes for 
online identity authentication. This is discussed further in the Digital identity section. 
Regulatory flexibility 
Government and regulators face challenges from the expected pace of change in 
technological developments. By its nature, regulation lags market developments. 
Consequently, Government and regulators need effective mechanisms for monitoring 
emerging trends, a flexible approach, and the ability to adapt and design regulation in 
a changing environment. 
Where new, technology-enabled business models, products and delivery mechanisms 
emerge, regulators need to consider whether and how to regulate such developments. 
They may also need to be flexible in how they apply existing frameworks. For 
example, to enable industry innovation and competition, ASIC has provided relief to 
operators of investor-direct portfolio services (IDPS) and IDPS-like schemes (known as 
‘platforms’ or ‘wraps’) from the legal requirements for managed investment schemes.51 
The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee recently released a report into 
equity crowd funding recommending regulatory changes to facilitate and stimulate 
industry development.52 
ASIC has recently been working with peer-to-peer (P2P) lenders to develop 
appropriate regulation. Entrants in the nascent Australian P2P lending market submit 
that regulation is valuable in ensuring the industry begins with and maintains high 
standards.53 Existing regulation is not seen as an inappropriate barrier to entry, but 
rather as a mechanism for ensuring new entrants are competent. Regulation is 
perceived as lifting industry standards and enabling operators “to compete based on 
providing better products and services to customers”.54 Submissions from P2P lenders 
voice support for the current regulatory regime, noting its importance for protecting 
customers and providing industry with guidance. In this way, regulation can help 
develop a well-managed, innovative industry. 
                                                          
50  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
51  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, First round submission to 
the Financial System Inquiry. 
52  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2014, Crowd sourced equity funding — Report, 
Australian Government, Canberra. 
53  See, for example, RateSetter Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry. 
54  SocietyOne 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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ASIC has also recently adapted its market integrity rules to mitigate emerging risks 
related to technology-driven developments in financial markets, including 
high-frequency trading (HFT) and dark pools.55 In recent years, there has been 
significant growth in HFT and off-market trading facilities such as dark pools. 
Flexibility in ASIC’s regulatory framework and approach has enabled it to mitigate 
resulting market integrity or fairness concerns.56 However, the dynamism of financial 
markets means ASIC will need to continue monitoring developments closely and 
adapt as required. 
Government can also facilitate innovation through implementing regulation. For 
example, the EFT Code (now the ePayments Code) played an important role in 
developing the electronic payments market.57 The ePayments Code protects consumers 
using electronic payment methods, such as ATMs, EFTPOS, debit and credit card 
transactions, including contactless transactions, online payments, internet banking and 
BPAY. By setting rules on allocating responsibility for losses, the Code boosted 
consumer confidence in electronic payments, leading to their mainstream adoption. 
Forward-looking mechanisms 
Submissions argue for Government to facilitate innovation through a variety of 
forward-looking mechanisms. Proposals include: 
Setting up a strategic body to oversee technology policy and promote innovation in 
Australia’s financial system. 
Various bodies, such as the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) and the Financial 
Sector Advisory Council (FSAC), already monitor developments in the financial 
system. However, while CFR and FSAC consider the efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulation, they do not have particular mandates to consider innovation. The 
International integration chapter discusses these bodies further. 
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has recently 
announced ‘Project Innovate’, an initiative to support industry innovation by smaller 
start-ups through to established firms with new models.58 The FCA’s policy unit is 
engaging with firms developing innovative approaches not explicitly covered by 
                                                          
55  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, 13-213MR ASIC makes 
rules on dark liquidity, high-frequency trading, media release 12 August, Sydney. 
56  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Report 331: Dark Liquidity 
and High Frequency Trading, ASIC, Sydney; and Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 394: Review of recent rule changes affecting dark liquidity, 
ASIC, Sydney. 
57  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2011, 11-205MR ASIC releases 
new ePayments Code, media release 20 September, Sydney. 
58  Wheatley, M 2014, Making innovation work for firms and customers, address at Bloomberg, 
London by Chief Executive, Financial Conduct Authority, 19 May, London. 
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regulation, or for which application of regulation is ambiguous. Its intent is to support 
innovators in three ways: first, by providing firms with compliance advice on new 
models and products; second, by proactively seeking out areas of the framework that 
need adaptation for new technologies or broader trends; and third, by launching an 
‘incubator’ to support innovative small financial businesses as they prepare for 
regulatory authorisation. 
Developing a comprehensive Government strategy, in consultation with industry, to 
ensure the regulatory framework supports technological innovation, while 
managing risks. 
Government already has various technology-related policies and strategies on issues 
such as e-Government and the digital economy,59 cloud computing60 and the uptake of 
mobile technologies.61 However, it does not have a single overarching technology 
strategy in place. 
As a significant participant in the financial system, Government can influence the 
uptake of technology through decisions it makes for its own services. For example, 
adding the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) to the myGov site — a secure single 
sign-on site that allows users to access a range of Australian Government services — 
will double its 2 million registered members by mid-2014.62 This type of uptake would 
facilitate the shift to digital delivery of services becoming the default position for the 
broader Australian economy. 
Submissions propose a comprehensive strategy driven from a financial services 
perspective. Stakeholders suggest such a strategy could consider issues including 
requirements for electronic disclosures, consumer protection, regulatory perimeter, 
maintaining a flexible principles-based framework, and updating and implementing 
the National Cyber Security Strategy. 
                                                          
59  The Coalition’s Policy for E-Government and the Digital Economy 2013, September, Canberra, 
viewed 30 April 2014, 
<http://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/assets/Coalitions_Policy_for_E-Government_and_the_
Digital_Economy_(2).pdf>. 
60  Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) 2013, 
The National Cloud Computing Strategy, DBCDE, Canberra. 
61  Australian Government Information Management Office 2013, Australian Public Service 
Mobile Roadmap: Adopting mobile technology across government, Department of Finance and 
Deregulation, Canberra. 
62  National Commission of Audit 2014, Report of the National Commission of Audit, Australian 
Government, Canberra. 
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Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• Establish a central mechanism or body for monitoring and advising Government 
on technology and innovation. Consider, for example, a public–private sector 
collaborative body or changing the mandate of an existing body to include 
technology and innovation. 
• Establish a whole-of-Government technology strategy to enable innovation. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Are there specific areas in which Government or regulators need to facilitate 
innovation through regulation or coordinated action? For example, by facilitating 
the development of central utilities? 
• Are there ways to improve how regulators monitor or address emerging 
technological developments? For example, through adopting new technologies or 
mechanisms for industry intelligence gathering? 
Managing information 
Observation 
Access to growing amounts of customer information and new ways of using it have 
the potential to improve efficiency and competition, and present opportunities to 
empower consumers. However, evidence indicates these trends heighten privacy 
and data security risks. 
Many firms now collect, hold and use large amounts of customer data, especially 
payments data. Some of these firms, including some from outside the financial sector, 
are seeking to use their vast data stores to gain entry into financial services. For 
example, Facebook is preparing to provide financial services in the form of remittances 
and electronic money, seeking regulatory approval in Ireland to do so.63 Google plans 
                                                          
63  Davies, S, Robinson, D and Kuchler, H 2014, ‘Facebook shifts focus to financial services’, The 
Australian Financial Review, 15 April. 
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to expand its mobile payments and wallet products and is likewise seeking United 
Kingdom regulatory approval.64 Almost half (47 per cent) of bankers recently surveyed 
believe their biggest competitive threat is from non-financial players — supermarket 
entrants, payments providers and other forms of disintermediation.65 
Although starting in payments, many of these firms are seeking to broaden their 
strategies to target the concept of a customer’s ‘financial health’. Both traditional and 
non-traditional firms are developing services to assist and influence consumer 
decisions on what to buy, and where and when to buy it. These services are designed 
to encompass all types of products, not only those of a financial nature. For example, 
services may come in the form of discounts and offers triggered by location-based 
technologies. Alternatively, they may be packaged as general advice on how to ‘spend 
smarter’. 
Privacy 
Information about an individual’s finances and creditworthiness forms one of the most 
sensitive categories of personal information.66 Financial institutions may hold details 
such as: account balances; repayment histories; spending patterns including products, 
store names and locations; tax file numbers; and evidence of income levels. Some 
institutions may additionally hold information on an individual’s health or genetics. In 
future, they may hold increasing amounts of biometric data. Firms are seeking new 
ways to use this information to predict the behaviour of individual customers for 
commercial purposes, raising questions around privacy. 
Preliminary assessment 
Firms are collecting and storing growing volumes and types of customer data. As they 
seek to harness the commercial value of the data, it increasingly raises concerns about 
the way in which personal information is handled and used. However, it may also 
present opportunities for improving consumer outcomes. The Data security and cloud 
technology section discusses risks related to data security. 
                                                          
64  Davies, Robinson and Kuchler, The Australian Financial Review. 
65  Robinson, B and Walker, T 2013, The financial services industry reaches an inflexion point: 6th 
annual survey of global financial services challenges, investment priorities and trends, Temenos 
White Paper in association with Deloitte, viewed 18 March 2014, 
<https://www.temenos.com/en/market-insight/white-papers/inflexion-point/>. 
66  For example, the Privacy Act 1988 has specific provisions that deal with tax file numbers and 
credit-related information and the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner has a 
series of related fact sheets, viewed 3 June 2014, 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-sheets/credit-and-finance/
>. 
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Benefits 
Most financial services firms are using data analytics to pursue personalised 
products.67 For consumers, this is leading to new products, enhanced product 
functionality and better customer service. Many consumers will also have improved 
access to products and services, although some may experience more difficulties with 
access as risk-based pricing becomes increasingly individualised. This is discussed 
further in the Underinsurance section of the Consumer outcomes chapter. 
For firms, information analytics supports more efficient marketing and better 
cross-selling opportunities by enhancing their ability to predict the behaviour of 
individuals. Customer issues can be identified earlier, improving customer satisfaction 
and retention. Firms can offer consumers lower-cost self-serve options and potentially 
lower fees and prices. Internal processes, such as fraud and risk management, are also 
improved. 
Risks, impediments and opportunities 
However, these benefits come with heightened privacy risks. One submission 
identifies two main privacy-related risks: first, data might be collected and used in 
ways a customer might not like; and second, the data might reveal information about 
persons other than the consenting customer, such as their friends, family or clients.68 
Another submission suggests that, given information analytics enables firms to target 
the most profitable customers, in some areas, such as extending credit, this may not be 
in the best interests of customers and may lead to financial hardship.69 Others note that 
some segments of the community, such as senior Australians, are particularly sensitive 
to privacy, safety and security issues.70 
Some submissions, while acknowledging that privacy protections are important, argue 
that, in some areas, privacy regulations are overly restrictive and impede efficiency. 
For example, when assessing creditworthiness, providers lack access to some data 
sources, such as utility payment history and some Government databases.  
Stakeholders also note the difficulties firms with transnational operations face in 
relation to cross-border information flows. For example, regulatory settings can 
impose requirements for record keeping that restrict data sharing across branches of 
the same financial institution located in different jurisdictions. In other cases, laws in 
one jurisdiction can make it difficult to meet regulatory reporting requirements in 
                                                          
67  IBM Institute for Business Value 2013, Analytics: The real-world use of big data in financial 
services — How innovative banking and financial markets organizations extract value from 
uncertain data, IBM Global Business Services, Somers, May. 
68  Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
69  Consumer Action Law Centre 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
70  National Seniors Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
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another. Institutions may be faced with a choice of complying with the requirements of 
one jurisdiction over another or ceasing the activity altogether. 
Some stakeholders suggest considering mechanisms to provide consumers with 
broader access to their own data to improve decision making.71 This could be similar to 
the United Kingdom Government’s ‘midata’ initiative, which seeks to empower 
consumers by providing them with secure access to their own data.72 Another 
stakeholder suggests giving customers greater control through an opt-in system for 
use of their data. This might, for example, involve requiring prior customer consent to 
use their data for cross-selling or enabling a customer to instruct one firm to share their 
personal data with another.73 Online comparators and their use of consumer data is 
discussed in the Consumer outcomes chapter. Others argue for more Government data 
sets to be released to improve industry analysis, risk management and public policy 
development.74 
Australia’s privacy framework 
Following a 28-month inquiry by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 
completed in 2008, privacy law reforms came into effect in March 2014.75 One of the 
review’s primary drivers was “the rapid advance in information, communication, 
storage, surveillance and other relevant technologies”.76 It specifically considered how 
personal information is used in credit reporting, direct marketing and cross-border 
information flows. 
The resulting reforms include 13 Australian Privacy Principles covering the collection, 
use, disclosure and management of personal information by Government agencies and 
certain private sector organisations. These reforms are substantial and have only 
recently been implemented. They require time to take effect. Consequently, assessing 
their effectiveness at this point will be of limited benefit, although a future review may 
be appropriate. 
                                                          
71  For example, refer to Choice 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
72  United Kingdom Government 2014, Providing better information and protection for consumers, 
United Kingdom Government, viewed 13 May 2014, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/providing-better-information-and-protection-
for-consumers/supporting-pages/personal-data>. 
73  Industry Super Australia 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
74  Actuaries Institute 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
75  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2014, Privacy Fact Sheet 17: Australian 
Privacy Principles, Australian Government, Canberra. 
76  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 2008 (modified 2013), ALRC Report 108 — For 
Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Australian Government, Canberra, 
page 19. 
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Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• Review and assess the new privacy requirements two years after implementation 
to consider whether the impacts appropriately balance financial system efficiency 
and privacy protections. 
• Review record-keeping and privacy requirements that impact on cross-border 
information flows and explore options for improving cross-border mutual 
regulatory recognition in these areas. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• What options could be explored for providing consumers with more control over 
use of their data and/or better access to their own data in useful formats to 
improve decision making and consumer outcomes? 
• What additional Government data sets could be released to improve consumer 
outcomes, industry analysis and public policy development via data.gov.au, 
taking into account relevant privacy requirements? 
Data security and cloud technology 
Preliminary assessment 
Growth in both the amount of data held and used by firms and in the use of cloud 
technology potentially increases efficiency, but concurrently intensifies operational 
risks related to privacy, security and control of data. Risks related to the use of 
information are discussed in the Privacy section. 
Data security 
The growing amount of data stored and used by firms can bring many benefits to 
consumers, businesses and Government. However, it also creates the risk of a data 
breach exposing large amounts of sensitive customer information, especially given the 
increased sophistication and frequency of cyber attacks. For example, a recent study on 
global threat activity reported that, worldwide, the number of data breaches had 
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grown by 22 per cent between 2011 and 2013.77 Compounding this increase in 
frequency, the growth in the size of each breach resulted in the number of individuals 
who had their personal information78 exposed more than doubling, from 232 million to 
552 million over the same period. 
Many submissions recognise the importance of institutions safeguarding the customer 
information they hold. If Australians do not trust institutions to protect their personal 
information, this will impede the ability to transact and conduct business online. A 
recent study shows data breaches not only negatively impact Australian businesses, in 
terms of the direct costs of managing the consequences of the breach; they also 
significantly damage reputation and drive away customers.79 The study also found 
that data breaches are more likely to occur in retail and financial services than other 
sectors, and these sectors are more susceptible to high customer turnover. 
Currently, where data breaches involve personal information, there are no mandatory 
requirements to report the incident to the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner (OAIC)80 or notify affected individuals under the Privacy Act 1988. In 
2012, the ALRC recommended this be amended.81 Mandatory notifications can help 
individuals regain control over personal information. Being transparent about 
handling information can help rebuild public trust by demonstrating that an 
organisation takes its obligation to protect personal information seriously. Similarly, 
notifying the OAIC may help reinforce this, and it may also assist the OAIC in 
handling inquiries and managing complaints.82 
Cloud technology 
Cloud technology has the potential to improve the efficiency of financial service 
provision. For example, shifting to cloud services has reduced the Commonwealth 
Bank’s storage, app testing and development costs by 50 per cent — above the 
                                                          
77  Symantec 2014, Internet Security Threat Report 2014, 2013 Trends, vol 19, Symantec, Mountain 
View, viewed 5 June 2014, 
<http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications/threatreport.jsp>. 
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79  Ponemon Institute 2014, 2014 Cost of Data Breach Study: Australia, benchmark research 
sponsored by IBM, Ponemon Institute, Traverse City. 
80  Under the 2014-15 Budget, the Australian Government announced plans to disband the 
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81  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2012, Data Breach Notification: A guide to 
handling personal information security breaches, Australian Government, Canberra. 
82  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2012, Data Breach Notification: A guide to 
handling personal information security breaches, Australian Government, Canberra. 
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40 per cent savings the bank expects from cloud migration.83 Previously, 75 per cent of 
the bank’s IT expenditure was on infrastructure. Cloud usage has reduced this to 
26 per cent, freeing up capital for innovative developments in business logic and 
customer-facing technologies.84 A recently released Government report into cloud 
computing regulation also recognises the innovation and productivity benefits of the 
technology.85 
Consequently, a number of submissions argue for flexibility in cloud technology 
regulation, particularly in any future guidelines to be developed by the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA).86 One submission notes that “because of its 
scale, cloud computing infrastructure is cheaper to run, more flexible to use, and can 
provide greater security, with the ability to update services rapidly with enhanced 
safeguards”.87 Submissions suggest that, to encourage the uptake of these technologies 
or those of other third-party providers, regulatory guidelines should take a 
principles-based rather than prescriptive approach.  
Although cloud technology offers many benefits, its use also potentially dilutes a 
firm’s control over its data and systems, increasing security risks. In addition, where a 
cloud provider is located offshore, a regulator may have limited capacity to obtain 
information, investigate or take enforcement action where necessary. Stakeholders 
acknowledge the importance of protecting customer data and core infrastructure, and 
therefore the need for APRA to develop guidelines. One submission also observes that 
APRA should monitor the concentration risk on a system-wide basis, given the 
increased reliance of firms on a potentially small number of third-party providers. 
From a consumer perspective, use of cloud technology also has the potential to 
introduce some level of confusion in relation to who is accountable to the consumer. In 
particular, where cloud solutions are provided by a third party, questions may arise if 
a consumer’s private data is handled inappropriately or financial services transactions 
are not administered to an appropriate standard. 
                                                          
83  Duckett, C 2012, ‘CBA striving for ‘pure cloud’ amid vendor garbage’, ZDNet, 14 November, 
viewed 3 March 2014, 
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84  Foo, F 2012, ‘CBA saves millions from cloud services’, The Australian, 29 November. 
85  Department of Communications 2014, Cloud computing regulatory stock take, report version 1, 
Australian Government, Canberra. 
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Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2010, Letter to ADIs, GIs and LIs, Outsourcing and 
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87  Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
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Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• Implement mandatory data breach notifications to affected individuals and the 
Australian Government agency with relevant responsibility under privacy laws. 
• Communicate to APRA continuing industry support for a principles-based 
approach to setting cloud computing requirements and the need to consider the 
benefits of the technology as well as the risks. 
Security 
Observation 
The financial system’s shift to an increasingly online environment heightens cyber 
security risks and the need to improve digital identity solutions. Government has 
the ability to facilitate industry coordination and innovation in these areas. 
Cyber security 
Preliminary assessment 
Cyber security’s growing importance 
The rise of e-commerce and widespread internet connectivity expose financial 
institutions to increasingly more cyber crime. Cyber attacks may cause service outages, 
failure of core operating systems, increased fraud, theft of intellectual property and 
loss of sensitive data. Criminal and malicious actors — state and non-state — seek 
ways to disrupt services, access personal and corporate data, and steal resources. 
Organised crime uses increasingly sophisticated techniques, particularly in money 
laundering and identity crime, to facilitate other illegal activities. 
Cyber attacks are no longer only a potential threat; they are occurring on an 
increasingly frequent basis. For example, recent figures show a 21 per cent rise in cyber 
threats to Australian Government networks between 2012 and 2013.88 In considering 
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national security risks, the Government has assessed cyber security risk to the 
Australian economy as high.89 Consequently, cyber security is one of the Government’s 
top national security priorities, and the financial system is considered a component of 
Australia’s critical infrastructure.90 The financial industry is a key target of cyber crime, 
alongside the resources, defence, telecommunications and technology sectors.91 
Although managing cyber security risks creates costs for industry and Government, 
there are also costs from failing to take action. For example, in 2013 cyber crime 
affected 5 million Australians at an estimated cost of $1.06 billion.92 Cyber crime may 
erode consumer and business trust and confidence in the financial system. 
Increasingly, cyber crime is also being identified as a potential source of systemic 
risk.93 
Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 
In Australia, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet provides 
whole-of-Government coordination on cyber security policy under the Cyber Security 
Strategy (CSS). The CSS, released in 2009, is designed to maintain a “secure, resilient 
and trusted electronic operating environment that supports Australia’s national 
security and maximises the benefits of the digital economy”.94 
Submissions consistently raise concerns that the CSS needs to be reviewed and 
updated, and that a strategy from 2009 is out of date in a rapidly changing threat 
environment. A recent Government report also warns of the need for organisations to 
be continually vigilant and up to date in network security to deal with the “increasing 
skill and resourcefulness of cyber adversaries”.95 
Australia’s CSS is the least up to date among the national cyber security strategies of 
the United States (2011), the United Kingdom (2011), Canada (2010), New Zealand 
                                                          
89  Attorney-General’s Department, Cyber security, Australian Government, viewed 11 June 
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(2011), France (2011), Germany (2011), Japan (2013) and Singapore (2013).96 Given the 
complexity and dynamic nature of the threat, stakeholders emphasise the importance 
of cyber security being managed strategically at a national level, hence the need for a 
refreshed strategy. 
Implementation of cyber security policy 
Due to its broad-ranging implications, many agencies are involved in implementing 
cyber security policy. The CSS identifies nine main agencies or bodies with significant 
cyber security responsibilities, such as the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), and 
various communications, defence and intelligence agencies. The CSS also established 
two new organisations in 2009: the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
Australia and the Cyber Security Operations Centre, both of which will now be 
co-located within the recently announced Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC).97 
In January 2013, the Government announced the establishment of the ACSC as part of 
the National Security Strategy.98 The ACSC is the joint responsibility of the 
Attorney-General and the Minister for Defence and will be overseen by the Cyber 
Security Operations Board (CSOB). The CSOB consists of agency heads and secretaries 
and is responsible for strategic oversight of the Government’s operational cyber 
security capabilities and coordination of cyber security measures.99 
The ACSC brings together cyber security expertise from the Australian Signals 
Directorate (ASD), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, AGD, Australian 
Federal Police and Australian Crime Commission (ACC).100 The ACSC will focus on 
threat identification and assessment, as well as coordinating operational responses to 
threats of national importance. The ACSC will also aim to improve partnerships 
between Government agencies and with industry.101 It is expected to be operational in 
late 2014.102 
A range of other agencies also play roles in cyber security; for example, in areas such 
as anti-money laundering, privacy and international cooperation against cyber threats. 
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In addition, a number of joint public–private sector committees exist for cyber and 
fraud threats. For example, the Australian Federal Government and Banking Industry 
Security Governance Forum for sharing intelligence on cyber threats, and the National 
Fraud Exchange for fraud intelligence sharing across Australian financial 
institutions.103 
Stakeholders suggest there could be more cohesion and coordination in implementing 
cyber security policy. They note that many of the organisations involved tend to be 
focused on tactical and operational issues, rather than strategic matters. Consequently, 
some of the strategic and forward-planning aspects are given less emphasis. For 
example, if a major cyber attack occurs, the roles and responsibilities for Government 
and the private sector are unclear. Developing a forum for private and public sector 
discussion of strategic issues has been suggested as a way of addressing these matters. 
Information sharing and collaboration 
Although the private sector itself collects significant amounts of threat information, 
Government is in a unique position to gather intelligence and should have effective 
mechanisms to share information with industry. Currently, CERT Australia and the 
ASD play roles in disseminating threat information to industry. Other Government 
organisations, such as the Trusted Information Sharing Network, also contribute.104 
However, stakeholders suggest that information flows between the public and private 
sector could be improved, particularly in relation to real-time actionable intelligence. 
Stakeholders also suggest improved sharing of intelligence with other sectors, such as 
the telecommunications sector. 
While recognising industry collaboration already occurs, submissions argue that cyber 
security risk management could be improved by greater collaboration between 
Government, regulators and industry. Although stakeholders acknowledge that 
financial institutions retain ultimate responsibility for maintaining the security of their 
own systems, they note that collaborating with Government can help institutions fine 
tune their efforts. The CSS itself includes as one of its guiding principles the 
importance of partnerships and collaboration with the private sector and broader 
Australian community. 
In a recent example of collaboration in the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is 
working with industry to test and improve the sector’s cyber resilience through its 
                                                          
103  ANZ 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
104  The Trusted Information Sharing Network enables information sharing between business 
and government to protect critical infrastructure and essential services in the face of all 
hazards. 
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CBEST initiative.105 CBEST is a framework to deliver targeted cyber security tests, but 
differs from traditional testing in that it is based on real and current cyber threat 
intelligence. Tests replicate the sophisticated and persistent attacks of threat actors to 
assess an institution’s capabilities.106 
Another collaborative model suggested by stakeholders is the Financial Services 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) based in the United States. The 
FS-ISAC is a member-funded and -managed, government-endorsed organisation that 
gathers threat, vulnerability and risk information about cyber and physical security 
risks faced by the financial services sector globally.107 Information is sourced from 
government and law enforcement agencies, private sector institutions, and academic 
and other trusted sources. The FS-ISAC delivers alerts to member organisations and 
provides various services based on a tiered system of membership.  
Stakeholders note that the global nature of both e-commerce and cyber threats 
increases the potential need for regional and international cooperation on cyber 
security issues. Recognising this, although it has always had members with global 
operations, the FS-ISAC recently extended its charter to specifically include 
information sharing with financial services firms worldwide.108 
Lifting industry standards 
Stakeholders argue that cyber security issues occur in an ecosystem where the 
capability of individual institutions affects the capability of the financial system as a 
whole. In other words, although some stakeholders have strong cyber security 
capabilities, they are still exposed to ‘weak links’ in the chain. Larger players generally 
have more capacity — and as larger targets, more incentive — to invest in cyber 
security. Smaller players are lesser targets; however, they can potentially be more 
vulnerable, as they typically lack the scale to invest to the same extent. Vulnerabilities 
can also arise from outside the sector; for example, during information transfer to 
technology service providers with inadequate data encryption standards. These 
differing capabilities heighten the need for Government to take a systems perspective 
in managing cyber security risks. 
                                                          
105  Bank of England (BoE), CBEST Vulnerability Testing Framework Launch, BoE, London, viewed 
11 June 2014, <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/fsc/Pages/cbest.aspx>. 
106 Bank of England (BoE), An Introduction to CBEST, BoE, London, viewed 11 June 2014, 
http://www. 
bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/fsc/Documents/anintroductiontocbest.pdf. 
107  Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC), FAQs, FS-ISAC, 
viewed on 12 June 2014, <https://www.fsisac.com/faqs>. 
108  Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC), About FS-ISAC, 
FS-ISAC, viewed on 12 June 2014, <https://www.fsisac.com/about>. 
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Firms with less capacity to invest in cyber security may require access to more 
information and advice from Government and industry sources. One submission 
suggests Government might follow the United States example in issuing guidelines to 
enhance cyber security across the industry and other critical sectors.109 In the United 
States, the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) recently released a Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity.110 The framework is the result of public–private sector collaboration and 
is voluntary and risk-based. It provides a set of industry standards and best practices 
to assist organisations in managing cyber security risks. It is intended to be scalable to 
meet different organisations’ needs, without adding regulatory burden. 111 
Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy option or other alternatives: 
Review and update the 2009 Cyber Security Strategy to reflect changes in the threat 
environment, improve cohesion in policy implementation and progress public–
private sector collaboration. 
 
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Would a private–public sector discussion forum for strategic issues, such as cyber 
crisis planning, improve cohesion in implementing cyber security policy? What 
other mechanisms might assist to improve cohesion or coordination? 
• Is there a need for more cross-sectoral or transnational mechanisms for 
information sharing, or for Government to work with industry to initiate the 
development of a collaborative model similar to the United States FS-ISAC? 
• How useful would a voluntary cyber security framework, similar to that of the 
United States NIST, be in assisting industry to develop cyber capabilities? 
                                                          
109  Australian Bankers’ Association 2014, First round submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry. 
110  National Institute of Standards and Technology 2014, Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.0, US Department of Commerce, Gaithersburg , 
12 February. 
111  National Institute of Standards and Technology 2014, Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.0, US Department of Commerce, Gaithersburg , 
12 February. 
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Digital identity 
Preliminary assessment 
An essential function 
Participants in Australia’s financial system have always needed, and continue to need, 
confidence in a person’s identity. At its simplest, confirming a person’s identity helps 
prevent others from misappropriating that identity to conduct illicit financial 
transactions or other illegal activities. 
Consumers’ growing preferences for accessing financial services through online and 
digital channels is increasing the need for efficient digital identity verification and 
authentication solutions. Traditionally, identity verification has involved sighting and 
collecting an individual’s original, government-issued identifying documents face to 
face. In a digital environment, this process is slow and onerous for customers and 
expensive and cumbersome for organisations. 
Submissions note both the importance of trusted digital identities to the financial 
system and heightened concerns over identity theft. For example, one submission 
notes that the superannuation industry is becoming increasingly attractive as a target 
for identity theft, as the size of member account balances grows.112 Trusted digital 
identities can stimulate the digital economy by increasing trust and enabling more 
sensitive transactions to be conducted online. Conversely, lack of consumer trust can 
result in ‘e-friction’, impeding the growth of the digital economy.113 Arguably, as the 
digital economy grows, systems and processes associated with digital identity 
management may increasingly be considered a type of critical infrastructure. 
Identity crime 
Trusted digital identities are important in helping prevent identity-related crime and 
fraud. Identity crime costs Australian consumers, businesses and Government. For 
example, in 2011 Australians lost an estimated $1.4 billion through personal fraud 
incidents related to credit card fraud, identity theft and scams.114 Over five months in 
2011, the ATO identified more than 7,300 income tax returns as suspected cases of 
identity crime; claimed refunds were worth approximately $36 million.115 The ACC 
                                                          
112  Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 2014, First round submission to the 
Financial System Inquiry. 
113  The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 2014, The Connected World: Greasing the Gears of the 
Internet Economy, BCG, January. 
114  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2012, Personal Fraud, 2010–2011, cat. no. 4528.0, ABS, 
Canberra. 
115  Australian Crime Commission 2013, Organised Crime in Australia 2013, Australian 
Government, Canberra. 
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rates identity crime as a key enabler of serious and organised crime, which in turn 
costs Australia $15 billion annually.116 
Identity crime is one of the most common types of crime in Australia. A 2013 survey by 
the Australian Institute of Criminology found almost 10 per cent of Australians had 
suffered theft or misuse of their personal information in the previous 12 months.117 
More than half of those who had suffered misuse of personal information had 
experienced financial losses as a result, with an average loss of approximately $4,000, 
ranging to over $300,000 in the most serious case. 
Australia’s identity infrastructure 
In Australia, there is no single government identity credential; instead, the identity 
infrastructure is provided by approximately 20 government agencies managing over 
50 million core identity credentials.118 This decentralised model is referred to as a 
federated identity system, which tends to emphasise market-based solutions. Multiple 
identity credentials are produced by government and commercial providers to provide 
access to public and private sector services. Under a syndicated model, a single 
identity credential is issued — typically by government — providing single sign-on 
access to public and private sector services. 
Financial services firms form an important part of Australia’s identity infrastructure. 
They both use the government-sourced identity infrastructure to perform identity 
management functions, and they form part of the infrastructure, as they themselves 
issue documents that are often subsequently used to prove identity, such as debit and 
credit cards. Financial services firms are also significant innovators in this area. 
In Australia, when a person seeks to use financial services, anti-money laundering 
(AML) legislation requires firms to meet ‘know your client’ (KYC) identity 
management and verification obligations.119 Stakeholders observe that these 
requirements, combined with a federated identity model, can result in significant 
process duplication as firms verify and re-verify identities. This is particularly the case 
where firms are not permitted to rely on the identity verification processes of other 
trusted firms. 
                                                          
116  Australian Crime Commission 2013, Organised Crime in Australia 2013, Australian 
Government, Canberra. 
117  Smith, R G and Hutchings, A 2014, Identity crime and misuse in Australia: Results of the 2013 
online survey, Research and Public Policy Series 128, Australian Institute of Criminology, 
Canberra. 
118  Attorney-General’s Department 2014, National Identity Proofing Guidelines, Draft Version 5.1, 
Australian Government, Canberra. 
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Although Australia has a National Identity Security Strategy, it does not set out a 
detailed comprehensive approach to the issue of digital identities.120 However, it has 
resulted in the development of significant building blocks, such as the Document 
Verification Service (DVS). This secure online service enables government agencies, 
financial institutions and other businesses to verify information on identity documents 
directly with the document issuing agency.121 In addition to preventing identity crime, 
the DVS helps to reduce AML and other compliance costs related to customer identity 
verification. Other initiatives include an assurance framework for accrediting 
commercial identity service providers,122 a national (identity) e-authentication 
framework,123 and identity proofing guidelines124 for government agencies and 
businesses. 
The myGov digital service provides a potential basis for a Government-issued digital 
identity.125 myGov provides Australians with secure single sign-on access to various 
government services, including Medicare, Centrelink, electronic health records and tax 
records, including a digital mailbox to receive government correspondence. The 
National Commission of Audit has recommended that myGov be a core component of 
a strategy to shift government services to a default position of delivery by digital 
channels.126 
Submissions question the cost and effectiveness of current identity arrangements, 
including compliance requirements under AML rules. Globally, AML compliance costs 
increased by an average of 53 per cent in the three years to 2014. This trend is expected 
to continue, driven by the increasing costs of transaction monitoring systems and 
meeting KYC requirements.127 
                                                          
120  Attorney-General’s Department 2013, National Identity Security Strategy 2012, Australian 
Government, Canberra. 
121  Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) 2013, Documentation Verification Service, AGD, 
Canberra, viewed 12 June 2014, <http://www.dvs.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx>. 
122  Australian Government Information Management Office 2013, Third Party Identity Services 
Assurance Framework, Department of Finance, Australian Government, Canberra. 
123  Australian Government Information Management Office, National e-Authentication 
Framework, Department of Finance and Deregulation, Australian Government, Canberra, 
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124  Attorney-General’s Department 2014, National Identity Proofing Guidelines, Draft Version 5.1, 
Australian Government, Canberra. 
125  Australian Government, myGov, Australian Government, Canberra, viewed 12 June 2014, 
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126  National Commission of Audit 2014, Report of the National Commission of Audit, Australian 
Government, Canberra. 
127  KPMG 2014, Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey, KPMG, viewed 3 March 2014, 
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Stakeholders are seeking ways to develop more efficient and secure identity processes. 
Existing commonly used processes such as passwords can be problematic. The average 
Australian maintains between five and 50 different login and password combinations 
for their online activities. This is challenging for individuals and firms: 20 to 
30 per cent of all IT service desk requests relate to password problems. Estimates 
indicate the cost of password resets alone is approximately US$1 billion globally.128 For 
the Oceania region, enabling e-government services via digital identities could 
generate US$1.5 billion in savings annually by 2020.129 
Stakeholders vary significantly in their views on how identity management can be 
improved in Australia. Some have suggested developing a Government-sponsored 
central utility for verifying customer identity. Others seek to develop identity services 
by leveraging their existing branch networks and services in partnership with 
Government. Some want access to additional Government information to provide 
these services themselves, rather than relying on Government. 
International developments 
Internationally, different jurisdictions are positioned at various points along the 
spectrum between federated and syndicated identity models. Towards the federated 
end, examples include the: 
• United States National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace — enables 
commercial providers to compete to produce credentials in accordance with 
standards set out under multiple accredited trust frameworks. A Federal Cloud 
Credential Exchange is being set up by the United States Government within the 
United States Postal Service to facilitate federal agencies in accepting accredited 
third-party digital credentials.130 
• United Kingdom Identity Assurance Program — allows accredited commercial 
identity providers to issue credentials providing access to multiple government 
services.131 Its standards-based approach relies on a hub that enables authentication 
                                                          
128  Research by the Australian Communications and Media Authority, cited by Senator George 
Brandis QC, Attorney-General and Minister for the Arts 2014, address at the opening 
plenary of the CeBIT Australia 2014 Conference, 5 February, Sydney. 
129  Secure Identity Alliance 2014, The role of trusted digital identity in enabling the eGovernment 
2020 vision, Secure Identity Alliance, Paris, February, viewed 14 May 2014, 
<http://www.securitydocumentworld.com/creo_files/upload/article-files/140206_-_digital_
identity_in_2020_-_sia.pdf>. 
130  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), About NSTIC, NIST, United States 
Department of Commerce, Gaithersburg, viewed 12 June 2014, 
<http://www.nist.gov/nstic/about-nstic.html>. 
131  Cabinet Office 2012, Identity assurance: delivering trusted transactions, United Kingdom 
Government, London, viewed 12 June 2014, 
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without unnecessary transfer, disclosure or storage of data, limiting privacy 
implications. 
• Canadian Cyber Authentication Renewal Initiative — provides individuals with a 
choice of private or public sector identity credentials to access government 
services.132 It offers GCKey, a government-provided identity credential, or the 
option to use SecureKey Concierge, a service that enables individuals to use 
identity credentials previously issued by partner banks. This model is effectively an 
authorised brokering service that relies on previous identity verification performed 
by the banks. 
A common theme among these initiatives is the growing role of financial institutions 
and other private sector organisations in providing identity-related services, 
traditionally the domain of government. 
At the syndicated end, government-developed examples designed specifically to 
enable digital service delivery include: 
• New Zealand’s RealMe credential — issued after an in-person interview at a 
New Zealand Post Office.133 The applicant must produce their passport, citizenship 
or birth certificate, or visa, and documents are verified using the Data Validation 
Service. RealMe allows individuals to consent to and share their personal 
information with other organisations, such as banks, if they wish. 
• India’s Aadhaar identifier — India’s new national identification number is linked 
to fingerprint, iris and facial biometric information captured at registration. The 
identifier enables access to online and offline government services and is an 
acceptable form of identity for commercial services such as banking.134 
Beyond government initiatives, private sector developments include the activities of 
groups such as the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance, members of which include 
MasterCard, Bank of America, Microsoft and Google. The FIDO Alliance is committed 
to “developing specifications that define an open, scalable and interoperable set of 
mechanisms that supplant reliance on passwords to securely authenticate users of 
online services”.135 Globally, the market for online identity authentication in the 
                                                          
132  Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission 2014, Cyber authentication 
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banking sector is forecast to reach US$1.6 billion by 2018, a 945 per cent increase since 
2012.136 
Biometrics 
Using biometric systems for identity verification is becoming increasingly common. 
Public and private sector organisations are seeking greater levels of assurance in the 
identities of their customers. Many financial institutions, both in Australia and 
overseas, have adopted biometrics to improve security around ATMs and phone 
banking services. For example, one major Australian bank first introduced voice 
biometrics technology in 2009 and now has more than 150,000 customers with 
registered voice prints for identity verification when dealing with the bank’s call 
centre.137 The National Commission of Audit also recently recommended 
strengthening myGov with biometrics (or face-to-face verification) to enable broader 
use of the identity credential.138 
Biometric systems offer considerable potential as a means of preventing identity theft 
and fraud, improving efficiency and convenience in service delivery, and enabling new 
online services and business models. However, they come with significant privacy 
issues and other potential drawbacks. In many cases, biometric information is not 
secret. For example, people leave fingerprints everywhere. Also, unlike passwords, 
biometrics cannot be reset after being compromised. 
Benefits of different models 
A system of trusted digital identities could have significant network benefits 
throughout the financial sector and the broader digital economy. If financial 
institutions and other companies could rely on trusted digital credentials, these firms 
could reduce their own duplicative identity verification processes. This would be more 
efficient for businesses and more convenient for consumers, who would need to 
maintain far fewer username and password credentials. Potentially, it could also be 
more secure, if designed and implemented effectively. Widespread acceptance and 
mutual recognition of trusted digital identities across the financial sector could also 
assist customers in transferring accounts between financial institutions. 
                                                          
136  ABI Research cited in Friedman, O 2013, Online ID and Authentication Market Expected to 
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138  National Commission of Audit 2014, Report of the National Commission of Audit, Australian 
Government, Canberra. 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
4-70 
If Government was the default provider of digital identities to Australians, there 
would be economies of scale and other potential benefits, such as ease of access to 
Government information sources. This approach is reflected in New Zealand’s RealMe 
service, in which the government conducts high-integrity identity verification, 
including biometric capture, equivalent to passport application processes, before 
issuing individuals with their government digital identity. 
Equally, Government could help guide and stimulate a commercial market of digital 
identity products and services. It could work with industry to establish minimum 
standards in more of a federated ‘trust framework’ model. In this approach, similar to 
that of the United Kingdom and United States, consumers could choose between 
government- and commercially-issued identity credentials. Allowing people to use 
multiple trusted credentials would have privacy benefits. It would also help reduce the 
potentially severe consequences where an individual only has a single digital identity, 
which is then compromised. 
Australia’s approach to developing trusted digital identities will need to take 
into account the broader international context. This will help Australian businesses 
compete in a global identity services market and benefit Australian consumers by 
facilitating wider acceptance of their digital identities. The Australian and 
New Zealand Prime Ministers have recently recognised these benefits and agreed to 
investigate options for mutual recognition of trusted online identities in both 
countries.139 
Policy options for consultation 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy option or other alternatives: 
Develop a national strategy for promoting trusted digital identities, in consultation 
with financial institutions and other stakeholders. 
 
                                                          
139  Abbott, T (Prime Minister of Australia) and Key, J (Prime Minister of New Zealand) 2014 , 
Joint statement of Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Key, media release 7 February, 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• In developing a national strategy, what should be the respective roles, 
responsibilities and expectations of Australian public and private sector 
organisations in creating, accepting and maintaining the digital identities used by 
Australians? 
• Is there a need for Government to enhance identity authentication by facilitating 
interoperability standards in areas such as biometrics, enabling better access to 
Government information or improvements to the Documentation Verification 
Service? 
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10: International integration 
Australia has benefited substantially from financial integration with the rest of the 
world, most notably from trade and accessing international capital markets over 
many decades. Benefits have also flowed from opening up Australia’s financial 
services market to foreign competition and from exporting financial services to 
other markets, although these exports have not been as significant. 
Since the global financial crisis (GFC), cross-border capital flows have declined 
globally, and the international regulatory response to the crisis has in part aimed to 
reduce the interconnectedness of the global financial system and increase its 
resilience to shocks. Although the risks are real, there remain long-term benefits 
from financial integration. The Inquiry supports efforts to drive greater international 
financial integration, provided they do not compromise appropriate standards for 
financial stability and conduct in Australia. 
This chapter outlines the importance of international integration and provides a 
basis for engaging with stakeholders in more detail about the existence of 
impediments and which, if any, need to be addressed. It also discusses Australia’s 
exposure to increasing global regulatory influence and the need for better 
coordination on integration between Government, regulators and industry. 
The Inquiry has made the following observations about the international integration 
of the Australian financial system: 
• Although elements of Australia’s financial system are internationally integrated, 
a number of potential impediments have been identified. Financial system 
developments in the region will require continuing Government engagement to 
facilitate integration with Asia. 
• Government efforts to promote Australia’s policy interests on international 
standard-setting bodies have been successful. Domestic regulatory processes 
could be improved to better consider international standards and foreign 
regulation, including processes for collaboration and consultation for 
international standard implementation, and mutual recognition and equivalence 
assessment processes. 
• Coordination of Australia’s international financial integration could be 
improved. 
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Context 
Financial integration 
Financial integration is a country’s financial connectedness with other countries. 
Greater financial integration tends to increase capital flows and equalise prices and 
returns on traded financial assets in different countries.1  
Financial integration and open capital markets offer significant benefits to an economy 
(see Table 10.1). A number of studies have shown financial integration has positive 
direct and indirect effects on a country’s economic growth.2 However, the GFC has 
reminded us of the risks of contagion from integration with economies experiencing 
volatility. The international regulatory response to the crisis has, in part, aimed to 
reduce the interconnectedness of the global financial system and increase its resilience 
to shocks.3 Although the risks are real, there remain long-term benefits from financial 
integration. 
Table 10.1: Benefits and challenges from financial integration4 
Benefits of financial integration  Challenges from financial integration 
Broadens funding sources and improves access to 
financial services 
Greater exposure to negative external shocks and 
risks from contagion 
Opens up domestic market to competition which 
can have efficiency gains 
Cross-border supervision and enforcement 
challenges 
Greater risk sharing through global diversification 
and more efficient allocation of global capital 
Adverse effects from potential higher volatility in 
capital flows, effects on asset prices and the 
financial system’s ability to manage volatility 
Foreign direct investment facilitates skill and 
technology transfers between countries 
 
Portfolio investment and foreign bank lending can 
contribute to the deepening of the domestic 
financial market 
 
                                                          
1  De Brouwer, G 2005, ‘Monetary and Financial Integration in Asia: Empirical Evidence and 
Issues’ Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Progress, Prospects and Challenges, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila. 
2  Epaulard, A and Pommeret, A 2005, ‘Financial Integration, growth and volatility’, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/05/67, IMF, Washington. and Kose, A, Prasad, E, Rogoff, K and Wei, S 
2009, ‘Financial Globalisation: A reappraisal’, IMF Staff Papers, vol 56, no.1, IMF, 
Washington. 
3  James, E, McLoughlin, K and Rankin, E 2014, ‘Cross-border Capital Flows since the Global 
Financial Crisis’, RBA Bulletin, June, RBA, Sydney. 
4  Based on remarks by Yellen, J 2011, Reaping the Full Benefits of Financial Openness, address to 
Bank of Finland 200th Anniversary Conference, 6 May, Finland.  
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Assessing Australia’s level of integration 
There is no single accepted measure of a country’s level of financial integration. Two 
common approaches are used: 
1. Quantitative — assessing levels of international capital and financial flows or 
price correlation across markets.  
2. Comparative — surveys or studies comparing features of different economies.  
A recent IMF paper considered that preferred quantity-based measures include gross 
stocks of foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP.5 This is shown for some 
countries in Chart 10.1.  
Chart 10.1: Financial integration across selected comparator countries6 
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Source: FSI calculations using ABS, IMF, Thomson Reuters, national sources. 
Australia is mid-ranking by this measure of financial integration. Unsurprisingly, 
Australia does not rank as highly as the global financial centres of the United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore. However, Australia ranks close to Canada, a 
country with a similar economy in terms of size, wealth and governance systems,7 with 
                                                          
5  Kose, A, Prasad, E, Rogoff, K, Wei, S 2009, ‘Financial Globalisation: A reappraisal’, IMF Staff 
Papers, vol 56, no.1, IMF, Washington. 
6  *Indicates data for 2012. 
7  Ciuriak, D 2012, Canada-Australia commerce: enhancing the relationship, a report for the 
Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Australian Industry Group, Sydney, page 1.  
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Canada also having the advantage of being geographically co-located to the world’s 
largest economy. 
Australia has benefited from financial integration with the global financial system. 
Financial reforms of past decades have delivered the basis for sounder macroeconomic 
policy, more diversified portfolios for Australian investors and the development of 
tools for hedging risk.8 Opening Australia’s borders to foreign goods, services and 
capital played a critical role in productivity growth.9 
Today, Australian banks and other entities raise foreign funding and invest in foreign 
assets.10 Foreigners’ willingness to fund Australia’s longstanding current account 
deficit has supported Australia’s growth, with international financial flows freeing 
firms’ investment decisions from domestic financing constraints.11 The Australian 
dollar is the fifth most traded currency internationally.12 
Australia’s financial sector as a proportion of its economy is large by international 
standards. It was the largest sector in the Australian economy in 2012–13, representing 
8.7 per cent of gross-value added.13 However, financial services exports only represent 
a small proportion of Australia’s trade, accounting for around 4.5 per cent of total 
trade in services at the end of 2013.14 
Australia’s main financial relationships are with Europe and the United States. These 
are the markets where Australia raises capital and makes foreign investments — with 
around three-quarters of corporate bond issuance conducted offshore, predominantly 
in the United States.15 While much of Australia’s funding is conducted offshore, 
Australia also provides a funding source for foreign companies. In March 2014, 
36 per cent of total issuance of non-government bonds were ‘kangaroo bonds’ issued 
by foreign entities in the Australian domestic market.16 
                                                          
8  Lowe, P 2014, Some implications of the internationalisation of the Renminbi, opening remarks to 
the Centre for International Finance and Regulation Conference on the Internationalisation of 
the Renminbi, 26 March, Sydney. 
9  For further discussion see Banks, G 2005, Structural reform Australian-style: lessons for others?, 
presentation to the IMF, World Bank and OECD, May. 
10  See detailed discussion of these flows in the Funding chapter. 
11  Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2011, Annual Report 2010/11, BIS, Basel, page 33. 
12  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, Developments in Foreign Exchange and OTC Derivatives 
Markets, RBA, Sydney, viewed 21 June 2014, 
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15  Reserve Bank of Australia, 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, 
page 25. 
16  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), 2014, Statistical table: Debt Securities Outstanding — D4, 
RBA, Sydney, viewed 19 June 2014, <http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/index.html>. 
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Although Australia has elements evidencing sound financial integration, there are both 
opportunities and challenges on the horizon. Although the focus of merchandise trade 
has shifted to the Asian region, financial flows are yet to follow in a substantial way. 
The pattern of integration is being influenced by cross-border digital connectivity. 
International rules and regulations will also reshape the level and direction of that 
integration. 
Integration trends — Growth of Asia 
Since the Wallis Inquiry, the weight of the world’s economic activity has been shifting 
to our region.  
Although Europe and the United States are likely to continue to be critical financial 
markets for Australia, as Asia becomes increasingly middle class and urbanised its 
share of the global economy is forecast to overtake that of the advanced17 economies 
(Chart 10.2). 
Chart 10.2: Past and forecast shift in economic weight 
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Source: Treasury projections.18 
                                                          
17  For definition see International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2014, World Economic and Financial 
Surveys World Economic Outlook Database—WEO Groups and Aggregates Information, IMF, 
Washington, viewed 24 June 2014, 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/groups.htm#ae>. 
18  Based on IMF and Conference Board data, as well as Maddison, A 2010, Statistics on world 
population, GDP and GDP per capita, 1-2008 AD, Historical Statistics, Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre, viewed 21 June 2014, <http://www.ggdc.net>. Based on purchasing 
power parity adjusted GDP. 
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In the next decade, Asia is forecast to account for more than half of world growth.19 
Asia also has an increasing share of world trade. Presently, four of Australia’s top five 
trading partners are in Asia. 
This presents significant opportunities and challenges for the Australian financial 
system. One of the largest anticipated regional financial system developments will be 
the liberalisation of China’s capital account, and the gradual easing of restrictions on 
trading in the onshore Chinese currency market by firms from outside of China.20 At 
present, China has the largest proportion of world trade, but a currency that is not 
actively traded. 
China has announced a program for relaxing currency and capital controls. In addition 
to stepped foreign exchange liberalisation, other financial system reforms planned 
include: 
• Ending mandatory low-interest payments on deposits in China 
• Allowing deeper competition in banking 
• Allowing limited foreign bank entry and a Shanghai free-trade zone for financial 
services 
• Expanding capital control schemes, including the Renminbi Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (RQFII) scheme, which will allow renminbi (RMB) raised 
offshore to be invested in listed Mainland bonds and equities, Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) and the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect scheme 
As China continues to free up capital controls, a significant proportion of the resultant 
increase in both portfolio and direct investment flows is likely to be within this 
region.21 
                                                          
19  Treasury 2013, Long-term international GDP projections Working Paper 2013-02, Commonwealth 
Government, Canberra, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2013/Long-term-inter
national-GDP-projections>. 
20  For an overview, see Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2013, ‘Developments in Renminbi 
Internationalisation’, RBA Bulletin, June Quarter, RBA, Sydney, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2013/>. 
21  A number of reports note these developments: see for example ANZ 2014, Caged Tiger: the 
transformation of the Asian financial system, ANZ, Sydney, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.media.anz.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=248677&p=irol-insight> and Centre for 
International Finance and Regulation (CIFR) 2014, Internationalisation of the Renminbi: 
Pathways, Implications and Opportunities Research Report, CIFR, Sydney, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.cifr.edu.au/site/Research/Targeted_Research_RMB_Internationalisation.aspx>. 
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Following China in terms of economic size is India. India’s financial system has the 
potential to provide similar opportunities and challenges for Australia, requiring us to 
build capacity and develop financial system architecture to connect with India’s 
economic transformation. World Bank modelling suggests that by 2020 China and 
India together will serve as nearly twice the engine for growth as the United States and 
the Euro zone combined.22 
There are also rapid changes underway in Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries.23 If ASEAN were a single country, it would be the fifth largest 
economy in the world, with a combined GDP of $US3.9 trillion in 2013, in purchasing 
power parity terms. By 2030, ASEAN is projected to be the equivalent of the fourth 
largest economy.24 
What does this mean for Australia? 
Currency and capital account liberalisation, and growth in the Asian region generally, 
are expected to intensify during the decade following this Inquiry. This is likely to 
have wide-ranging implications for the Australian financial system, some of which are 
already being observed: 
• Potentially significant amounts of Asian direct and portfolio investment moving 
into markets around the world, including Australia 
• Increasing payment of physical trade using RMB 
• Deeper capital markets developing in Asia 
As capital liberalisation incrementally expands, Asia is likely to become a more 
important source of funding, especially for portfolio investment. Australian banks and 
non-financial corporates are increasingly likely to raise funds in RMB and other Asian 
                                                          
22  The World Bank 2011, Global Development Horizons 2011: Multipolarity: The New Global 
Economy, World Bank, Washington, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDH/Resources/GDH_CompleteReport2011.pdf>. 
23  Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states: Brunei, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. For a 
description of Australia’s trading relationship see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT), Economic Fact Sheet, DFAT, Canberra, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/asean.pdf>. 
24  Based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2014, World Economic Outlook, IMF, 
Washington, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/> and Treasury 2013, Working Paper 
2013-02, Long-term international GDP projections Working Paper 2013-02, Treasury, Canberra, 
viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2013/Long-term-inter
national-GDP-projections>. 
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currencies.25 Asian financial markets will also become a more important investment 
destination for Australians.  
Some financial centre jurisdictions have a clear timetable for adapting their market and 
payment infrastructure to deal with changes in the region.26 The next section discusses 
the continued Government engagement that will be required to ensure Australian 
businesses, and all financial system users, can access the opportunities presented by 
these developments. 
Improving integration 
The Inquiry supports efforts to drive greater financial integration, provided it is not at 
the cost of appropriate standards for financial stability and conduct. The Inquiry sees 
scope to enhance productivity in the Australian financial services sector through 
increasing competition, diversity and depth of offering, which would benefit the 
broader economy and users of Australia’s financial system. 
This chapter focuses on the following elements: 
• Impediments that can be removed or adjusted to accommodate integration, where 
benefit to the economy as a whole can be demonstrated. This might include 
removing tax, regulatory or other impediments. 
• Identifying where continuing Government involvement and engagement is 
necessary to facilitate integration with Asia. 
• Enhancing domestic regulatory processes to have better regard to international 
regulatory activity. 
• Better coordinating industry, regulators and whole-of-Government. This is seen by 
most stakeholders as an important element in realising the benefits and managing 
risks presented by a globally integrated financial system. 
                                                          
25  For example, in April 2014, Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd issued CNH 2 billion bonds, 
through lead managers Bank of China (Sydney Branch), ANZ, CBA, NAB, Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) and Westpac. 
26  See for example City of London Corporation 2014, London as a centre for renminbi business, 
City of London Corporation, London, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/support-promotion-and-advice/promoting-the-
city-internationally/china/Pages/London-as-a-centre-for-international-renminbi-business.
aspx>. 
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Impediments to financial integration 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
Although elements of Australia’s financial system are internationally integrated, a 
number of potential impediments have been identified. Financial system 
developments in the region will require continuing Government engagement to 
facilitate integration with Asia. 
Impediments to financial integration 
This Inquiry has the benefit of following a number of Government inquiries and 
private sector reviews that have put forward proposals to promote integration. The 
most recent Australian Government report in 2012, Australia in the Asian Century White 
Paper,27 recommended that Australia develops the skills needed to ensure businesses 
can take advantage of changes in our region. 
The 2009 Johnson report28 examined opportunities to increase both foreign 
participation in Australian markets and financial services exports, especially to the 
growing Asian region. The report concluded the main opportunities for Australian 
businesses were:  
• Australian fund managers managing more offshore-sourced funds 
• Banks doing more transactional banking business in the region 
• Financial institutions managing offshore business from Australia, rather than 
overseas 
Also, globally published indices are regularly released comparing various national 
attributes, including ‘competitiveness’. Australia is generally ranked highly for 
liveability, strong rule of law, financial market sophistication, lack of corruption and 
                                                          
27  Commonwealth Government 2012, Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, 
Commonwealth Government, Canberra, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/133850/20130914-0122/asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au/white-
paper.html>. 
28  Australian Financial Centre Forum 2009, Australia as a Financial Centre: Building on our 
strengths, Commonwealth Government, Canberra, viewed on 21 June 2014, 
<http://afcf.treasury.gov.au/afcf/content/final_report.asp>. 
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overall economic environment.29 However, Australia is typically ranked lower on the 
overall burden of regulation and business focus of regulators.30  
The elements in these reports and other studies provide useful indicators of the critical 
factors for successful financial system integration:  
• Deep and globally integrated financial markets. 
• Strong business environment and well-developed infrastructure. 
• Regulators with a global perspective and an understanding of global businesses.31 
Some submissions note impediments in the business environment that hamper those 
factors, or where more Government engagement may be required to achieve them.  
Taxation 
Submissions suggest that some tax settings in Australia distort international financial 
flows. Many of these issues have been raised before as part of the Johnson, Australia’s 
Future Tax System and Board of Tax reviews. Table 10.2 below outlines some tax 
issues, the recommendations from prior reviews and their current status, as 
understood by the Inquiry. 
To the extent that the changes are not being currently progressed, the Inquiry will refer 
these items to be considered by Australia’s Tax White Paper. 
                                                          
29  Including: PriceWaterhouse Coopers (PWC) 2014, Cities of Opportunity 6, PWC, Sydney, 
viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.pwc.com/us/en/cities-of-opportunity/2014/assets/cities-of-opportunity-2014.
pdf> and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Best cities ranking and report, The Economist, 
London, viewed 21 June 2014, <http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/EIU_BestCities.pdf>. 
30  For example World Economic Forum (WEF) 2013, ‘Australia ranked 128th for burden of 
regulation’, Global Competiveness Report 12–13, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness>. 
31  City of London Corporation 2013, Local to global: Building a modern financial centre Special 
Interest Paper, City of London Corporation, London viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/research-
publications/Pages/From-local-to-global-building-a-modern-financial-centre.aspx>, and 
Menon, R 2014, Singapore’s Financial Centre in the New Landscape, Investment Management 
Association of Singapore 14th Annual Conference, Singapore, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r130313c.pdf>. 
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Table 10.2: Financial integration tax issues raised in submissions 
Tax issue  Explanation  Past review 
recommendations 
Status 
Interest 
withholding 
tax (IWT) 
Submissions argue IWT 
distorts the funding 
decisions of financial 
institutions and places 
Australia at a competitive 
disadvantage 
internationally. 
Johnson reco. 3.4: remove 
IWT. 
AFTS reco. 33: financial 
institutions operating in 
Australia should generally 
not be subject to IWT on 
interest paid to 
non-residents. 
Government announced in 
2013–14 Mid-year 
Economic and Fiscal 
Outlook (MYEFO) not 
proceeding with IWT 
removal.32 
London 
interbank 
offered rate 
(LIBOR) cap 
for IWT 
Caps deductibility in 
respect of interest paid by 
an Australian branch to a 
foreign head office to the 
applicable LIBOR. 
Submissions argue LIBOR 
does not reflect the true 
cost of raising funds. 
Johnson reco. 3.5: remove 
the LIBOR cap on 
deductibility of interest paid 
on branch-parent funding. 
Considered by the Board 
of Tax as part of its review 
of tax arrangements 
applying to permanent 
establishments. 
The Board of Tax report is 
yet to be released. 
IWT for 
counterparties 
(CCPs) 
Submissions argue that 
Australia is at a 
competitive disadvantage 
globally as one of the only 
countries that applies IWT 
for CCPs. 
 Treasury released a 
discussion paper outlining 
the issues involved in 
mandatory central clearing 
in late February 2014. This 
paper mentioned IWT 
issues. 
Package of 
reforms 
aimed at 
facilitating 
managed 
funds 
Submissions note the 
limitations of the current 
regime and support 
extending tax flow through 
treatment to collective 
investment vehicles (CIVs) 
other than managed 
investment trusts (MITs). 
Johnson reco. 3.3: 
recommended the 
Treasurer request the 
Board of Tax to review the 
scope for providing a 
broader range of tax flow 
through CIVs. 
Board of Tax completed a 
review into CIVs in 
December 2011.  
The Board of Tax report is 
yet to be released 
Introduce an Investment 
Manager Regime (IMR) to 
provide clear and certain 
tax treatment for 
transactions undertaken by 
foreign residents using 
Australian intermediaries 
Johnson reco. 3.1: 
Introduce an IMR. 
Elements 1 and 2 of the 
IMR have been legislated. 
Consultation with industry 
stakeholders is continuing 
on Element 3. 
New tax system for MITs Board of Tax review of the 
tax arrangements applying 
to MITs. 
Government announced 
start date of 1 July 2015.  
Some elements of the new 
tax system have been 
legislated since the release 
of the Board’s report.  
                                                          
32  Commonwealth Government 2014, Appendix A: Policy decisions taken since the 2013–14 Budget, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.budget.gov.au/2013-14/content/myefo/html/11_appendix_a_revenue.htm>. 
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Tax issue  Explanation  Past review 
recommendations 
Status 
Offshore 
Banking Unit 
(OBU) 
Submissions seek 
Government support for 
OBU regime and 
clarification of rules. 
Johnson reco. 3.2: 
Remove tax uncertainty 
about what constitutes an 
offshore transaction and 
move some provisions 
from legislation to 
regulation. 
Government announced 
start date of 1 July 2015 
Islamic 
financing 
Clarify tax treatment of 
Islamic financing. 
Johnson reco. 3.6: 
recommended Board of 
Tax review. 
Board of Tax review 
completed in 2011. 
The Board of Tax report is 
yet to be released 
Other impediments 
Submissions identify other impediments to integration in the following areas: 
• Ownership restrictions, particularly in relation to banking and financial market 
infrastructure. 
• Costs and requirements associated with licensing and ongoing compliance costs 
being barriers to foreign entrants. 
• Aspects of prudential settings in Australia having a negative impact on 
international competitiveness. 
• Aspects of prudential setting in Australia and its inconsistency with supporting 
international expansion, such as the way equity investments in offshore financial 
services businesses are treated for capital purposes. 
• Firms with transnational operations having difficulties in relation to cross-border 
information flows. For example, regulatory settings can impose requirements for 
record keeping that restrict data sharing across branches of the same financial 
institution located in different jurisdictions, acting as an impediment to 
cross-border activity. 
• Australia’s trust law needing greater codification to promote better understanding 
globally of our regulatory structure in a number of private wealth, debt and equity 
products. 
• Lack of access to some international concessional treatments and quotas for 
investment that would be useful to Australian financial services businesses, such as 
access to China’s RQFII program. 
• Anomalies between governance requirements in Australia and some offshore 
jurisdictions that may place our companies at a competitive disadvantage. 
Addressing many of these issues involves trade-offs with other policy objectives. 
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Although economic theory suggests that international capital flows can boost growth, 
be a source of resilience for individual economies and provide financial stability 
benefits, they also make financial conditions more correlated across jurisdictions and 
create channels for contagion.33 
The Inquiry supports efforts to drive greater financial integration with the rest of the 
world, provided it is not at the cost of appropriate standards for financial stability and 
conduct in Australia. The Inquiry supports removing market and other impediments; 
enhancing mutual recognition and equivalence processes; and continuing efforts to 
support Australian regulators to participate in international standard-setting bodies, 
with a view to advancing Australia’s national interest.  
The Inquiry does not support tax subsidies or concessions, or market intervention to 
enhance financial integration. 
In considering any recommendations for removing particular impediments in the final 
report, the Inquiry seeks more detail from stakeholders, particularly on the relative 
importance of these potential impediments and how changes balance with other policy 
objectives. Other issues relating to cross-border transactions are discussed in the 
Technology chapter. 
Government engagement – Asia 
Although the Inquiry’s approach is focused on reducing impediments, proactive 
Government action will also be required. The region’s financial system is already 
highly regulated and foreign governments are initiating significant changes. 
Government-to-government dialogue will be needed and industry integration efforts 
will continue to require Government support. 
Although the following discussion focuses on the changes forecast in China, it 
illustrates the intensity of Government involvement required to ensure access, a 
smooth transition and risk mitigation for Australia to play an increasing role in the 
region. 
Asia’s largest anticipated financial system development will be the liberalisation of 
China’s capital account, and the gradual easing of restrictions on trading in the 
onshore Chinese currency market by firms from outside China.34  
                                                          
33  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2014, ‘Cross-border Capital Flows since the Global Financial 
Crisis’, RBA Bulletin, June Quarter, RBA, Sydney, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2014/>. 
34  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2013, ‘Developments in Renminbi Internationalisation’, 
RBA Bulletin, June Quarter, RBA, Sydney, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2013/>.  
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China has set a program for further relaxing currency and capital controls. HSBC 
forecasts that a third of China’s total trade will be settled in RMB by 2015, making 
RMB one of the top three trade settlement currencies by volume.35 As China continues 
to free up capital controls, a significant proportion of the resultant increase in both 
portfolio and direct investment flows is likely to be in Asia.36 To date, the level of 
Government involvement has been significant to ensure that, if commercial and 
market factors support increased industry activity with China, the Australian financial 
system’s capacity and infrastructure is capable of supporting that interaction.  
Coordination and raising awareness 
Government capacity building includes efforts to raise awareness of these forecast 
changes. One of various initiatives is the Australia-Hong Kong RMB Trade and 
Investment Dialogue — a private sector–led forum facilitated by the Australian 
Treasury, Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The 
dialogue gives Australian and Hong Kong banks and corporates a forum to discuss the 
benefits and challenges associated with RMB trade and investment.  
Discussions held in Sydney in 2013 and Hong Kong in 2014 were informed by the 
results of two surveys of corporate attitudes towards RMB trade settlement and 
investment, conducted by the RBA in 2013 and expanded on by the Centre for 
International Finance and Regulation in 2014.37 
Following the 2014 Dialogue, the Group announced its objectives as being to: 
• Educate Australian corporates on the risks and rewards arising from RMB trade 
and capital flows 
• Support initiatives to understand better the products and services needed to grow 
the RMB market in Australia 
• Encourage deeper levels of engagement and links between the financial markets in 
Australia and Hong Kong to better serve the wider Asian market, especially 
through developing critical infrastructure to support settlement, clearing, liquidity 
and pricing of RMB 
                                                          
35  HSBC 2014, Internationalising the RMB, HSBC, London, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<https://globalconnections.hsbc.com/canada/en/articles/internationalising-rmb>. 
36  Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR) 2014, Internationalisation of the 
Renminbi: Pathways, Implications and Opportunities Research Report, March, CIFR, Sydney, 
viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.cifr.edu.au/site/Research/Targeted_Research_RMB_Internationalisation.aspx>. 
37  A summary of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) survey is available in RBA 2013, 
Developments in Renminbi Internationalisation, RBA Bulletin, June Quarter, RBA, Sydney, 
viewed 21 June 2014, <http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2013/>.  
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• Actively collaborate with the Australian and Hong Kong funds and asset 
management sectors in these efforts38 
Facilitating financial system architecture  
In addition to ongoing engagement with the private sector, the Government and 
regulators have also taken — or are in the process of taking — a number of steps to 
facilitate the development of the RMB market in Australia. These include: 
• Establishing a bilateral local currency swap agreement between the People’s Bank 
of China and the RBA in March 2012. The agreement is designed to provide market 
participants with greater confidence regarding the availability of RMB liquidity in 
Australia, particularly during times of stressed market conditions. 
• Introducing direct trading between the Australian dollar and the Chinese RMB — 
that is, trading between these two currencies without using an intermediate third 
currency — in the onshore foreign exchange market in April 2013. In time, this is 
expected to facilitate greater local currency trade invoicing between Australia and 
China. 
• The RBA investing around 3 per cent of its foreign currency reserves in the Chinese 
sovereign bond market.  
• The RBA and People’s Bank of China developing future RMB clearing and 
settlement arrangements in Sydney.39 An ‘official’ RMB clearing bank in Australia 
would be given direct access to the Mainland Chinese foreign exchange and RMB 
interbank markets to facilitate cross-border trade transactions. 
Given the anticipated development in Asian financial markets in coming decades, 
and the strength and significance of Australia’s trade relationships with the region, 
opportunities will increasingly arise to access capital from Asia, for Australian and 
Asian financial services firms to expand into each other’s markets, and to grow 
financial services exports and imports. 
While the Inquiry recognises that much of the success in enhancing financial 
integration will depend on commercial and market factors, Asian markets are 
undergoing significant structural changes, which are being shaped to a large degree 
                                                          
38  Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) 2014, Second Australia-Hong Kong RMB Trade and 
Investment Dialogue, media release 22 May, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.bankers.asn.au/Media/Media-Releases/Media-Release-2014/Second-Australia
-Hong-Kong-RMB-Trade-and--Investment-Dialogue>. 
39  Hockey, J 2014, Deepening financial ties with China, Canberra, media release, 11 April, 
Canberra, viewed 21 June 2014 
<http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/014-2014/>. 
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by governments. Capital and foreign exchange liberalisation are 
government-initiated activities. Unlike some other regulatory changes, 
government-to-government dialogue is critical to ensure Australia has prompt 
access to competency building initiatives and develops appropriate financial system 
architecture.  
The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• What are the potential impediments to integration, particularly their relative 
importance, and the benefits to the broader Australian economy that can be 
demonstrated if they were removed?  
• Where is future Government engagement needed to facilitate integration with 
Asia? 
Cross-border regulatory settings 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
Government efforts to promote Australia’s policy interests on international 
standard-setting bodies have been successful. Domestic regulatory processes could 
be improved to better consider international standards and foreign regulation, 
including processes for collaboration and consultation about international standard 
implementation, and mutual recognition and equivalence assessment processes. 
Regulatory settings are one of the most significant factors affecting the level and nature 
of international financial integration. Regulatory barriers create friction in financial 
flows across borders. 
Since the GFC, the scope and complexity of cross-border regulation has increased 
significantly. The Australian financial system is increasingly affected by international 
standards and foreign regulation. This trend is expected to continue.  
There are two sources of this increasing international influence:  
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1. Standard setting by international setting bodies implemented domestically by 
Australian regulatory agencies:40 ‘international soft law’.41 In some cases, this is 
implemented after international inter-governmental agreements42 or may be 
initiated by international standard-setting bodies to promote global convergence of 
good practice. Implementing an international standard can result in domestic 
legislation, standards or guidance. 
2. Extraterritorial effect of other countries’ legislation within Australia.43 The main 
issues for the Australian financial system are the cost this imposes where foreign 
requirements are inconsistent with Australian requirements, and practical 
compliance implications for Australian financial services providers. 
The issues discussed in this chapter mirror the dialogue occurring at an international 
level to improve processes for forming international standards and assessing conflicts 
caused by inconsistent foreign regulation.44 This chapter notes, but does not discuss 
further, these global issues, instead it focuses on improvements in the domestic 
context. 
Additional issues about Australia’s regulatory environment are also discussed in the 
Regulatory architecture chapter. 
                                                          
40  For example, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2014, Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision, BCBS, Switzerland, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm> and International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) 2010, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, Madrid,  viewed 
21 June 2014, <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf>. 
41  Alexander, K, Dhumale, R and Eatwell, J 2006, Global Governance of Financial Systems, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, pages 134–154. 
42  See G20 2009, Leaders Statement, Pittsburgh Summit, 24–25 September, Pittsburgh, viewed 
24 June 2014, 
<https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Pittsburgh_Declaration.
pdf>. 
43  For example, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2000. 
44  For example: 
• Formed in May 2014, the Cross-Border Regulation Forum (CBRF) is an international group 
of financial services trade associations, investment banks, brokerage houses, market 
infrastructure operators and consumers of financial services formed “to help improve and 
encourage the dialogue on international regulatory standards”. See 
<http://www.icsa.bz/img/letter_pdf/Annex_13.CBRF_Response_to_IOSCOQuestionnaire__f
inal_ver_13.1_28_MAY_2014.pdf>.  
• The ‘Financing Growth’ taskforce of the B20 is examining how core global reforms in 
financial services can be implemented in a way that promotes an integrated global financial 
system. B20 2014, Summary of B20 2014 Priorities, B20, Sydney, viewed 24 June 2014, 
<http://www.b20australia.info/priorities-1>. 
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Standard setting  
Australia is well placed to be influential in the global context. As the RBA Governor 
recently noted, “something that is a bit new and, overall, refreshing is that Australia 
actually does have a place at more of the relevant tables than it used to”.45 Australia is 
represented at many levels, and holds leadership positions in some global 
standard-setting bodies (Table 10.3). 
Table 10.3: Australian representation in selected international groups 
Body  Agency 
Group of Twenty (G20) 
President Australian Government (2014) 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors 
Reserve Bank, Treasury 
Other groups CFR representatives 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
Plenary Reserve Bank, Treasury, (ASIC) 
Steering Committee Reserve Bank, Treasury, (ASIC) 
Standing Committee on Assessment of Vulnerabilities Reserve Bank 
Regional Consultative Group for Asia Reserve Bank, Treasury, 
Official Sector Steering Group (on financial benchmarks) Reserve Bank, ASIC 
Other groups CFR representatives 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
Governors Meeting Reserve Bank  
Asian Consultative Council Reserve Bank  
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Reserve Bank, APRA 
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Reserve Bank, APRA 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems Reserve Bank 
Other Groups CFR representatives 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
Executive Committee  APRA 
Technical Committee APRA 
Financial Stability Committee APRA 
Working groups APRA  
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
Board Chair ASIC 
Asia-Pacific Regional Committee ASIC 
CPSS-IOSCO Steering Committee on Financial Markets 
Infrastructure (Co-Chair) 
ASIC 
                                                          
45  Stevens, G 2013, Financial Regulation: Australia in the Global Landscape, RBA, Sydney, viewed 
21 June 2014, <http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2013/sp-gov-260313.html>. 
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Body  Agency 
Assessment Committee (Chair), Capacity Building Resource 
Committee (Chair), IOSCO 2020 Task Force (Chair) and Cross 
Sectoral Taskforce on Securitisation (Co-Chair) 
ASIC 
Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products ASIC 
Task Force on Financial Market Benchmarks ASIC  
Other groups ASIC  
International Organisation of Pension Supervisors 
Executive Committee APRA 
Other groups APRA   
Other International Committees  
Asian region based Committees including EMEAP  APRA  
OECD Committees APRA  
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
President AGD (2014–15) 
Plenary and working groups AUSTRAC, AGD, DFAT 
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (Egmont) 
Oceania representative  AUSTRAC  
Plenary and working groups AUSTRAC  
Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) 
Co-Chair (permanent) AFP 
Plenary and working groups AUSTRAC, AFP, AGD 
Source: Provided by Treasury, ASIC, AUSTRAC and APRA. 
Submissions support Government efforts to maintain focused international 
representation. They cite examples of when this representation has assisted outcomes 
in international standard setting, where those standards apply in the Australian 
context.  
However, submissions also ask the Inquiry to consider changing Australia’s regulatory 
process to better accommodate the scale and complexity of increasing international 
influence on the domestic regulatory environment.  
Where possible, the domestic application of international standards should be 
accompanied by transparency and consultation mechanisms. International standards 
are not always implemented with disclosure and transparency consistent to those that 
must be applied for domestic regulatory initiatives. For example, consultation 
processes required by a global standard setter might be truncated, or be inconsistent 
with priorities for domestic consultation on other local legislation applied to the sector 
affected. 
Submissions request the Inquiry considers mechanisms to ensure: 
• Australian representatives on international standard setters have regard to 
whole-of-Government objectives when participating in international forums. This 
might simply mean Treasury better coordinating contributions from its agencies 
and ensuring policy outcomes are consistent across agencies in global forums. Some 
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submissions suggest a revised Statement of Expectation46 might clarify that the 
regulator needs to have regard to broader interests when negotiating at 
international level. 
• Domestic stakeholders have sufficient transparency of international 
standard-setting agendas and, to the extent possible, are consulted before these 
standards are applied domestically. 
• Other good regulation principles required for Australian regulation are observed, 
to the extent possible, for standard-setting activities and, in particular, cost/benefit 
processes are followed to balance regulatory burden with regulatory benefit in the 
local context. 
Examples of these concerns in the prudential standard-setting context are discussed in 
more detail in the Stability chapter. A discussion of Australia’s regulation policy 
develop processes is included in the Regulatory architecture chapter. 
Extraterritorial effect of foreign legislation  
An increasing volume of foreign regulation is imposed by other countries on 
Australian business, particularly in financial services. The Australian Bankers’ 
Association (ABA) submission cites examples of legislation emanating from the United 
States,47 but notes that most global financial centres apply similar legislation with some 
extraterritorial effect that can impact financial services businesses in Australia. 
There is limited scope for our regulators to influence the implementation of foreign 
regulation that affects Australia. In this regard, the mutual recognition and 
equivalence process is an important regulatory tool to support increased financial 
integration. It minimises regulatory barriers to cross-border activity, while not 
compromising regulatory standards for financial stability and conduct in Australia.  
Foreign regulation is a regulatory reality for the increasing number of Australian 
businesses that interact with international markets from Australia, or provide services 
internationally from Australia: 
• Large Australian-owned banks have increased their activity in Asia over recent 
years. Exposure of all Australian-owned banks to the Asian region, measured as 
                                                          
46  Australian Government 2014, Statements of expectations, Australian Government, Canberra, 
viewed 21 June 2014, <http://www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-Topics/PublicPolicyAndGovt/ 
Statements-of-Expectations>. 
47  Key examples, all from the US, include the Patriot Act, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act and Dodd-Frank. The Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) discusses 
the impact of some of these pieces of US regulation on the Australian financial system in 
ABA 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 106–108. 
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aggregate claims, was $142 billion at September 2013, which has risen from 
$22 billion in 2003.48 
• Insurers are also active overseas and expanding into Asia. QBE is a global insurer 
with 73 per cent of its $18 billion of premium income sourced outside Australia and 
New Zealand.49 IAG, which has $9.4 billion in gross written premium, noted that 
7 per cent of its growth came from Asia in 2012–13.50 
• A number of funds managers have significant global reach; for example, Macquarie 
had $US38 billion in assets under management across seven markets in Asia in 
March 2014.51 
Around 40 per cent of Australian exporters are small businesses who require financial 
services to support their activities.52 Simplifying cross-border regulation is of benefit to 
these groups as well as larger exporters. 
Divergent international and domestic legislative requirements applying to the same 
business process increase compliance costs, create legal risk and limit the cost 
efficiencies of scale businesses. Submissions pointing to this development request 
heightened awareness of the foreign regulation environment in domestic regulatory 
processes.  
The submissions seek to ensure: 
• Domestic regulatory processes have regard to the volume and cost of the 
international regulatory environment when assessing the cost and benefits of 
domestic regulation. 
• Regulatory drafting of financial system requirements has regard to requirements in 
key regional centres to achieve harmonised legislation, where appropriate. 
                                                          
48  Reserve Bank Australia 2014, data provided to Financial System Inquiry, 21 March 2014.  
49  Calculations based on reported gross written premium, QBE Insurance Group 2013, 2013 
Annual Results Presentation, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.group.qbe.com/investor-centre/reports-presentations>. 
50  IAG 2014, Financial Results Half Year Ended 31 December 2013, presentation, IAG, Sydney, 
viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.iag.com.au/results/reports/2014/HY/media/IAG_1H14_Investor_Presentation.
pdf>. 
51  Macquarie 2014, Macquarie in Asia, Macquarie, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://static.macquarie.com/dafiles/Internet/mgl/au/about-macquarie-group/investor
-relations/events-and-presentations/documents/2014/operational-briefing/alex-harvey
-presentation.pdf?v=5>. 
52  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia, 
May 2014, cat. no. 5368.0.55.006, ABS, Canberra. 
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• Regulatory agencies have appropriate powers to enter mutual recognition or 
substituted compliance arrangements to minimise the impact of cross-border 
regulatory frictions. These arrangements are discussed in more detail below. 
Regulatory recognition arrangements 
A challenge for financial services providers operating across borders is meeting the 
additional national regulatory requirements for each country where services are 
provided, or that apply in Australia from another country. Given the increasing 
internationalisation of business, governments around the world are increasingly taking 
steps to avoid unnecessary duplication, burden and conflict of regulation across 
borders. 
Cross-border regulated activity can be facilitated by: 
• Substituted compliance — unilaterally recognising another country’s regulation 
• Mutual recognition — recognising each other’s regulation as equivalent 
• Multilateral recognition — recognising a number of countries’ regulations as 
equivalent and allowing ‘home’ country regulation to meet ‘host’ country 
requirements  
These arrangements are often facilitated by governments and reduce the regulatory 
burden for providers seeking to access foreign markets. They have the potential to 
facilitate quicker market entry, reduce regulatory costs, increase competition and 
capital flows, and promote investor choice. Although these benefits are desirable, such 
arrangements must be applied in a way that protects local investors adequately, 
prevents financial market integrity from being compromised and addresses systemic 
risks. Mutual recognition and substituted compliance processes are regulatory tools 
that reduce regulatory frictions, while ensuring Australian regulatory standards are 
not weakened. 
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Most Australian regulators have transparent guidelines for their approach to mutual 
recognition and substituted compliance.53 ASIC’s general approach is to facilitate 
access by financial services providers from overseas regulatory regimes that are 
‘sufficiently equivalent’ to the Australian regulatory regime, in terms of the degree of 
investor protection, market integrity and reduction of systemic risk they achieve. The 
factors considered are clear and transparent and have been the subject of consultation. 
Under ASIC’s Principles, it can exempt financial services providers from domestic 
licensing. This is allowed where the financial services are overseen by an overseas 
regulatory authority whose regulatory regime is sufficiently equivalent to the 
Australian regulatory regime, with effective cooperation arrangements between the 
two regulators.54 For example, under this arrangement, relief has been given to 
wholesale service providers from the United Kingdom, United States, Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Germany.  
A reverse example of substituted compliance was RBA’s clarification on Australia’s 
regulatory regime for Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) clearing services, which 
assisted the European Securities and Markets Authority’s recognition of Australia’s 
regulatory regime as equivalent — a necessary pre-condition for ASX to continue to 
offer clearing services to European Union banks.55 
Mutual recognition has been applied between Australia and New Zealand on 
trans-Tasman mutual recognition of securities offerings. The regime allows issuers 
from either country to offer securities, including shares and debentures, or interests in 
managed investment schemes in the other country, using their home prospectus or 
Product Disclosure Statement, without complying with most of the substantive 
requirements of the host jurisdiction. 
                                                          
53  ASIC 2012, Regulatory Guide 54, Principles for cross-border financial regulation, ASIC, Sydney, 
viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg54-published-29-June-2012.
pdf/$file/rg54-published-29-June-2012.pdf>. See also Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, 
Assessing the Sufficient Equivalence of an Overseas Regulatory Regime, RBA, Sydney, viewed 21 
June 2014, 
<http://www.rba.gov.au/payments-system/clearing-settlement/standards/overseas-
equivalence.html>. 
54  ASIC 2012, Regulatory Guide 54, Principles for cross-border financial regulation, ASIC, Sydney, 
viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg54-published-29-June-2012.
pdf/$file/rg54-published-29-June-2012.pdf>. 
55  European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2013, Final report Technical advice on third 
country regulatory equivalence under EMIR — Australia, ESMA, Brussels, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2013-1159_technical_advice_on_third_country
_regulatory_equivalence_under_emir_australia.pdf>.  
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This arrangement has improved time to market and reduced legal and documentation 
costs for some issuers by 55 to 95 per cent. From 30 June 2008 to 15 March 2013, the 
number of offers made under the regime was 66 New Zealand offers to Australia and 
834 Australian offers to New Zealand.56 
Submissions note that as the volume of international regulation increases, processes 
that allow timely, comprehensive and effective mutual recognition and substituted 
compliance processes with priority jurisdictions will be of increasing importance. 
Submissions seek to ensure that: 
• Government and regulatory agencies have appropriate powers to enter mutual 
recognition or substituted compliance arrangements 
• Government and regulatory agencies have considered when unilateral recognition 
is appropriate without mirror concessions for Australian businesses entering 
foreign jurisdictions 
• Existing mutual recognition guidance and processes are reviewed to ensure they 
are well positioned to facilitate industry-led approaches for regulatory assessments 
— particularly to promote access to Australia’s wholesale markets 
• Existing arrangements are regularly reviewed to ensure there continues to be 
equivalence and adequate regulatory cooperation, and that the arrangements 
remain appropriate 
• Current regulatory recognition arrangements receive regular stocktakes to identify 
priority jurisdictions and activities that might benefit from further arrangements 
Funds – mutual recognition 
Managed investment schemes are a significant feature of the Australian financial 
system landscape and throughout Asia. However, foreign investment in Australian 
managed investment schemes is very low. In March 2014 it was 3.4 per cent,57 while it 
was over 60.0 per cent in Hong Kong58 and approximately 80.0 per cent in Singapore.59 
                                                          
56  ASIC 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 26. 
57  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2014, Managed Funds, Australia, Mar 2014, cat. 
no. 5655.0, ABS, Canberra. 
58  Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) 2013, Fund Management Activities Survey 2012, SFC, 
Hong Kong, viewed 19 June, 
<http://www.sfc.hk/web/files/ER/PDF/FMAS%202012_Report(Eng)_Final%20on%2025%
20Jul%202013.pdf>. 
59  Monetary Authority of Singapore 2012, Singapore Asset Management Industry Survey, 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore, viewed 19 June, 
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A number of submissions suggest reducing barriers to offering managed investment 
scheme products internationally to attract interest in Australian managed funds. 
Industry submissions indicate major impediments are the unique structure of the 
Australian managed investment scheme and the uniqueness of Australian regulation 
of collective investments.60 
The Asian Funds Passport is being developed to address these concerns. The Passport 
is a mutual recognition agreement for managed investment schemes. It will allow a 
fund registered in its home economy to be offered in other participating countries, 
without different operational and licensing requirements.61 In originally 
recommending the Passport, the Johnson report identified the European Undertakings 
for the Collective Investment of Transferable Securities (UCITS) framework as an 
example of a successful multilateral funds passport arrangement. 
The Passport is a significant first step to better integrating the funds management 
industry in the region. While supporting its progress, the Inquiry also notes that a 
number of initiatives are currently in place or in motion, designed to establish fund 
regulatory structures that can promote funds to be offered across borders. They 
include three proposals emanating from Asia, in addition to the UCITS structure 
recognised throughout Europe and in wide use in Asia.  
Policy options for consideration 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy option or other alternatives: 
Improve domestic regulatory process to better consider international standards and 
foreign regulation — including processes for transparency and consultation about 
international standard implementation, and mutual recognition and equivalence 
assessment processes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/News%20and%20Publications/Surveys/Asset%
20Management/2012%20AM%20Survey%20Public%20Report%20FINAL.pdf>. 
60  The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) has also reviewed the 
operation of managed investment scheme laws and discussed its possible impediment to 
international integration. CAMAC 2014, Managed investment schemes, CAMAC, Canberra, 
viewed 19 June 2014, 
<http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/Whats+NewMIS+DP+Media+
Release+March+2014?openDocument>. 
61  Corman, M (Acting Assistant Treasurer) 2014, Asia Region Funds Passport to drive financial 
services export growth, viewed 19 June 2014, 
<http://mhc.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/005-2014/>. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• What changes can be made to make implementing international standards more 
transparent and otherwise improved? 
• What improvements could be made to domestic regulatory process to have 
regard to foreign regulatory developments impacting Australia? 
• Are there priority jurisdictions and activities that might benefit from further 
mutual recognition or other arrangements? What are the identified costs and 
benefits that might accrue from such an arrangement? 
Coordination of financial integration 
Preliminary assessment 
Observation 
Coordination of Australia’s international financial integration could be improved. 
Stakeholders’ concerns 
Although greater financial integration is not without risk, a number of inquiries have 
recommended removing impediments to greater integration and fostering mutual 
recognition, particularly within the Asian region. Government has generally 
responded positively to these recommendations, but implementation has been slow 
and is not always well coordinated across Government, regulators and industry. 
Given the continuing level of change forecast in the region, it is important to improve 
Australia’s coordination effort. 
Stakeholders have suggested an expanded role for the CFR to provide oversight and 
direction in negotiating and implementing global regulatory standards.  
Other specific suggestions and areas of concern raised in submissions include: 
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• Better planning to deal with simultaneous domestic and international regulatory 
changes involving multiple agencies62  
• Giving a Treasury Minister responsibility for championing Australia’s financial 
services, both within Government and externally, and for working with state 
counterparts to coordinate policies to promote Australia’s financial sector63 
• Dedicating a Government resource to focus on competitiveness issues, with the 
authority to generate legislation quickly and effectively to significantly improve 
Australia’s competitiveness64 
• Improving communication and feedback between the market and financial policy 
advisers by having a standing body that provides: 
– Policy-relevant information to the Treasurer on market developments globally 
– Advice to Treasury on likely market response and reaction to policy proposals 
under consideration 
– Policy proposals on issues it considers critical to the efficient and effective 
operation of financial markets 
– Policy advice on an ad hoc basis at the request of Treasury65 
Advisory and oversight bodies 
A number of bodies already consider Australia’s position in the broader international 
financial system. Some of these bodies consist solely of representatives in Australia, 
while others are part of an international infrastructure. 
Council of Financial Regulators 
CFR is the coordinating body for Australia’s main financial regulatory agencies. It is a 
non-statutory body whose role is to contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
financial regulation and promote the stability of the Australian financial system. 
Chaired by the RBA, its membership further comprises APRA, ASIC and Treasury.66 
                                                          
62  ANZ 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
63  Australian Financial Markets Association 2014, First round submission to the Financial 
System Inquiry. 
64  Financial Services Council 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
65  Johnson, M 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry. 
66  Commonwealth Government 2014, Home page, Council of Financial Regulators, Sydney, 
viewed 21 June 2014, <http://www.cfr.gov.au>. 
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The CFR considers a range of international regulatory reforms, such as the regulatory 
framework for financial markets infrastructure. As noted in the Regulatory architecture 
chapter, the Inquiry is seeking feedback on increasing the role, transparency and 
external accountability mechanisms of the CFR. 
Financial Sector Advisory Council (FSAC) 
FSAC was established following a recommendation from the Wallis Inquiry. The 
Wallis Inquiry specifically noted the Council should focus on the international 
competitiveness of Australia’s financial sector and how Australia could become a 
preferred location for financial activities in the region.67 
FSAC’s mandate is to advise the Treasurer on policies that will maintain an efficient, 
competitive and dynamic financial sector, consistent with the objectives of fairness, 
financial stability and prudence. 
APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) 
ABAC comprises three business leaders from each of the 21 APEC economies. It 
advises on issues on APEC’s agenda of importance to businesses in the region. Each 
year, the Council meets with APEC leaders, including the ministers responsible for 
major sectoral policy issues. Under ABAC’s auspices, the Asia Pacific Finance Forum 
has been established to advise on financial market regulatory developments and 
market integration in the Asia Pacific. 
Business 20 (B20) 
The B20 is an international forum of private sector leaders that produces policy 
recommendations for the annual meeting of the G20 leaders. Australia is chairing the 
B20 in 2014.  
Policy options for consultation 
Australia’s coordination efforts across industry, regulators and Government could be 
improved through amending the remit of one of these or another existing body, or 
establishing an industry-led body.  
However, any changes to existing arrangements would need to be clearly defined and 
realistic expectations established on the body’s scope and influence. The Commission 
of Audit provided a blunt assessment of the status of Australia’s Government bodies 
and coordination efforts: 
                                                          
67  Wallis Recommendation 110. 
Emerging Trends – International integration 
4-101 
There are too many government bodies in Australia. This leads to duplication and 
overlap, unnecessary complexity, a lack of accountability, the potential for uncoordinated 
advice and avoidable costs.68 
Elements for coordination body 
A number of the submissions discuss the critical elements for a body of this type to be 
effective. Some submissions note the importance of senior industry representation and 
significant international experience. The importance of Government involvement is 
discussed and the involvement of regulators, including those with competition and 
taxation mandates, is considered crucial for a whole-of-Government perspective. 
Accountability mechanisms are important to ensure transparency and reporting on 
progress and to ensure appropriate levels of Government support. 
Submissions were split about whether such a body should be funded by industry or 
Government.  
Taking into account the issues raised in Impediments to financial integration and 
Cross-border regulatory settings, a coordinating body mandate might include the 
following responsibilities: 
• Providing input to regulators at the time of formation of policies and standards — 
including in relation to international standards and other international regulation 
• Providing input to coordinate policy formulation and position for regional change 
• Providing guidance to Government about where future Government engagement 
efforts are required 
The Inquiry would value views on the costs, benefits and trade-offs of the 
following policy options or other alternatives: 
• Making no change to current arrangements. 
• Amend the role of an existing coordination body to promote accountability and 
provide economy-wide advice to Government about Australia’s international 
financial integration. 
 
                                                          
68  Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Towards Responsible Government, The Report of the National 
Commission of Audit, February 2014, Phase One, National Commission of Audit, Canberra, 
page 204, viewed 21 June 2014, 
<http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/docs/phase_one_report.pdf>. 
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The Inquiry seeks further information on the following areas: 
• Have appropriate elements been put forward for an effective coordination body? 
• What role should industry play in any new coordination body, including its 
funding? 
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Appendix 1: 
Terms of reference 
The Treasurer, the Hon Joe Hockey announced the final terms of reference for the 
Financial System Inquiry on 20 December 2013. The terms of reference are set out 
below. 
Objectives 
The Inquiry is charged with examining how the financial system could be positioned 
to best meet Australia’s evolving needs and support Australia’s economic growth. 
Recommendations will be made that foster an efficient, competitive and flexible 
financial system, consistent with financial stability, prudence, public confidence and 
capacity to meet the needs of users. 
Terms of reference 
1. The Inquiry will report on the consequences of developments in the Australian 
financial system since the 1997 Financial System Inquiry and the global financial 
crisis, including implications for:  
1. how Australia funds its growth; 
2. domestic competition and international competitiveness; and 
3. the current cost, quality, safety and availability of financial services, products 
and capital for users. 
2. The Inquiry will refresh the philosophy, principles and objectives underpinning the 
development of a well-functioning financial system, including:  
1. balancing competition, innovation, efficiency, stability and consumer 
protection; 
2. how financial risk is allocated and systemic risk is managed; 
3.  assessing the effectiveness and need for financial regulation, including its 
impact on costs, flexibility, innovation, industry and among users; 
4. the role of Government; and 
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5. the role, objectives, funding and performance of financial regulators including 
an international comparison. 
3. The Inquiry will identify and consider the emerging opportunities and challenges 
that are likely to drive further change in the global and domestic financial system, 
including:  
1. the role and impact of new technologies, market innovations and changing 
consumer preferences and demography; 
2.  international integration, including international financial regulation; 
3. changes in the way Australia sources and distributes capital, including the 
intermediation of savings through banks, non-bank financial institutions, 
insurance companies, superannuation funds and capital markets; 
4. changing organisational structures in the financial sector; 
5.  corporate governance structures across the financial system and how they 
affect stakeholder interests; and 
6.  developments in the payment system. 
4. The Inquiry will recommend policy options that:  
1. promote a competitive and stable financial system that contributes to 
Australia’s productivity growth; 
2. promote the efficient allocation of capital and cost efficient access and services 
for users; 
3. meet the needs of users with appropriate financial products and services; 
4. create an environment conducive to dynamic and innovative financial service 
providers; and 
5. relate to other matters that fall within this terms of reference. 
5. The Inquiry will take account of the regulation of the general operation of 
companies and trusts to the extent this impinges on the efficiency and effective 
allocation of capital within the financial system. 
6. The Inquiry will examine the taxation of financial arrangements, products or 
institutions to the extent these impinge on the efficient and effective allocation of 
capital by the financial system, and provide observations that could inform the Tax 
White Paper. 
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7. In reaching its conclusions, the Inquiry will take account of, but not make 
recommendations on the objectives and procedures of the Reserve Bank in its 
conduct of monetary policy. 
8. The Inquiry may invite submissions and seek information from any persons or 
bodies. 
9. The Inquiry will consult extensively both domestically and globally. It will publish 
an interim report in mid-2014 setting out initial findings and seek public feedback. 
A final report is to be provided to the Treasurer by November 2014. 
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Appendix 2:  
Tax summary 
The Inquiry has identified a number of taxes that distort the allocation of funding and 
risk in the economy. The Funding chapter explores these issues in detail. The Inquiry 
has also identified other tax issues that may adversely affect outcomes in the financial 
system. The tax issues listed below should be considered as part of the Tax White 
Paper process unless they are already under active Government consideration.
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 p
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 m
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 b
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 d
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 c
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 d
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 c
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 c
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r c
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at
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 p
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 b
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r c
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t f
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r b
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 d
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 m
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t d
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t c
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 c
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t c
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 c
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 c
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 p
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t m
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 c
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Appendix 3:  
Submissions to the Inquiry 
The first round of submissions to the Financial System Inquiry closed on 
31 March 2014 and informed the Inquiry’s Interim Report.  
The Inquiry received over 280 first round submissions on the issues set out in the 
Inquiry’s Terms of Reference. Submissions lodged up until 2 May 2014 are available on 
the Financial System Inquiry website (www.fsi.gov.au), except where authors 
requested confidentiality. 
The following is a list of people and organisations that made non-confidential first 
round submissions. 
Institute of Actuaries of 
Australia 
Australian Financial 
Market Association 
(AFMA) 
Allianz Australia 
Limited 
American Express 
Australia Limited 
AMP 
ANZ 
Australian 
Restructuring 
Insolvency & 
Turnaround 
Association (ARITA) 
Association of 
Superannuation Funds 
of Australia (ASFA) 
Assetsecure Pty Ltd 
Association of 
Financial Advisers 
Limited (AFA) 
Association of 
Independently Owned 
Financial Professionals 
(AIOFP) 
Association of Mining 
and Exploration 
Companies (AMEC) 
ASX 
AT Kearney 
Atchison Consultants 
AHL Investments Pty 
Ltd (Aussie) 
The Australia Institute 
Australia Post 
Australia Ratings Pty 
Ltd 
Australian Bankers’ 
Association Inc 
Australian Catholic 
Bishops Conference 
Australian Centre for 
Financial Studies 
Australian 
Government Financial 
Literacy Board 
Australian Industry 
Group 
Australian Institute of 
Company Directors 
Australian Institute of 
Superannuation 
Trustees (AIST) 
Australian Payments 
Clearing Association 
(APCA) 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
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Australian Private 
Equity & Venture 
Capital Association 
Limited (AVCAL) 
Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority 
(APRA) 
Australian Retail 
Credit Association 
(ARCA) 
Australian Retailers 
Association (ARA) 
Australian Securities 
and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) 
Australian 
Securitisation Forum 
Australian Settlements 
Limited (ASL) 
Australian 
Shareholder’s 
Association (ASA) 
Baker, Bruce 
Baker, Carl 
Bank of Queensland 
(BoQ) 
Banki Haddock Fiora 
Bankmecu 
Barry, Robert 
Bendigo and Adelaide 
Bank Limited 
Bergwald, Andrew 
Bird, David 
Brotherhood of St 
Laurence 
Brown, Robert 
Burrell Stockbroking & 
Superannuation 
Business Council of 
Australia 
Business Council of 
Co-operatives and 
Mutuals 
Byford, Martin (RMIT) 
CapMX Pty Ltd 
Carter Newell Lawyers 
Cawley, Dr Adam 
Centre for Policy 
Development 
Centre for Excellence in 
Population Ageing 
Research (CEPAR) 
Centre for Law, 
Markets and 
Regulation (UNSW) 
CFA Societies Australia 
Challenger Limited 
CHAMP Private Equity 
Chan & Naylor 
Chapman Tripp 
Chi-X Australia Pty Ltd 
CHOICE 
Cisco Systems 
Australia Pty Ltd 
Citizens Electoral 
Council of Australia 
Coates, Doug 
Cohen, Roger 
Coles Supermarkets 
Australia Pty Ltd 
Commercial Asset 
Finance Brokers 
Association of 
Australia Limited 
(CAFBA) 
Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia 
Community Council 
for Australia (CCA) 
Compare the Market 
Consumer Action Law 
Centre 
Consumer Credit Legal 
Centre (NSW) 
COTA 
Council of Small 
Business Australia 
(COSBOA) 
CPA Australia 
Credit Ombudsman 
Service Limited 
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CSIRO Monash 
Superannuation 
Cluster 
CSR Limited 
CUA 
Cullen Capital Pty Ltd 
Cuscal 
Customer Owned 
Banking Association 
de Tarle, Benoit 
Digital Finance 
Analytics 
DFA Australia Ltd 
Doe, Vince 
eftpos Payments 
Australia Limited 
Elite Wealth Solutions 
Pty Ltd 
Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation 
(EFIC) 
Ferraro, Salvatore 
Fiduciarys Friend Pty 
Ltd 
Finance Brokers 
Association of 
Australia Ltd 
Financial Literacy 
Australia Ltd 
Financial Ombudsman 
Service Limited 
Financial Planning 
Association of 
Australia 
Financial Services 
Council (FSC) 
Financial Services 
Institute of Australasia 
(FINSIA) 
FirstMac Limited 
Fowler, E M 
Franklin, Craig 
Friendly Societies of 
Australia 
Finance Sector Union 
(FSU) Australia 
Good Shepherd 
Microfinance and 
Good Shepherd Youth 
& Family Services 
Governance Institute of 
Australia Ltd 
Gray, Jack 
GreySpark Partners 
Harkness, Leigh 
Herbert, Greg 
Housing Industry 
Association (HIA) 
HSBC 
Hume, Lyn 
ICI Global 
Impact Investing 
Australia Ltd 
Industry Super 
Australia 
Infrastructure 
Australia 
ING Direct 
Innovation Australia 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Australia 
Institute of Public 
Accountants 
Insurance Australia 
Group (IAG) 
Insurance Council of 
Australia 
International Stock 
Exchange Executives 
Emeriti (ISEEE) 
International Swaps 
and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) 
Jacobs, Alan 
Johnson, Mark and 
Weir, Geoff 
Johnston, Adam 
Jones, Ian 
K&L Gates 
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Kajlich, Anti 
KCG Australia 
King & Wood 
Mallesons 
King, Yasmin 
Kingsford Smith, 
Dimity (UNSW) 
Kourouche, Hind 
KPMG 
KS Nathan 
Law Council of 
Australia Limited 
LCH.Clearnet Limited 
Legal Aid NSW 
Leslie, Kenneth (Project 
ERNA) 
LIXI Ltd 
Lynch, Troy 
Macfarlane, Ian 
Mackay, Anthony 
(Max) 
Mackinnon, Ronald 
Macquarie Group 
Limited 
Maddock, Rodney 
(Monash) 
Mair, Peter 
Marx, Tony 
Master Builders 
Australia Ltd 
MasterCard 
Australasia 
Maxwell, Ian 
McAuley, John 
McNeil, Peter 
McQueen, Colin 
Members Equity Bank 
Pty Ltd 
Menzies, Gordon 
(UTA) and Chapman, 
Bruce (ANU) 
Menzies, Gordon 
(UTS), Bird, R (UTS) 
and Dixon, P 
Mercer 
Mills, Alan 
Minister for Small 
Business 
Minter Ellison 
Moloney, David 
Morgij Analytics 
Morrow, Bryan 
Mortgage and Finance 
Association of 
Australia (MFAA) 
NAB 
Name withheld 
Narrow Road Capital 
National Financial 
Services Federation 
(NFSF) 
National Insurance 
Brokers Association of 
Australia (NIBA) 
National Seniors 
Australia 
Neave, Barbara 
Nehme, Marina 
(UNSW) and Chioatto, 
Ulysses (UTS) 
NSW Business 
Chamber 
NSW Government 
Nugent, Des 
O’Brien, John 
Oxfam Australia 
P&N Bank 
Pascuzzo, Patricia 
PayPal 
Peterson, John 
Piper, William 
Property Council of 
Australia 
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Property Funds 
Association of 
Australia 
Prudames, Geoff and 
Ann 
PWC Australia 
QBE 
QBE Lenders’ 
Mortgage Insurance 
Quinn, Jim 
Raftery, Adrian 
RateSetter Australia 
Pty Limited 
Rayner, Frank 
Redfern Legal Centre 
Regional Banks 
submission (on behalf 
of BoQ, Bendigo and 
Adelaide Bank, ME 
Bank and Suncorp 
Bank) 
Regnan Governance 
Research and 
Engagement 
Renton, Nigel 
Reserve Bank of 
Australia 
RMIT 
Roberts, Oliver 
Schlusser, William 
Singh, Supriya (RMIT) 
SIRCA Limited 
Smith, Sophee 
SMSF Owners’ Alliance 
SMSF Professionals’ 
Association of 
Australia 
Social Ventures 
Australia 
SocietyOne 
Sommerville, Tim 
Standard & Poor’s 
Ratings Services 
Steen, Adam (CSU) 
Stockbrokers 
Association of 
Australia 
Suncorp Bank 
Suncorp General 
Insurance 
Suncorp Life 
Superannuation 
Consumers’ Centre 
Swan, Peter (UNSW) 
Switzer Financial 
Group Pty Ltd 
TAL Dai-ichi Life 
Australia Pty Limited 
The Treasury 
Turnbull, Robert 
Turnbull, Shann  
Tyro Payments Ltd 
UniSuper 
University of 
Melbourne 
Veritec Solutions 
VFT 2 Project 
VISA Inc. 
Westpac Banking 
Corporation 
White, Glenn 
Wide Bay Australia Ltd 
Wilson Asset 
Management 
Yellow Brick Road 
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Glossary, acronyms and abbreviations 
Acronyms and abbreviations 
ABA — Australian Bankers’ Association 
ABAC — APEC Business Advisory Council 
ACC — Australian Crime Commission 
ACCC — Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
ACSC — Australian Cyber Security Centre 
ADI — authorised deposit-taking institution 
AFMA — Australian Financial Markets Association 
AFSL — Australian Financial Services Licence 
AGD — Attorney-General’s Department 
AIFRS — Australian equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards 
ALRC — Australian Law Reform Commission 
AML — anti-money laundering 
AOFM — Australian Office of Financial Management 
APEC — Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum 
APRA — Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
ASC — Australian Securities Commission 
ASD — Australian Signals Directorate 
ASEAN — Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASIC — Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Financial System Inquiry — Interim Report 
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ASFA — Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 
ASX — ASX Limited or the exchange operated by ASX Limited 
ATM — automated teller machine 
ATO — Australian Taxation Office 
AUSTRAC — Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre  
BCBS — Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS — Bank for International Settlements 
bps — basis points 
CAMAC — Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 
CCPs — central counterparties 
CCR — comprehensive credit reporting 
CEPAR — Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research 
CERT — Computer Emergency Response Team 
CFR — Council of Financial Regulators 
CGFS — Committee on the Global Financial System 
CGS — Commonwealth Government Securities 
CIFR — Centre for International Finance and Regulation 
CIV — collective investment vehicle 
CLF — committed liquidity facility 
COAG — Council of Australian Governments 
CPSS — Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
CSEF — crowd-sourced equity funding 
CUBS — Credit unions and building societies 
CSS — Cyber Security Strategy 
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CSOB — Cyber Security Operations Board 
CSOC — Cyber Security Operations Centre 
DB — defined benefit 
DC — defined contribution 
DLA — deferred lifetime annuity 
EFT — electronic funds transfer 
EMV — Europay, Mastercard and Visa 
ESMA — European Securities and Markets Authority 
ETFs — exchange-traded funds 
FATCA — Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (US based legislation) 
FCA — UK Financial Conduct Authority 
FCS — Financial Claims Scheme 
FIDO — Fast Identity Online alliance 
FMI — financial market infrastructure 
FOFA — Future of Financial Advice law reform 
FOS — Financial Ombudsman Service  
FSAC — Financial Sector Advisory Council 
FSAP — Financial Sector Assessment Program 
FSB — Financial Stability Board, formerly the Financial Stability Forum.  
FSF — Financial Stability Forum (Now the Financial Stability Board) 
FSG — Financial Services Guide 
FS-ISAC — US-based Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
FSOC — Financial Stability Oversight Council 
FSR — Financial Services Reform 
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G20 — Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from 20 major 
economies 
GDP — gross domestic product 
GFC — Global Financial Crisis 
GLAC — Gone Concern Loss Absorbing Capacity 
GSA — group self-annuitisation 
GST — goods and services tax 
HFT — high-frequency trading 
HQLA — high-quality liquid assets 
HVCS — High Value Clearing System operated by Australian Payments Clearing 
Association Limited. 
IAIS — International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
IASB — International Accounting Standards Board 
IDPS — investor-direct portfolio services 
IMF — International Monetary Fund 
IMR — Investment Manager Regime 
IOSCO — International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
IRB — internal ratings-based 
IWT — interest withholding tax 
KYC — know your client 
LCR — liquidity coverage ratio 
LIBOR — London Interbank Offered Rate 
LIF — life income fund 
LMI — lenders mortgage insurance 
LVR — loan-to-valuation ratio 
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MAMBO — Me and My Bank Online 
MIS — managed investment scheme 
MIT — managed investment trust 
MLH — minimum liquidity holdings  
MOU — memorandum of understanding 
NCC — National Credit Code 
NCCP Act — National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 
NCPFs — non-cash payment facilities 
NFC — near field communications 
NISS — National Identity Security Strategy 
NIST — US-based Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 
NPP — New Payments Platform or New Policy Proposal (depending on the context) 
NSFR — net stable funding ratio 
NTA — net tangible assets 
OAIC — Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
OBPR — Office of Best Practice Regulation 
OECD — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTC — over-the-counter trading 
P2P — peer-to-peer 
PC — Productivity Commission 
PDS — product disclosure statement 
PI — professional indemnity  
PPFs — purchased payment facilities 
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PSB — Payments System Board 
RBA — Reserve Bank of Australia 
RBNZ — Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
RE — responsible entity 
RITS — Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System 
RMB — Reminbi, the official currency of the People’s Republic of China 
RMBS — residential mortgage-backed securities 
SAFs — small APRA funds 
SCCI — specialist credit card institutions 
SIS Regulations — Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 
SG — superannuation guarantee  
SME — small and medium enterprises 
SMSF — Self-managed superannuation fund 
SOA — Statement of Advice 
SOE — Statement of Expectations 
SOI — Statement of Intent 
UCCC — Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
UCITS — European Undertakings for the Collective Investment of Transferable 
Securities 
VCLP — Venture Capital Limited Partnership 
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Glossary 
accumulation phase — the period of time over which an individual builds the value of 
their superannuation benefits before retirement. 
account-based pension — an individual investment account set up with 
superannuation benefits from which a retiree draws a regular income. 
annuity — an investment that pays a guaranteed regular income stream.  
Australian Payments Clearing Association Limited (APCA) — a public company 
owned by banks, building societies and credit unions with specific accountability for 
key parts of the Australian payments system, particularly payments clearing 
operations. 
Australian Paper Clearing System (APCS) — operated by Australian Payments 
Clearing Association Limited. 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) — APEC was established in 1989 
and has become the primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade and practical 
economic cooperation. It has 21 member countries, including Australia. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) — the prudential regulator of 
the Australian financial services industry that oversees banks, credit unions, building 
societies, general insurance and reinsurance companies, life insurance companies, 
friendly societies, and most members of the superannuation industry. 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) — the national regulator 
of corporate entities, with responsibility for market protection and consumer integrity 
issues across the financial system. 
Austraclear — a separate legal entity within the ASX Group that solely provides 
settlement and related depositary services. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) — a Commonwealth 
statutory authority responsible for ensuring compliance with the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (formerly the Trade Practices Act 1974) and the provisions of the 
Conduct Code. ACCC’s consumer protection work complements that of State and 
Territory consumer affairs agencies. 
Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) — an industry body representing 
about 200 organisations that participate in Australian over-the-counter wholesale 
financial markets such as those for foreign exchange, interest rate products, financial 
derivatives, repurchase agreements, commodities, equity and electricity derivatives. 
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Australian Office of Financial Management (AOFM) — the agency responsible for 
the management of Australian Government debt and certain financial assets. It issues 
Treasury Bonds, Treasury Indexed Bonds and Treasury Notes, manages the 
Government’s cash balances and invests from time to time in high quality financial 
assets. 
authorised deposit-taking institution (ADI) — an institution authorised by APRA to 
carry on banking business such as a bank, credit union or building society. 
Basel I, II, III standards — the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision standards 
governing internationally active banks.  
BCBS — Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) — provides a forum for 
regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance 
understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking 
supervision worldwide.  
BPAY — a payments clearing organisation owned by a group of retail banks. 
Individuals who hold accounts with a BPAY participating financial institution can pay 
billing organisations which participate in BPAY, using account transfers initiated by 
phone or internet. The transfers may be from savings, cheque or credit card accounts. 
Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) — the coordinating body for Australia’s main 
financial regulatory agencies — RBA, APRA, ASIC and Treasury. CFR’s role is to 
contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation and to promote 
stability of the Australian financial system. 
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) — a committee of the BIS that 
seeks to support central banks in developing appropriate policy recommendations in 
relation to financial stability, intermediation and transparency. 
Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF) — the CLF is part of Australia’s implementation 
of the Basel III liquidity reforms. It enables some ADIs to access a pre-specified amount 
of liquidity by entering into repurchase agreements with the RBA using securities 
deemed eligible by the RBA. 
Commonwealth Government Securities (CGS) — debt obligations of the Australian 
Government evidenced by the issue of securities. The vast bulk of the CGS on issue is 
represented by Treasury Bonds and Treasury Indexed Bonds. 
consumer price index (CPI) — a general measure of price inflation for the household 
sector compiled and published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
defined benefit (DB) superannuation — a superannuation scheme where 
contributions are pooled. Benefits are calculated using a predetermined formula, and 
depend on an individual’s salary or wage and length of service. 
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defined contribution (DC) superannuation — a superannuation scheme where 
contributions are made, and investment earnings accrue, in an individual’s account 
over their working life. Benefits in retirement are the balance of the account. 
derivative — a financial contract whose value is based on, or derived from, another 
financial instrument (such as a bond or share) or a market index (such as the Share 
Price Index). Examples of derivatives include futures, forwards, swaps and options. 
eftpos — electronic funds transfer at point of sale. The eftpos system is a domestic 
debit card system managed by eftpos Payments Australia Limited. 
equity market — a market where investors buy and sell securities providing 
ownership of a company’s shares. 
exchange rates — the price of one currency expressed in terms of another currency. 
Any exchange rate can be quoted two ways, e.g. Australian dollars per US dollar 
(USD/AUD) or US dollars per Australian dollar (AUD/USD). The convention for the 
Australian dollar is that it is quoted as the foreign currency price of the Australian 
dollar. 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) —  types of managed funds that can be bought and 
sold like shares and track the performance of a specified index or benchmark (such as 
the S&P/ASX 200 index), a currency or commodity, or other assets. 
Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) — the Australian Government’s guarantee on retail 
deposits of up to $250,000 per depositor per ADI. 
financial markets — a generic term for markets in which financial instruments are 
traded. The four main financial markets trade in foreign exchange, fixed interest or 
bonds, shares or equities, and derivatives. 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) — a joint International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank program, seeking to identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of 
countries’ financial systems, and to determine how key sources of risks are being 
managed. 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) — formerly the Financial Stability Forum. The FSB 
was formed in April 2009 as the re-establishment of the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF), which had existed since 1999. The FSB has a mandate to assess the 
vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, identify and oversee action to address 
them, and promote co-operation and information sharing among authorities 
responsible for financial stability. Its membership comprises the G20 countries such as 
Australia. 
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financial market infrastructure (FMI) — the channels through which financial 
transactions are cleared, settled and recorded, including payments systems and 
trading platforms. 
Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) — regulatory reforms relating to financial advice 
that commenced in mid-2013. These reforms included the introduction of the ‘best 
interests’ duty and a ban on conflicted remuneration. 
gross domestic product (GDP) — a measure of the value of economic production in 
the economy. 
Investor-direct portfolio services (IDPS) — for acquiring and holding investments 
that generally involves custody arrangements and consolidated reporting to investors. 
The service is typically marketed as a master fund or wrap account. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) — is an international organisation of 188 member 
countries that was established to promote international monetary co-operation, 
exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; foster economic growth and 
high levels of employment; and provide temporary financial assistance to countries to 
help ease balance of payments adjustments. 
interest rate spreads — the difference between the average yield a financial institution 
receives from loans and other interest-accruing activities and the average rate it pays 
on deposits and borrowings — an important determinant of profitability. 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) — an international 
organisation whose members co-operate to promote high standards of regulation in 
order to protect investors and ensure that markets are fair, efficient and transparent. 
internal ratings-based (IRB) — an approach allowed under the Basel II guidelines, 
where major banks use their own risk models to calculate risk weights for the purposes 
of regulatory capital requirements. 
Know Your Client (KYC) — customer identity verification requirements applied 
under anti-money laundering legislation. 
leverage — the amount of debt used to finance an asset. A firm with significantly more 
debt than equity is considered to be highly leveraged. 
liquidity — the capacity to sell an asset quickly without significantly affecting the 
price of that asset. Liquidity is also sometimes used to refer to assets that are highly 
liquid. 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) — the Basel III liquidity standard requires ADIs to hold 
a level of high-quality liquid assets, such as reserves with the central bank or 
government securities, sufficient in size to cover estimated net cash outflows in a 
severe liquidity stress. 
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liquidity management — activities within a financial institution to ensure that 
holdings of liquid assets (e.g. cash, bank deposits and other financial assets) are 
sufficient to meet its obligations as they fall due, including unexpected transactions. 
longevity risk — the uncertainty about how long a particular person (or group of 
people) will live. For an individual, it is the risk of outliving their savings. For 
providers of guaranteed retirement income products, it is the risk recipients will live 
longer, and draw more benefits, than the provider has allowed for. 
lump sum — an amount of a superannuation benefit paid to a fund member as a 
stand‐alone cash amount. Benefits can be paid as one or more lump sums. 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) —  an agreement between two or more 
parties setting out responsibilities and obligations on matters of common interest. For 
example, MOUs exist between the Reserve Bank of Australia, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority and Australian Securities and Investments Commission. 
monetary policy — the setting of an appropriate level of the cash rate target by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia to maintain the rate of inflation in Australia between 2 and 
3 per cent per annum on average over the business cycle. 
MySuper — low-cost, simple default superannuation accounts, established as part of 
the Stronger Super reforms announced in 2011.  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) — regarded as 
representing industrial market countries. It seeks to encourage economic growth, high 
employment and financial stability among member countries and contribute to the 
economic development of less-advanced members and non-member countries. 
Payments System Board (PSB) — created in 1998, within the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA). The PSB is responsible for determining the RBA’s payments system 
policy so as to best contribute to: controlling risk in the financial system; promoting the 
efficiency of the payments system; and promoting competition in the market for 
payment services, consistent with the overall stability of the financial system. Powers 
to carry out the PSB’s policies are vested with the RBA. 
platforms — administrative services made available by intermediaries for the holding, 
dealing and viewing of investments selected by individual investors. They provide the 
capability for investors to choose investment products and generally offer a range of 
tools to analyse investment portfolios.  
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) — Australia’s central bank. 
retirement phase (or decumulation phase) — the period after an individual has 
retired from the workforce and qualifies for, and may be in receipt of, superannuation 
benefits. 
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securitisation — asset securitisation is the process of converting a pool of illiquid 
assets, such as residential mortgages, into tradeable securities. 
Self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF) — a superannuation fund with fewer 
than five members, all of whom are trustees (or directors of a corporate trustee). 
small and medium-enterprise (SME) — there are a range of definitions for SMEs 
based on number of employees, turnover and other factors, but in essence the term 
relates to businesses that are not large businesses.  
Superstream — a Stronger Super reform to be implemented on a transitional basis 
starting from 1 July 2014. The reform is aimed at improving the efficiency of the 
superannuation system. Under SuperStream, employers must make super 
contributions on behalf of their employees by submitting data and payments 
electronically in accordance with the SuperStream standard. All superannuation funds, 
including SMSFs, must receive contributions electronically in accordance with this 
standard. 
